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This thesis presents the results of research on the
life and work of David Hume in respect to his attitude towards
religion. The method of interpretation used in this study
was one which sought to combine biographical information
concerning the man of letters with statements made in his
writing. My procedure has not been merely a critical examina¬
tion of Hume's works but rather an attempt to determine the
kind of man he was and what his literary and religious inten¬
tions were. I have endeavored to discover the proper inter¬
pretation of his religious attitude in the light of his con¬
tribution to man's knowledge.
The spelling and punctuation used throughout this work,
with the exception of direct quotations which are true to the
source, follow standard American usage.
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The great Scottish philosopher, David Hume, is
generally supposed to be a mere empiricist denying every
kind of rational philosophy and metaphysics. By far the
most wide-spread view of his philosophy is that it is
identifiable with extreme scepticism. The assertion has
often been made that Hume's thought exemplifies a vigorous
development of the principles of Locke and Berkeley to
their ultimate logical outcome, Hume is linked with his
two immediate predecessors in a thought sequence which con¬
sequently forces one to interpret him as pre-eminently a
destructive critic, anxious to destroy all faith in human
knowledge. His primary concern is accepted as being the
uprooting of the traditional and dominating philosophy of
the time. Whenever this extreme view of Hume's work has
been modified, the result has largely been the position that
although his doctrine was a constructive effort based on
Locke's principles, the sceptical conclusion simply serves
as evidence of the inadequacy of such empirical systems.
In this introductory chapter we intend to survey
some of the popular interpretations of Hume's position in the
history of philosophy and to note the tendency in the past
half century to raise objections against these widely held
1
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views. In the light of recent re-interpretations of Hume's
guiding purpose we believe that there Is a need for a re-
evaluation of Hume's attitude towards religion. Bruce M'Ewen
in his "Introduction" to Hume's Dialogues has summarized very
well the commonly held view when he writes, . . the easy,
well-worn way of dealing with Hume's theology has been to
rank his speculations as a side issue, to dub them 'Absolute
Agnosticism' or 'Universal Scepticism,' and the reader, having
been safely conducted up to the end of this philosophical cul-
de-sac, is invited to retrace his steps and pursue his light-
hearted journey by some other route.""'" In the course of this
study, evidence will be presented for an alternative interpre¬
tation of Hume 1s basic religious attitude. We shall contend
that a careful analysis of David Hume's life and works indi¬
cates that the traditional judgment concerning his position
manifests not only a misunderstanding of the intention and
outcome of his philosophy but also a misinterpretation, or
possibly even an intentional misrepresentation, of what is
central and most distinctive in his teaching.
Eighteenth Century Interpretation of Hume's Teaching
Unable to answer Hume's reasoning, critics levelled
charges of scepticism, claiming that his empiricism if pushed
far enough made positive knowledge impossible, one critic,
■'•Bruce M'Ewen, Introduction to the Dialogues Concern¬
ing Natural Religion by David Plume (Edinburgh and London:
William Blackwell and Sons, 1907), pp. xiv-xv.
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referring to Hume's discussion on "Sceptical Doubts concern¬
ing the Operations of the Understanding" and "Sceptical
Solutions of these Doubts" in the Enquiry Concerning the
Human Understanding, states that these doctrines "lead
directly to a scepticism of an atheistical tendency, whose
dangerous nature can require no comment, nor any apology for
its refutation."^ In his own day opponents of Hume advanced
criticisms against him which were regarded as final refuta¬
tions of his ideas. These estimates became widely accepted
then and persist even now. The traditional view of Hume's
philosophy rests, primarily, upon the continued acceptance
of that interpretation which gained currency through the
writings of Thomas Reid and James Beattie.
Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles
of Common Sense was published in 176k and his Essays on the
Intellectual Powers of Man in 178p. His attitude towards
Hume's thought centers around an analysis of the treatment
of the "doctrine of ideas" in the opening sections of the
Treatise of Human ITature. In the "Dedication" introductory
to the Inquiry Reid indicates the position he believes Hume
advocates:
I acknowledge, my Lord, that I never thought of calling
in question the principles commonly received with regard
to the human understanding, until the "Treatise of Human
Nature" was published in the year 1739• The ingenious
author of that treatise upon the principles of Locke—
who was no sceptic—hath built a system of scepticism,
which leaves no ground to believe any one thing rather
Ohion] , An Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect,
Controverting the Doctrine of Mr. Hume, etc. (London: T. Hook-
ham, 182k) , p. k. '
k
than its contrary.-*-
Reid declares that the "doctrine of ideas" assumed by
Descartes, Locke and Berkeley leads inevitably to a self-
defeating scepticism; the logical conclusion is no world and
no mind.
Des Cartes no sooner began to dig in this mind, than
scepticism was ready to break in upon him. . . .
Malebranche and Locke, who dug deeper, found the diffi¬
culty of keeping out this enemy still to increase. . . .
Then Berkeley, who carried on the work, despairing of
securing all, bethought himself of an expedient:—By
giving up the material world, which he thought might be
spared without loss, and even with advantage, he hoped,
by an impregnable partition, to secure the world of
spirits. But alas I the Treatise of Human ITature wan¬
tonly sapped the foundation of this partition, and
drowned all in one universal deluge.2
Reid believes Hume's theory is simply the logical consequence
of the assumption underlying the philosophies of his prede¬
cessors that we know only our own sensations or ideas. Hume
borrowed his basic principles from Locke and Berkeley and,
with great acuteness, developed a system of absolute scepti¬
cism. As Reid sees it, the final result of Cartesian philoso¬
phy is the complete destruction of the basis of all knowledge.
In both the Inquiry and the Essays Reid has dealt
almost exclusively with Book I of the Treatise. It appears
that he considered any further writings beyond Book I to be
either manifestations of this pernicious sceptical philosophy
or simply sophistries. Since Hume's teaching is sheerly
negative and in effect little more than a reductio ad absurdum
•'•Thomas Reid, The Works of Thomas Reid, ed. Sir William
Hamilton (Edinburgh, 13)|.6), I, 9fT."
2Ibid. , I, 103
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of the principles of his predecessors, we cannot expect to
find any possible contributions to knowledge in the pages of
the Treatise.
The {author of the Treat isel proceeds upon the same
principles {as Berkeley] Tout carries them to their
full length; and, as the Bishop undid the whole material
world, this author, upon the same grounds, undoes the
world of spirits, and leaves nothing in nature but
ideas and impressions, without any subject on which
the:/ may be impressed.^
Reid contends that modern scepticism is the natural outcome
of this system of thought.
Endeavouring to prove his interpretation, Reid
quotes the Treatise mainly in connection with the denial of
the self or the denial of the external world. He wishes to
concentrate the reader's attention upon Hume's most extreme
statements and suggests that these utterances give a true
and appropriate expression of Hume's teaching. This one¬
sided presentation of Hume's ideas has been described by one
of his defendants in the following way: "Reid's indictment
of Hume--for, surely it is an indictment and not an eulogy—
is twofold: first, that Hume's fundamental principles have
been taken over in an uncritical manner from his predecessors
Locke and Berkeley; and secondly, that though Hume has had
the insight to recognize--this indeed is the sole merit which
Reid allows to Hume—that they do not suffice in answering any
of the questions to which philosophy seeks a soltition, he has
yet been content to rest in the sheerly sceptical self-
1Ibid. , I, 102.
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destroying attitude to which, he has thereby been c ommitted."
James Beattie's Essay on the Nature and Immutability
of Truth; in Op-position to Sophistry and Scepticism was pub¬
lished in 1770. In this work Beattie takes his principles
and interpretation directly from Reid but fails to echo the
politeness and respect for Hume's arguments which Reid had
always manifested. Except for the fact that Beattie gives
more direct and substantial quotations from the Treatise
than Reid did, the Essay on Truth is scarcely more than a
sequel to Reid's original criticism.^ But since the Essay
on Truth gained great popularity and influence,^ it, more
•^•Norman Kemp Smith, "David Hume: 1739-1939"* Hume
and Present Day Problems, Aristotelian Society Publications,
Supplementary Volume XVIII (London: Harrison and Sons, Ltd.,
1939), P. ix.
2
E.g., "The substance, or at least the foundation of
Berkeley's argument against the existence of matter, may be
found in Locke's Essay, and in the Princioia of Des Cartes
. . . . Mr. Hume, more subtle, or less reserved, than any of
his predecessors, hath gone still greater lengths in the
demolition of common sense." £james Beattie, Essay on the
Nature and Immutability of Truth in op-position to Sophistry
and Scepticism~T7th ed. , London: J. Mawman, 1(307), PP» 212-
213.]
3-^The book was declared to be the favorite of Dr.
Samuel Johnson, Edmund Burke, and George III, and it was
through Beattie's quotations from the Treatise that Kant was
awakened from his dogmatic slumbers. [Gf. Norman Kemp Smith,
Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (London: Macmillan,
1913), pp. xxvi i i -xxix 7} Kant objected that, "fate, ever un¬
kind to metaphysics decreed that he [Hume] should be under¬
stood by nobody. One cannot observe without feeling a certain
pain, how his opponents Reid, Oswald, Beattie and finally
Priestley, so entirely missed the point of his problem. By
always talcing for granted what he was doubting and on the other
hand proving, with violence and often with great unseemliness,
what It had never entered his mind to doubt, they so mistook
his hint as to how to improve matters that everything remained
as it was, as if nothing had happened." jjmmanuel Kant,
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than any other work, determined the prevailing impression of
the nature and effect of Hume's philosophy.
Seattle displays an extreme bitterness and moral
condemnation towards Hume for having constructed his system.
Incensed by the politeness and respect shown Hume by many of
his antagonists, Beattie descends into invective:
I could not approve that extraordinary adulation
which some of them paid their arch-adversary. I could
not conceive the propriety of paying compliments to a
man's heart, at the very time one is proving that his
aim Is to subvert the principles of truth, virtue, and
religion; nor to his und e rst anding, when we are charging
him with publishing the grossest and most contemptible
nonsense. . . •
You are sensible, that . . . It Is absolutely
necessary for me to use great plainness of speech. My
expressions must not be so tame as to seem to imply
either a diffidence in my principles, or a coldness
toward the cause I have undertaken to defend.1
Hume was subjected to contemptuous and arrogant treat¬
ment in the Essay on Truth. In the preface Beattie acknow¬
ledges :
Ever since I began to attend to matters of this kind,
I had heard Mr. Hume's philosophy mentioned as a system
very unfriendly to religion both revealed and natural,
as well as to science; and its aiithor spoken of as a
teacher of sceptical and atheistical doctrines, and withal
Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics that will be able to
present itself as a Science, trans. Peter G-. Lucas (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1953)? P« 7J
In the Annual Register it is stated that Dr. Beattie
"more than thirty years after' the publication of that sceptical
system Tthe Treatise"! , has been so successful as to obtain a
pension by his lis say on the Immutability of Truth: in which he
discovers all the violence of a sectary, and all the illiberal¬
ly of a pedant, and rather abuses than confutes Mr. Hume."UAnon), "An Account of the Life and Writings of the late David
Hume, Esq; as given to the World in one of the periodical pub¬
lications," in the Annual Register. XIX (1776)/ 28J
^William Forbes, An Account of the Life and Writings of
James Beattie, LL.D., (Edinburgh, lb06), I, 131-132, 13/-135.
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as a more acute and ingenious writer. I had reason to
believe, that his arguments, and his influence as a great
literary character, had done harm, by subverting or weaken
ing the principles of some, and countenancing the licen¬
tious opinions of others. Being honoured with the care
of a part of the British youth, and considering it as my
indispensable duty (from which I trust I shall never
deviate) to guard their minds against impiety, and error,
I endeavoured, among other studies that belonged to my
office, to form a right estimate of Mr. Hume's philosophy,
so as not only to understand his peculiar tenets, but
also to perceive their connection and consequenc es.l
Turning the full force of his polemic against Hume, Beattie
Had I done half as much as he, in labouring to sub¬
vert principles which ought ever to be held sacred, I
know not whether the friends of truth would have granted
me any indulgence; I am sure they ought not. Let me be
treated with the levity due to a good citizen no longer
than I act as becomes one.
. . . One thing we certainly know: the fashion of
sceptical systems soon passeth away. Those unnatural
productions, the vile effusion of a hard (j'and stupid"
was deleted In the 1778 edition.!] heart that mistakes
its own restlessness for the activity of genius, and its
own captiousness for sagacity of understanding, may,
like other monsters, please a while by their singularity;
but the charm is soon over: and the succeeding age will
be astonished to hear, that their were de¬
luded, or amused, with such foolemca.
Away with this passion for system-building I it is
pedantry:, away with this lust of paradoxes!, it is pre¬
sumeti on.M-
A similar attitude towards Hume has continued down to
recent times. Expressed in more respectful terms, subsequent
interpretations have, nevertheless, supported to one degree
or another the original evaluation of Reid and Beattie. A
writes:
Criticism of Hume's Motives
T_
Beattie, op. cit., p. xxi. 2Ibid., p. 10.
j,rlbid., p. Ii21.3Ibid., pp. Ip).
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familiar legend was developed which pictured Hume as mani¬
festing intentions of a distinctly dishonorable kind. The
questioning of Hume's motives, of his intellectual and moral
integrity, began with some of his contemporaries. Dr. John
Brown describes Hume as a writer "of our Times, bent upon
Popularity and Gain," omitting "no Opportunity that offered,
1
to disgrace Religion." Brown continues:
When this Gentleman found that his History, though larded
with Irreligion, did not sell among the licentious; and
1 that the serious were shocked at his Treatment of Religion,
and on that Account were not Purchasers; he ordered his
Agent (but too late) to expunge the exceptional Passages;
assigning for the Reason of his avoiding every Thing of
this Kind in his Second Volume, 'that he would not offend
the Godly. ' How this very Man, .in Defiance of all Decency,
hath for several Years carried on a Trade of Essay-writing;
in the Coiirse of which he hath not only misrepresented,
abused, and insulted the most essential Principles of
Christianity, but, to the utmost of his Power, shaken the
Foundations of all Religion. In these sorry Essays he
had no Fear of offending the Godly, because he knew the
Godly were not to be his Buyers: But when he finds that
his History must sell among the Godly, or not sell at all;
then comes the Panic upon him; then, forsooth, he will not
offend the Godly. Here, therefore, a Character is clearly
developed. With St. Paul, Godliness was Gain: But with
this Man, Gain produceth Godliness.R
In a letter to Hume's publisher, Andrew Millar, Dr.
William Warburton wrote: "You have often told me of this man's
moral virtues. He may have many, for aught I know; but let
me observe to you, there are vices of the mind as well as of
the body: and I think a wickeder mind, and more obstinately
bent on public mischief, I never knew.James Boswell
John Brown, An Estimate of the Manners and Principles
of the Times (London: L. Davis and C. Reymers, 1758), I, >7.
^Ibid., I, 86-87.
^William V/arburton, A Selection from Unpublished Papers
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declares that "vanity, as a fascinating mistress, seized
upon [Hume' s^ fondness, and never quitted her dominion over
him,""'" arid that "his vanity made him publish treatises of
2
skepticism and infidelity. ..." Boswell records that Dr.
Samuel Johnson "holds Mr. Hume in abhorrence and left a
3
company one night upon his coming in." Dr. Johnson called
Hume a blockhead and a rogue; and when Boswell mentioned
Hume's assertion that "he was quite easy at the thought of
annihilation," "He lied," retorted Johnson,
He had vanity in being thought easy. It is more
probable that he lied than that so very improbable a
thing should be as a Man not afraid of death; of going
into an unknown state and not being uneasy at leaving
all that he knew. And you are to consider that upon
his own, principle of Annihilation he had no motive not
to die.'-f-
On another occasion Johnson spoke of Hume as a man
. . . who has so much conceit as to tell all mankind
that they have been bubbled for ages, and he is the
wise man who sees better than they,—a man who has so
little scrupulosity as to venture to oppose those prin¬
ciples which have been thought necessary to human
happiness,—is he to be surprised if another man comes
and laughs at him? If he is the great man he thinks
himself, all this cannot hurt him: it is like throwing
peas against a rock.5
of the Ripht Reverend William Warburton, ed. Francis Kilvert
'(London, iL'hl), p. 310.
James Boswell, The Hypochondrlack, ed. by Margaret
Bailey (Stanford University, 1928), II, l'f?7»
O
^James Boswell, Private Papers of James Boswell from
Halahide Castle, edd. Geoffrey Scott and Frederick A. Pottle
(Priv. ptd., New York, 1928-3L\.), XVI, 20.
3Ibid., I, 136. 4-Ibid., I, 128; XIII, 23.
^James Boswell, The Journal of a Tour to the Hebrides
with Samuel Johnson (2nd ed., London: Charles Dilley, 1785),p
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John Wesley records in his Journal that he "read over . . •
Dr. Beattie's ingenious Inquiry After Truth. He is a writer
quite equal to his subject, and far above the match of all
the 'minute philosophers,' David Hume in particular--the
most insolent dispiser of Truth and virtue that ever appeared
in the world. . . . he is an avowed enemy to God and man,
and to all that is sacred and valuable upon earth."'*'
In the nineteenth century the same thesis was re¬
stated, often in severe language. John Stuart Mill, for
instance, describes Hume as possessing
. . . powers of a very high nature; but regard for
truth formed no part of his character. He reasoned with
surprising acuteness; but the object of his reasoning
was, not to obtain truth, but to show that it was unattain¬
able. His mind, too, was completely enslaved by a taste
for 15.terature; not those kinds of literature which teach
mankind to know the causes of their happiness and misery,
that they may seek the one and avoid the other, but that
literature which without regard for truth or utility,
seeks only to excite emotion.^
T. H. Green traces the supposed defects in Hume's
philosophy to faults in the writer's character:
Pew men of letters have been at heart so vain and greedy
of fame as was Hume. In all other respects he learned to
school his temper; but his appetite for applause was in¬
satiable, and even his publisher had on occasion to re¬
buke the philosopher.3
"*"John Wesley, The Journal of the Rev. John Wesley,
A. M,, ed. Hehemiah Curnock (London, 190'9-l6) , V, k58.
2
John Stuart Mill, Review of George Brodie's History
of the British Pmnire in the Westminster Review, II (18?J;), 3I4.6.
^T. H. Green, Introduction to the Philosophical Works
of David Hume, edd. T. H. Green and T. Ii. Grose (London:
Longmans, Green, and Co., I87k-l875>), I, 36.
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On reviewing the Treatise, he must have seen that
the general result gave him a vantage-ground from which
he could ply weapons of scepticism and irony in a novel
and popular fashion; but if he maintained the earnest
spirit of his youth, he must be content to remain unread.
He selected for "recasting" precisely those portions
which lent themselves to this manner, and which were
likely to excite public attention,-*-
Green asserts that Hume was basically dishonest in his philo¬
sophical approach; he simply wanted to jeer at the traditional
philosophy and theologians.
It is not the fault of Hume but his merit that, in under¬
taking to maintain more strictly than others the identi¬
fication of extension with feeling he brought its
impossibility more clearly into view. The pity is that
having carried his speculative enterprise so far before
he was thirty, he allowed literary vanity to interfere
with its consistent pursuit, caring only to think out
the philosophy which he inherited so far as it enabled
him to pose with advantage against Mystics and Dogmatists,
but not to that further_issue which is the entrance to
the philosophy of Kant.
T. H. Huxley expresses his assent to the Hume legend
and comments on what he considers to be Hume's chief moral
weakness:
. . . Hume exhibits no small share of the craving
after mere notoriety and vulgar success, as distinct from
the pardonable, if not honourable, ambition for solid and
enduring fame, which would have harmonised better with his
philosophy. Indeed, it appears to be by no means improb¬
able that this peculiarity of Hume's moral constitution
was the cause of his gradually forsaking philosophical
studies, after the publication of the third part (On
Morals) of the Treatise, in 171-J-O, and turning to those
political and historical topics which were likely to yield
and did in fact yield, a much better return of that sort
of success which his soul loved,3
Even L. A. Selby-Bigge, the nineteenth century editor
1Ibid., I, 76-77. 2Ibid. , I, 213.
3t. H. Huxley, Hume (London: Macmillan and Co., 1879),
p. 11.
13
of Hume1s works, speaks of the Treatise as displaying "an
occasional note of insincerity, arrogance or wantonness
which strikes the serious student painfully." He declares
that Hume included a lively and sceptical discussion of
miracles and providence in the Enquiries because they "could
hardly fail to find readers, attract attention, and excite
that 'murmur among the zealots' by which the author desired
to be distinguished;" these sections, Selby-Bigge contends,
"may be ascribed to Hume's ambition to disturb 'the zealots'
at all costs."*''
Twentieth century criticisms are hardly less harsh.
Vinding Kruse passes the following judgment upon Hume;
Hume was a far more complex, versatile, and ambi¬
tious character, than, for instance, Kant or Spinoza.
He combined two glaring contrasts: he was not only, like
these, a great solitary thinker, knowing but one purpose,
the realization of truth; lie was, indeed, a man with
many irons in the fire, a man with divers aims. And
among these aims the realization of truth was not the
most important; for Hume was possessed by literary am¬
bition to such an extent that he set aside all considera¬
tions, even the consideration of truth, in order to win
the favour of the public. For instance, it is well known
that in his later life Hume time after time suppressed
his most radical ideas in order to be better appreciated
by the public, and it is characteristic that in his
autobiography he describes the 'ruling passion' of his
life not as a Spinoza would have done, as the urge of
philosophical cognition, but love of literary fame.
And this literary ambition was not of the nature
which was content with the immortality usually accorded
to great thinkers by a late posterity; but, practical and
concrete as he was, he craved first and foremost the ad¬
miration of his contemporaries. ... And therefore he
was consistently led to regard the judgement of the public
L. A. Selby-Bigge, Introduction to the Enquiries
Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Prin¬
ciples of Morals by David Huge (2nd ed., Oxford: Clarendon
kress, 1902, Impression of 195l), pp. x; xii; xviii.
Ik
as his supreme court, his only guide in Ms literary
work.~
At an even more recent date John H. Randall, Jr.
repeats the customary accusation that Hume was so bent
upon immediate success that he was willing to seek it in
unworthy ways after his failure to gain a hearing by legiti¬
mate means. The Treatise lacked the ideas which would gain
notoriety, and so Hume turned his attention away from
philosophy to theology and moral sciences. "Hume," Randall
observes, "set as his goal precisely those usual surroundings
of social life, the pleasures of the senses, riches, and
fame. . . and he delighted all his life in setting forth
his opinions diametrically opposite to those of his fellow-
men. . . . Since he couldn't shock men by a new theory of
2
science, he would try politics and religion."
This intellectual personality of Hume's makes
clear why his thought is so elusive, why it is so diffi¬
cult to emerge from his subtle dialectic with definite
conclusions. He was wholly uninterested in building up
a consistent position of his own, either a new theory of
science or a new natural theology. Though the former is
certainly implied in his thought, he was always ready to
sacrifice it to the literary display of his dialectical
skill. . . .He was interested, not in establishing a
method and conclusions of his own but in commenting on the
methods and conclusions of others. . . . Hume's whole
attitude is: I don't for a minute believe it, amy more
than you do. But refute it if you can; i won't.
Hume employs this scepticism, not as a position to
1Vinding Kruse, Hume's Philosophy in His Principal
York "A Treatise of Human Hature" and in His Essays trans.
P. T. Federspiel (London: Oxford Press, 1939) > P»
^John II. Randall, Jr., "David Hume: Radical Empiricist
and Pragmatist," in Freedom and Itcperience: Essays Presented
to Homace !.:. Kailen, edd. Sidney Hook and Hilton R. Konvitz
(Ithaca and Hew York, 19'|-7), p. 29li.
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be defended, but as a literary device,^
Predominance of the Traditional Interpretation
When Iramanuel Kant read Seattle's quotations from
the Treatise (some thirty-four years after its publication),
it was the sceptical consequences of Hume's argument that
2
gave a new turn to his thinking. Scepticism was all that
Reid and Beattie saw in Hume's philosophy. This attitude
reappeared, almost unmodified in James Mill, John Stuart
Mill, Alexander Bain, T. H. Green, T. H. Huxley, William
Knight, and in the histories of literature and philosophy,
such as those by Leslie Stephen, Wilhelxn Windelband, and
Johann Eduard Erdmann.
J. S. Mill speaks of Hume as disclosing on unduly
sceptical attitude of mind. He contrasts Hume's sceptical
teaching with the positive constructive teaching of Hartley
and declares it was "a disadvantage to Hartley's theory,
that its publication so nearly coincided with the commence¬
ment of the reaction against the experience psychology, pro¬
voked by the hardy scepticism of Hume. "3 In another work
Mill writes: "In England, the philosophy of Locke reigned
1Ibid., pp. 296-297.
p
Kant, op. pit. , pp. 5-12. The sceptical consequenceswhich "int errupted (}\ant' sj dogmatic slumber" were those which
follow upon acceptance of Hume's criticism of the supposedly
self-evidence character of the causal maxim.
3John Stuart Mill, Introduction to the Analysis of
the Human Mind by James Mill (2nd ed., London, 1669), T~,
xi-xii.
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supreme, until a Scotchman, Hume, while making some capital
improvements in its theory, carried out one line of its
apparent consequences to the extreme which always provokes
a reaction."1 lie notes "the negative, or destructive
philosophers; those who can perceive what is false, but not
what is true."
Prance had Voltaire, and England (or rather Scotland)
had the profoundest negative thinker on record, David
Hume: a man, the peculiarities of whose mind qualified
him to detect failure of proof, ana want of logical
consistency, at a depth which French sceptics, with
their comparatively feeble power of analysis and ab¬
straction, stopt far short of, and which German subtlety
alone could thoroughly appreciate, or hope to rival.2
Alexander Bain accepts the assumption of his fore¬
bear, J. S. Mill, that Hume belongs entirely to the tradi¬
tion of Locke and Berkeley and that he treats the common-
sense belief in external bodies and in the self as fictitious
and illusory. Bain regards Hume's analyses and conclusions
as simply literary display. The arguments of the Treatise
were a sort of reductio ad absurdum. But Hume, according
to Bain, did not really believe in all seriousness the con¬
clusions at which he arrived; he wrote philosophy with tongue
in cheek.-
In the opening paragraph of his Introduction to
Hume's Enquiries, L. A. Selby-Bigge writes:
1J. S. Mill, Dissertations and Discussions (London:
1859), 111,98.
2lbid., III, 33^-336.
^Alexander Bain, History of Mental and Moral Philosoohy
(London, 1863), II, 20p, 20?. "
17
Hume's philosophic writings are to be read with
great caution. His pages, especially those of the
Treatise, are so full of matter, he says so many dif¬
ferent things in so many different ways and different
connexious, and with so much indifference to what he has
said before, that it is very hard to say positively that
he taught, or did not teach, this or that particular
doctrine. He applies the same principles to such a
great variety of subjects that it is not surprising
that many verbal, and some real inconsistencies can be
found in his statements. He is ambitious rather than
shy of saying the same things in different ways, and at
the same time he is often slovenly and indifferent about
his words and formulae. This makes it easy to find all
philosophies in Hume, or, by setting up one statement
against another, none at all.l
T. H. Green in his Introduction to Hume's Treatise
has virtually reduced Hume's philosophy to nothing. Inter¬
preting Hume in the traditional manner, Green seeks to refute
his philosophy and to discourage the study of it.
Our business ... has not been to moralize, but to show
that the philosophy based on the abstractions of feeling,
in regard to morals no less than to nature, was with Hume
played out, and that the next step forward in speculation
could only be an effort to re-think the process of nature
and human action from its true beginning in thought. If
this object has been in any way attained, so that the
attention of Englishmen 'under five-and-twenty' may be
diverted from the anachronistic systems hitherto prevalent
among us to the study of Kant and Hegel, an irksome labour
will not have been in vain.
Green takes the opening sections of the Treatise as
an adequate expression of Hume's central position. Hume has
no set of positive beliefs; the sole legitimate outcome of
his principles is an extreme self-destructive scepticism.
Hume's chief characteristic, according to Green, lies in his
more vigorous and logical application of the principles which
he inherits from Locke and Berkeley; Hume is not significantly
1Selby-Bigge, op. cit., p. vii.
2T. H. Green, op. cit., II, 71.
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Influenced by any other philosophers."^" Green contends that
both Locke and Hume are subjective idealists and that Hume
p
is even more a subjective idealist than Berkeley.1- There is
a transition to Hume from Locke through Berkeley; and the
systems of all three ultimately rest on the faith that the
world, or existence, can be explained by intellectual activity.
Hume, in Green's opinion, is a thorough sceptic, denouncing
all belief in permanence, in identity, in activity, v/hether
in a self or outside it. The common-sense beliefs in external
bodies and in the self are fictions and illusions. All that
exists are subjective states organized by association. Green
completely ignores Hume's doctrine of natural belief and in¬
terprets him as a thorough-going associationist. Green
presents Hume's doctrine of association in such a manner that
it is not merely a description of the observed ways in which
ideas are associated but a mechanism generating experience
out of simple impressions.
The vital nerve of [Hume's] philosophy lies [Green alleges]
in his treatment of the "association of ideas" as a sort
of process of spontaneous generation, by which impressions
of sensation issue in such impressions of reflection, in
the shape of habitual propensities, as will a.ccount, not
indeed for their being--since they really are not—but
for there seeming to be, those formal conceptions which
Locke, to the embarrassment of his philosoohy, had treated
as at once real and creations of the mind.3
Much the same position is assumed by Green in his
criticism of Books II and III of the Treatise. "In his specu¬
lations on morals, no less than on knowledge, Hume follows the
1 lbia., I, 2-3; 131; 133; 238-239.
3Ibid., 1, 5; 151. 3Ibid., 1, 162-163.
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lines laid dorm by Locke.In other words, Green assumes
that Hume's moral philosophy, like his epistemology, is the
logical consequence of Locke's principles.
The two Mills, Bain, Green, and Huxley support to
one degree or another the Reid-Beattie evaluation and in¬
terpretation of Hume. Their comments consist not only of an
exploration of Hume's theories and doctrines, but also of
expositions and supporting arguments for their own particular
philosophical point of view. Their positions gained prominence
O
at the expense of Hume's, and his philosophy became secondary.
The polemical interest displayed by these philosophers may
partially account for the way in which they viewed Hume;, but
it is surprising that Leslie Stephen, whose main interests
were historical, accepted the account according to which
Hume's teaching was regarded as essentially sceptical. In a
summary of what he takes to be Hume's central doctrines,
Leslie Stephen says:
Hume starts from the positions occupied by Locke
and Berkeley. He regards innate ideas as exploded; he
accepts Berkeley's view of abstraction (as he understands
it) and of the distinction between primary and secondary
qualities; he applies and carries out more systematically
the arguments by which Berkeley had assailed the hypo¬
thetical substratum of material qualities. But with Hume
the three substances [i.e., mind, matter and GodJ dis¬
appear together. The soul is dissolved by the analysis
which has been fatal to its antithesis. . . .We are
conscious only of an unceasing stream of more or less
vivid feelings, generally cohering in certain groups.
The belief that anything exists outside our mind, when
1Ibid., II, 1. Cf. II, 2; 20-21;
^Huxley wrote: "Here and there ... it must be
confessed that more is seen of my thread than of Hume's
beads." [Huxley, op. cit., p. ks.J
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not actually perceived, is a 'fiction'. The belief in
a continuous subject which perceives the feeling is
another fiction. The only foundation of the belief that
former coherences will again cohere is custom. . . .
Association is in the mental what gravitation is in the
natural world. The name signifies the inexplicable ten¬
dency of previously connected ideas and impressions to
connect themselves again. We can only explain mental
processes of any kind by resolving them into such cases
of association. Thus reality is to be found only in
the ever-varying stream of feelings, bound together by
custom, regarded by a 'fiction' or set of fictions as
implying some permanent set of external or internal
relations, and becoming beliefs only as they acquire
liveliness. Chance, instead of order, must, it would
seem, be the ultimate objective fact, as custom, instead
of reason, is the ultimate subjective fact. We have
reached, it is plain, the fullest expression of scepticism,
and are not surprised when Hume admits that his doubts
disappear when he leaves his study. The old bonds which
held things together have been completely dissolved. Hume
can see no way to replace them, and Hume, therefore, is
a systematic sceptic.-
In emphasizing the scepticism of the Treatise, Leslie
Stephen has overlooked Hume's doctrine of natural belief.
Books II and III of the Treatise of Human Nature, in which
Hume expounds his theory of passions and his positive moral
theory, have been set aside as Irrelevant or unimportant.
The histories of philosophy written by Windelband
and Erdmann indicate a somewhat wider breadth of interpreta¬
tion of Hume's philosophy. Both emphasize that Hume cannot
be regarded strictly as a sceptic. Erdmann states that Hume's
aim was "to limit the understanding to the sphere where it
p
could accomplish something." Windelband claims that Hume's
■'"Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought in the
Eighteenth Century (London: Smith, Elder & uo., 1376)^ I,
k-3-kS.
pr-Johann Eduard Erdmann, History of Philosophy, trans.
W. S. Hough (3rd ed., London: Swann & Sonnenshein & '^o., 1S92) ,
II, 130.
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position is that of the absolutely honest and consistent
empiricist. There is a characteristic supplement for Hume's
theory of knowledge in his doctrine of natural belief."'" In
his thought the doctrine of natural belief is completely
adequate for practical life. Both Erdmann and Windelband
assert that Hume always emphasized practical as well as
theoretical philosophy. They contend that Hume's theory of
knowledge is directly derived from the empirical doctrines
formulated by Locke and developed by Berkeley. In the moral
field, Hume is a member of the Moral Sense School of Shaftes¬
bury, Hutcheson, and Adam Smith. In the problems of epis-
temology Hume Is presented as carrying to a logical conclu¬
sion the doctrines of empiricism; but in moral theory he is
not influenced to the same extent by Locke and Berkeley.
In giving a few new insights Windelband and Erdmann
have advanced beyond the traditional attitude towards Hume.
But, fundamentally, the interpretation lias changed very little.
We are told that we must not regard Hume as a sceptic; yet in
the accounts given by these writers it is difficult to see
exactly why he should not be regarded as one. The reported
conclusions at which he arrived are certainly sceptical
enough. As for Hume's doctrine of natural belief (which is
depicted by Erdmann and Windelband as more or less an after¬
thought), it may be argued that Locke and Berkeley also
supplemented their systems, but they are nevertheless regarded
3-Wilhelm Windelband, History of Philosophy, trans.
J. K. Tufts (Hew York: Ivlacmillan, li'93)> p. t-7o.
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as sceptical writers. The general position at vihich v/e
arrive is still simply a slightly modified restatement of the
evaluation of Reid and Beattie.
The logical implications of this traditional inter¬
pretation forces us to accept unfavorable conclusions as to
the character, quality, and intent of Hume and his work. Are
these conclusions true? The answer to this question can only
be ascertained by examining the biographical and philosophical
materials available to us. We must try to determine if Hume
is simply a more consistent advocate of the empirical tradi¬
tion of Locke and Berkeley. We must examine the evidence
given in supoort of the contention that there is a fundamental
paradox or hypocrisy in Hume's life and works. It is necessary
to investigate these problems in order to come to a true
understanding of the man and his writings.
Re-interpretation of Hume's Teaching
Within the past fifty years technical investigations
concerning the life and thought of David Hume have been con¬
tinually on the increase. Before the turn of the century
there seemed to be no question about the conclusions of Hume's
philosophical investigations being completely negative. He
was regarded as having taken the empirical positions of Locke
and Berkeley and carried them ruthlessly to their logical
conclusions. The tide has now changed, and new interpretations
of Hume's work have been advanced. There has been a strong
reaction against the traditional interpretation. In the
advanced studies carried out by such scholars as E. B.
McGilvary, Norman Kemp Smith, Edna A. Shearer, P. C. Sharp,
C. '7. Hendel, Hugh Killer, I.'ary Shaw pun/per s, R. E. Hobart,
John Laird, 3. M. Laing, P. Stanley, Contance Maund, H. H.
1
Price, E. C. Mossner, J. A. Passmore, and others, there has
been a general trend towards the view that Hume should be
studied for guidance rather than to be refuted. Hume has
been slowly emerging as a positive force in the modern world;
he is seen as a dynamic and influential factor in the philo¬
sophical scene. Former accounts and commentaries on his life
and philosophy are shown to have been subjective and biased.
Quite clearly we can see the truth in the claim that there is
a need for re-interpretation of Hume in the light of more
intensive and objective research into his life and writings.
Hume is regarded today as a great philosopher. Men
have been able to overcome the fear that his questionings
will corrupt morals and religion. His special questions con¬
cerning the value of the principle of cause and effect have
come to be appreciated as the discovery of genius. Other
aspects of his system have also been accepted and applied
to modern philosophical endeavor. Nevertheless, the general
conception of Hume is still an eighteenth and nineteenth
century one, a view which regards his chief contribution to
be a challenging sceptical attitude. This was Kant's discovery,
•'-The titles of the articles and books published by
these authors may be found in the Bibliography'of this thesis.
2k
and It appears that he saw in Hume simply critical genius.^
It is largely due to Kant's influence that the present day
appreciation of Hume Is merely of a man who manifested an
admirable spirit of honest Inquiry. Such a spirit was typical
of the eighteenth century mind. A man was held In high esteem
who studied, analyzed and reasoned out his conclusions. The
critical spirit was always cool, unperturbed, and dis¬
interested; self-delusion had to be painstakingly avoided.
It was true of the eighteenth century man of letters that
his hope for progress gave him persistence in the questioning
of what we really mean by the convictions we live by and call
the truth. These characteristics Hume shared with his con¬
temporaries.
It cannot be denied that scepticism is to be found in
the philosophical works of Hume; but the question must be
asked, "VJhat kind of scepticism does one encounter here?" The
traditional interpretation of Hume has consistently pictured
him as advocating a completely negative and destructive
scepticism with regard to the possibility of man's knowledge
of the self, the existence of an external world, and the re¬
lation of cause and effect. Emphasis has been placed primarily
on Book I of the Treatise to such an extent that Books II and
III are largely neglected; consequently, the ordinary reader
of Hume comes away with the negative aspect of his thought and
the feeling that he had nothing whatsoever of a constructive
nature to say.
3-See sunra, p. 15.
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There is no doubt that Hume recognized himself as a
critic; he was conscious of the predominately critical aspect
of his philosophy. More will be said later concerning Hume's
critical attitude, but what concerns us at the present moment
is the query, "Does Hume claim to present a positive doctrine
of any kind?" The answer to this question, for which evidence
will be given in the chapters to follow, is in the affirmative.
Prom statements made in his letters and from certain indica¬
tions in his philosophical writings we see that he was not
content to be regarded as merely a sceptical philosopher who
only cleared ground for subsequent thinkers. He speaks of
his literary ambition "to augment the Stock of Knowledge that
must pass to future Ages.""'" He hoped to answer the questions
raised by his sceptical doubts and devoted himself to this
2
task. In this aim Hume was carrying on the mission that
Francis Bacon had set for himself—that of advancing knowledge
in the fields of research opened by the scientific method.
It was Hume's ambition to establish a body of knowledge that
would develop fruitfully in the minds of other philosophers.
He philosophized mainly to help people understand what they
were doing in matters scientific, religious, ethical and
philosophical. He wanted men to see the necessity for
^Letters, I, 39 •
If in order to answer the Doubts started, new Prin¬
ciples of Philosophy must be laid; are not these Doubts them¬
selves very useful? Are they not preferable to blind, &
ignorant Assent? I hope I can answer my own Doubts: But if I
coud not, is it to be wonder'd at? To give myself Airs, &
speak magnificently, might I not observe, that Columbus did
not conquer Empires b plant Colonies?" [Letters, I, 1^6^
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constructing their own system of knowledge grounded in human
experience.
It is a misconception, established by bigoted contem¬
poraries of Hume, to regard his work as wholly sceptical; he
attempted to answer the doubts he had raised. The deep-seated
desire to enter the literary world and to gain fame was in
order that his work as a thinker might enlighten others; not
destroy all human knowledge. Hume's ambition, rightly seen,
was to contribute some positive truth to the body of permanent
human knowledge. This is clearly seen in a statement made
near the close of Book I of the Treatise;
I am concern'd for the conditions of the learned world,
which lies under such a deplorable ignorance in all these
particulars. I feel an ambition to arise in me of con¬
tributing to the instruction of mankind, and of acquiring
a name by my inventions and discoveries. These sentiments
spring up naturally in my present disposition; and shou'd
I endeavour to banish them, by attaching myself to any
other business or diversion, I feel I shou'd be a loser
in point of.pleasure; and this is the origin of my
philosophy.
Hume felt, and logically so, that his work as a thinker and
man of letters would be fruitless without the recognition and
response of his fellowmen. 7,hen this response failed to appear
at the publication of the Treatise, he had pangs of self-dis-
2
trust and began to ask himself why he had failed. He regarded
himself as a discoverer; and by some new means he hoped to
establish truth in the fields of literary criticism and
philosophy. Men would have to know the meaning of his philosophy
and be enlightened by it if he were ever to realize his desire
1T, 271. ^Letters, I, 3.
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to advance learning. Hume wanted to be assured of the sound¬
ness of his thinking by seeing that others had learned some¬
thing positive from him after he had cleared away their
prejudices and uncritical assumptions by critical and scep¬
tical analysis. He had learned from Bacon and was in agree¬
ment with the idea that for a progress of learning there must
be a collaboration of many minds in the construction of a
common body of knowledge. In a letter Hume said: "The Argu¬
ments have been laid before the World, and by some philosophi¬
cal Minds have been attended to. I am willing to be instructed
by the public; tho' human Life is so short that I despair of
ever seeing the Decision.We may take this to be an expres¬
sion of his longing to be instructed and criticized in order
to help the progress toward truth.
It seemed to Hume that his ambition had been thwarted,
and he began to question the value of his literary works and
p
of his life as a whole. He was left in doubt concerning his
writing--had he made a real point in his philosophy? When the
•^Letters, I, 187.
^Letters, I, If.. In a letter to Francis Ilutcheson,
Hume wrote": "I assure you, that without running any of the
heights of Scepticism, I am apt, in a cool hour to suspect, in
general, that most of my Reasonings will be more useful by
furnishing Hints & exciting People's ciiriosity than as contain¬
ing any Principles that will augment the Stock of Knowledge
that must pass to future Ages. I wish I cou'd discover more
fully the particulars wherein I have fail'd. I admire so much
the Candour I have observd in Mr Locke, Yourself, & a very few
more, that I woud be extremely ambitious of imitating it, by
frankly confessing my Errors: If I do not imitate it, it must
proceed neither from my being free from Errors, nor from want
of Inclination; but from my real imaffected Ignorance."
[Letters, I, 39^]
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Treatise was received with indifference and even open hostility,
Hume began to lose hope of contributing to the knowledge of
mankind; scepticism arose in his mind about the value of his
system of thought. His persistence in re-writing the Treatise
clearly shows that he believed in his answers to the questions
which had been raised, but he wanted to know that he was
discussing the right problems. He was anxious for an effectual
discussion to arise out of his philosophy; this he felt would
serve to assure him that he had the character of the true
philosopher. When he found that no such discussion came, he
suffered the doubts of one who questions if his life has
contributed anything. A profound discontent with himself
appears in his personal letters to friends. Yet he did not
give up his chosen career. In the revisions and deletions of
sections from the Treatise found in Hume's .Enquiries and Essays,
we see him at work correcting and criticizing his original
attempts to contribute a positive theory.
Recent research into Hume's philosophy has tended to
substantiate his claim to have made a positive contribution.
Commentators have questioned the narrow traditional view of
his intentions which widely prevailed previous to Norman Kemp
Smith's work on Hume.^ It has been cogently argued from
■'•Kemp Smith first suggested the possibility of a new-
interpretation of Hume's teaching in two articles entitled "The
Naturalism of Hume" published in Mind, XIV (1905), lk3-173;
335-3^7. The general arguments of these articles were later
expanded and appear in The Philosophy of David Hume, A Critical
Study of Its Origins and Central Doctrines (London: Macmillan
and Co., Ltd., 19kl; Reprinted 19k9)»
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evidence in Hume's works themselves that his scepticism is
a "mitigated" or methodological type advanced for the purpose
of clearing ground in preparation for a new system of thought--
the science of human nature. In answer to the question raised
concerning the logical necessity for the causation of the
universe, Hume's sceptical analysis led him to the suggestion
of a form of naturalism as a possible alternative explanation
for the existence of the world."1" But this was, at least, a
positive suggestion; whether or not it can be consistently
held with the sceptical conclusions of his thought is another
matter.
For many rears after Hume made his discovery about
causal reasoning, his achievement was valued, primarily, as
an effective criticism of an old metaphysical type of reason¬
ing. In the early part of the present century the situation
began to change and the idealism inspired by Hegel and the
Romantic Movement slowly receded in popularity as new doc¬
trines of a positive nature entered on the philosophical scene.
Humanism, experimentalism, pragmatism and realism came into
prominence; the type of thinking broadly called naturalism
made its claims to recognition as an explanation of the nature
of things. Uhile these points of view were developing in the
latter part of the nineteenth century and the opening of the
twentieth, there was an increasing interest in the writing of
"*"0. ■"/. Hendel agrees with Kemp Smith on the matter of
Hume's acceptance of naturalism as a thoroughly possible view
for the cause of nature. £c. ,V. Hendel, Studies in the
Philosophy of David Plume (Princeton: Princeton University
press, 1927), pp.
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David Hume. Translations of his works were printed in various
languages. Some of the men who found themselves drawn to the
naturalistic tendenc?/ referred to Hume as their mighty fore¬
bear. It was believed that Hume had something positive to
say and that we should read him with the purpose of getting
new insight from his pages.
One commentator, Constance Maund, asserts that she
"disagrees strongly with the view of [Hume's^ early critics,
which is still widely current, that Hume has nothing of im¬
portance to contribute to philosophy and that his own claim
to fame as a philosopher lies in the fact that he developed
the false premisses of his predecessors to their logical
conclusions.Maund believes that Hume's positive contri¬
bution was of prime importance for "he was the first to raise
some of the problems about which philosophers are still
O
puzzling today." A number of students of Hume's philosophy
have now agreed with this view.^ Rudolf Metz, John Laird,
Andrea-Louis Leroy, J. A. Passmore, and other commentators,
manifesting a sympathy for Hume's works, have interpreted Hume
as attempting to erect a science of human nature which would
serve as a basis for all other studies. It Is interesting to
note the development of a new appreciation and reorientation
^Constance Maund, Hume's Theory of Knowledge, A Crlti-
cal Ibcamination (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1937), p. v.
2Ibid., p. vi.
3h. h. Price indicates his opposition to the tradi¬
tional attitude which attempts only to refute Hume and to
pounce on his every error and inconsistency. jH. H. Price,
Hume' s Theory of the "tcternal 7/orId (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
19Il0), p. 3.J
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of Hume's thought in the articles and books of recent Hume
scholars. It would be impossible within the compass of this
paper to present all the basic contentions of these various
authors. Therefore, attention will be centered upon what
we believe is the most comprehensive and representative
presentation of this modern interpretation of David Hume.
The work of Norman Kemp Smith may rightly be con¬
sidered the major contribution to a re-interpretation of
Hume."*" The Philosophy of David Hume enlarges and transcends
all previous research and calls for an almost complete re¬
orientation of our view of Hume's philosophy. The new and
revolutionary nature of the book is expressed in three
principal theories: First, Kemp Smith contends it is im¬
possible to evaluate the meaning and outcome of Hume's
philosophy until its naturalistic foundations are taken into
account. Second, a theory is advanced concerning hitherto
■unrecognized influences on the development of Hume's
philosophy. Finally, Kemp Smith suggests a new theory con¬
cerning the way in which the Treatise, Hume's major work, was
composed.
The theory dealing -with the naturalistic basis of
Hume's philosophy first appeared in Kemp Smith's articles
"The Naturalism of Hume" in Hind. Dissatisfied with the
i
A present day commentator on Hume's philosophy, J.
A. Passmore, states that his method for interpretation was
suggested by Kemp Smith's articles in Kind, by The Philosophy
Of David Hume and by the discussions in Kemp Smith's edition
of Hume's Dialogues. (3l. A. Passmore, Hume's Intentions
(Cambridge: University Press, 19.32), p. vii.J
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traditional interpretation that Hume's system is characterized
by complete scepticism, Kemp Smith tries to determine the
central theme of Hume's philosophy without attempting to
trace the influences on him. The determining factor in Hume's
philosophy, according to Kemp Smith, is "the establishment
of a purely naturalistic conception of human nature by the
thorough subordination of reason to feeling and instinct.""'*
"/hen the positive aspects of Hume's work are ignored (as in
T. H. Green's interpretation), one misses a great deal of
the point, if not what is characteristic of the over-all sys¬
tem. The basis of Hume's philosophy is a new and revolutionary
concept of knowledge not found in the philosophy of his pre¬
decessors. Reason is purely practical in its application and
ultimately rests on theoretically unjustifiable tendencies
or instincts of human nature.
Kemp Smith asserts:
. . . the chief aim of Hume's philosophy is to prove that,
save as regards those relations upon which the mathemati¬
cal sciences are based, belief never rests on reason or
insight, and that, on the contrary, what we may call
synthetic reason is itself merely generalised belief.
The assumption of the existence of body is a "natural
belief" due to the ultimate instincts or propensities
that constitute our human reason. It cannot be justi¬
fied by reason, but this unaccountability it shares in
common with our moral and aesthetic judgements and with
all those theoretical beliefs which concern matters of
fact.2
This doctrine of belief is one of the most essential
and perhaps most characteristic doctrines In Hume's philosophy.
3-Kemp Smith, "The Naturalism of Hume," p. 150.
2Tbid., p. 131.
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Hume contends that we cannot by means of reason explain
any of the ultimate characteristics of our experience—the
origin of sensation, the nature of causal connection, appre¬
hension of reality, appreciation of beauty, judgment of an
action as good or bad. The alternative is not scepticism,
but the practical test of human validity. Certain beliefs
or judgments can be shown to be "natural," "inevitable," "in¬
dispensable," and are thus removed beyond the reach of our
sceptical doubts."'' The necessity of the relation of cause
and effect, the existence of the external world, the exis¬
tence of the self—these are recognized as natural beliefs,
determined for us by nature. They cannot be justified by
reason.
Kemp Smith refutes Green's opinion that Hume's princi¬
ples are all borrowed from Locke and Berkeley and that Hume's
philosophy may be adequately regarded as simply the consistent
and thorough development of their fundamental principles.
"There is," Kemp Smith claims, "much positive teaching in the
Treatise which is not to be found anywhere in the writings of
[Hume's]} predecessors; and his philosophy is throughout in¬
spired by a new conception of knowledge. . . . "2 Hume is not
a sceptic as to the powers of reason but regards its sole
function as being practical.
The famction of knowledge is not to supply a metaphysics,
but only to afford us .guidance in practical life. If we
are content to regard our beliefs as the outcome of the
ultimate propensities that constitute our human nature,
they can be shown in their perfect fitness to the calls
"*"See T, 187. 2Kemp Smith, "Hatur„alism of Hume," p. l£5.
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which things make upon us, to be as wonderfully adapted
as any of the animal instincts; but if, on the other
hand, we wrongly insist on interpreting them as the con¬
clusions of supposed inferences, they will be found to
rest on a mass of contradictions and of theoretically
unjustifiable assumptions.
Kemp Smith repeats this interpretation of Hume in
The Philosophy of David Hume;
. . . what is central in [Hume's] teaching is not Locke's
or Berkeley's 'ideal' theory and the negative consequences,
important as these are for Hume, which follow from it, but
the doctrine that the determining influence in human, as
in other forms of animal life, is feeling, not reason or
understanding, i.e. not evidence whether a priori or
empirical, and therefore also not ideas—at least not
'ideas' as hitherto understood. 'kassion' is Hume's
most general title for the instincts, propensities, feel¬
ings, emotions and sentiments, as well as for the passions
ordinarily so called; and belief, he teaches, is a passion.
Accordingly the maxim which is central in his ethics—
'Reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions'--
is no less central in his theory of knowledge, being
there the maxim: 'Reason is and ought to be subordinate
to our natural beliefs.
In Hume's philosophy two distinct meanings are ascribed
to "reason." "All reasonings may be divided into two kinds,
namely, demonstrative reasoning, or that concerning relations
of ideas, and moral reasoning, or that concerning matter of
fact and existence."3 In discursive analytic reasoning, the
truth of ideas is guaranteed by the law of non-contradiction;
such truth is found in the sciences of geometry, algebra, and
arithmetic.'-'"" The logical necessity, which consists In the
impossibility of conceiving the opposite, is the sole form of
rational necessity known to us and is completely absent from
■^-Ibid.
3E, 35.




all our knowledge of matters of fact.1 Kemp Smith interprets
Hume's concept of synthetic reason as follows:
When we seek by means of inferences to extend our know¬
ledge of real existence, we make use of certain non-
rational synthetic principles which can only be explained
as blind instinctive propensities of the human soul. And
as this second, synthetic, form of reasoning embraces
all knowledge outside mathematics (for even the present
testimony of sense and the records of memory involve
synthetic principles), it is much the more important;
and Hume constantly equates it with reason in general.
. . . jjlume3 seeks to show that owing to the constitution
of our experience, [rational necessity] cannot be attained
in any department of our knowledge of matters of fact.
Natural belief takes the place of rational insight.3
In a brief summary of Hume's main argument in the
Treatise and the Enquiry Kemp Smith endeavors to state the
grounds of Hume's naturalistic view of reason and to show
how his philosophy of knowledge culminates in a new theory of
belief. It is pointed out here that there is a close connec¬
tion between Hume's theory of knowledge and his ethical teach¬
ing.^" An associational explanation is advanced to account
for certain indispensable beliefs which are incapable of
theoretical justification (e.g., permanence and identity in
things; belief in the self as an abiding existence). There
is in man a "feeling" of identity. Hume assigns a determining
influence to this feeling; it has a practical function in
our lives, but we cannot base a metaphysic of the soul on it.
Peeling plays a role in the explanation of the belief in the
necessity of causal connection and in the assumption that the
future will resemble the past; there is not sufficient evi¬
dence existing in experience for such inferences. Blind but
1Ivemp Smith, "The Naturalism of Hume," p. 1£6-157.
2Ibid., p. 157. 3Ibid. , p. 158. ^Ibid., p. l£9.
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powerful instinct irresistibly inclines the mind to these be¬
liefs. They are the outcome of some unreasoning propensity,
and that propensity is custom or habit."" Hume does not pre¬
tend to give the ultimate reason for such a propensity, but




This new theory of belief is the indispensable comple¬
ment of Hume's new view of the function of knowledge, and
was all-important in determining his philosophical attitude.
By his predecessors belief had been regarded as purely
intellectual, dependent on insight, and therefore at the
mercy of the philosophical sceptic; whereas, if Hume's
teaching is true, it does not result from knowledge but
precedes it, and as it is not caused by knowledge, so
also is not destroyed by doubt.3
Thus, sceptical arguments cannot overthrow our natural be¬
lief without totally destroying our human nature.
Hume opposes the spiritualism and consequent deism
of Descartes and his English successors.^ But in doing so he
does not repudiate entirely the functions of reason. Kemp
Smith Indicates that Hume has a positive view of the rela¬
tion of reason to feeling and instinct:
. . . though reason cannot take the place of natural
belief, still less overthrow it, its generalising pavers
are yet necessary for its interpretation and control.
Only through the use of our natural beliefs as universal
synthetic principles can we discover their limited range
and their merely practical worth.-5
1E, k3.
^Kemp Smith, "The Naturalism of Hume," pp. Io0-l65.
3Ibid., p. 165. kr, 179, 267.
-'Kemp Smith, "The Naturalism of Hume," p. 169.
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This positive view of the use of reason is in agreement with
Hume's conclusions in his ethical philosophy.
In the second article of the series on Hume's Natural¬
ism, Kemp Smith attempts to show how Hume finds in the facts
of the moral life convincing confirmation of his naturalis¬
tic view of reason, and so is enabled to develop his ethical
theory in complete harmony with his general philosophy. Hume's
moral theory is described as the natural and logical exten¬
sion of the principles found in this theory of knowledge.
The central point is the dependence of reason on feeling
and instinct. Reason in morals is dependent on the natural
passions--the foundation of human nature. Kemp Smith points
out that Hume has a positive attitude towards the function
of reason in the ethical sphere: "Through the instinctive
activities of reason nature adapts the other instincts of
man to the complex recuirements of social existence.""*"
2Reason and sentiment concur in almost all moral action.
Peeling determines the ends; reason decides when and how
these can best be attained. Without displacing the instincts,
reason enables them to fulfil their human function.
It is pointed out by Kemp Smith that Hume's theory of
reason and instinct runs throughout his whole philosophy and
gives unity to his S7fstem. Kemp Smith sums up his interpre¬
tation of Hume's naturalism as follows:
1 lbid. , p. 3I4.5. [See E, 201-202.]
2T, 590; E, 172-173.
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Only when we have recognized the important functions
which Hume ascribes to feeling and instinct, and the
highly complex emotions and propensities which he is
willing to regard as ultimate and ■unanalysable, are
we in a position to do justice to his new, and very
original, conception of the nature and conditions of
experience. Hume may, indeed, be regarded, even more
truly than Kant, as the father of all those subsequent
philosophies that are based on an opposition between
thought and feeling, truth and validity, actuality and
worth. Though his real position is positivism or
naturalism, it is not of that familiar type which seeks
to limit knowledge to material phenomena, but rather is
akin to the broader, more humanistic, philosophy which
was developed by Comte in his later days, and which
rests the hopes of the future on those sciences which
more immediately concern our human nature. For Hume's
disbelief in speculative physics and in metaphysics is
more than counterbalanced by a belief in the possibility
of a philosophical science of human nature, and of the
special sciences of ethics, aesthetics, politics and
political economy. These, he believes, are sciences
which have a sure foundation in human experience.^
In The Philosophy of David Hume Kemp Smith again
emphasizes the fact that most critics have represented Hume's
philosophy as the extension of Locke's theory of ideas to
its logical conclusion--scepticism. They failed to empha¬
size that both Locke and Berkeley had supplemented the theory
of ideas. Supplements were necessary to account for experience
not assimilated to their theory. Kemp Smith contends that
Hume had a supplement also {the doctrine of natural belief]
and that the point of much of his sceptical writing is to
O
illustrate its necessity. No trace of this characteristic
supplement is found in the philosophies of Locke or Berkeley
who are usually regarded as the only significant influences
on Hume. Kemp Smith turns to Francis Hutcheson as a
1Kemp Smith, "The Naturalism of Hume," pp. 3I4.0-3L7.
p
Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume, pp. 8-12.
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logical source for previous traces of the doctrines which
are considered to be central in Hume's philosophy." An
evaluation of Hutcheson's influence is presented as one of the
keys to the understanding of Hume's philosophy. Hutcheson's
effect, according to Kemp Smith, is dominant not only in
Hume's positive contributions to moral philosophy but also
2
in his theory of knowledge.
As a youth Hume took an interest in literature as
well as philosophy and was widely read in various languages.
He seriously considered books bearing on human nature and
studied works on religion, politics, history, and other sub¬
jects connected with man.^ In this endeavor he shared the
common opinions of the eighteenth century, for a man of
letters dealt with a great variety of topics. Kemp Smith
suggests that the most illuminating part of Hume's philosophy
is found in his discussion of "moral subjects." In moral
theory Hume expresses most effectively the true intentions of
his writing. Hume claimed this himself when he regarded The
Hnciulry Concerning the Principles of 'locals as his chief work.-*
•^Ibid. , pp. 12-20; lj.fp-51. This thesis was expressed
by Kemp Smith in an article entitled "David Hume, 1739-1939"
which appeared in Hume and Present Day Problems, Aristotelian
Society, Supplementary Volume XVIII (London: Harrison and Sons,
Ltd., 1939)j PP. xvi-xx,
further discussion of Hutcheson's influence on Hume
appears in Chapter IV of this thesis. [see infra, pp. 166-170J
^Letters, I, 1-2.
^Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume, pp. 12-13;
l3a-f; 139. " ~ ~
^Letters, I.
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His increasing interest in matters of history, politics,
morality and religion is significant when we recall the
topics which he neglected to reconsider in his subsequent
studies (i.e., the problems of space, time and mathematics).
Hume no doubt recognized that his powers could be effectual
in the sciences of human nature, whereas he labored under
personal limitations in the sphere of mathematical and
physical science.
In analyzing the way in which the Treatise was com¬
posed, Kemp Smith contends that it was in connection with
ethical questions, and under Hutcheson's influence, that
Hume first came to formulate the more strictly logical prob¬
lems dealt with in Book I.-*- In the book on the understand¬
ing the thesis is formulated that In all judgments of matters
of fact and existence belief takes the place of knowledge
and as being belief, not knowledge, rests exclusively on
feeling, as predetermined by the constitution of our common
human nature. Kemp Smith's Interpretation of the composition
of the Treatise is based on two observations: First, Hume's
doctrine of sympathy is as central in Books II and III as is
his doctrine of belief in Book I, and the doctrine of belief
is suggested by and modelled upon the doctrine of sympathy.
Second, Hume's formulation of the laws of association In
Book III shows that the teaching of Books II and III antedate
the teaching of Book I. The bulk of the last two books Is
■'•Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume, pp. l£9~
160, 205-229. See also Kemp Smith, "David Hume, 1739-1939,"
pp. xxi-xxxi.
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prior, both in the first thinking out of their teaching, and
in the date of their original composition, to the use made
of association in the first book. Kemp Smith suggests that
a recognition of these contentions sheds new light on the
philosophy of David Hume and aids in an interpretation and.
understanding of some basic difficulties encountered in an
analysis of the Treatise.
Hume's Religious Attitude
Largely due to the impetus of Kemp Smith's studies,
scholars have been considering the possibility of an under¬
lying unity in Hume's writing. In perusing the work of the
commentators interested in finding this unity of intention
in his philosophy, it may be noted that very little atten¬
tion is given to the discussion of the religious ideas in
his system. It is our aim in this thesis to gain an under¬
standing of Hume's attitude towards religion. After meta¬
physics and epistemology, there is perhaps no sphere in which
the influence of David Hume's writing has been more greatly
manifested than in religion and theology. His ideas in this
realm have usually been regarded as purely negative and fatal
not only to the supernatural revelation of Christianity but
also to the rationalistic religion of Deism.
It is customary to think of Hume as being extremely
indifferent to religion, if not violently opposed to it. Many
commentators have regarded him as actually denying any mean¬
ing to religious statements. Kant's discovery of Hume through
the interpretation and quotations of James Beattie appears to
1+2
have established a tradition which greatly neglects any
attempt to understand the man or even to come to a full
knowledge of his philosophical and literary intentions.
Writing near the close of the nineteenth century,
Plenry Calderwood gave the following description of the typi¬
cal attitude towards Hume:
Notwithstanding Plume's vast ability and many services,
his name has hitherto awakened the dislike of the
majority of his fellow-countrymen, because of his openly
avowed scepticism concerning views reverently cherished
by Christian men.
The keen antagonism of the religious men of the
time induced the country to regard Hume as an "Infidel,"
a "Philistine," and an "Arch Sceptic," a good man who
had gone astray. 3-
Sven today most individuals read Hume exclusively as the
sceptic and atheist. His work is seen only in contrast to
an idealism which was called into being as an answer to that
scepticism logically following from the empirical starting
point accepted by Locke and Berkeley. Some critics have
recognized a small trace of constructive thought in Plume's
moral theory which ties him in historical continuity with
the moral sense school or with utilitarian ethics. But even
these interpretations are presented in such a manner as to
leave the impression that his contributions were insignificant.
To accept Hume's philosophy in the light of these
interpretations places it in a position where it is powerless
to give any new inspiration. We are forced to regard his
system as one having influenced only the thought cf the
"'"Henry Calderwood, David Hume (Edinburgh & London:
Oliphant Anderson & Ferrier^ li39b), p'.
b3
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It may have been due to
fear of such misrepresentations of his concepts that Hume
left for posterity his autobiography, "My Own Life. " In
this brief memoir he endeavors to convey the story of his
purposes and career and pictures himself as having a passion¬
ate devotion to truth."*" Hume seemingly felt that if his
autobiography presented new insights into his life, then it
was possible that a renewed interest in his work would bring
about the recognition of the true meaning of his writings.
There is sufficient evidence to substantiate the view
that Hume had an abiding religious interest, one that arose
in his youth and continued throughout his life-time. He
always professed, however inconsistently, some kind of belief
in a Supreme Being and considered philosophical theism a de¬
fensible position which he claimed as his own. Information
relative to Hume's early reasoning indicates that his career
as a philosophical thinker was begun by questioning the
religious beliefs of his day. Questions concerning religion
had arisen in his mind before he was twenty; he had not yet
begun to write the Treatise. When tracing the progress of
Hume's thought, it should be kept in mind that his scepticism
arose, in part at least, from earnestly wrestling with the
arguments to confirm in his own mind the common opinion of
the existence of a personal God. It becomes plausable to
suppose that his discovery of the new view of causation and
his positive contributions in the moral sphere came as a
^-Letters, I, 1-7. ^Letters, I, lfpli..
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result of dealing with the realities of religious belief.
We intend to show in this paper that it was through a study
of religious problems that Hume came to embark on a philosophi¬
cal career. Prom these questionings he developed a sceptical
attitude of mind, but he never became as irredeemably anti-
religious as most books picture him.
It appears from some of Hume's letters that he was
for a long time in perplexity over the attitude he should take
towards religion. Religious conviction was an aspect of
human nature which he had undertaken to examine by the new
experimental method of analysis. But a doubt arose in his
mind as to whether he had really provided a new medium of
truth which could answer all questions, especially the most
vital of questions—those of religious import. The Dialogues
Goncerning Hatural Re 1 ig ion, for the publication of which
Hume took such great pains, may be interpreted as expressing
something of the inner conflict of his mind. There appears
to have been an opposition within his own thinking between
belief and doubt, and the dialogue style of writing provided
him with an excellent means of putting before men's minds the
questions of religion which had been troubling him for several
years.
There are indications of repeated attempts on Hume's
part to uphold the common religious opinion—belief in a
living God. He desired a definite answer, one way or the
other. Having a restless mind, and imagining all sorts of
possibilities Hume could not confirm himself in the Christian
k$
faith. Intellectual restlessness made it impossible for him
to accept anything as certain, except the truth man has in
such realms as mathematics and logic. He evidently saw some
validity for Christian beliefs and noted that there was a
natural inclination to believe in G-od; otherwise he would
have entirely given up these ideas and focussed his atten¬
tion on other problems. Recognizing a reasonableness and
value in some aspects of religion, Hume was tossed between
his doubts and his inclinations to assent. These conflicting
attitudes he recorded in his notebooks throughout a number
of years."*"
Despairing of reaching certainty in religious matters,
Hume concerned himself with a subject he believed to be
fruitful for exploration—the science of human nature. He
considered this discovery so important that he began to put
his ideas in writing and later published them in the Treatise.
He believed he had discovered a method which would make possible
a profitable examination of human nature. In the Enquiry
Concerning Human Understanding, published eight years after
the Treatise, Hume made bold to discuss some of the ques¬
tions about religion that had been bothering his mind. In
this book we find the two essa3rs entitled "Of Miracles" and
"Of a Particular Providence and of a Future State." The
essay "Of the Natural History of Religion" indicates that
Hume's interest continued in that aspect of human experience
which has to do with religion. In the Dialogues we have what
^•Letters, I, 15>k.
14-6
may rightly be considered his mature thought on the validity
of the traditional answers to religious questions; here he
states the truth he believes he has found in the religious
realm.
In the following chapters we shall endeavor, chiefly
by biographical and historical analyses, to arrive at some
conclusions concerning Hume's true attitude towards religion.
Our study will necessarily involve a survey of the religious
milieu in which Hume was born and of which he continued to
be a part as well as an attempt to appreciate the sort of
man he really was. It Is not easy to discover what his
private religious views were. In his works there often
occur passages which are curiously orthodox. But we cannot
always be sure that these are truly indicative of his own
personal beliefs. Evidence will be presented to show that
the expression of Hume's religious opinions provides some
interesting and illuminating insights into the man and his
work. One of the principal aims of this thesis is to advance
the suggestion that Hume's religious interests and opinions
must be considered if we are to attain proper understanding
of the unity which modern Hume scholars are seeking in his
philosophy. If Hume was as interested in religion as the
evidence seems to indicate, then there is good reason for our
examining the influence of this religious attitude on the
formulation of his positive doctrines.
In order to study objectively Hume's philosophy we
must consider his abiding concern with religion as well as his
k-7
clearly stated ambition of contributing some positive truth
to the body of human knowledge. We intend to take Kemp
Smith's suggestions as to what Hume's constructive ideas were
and to investigate how these ideas may be related to his
abiding interest in religious questions. It is believed that
when his positive doctrines are examined in the light of his
religious opinions, we will see an integral connection of
the two, each aiding in our under standing of the other. In
this way David Hume will be viewed in a complete perspective
wherein his guiding purpose becomes evident.
CHAPTER II
PREVAILING RELIGIOUS TENDENCIES IN THE AGE OF HUME
Introduction
For a proper understanding of Hume's own religious
thought a knowledge of his Calvinistic environment is indeed
an aid if not a necessity. Space will not permit a detailed
analysis of the ecclesiastical events in the closing years of
the seventeenth century which profoundly influenced the
thoughts and actions of the clergy and laymen #10 were Hume's
contemporaries, but a brief survey of the most important
happenings in this turbulent period is needed. It would in¬
deed be presumptuous to try to evaluate or to set forth in
complete order all that transpired in the Church of Scotland
in the years immediately preceding Hume's birth and during
his lifetime. If in the following pages we can arrive at an
appreciation of some of the ecclesiastical controversies and
theological debates which surrounded Hume, our object in
presenting this background will be accomplished.
Ecclesiastical Controversy
The end of the seventeenth century saw the beginning
of an ecclesiastical revolution in Scotland and of a conflict
between Presbyterians and Episcopalians which raged on into
the following century. When William of Orange ascended the
throne of England in lb88 a Presbyterian insurrection broke
lj.8
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out in Scotland and the Prelacy of the Stuarts was overthrown.
The Claim of Right declared Episcopacy contrary to the inclina¬
tion of the majority of people."'" "In the beginning of 1689,
200 of the clergy had been expelled from their parishes by
the Cameronian rabble; and, in the course of this year, their
refusal to read the proclamation in favour of William and
Mary caused the ejection of nearly 200 more." Even after
being thus reduced, the Episcopal ministers remained far sup¬
erior in number to the Presbyterian. This presented a grave
problem to the Revolution Parliament which met in 1690. It
was by its Acts relating to the Church that this session be¬
came important in Scottish History.^ The results of the
Settlement have been summarized by one church historian in
the following words:
The Revolution Settlement, as the arrangement was
called which jcame] to Scotland after the fighting was
over, (1) abolished Episcopacy, (2) reinstated the sur¬
viving sixty in number, of the Ij-00 ministers expelled from
their livings in 1662, (3) restored the Act of 1592,
vjhich set up Presbyterianism, (i^.) ratified the Westminster
Confession as the standard of the Church's belief, (5)
abolished Patronage, the right of choice of a minister
being given to the heritors, or landowners, but the con¬
gregation having the right to appeal to the Presbytery
against a minister to whom they objected, (6) Episcopalian
ministers, who were still in a large majority, were to be
allowed to remain in their parishes provided they took an
oath of allegiance, and accepted Presbyterian government,
(7) the Covenants, however, were not renewed, and therefore
^-G. D. Henderson, The Kirk Through the Centuries
(Edinburgh: Church of Scotland Committee on Publications,
19^0), p. 18.
p
William Law Mathieson, Scotland and the Union
(Glasgow: James Maclehose and Sons', 190*577 P. 13.
3p. Hume Brown, History of Scotland (Cambridge: at
the University Press, 1911), III, 11.
£0
the extreme Cameronians would not accept the Settlement,
and join the new Church of Scotland.1
In the days following the Settlement there was much
"rabbling," inquisition, and purging of the Episcopal curates
until in 169)4- Parliament imposed upon the Church a policy of
toleration; the General Assembly was compelled to admit to a
share In government all Episcopalian ministers who took the
oath of allegiance, siibscribed to the Confession of Faith,
and conformed to Presbyterian rule. It is significant that
the Covenants were not renewed and the Act of 1662, which
condemned them as unlawful, remained in force. Thus excom¬
munication was "deprived of its civil penalties; and the
oath of allegiance was adopted in lieu of all religious tests
3
as the passport to political office. " The period after the
Revolution was in a sense a time of decline of religious and
ecclesiastical powers.
King William advocated a liberal policy and contended
for a tolerant treatment of his Episcopal adherent in Scotland.
His scheme failed chiefly because the Episcopal clergy did not
accommodate themselves to the subordinate position which the
Act of 1690 had assigned to them. Parliament in 1693 made
the terms of conformity more difficult and in 1695 an Act
•^•John D. Rose, Scotland's True Glory (London: Marshall,
Morgan & Scott, Ltd., n.d.), p. 113.
^Henry Grey Graham, The Social Life of Scotland in
the Eighteenth Century (I|.th ed., London: Adam and Charles
Black,Reprinted 1950), p. 271.
3Mathieson, Scotland and the Union, p. ill.
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was passed which permitted the Episcopal ministers "who ac¬
knowledged William and Mary as lawful sovereigns, both de
facto and de jure, to retain their livings, on condition that
they took no part in the government of the Church.""'" Thus
any attempt to unite discordant elements had to be given up.
The Episcopal and Presbyterian factions were established
then as separate systems.
William Law Mathieson regards the closing decade of
the seventeenth century as manifesting the "existence of a
moderate tradition intersecting rather than running parallel
with the superficial ecclesiastical divisions." He states
that,
... if we look more closely into the spirit of the
age, we shall find that the Revolution marks a definite
and final readjustment in the relations of politics and
religion, of Church and State. Ever since the reaction
which had set in after the battle of Dunbar, religious
interests had been declining in Scotland, and secular
interests had been gaining ground; the ascendency of
the religious question, no longer undisputed, had been
prolonged beyond its natural duration by the misgovern-
ment of the Stewarts: and now, after a hundred and thirty
years of strife, the great majority of the nation were
disposed to regard the questions as settled, and to de¬
vote themselves to more profitable pursuits.
In opposition to the secular spirit that was begin¬
ning to gai.n strength, there was a zealous religious interest
at work in Scotland. The meeting of the General Assembly in
169O' appointed two Commissions, one for the north and another
for the south of the river Tay. "The object of both was the
same--to restore church order and to extrude such ministers,
Presbyterian or Episcopalian, as in life, doctrine, and
1Ibid., p. 15. 2Ibid. , pp. 16-17.
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political sentiments failed to give satisfaction to the
Commissioners."''" The work of the Commission in the north,
where the covenanting spirit had never spread, was difficult
A }
and the Episcopal heji,rarchy remained in power. "There were
few parishes where [the Commissioners) did not encounter more
2
or less opposition to their reforming zeal." In several
places they were met by angry mobs and forced to flee for
their lives. The Commission succeeded in deposing a con¬
siderable number of the Episcopal curates, many of whom went
directly to England. The situation in the north continued
to be unsettled for a number of years, and it is said that
the Presbyterian minister of Lochcarron, in 1726, found it
advisable to carry firearms to protect himself from his
•3
Episcopal parishioners. "The process of the extrusion by the
special Church Commission was most keenly resented by the
fallen Church, and it was only by the decisive interference
of the Government that the inquisition was gradually stayed."^"
To the south of the Tay the Commissioners had the
sympathy of the main body of people. When Presbyterianism
was re-established there, so many of the Episcopal clergy were
expelled that there were not enough Presbyterian ministers to
^Hume Brown, op. cit., p. 12.
2Ibid. , pp. 12-13.
^Hew Scott, Fasti Ecclesiae Scotlcanae (Edinburgh:
Oliver and Boyd, 1917), VII, 160.
^Hume Brown, op. cit., p. 13.
5Ibid., p. 12.
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take their places. Many districts had been without ministers
for so long that manses became uninhabitable and the churches
fell in ruins.1 The Presbyterians began to strengthen their
hold on this section of the country and no doubt, in many
cases, their methods were such as to cause resentment from
the parishioners. These were the days of the pamphleteers
when there was an incessant war of reproaches, recriminations,
charges and countercharges; consequently, it is exceedingly
difficult to determine the true character of the parties
involved in the ecclesiastical conflicts of the time. It
seems fairly certain, however, that the Presbyterian ministers,
who came into power after the overthrow of Prelacy, lacked
the characteristics of moderation and tolerance. The follow¬
ing estimate may be accepted as a fair representation of
these clergymen:
The old men, during their field-life and wanderings
amongst bog mosses and moorland glens, had increased, not
in learning but in fanaticism. The younger men—save the
few who had studied in Holland--had had no opportunity for
study, and usually felt that to know the Lord's Word was
worth all the pagan learning of the world. Though some
were men of good sense and good scholarship, and several
of good birth, the great majority were rude in mind and
manners, grimly religious and bigoted in spirit. . . A
persecution such as the Presbyterian had of late years
undergone, which was not fiery, but merely vexatious and
irritating, does not develop the higher qualities or
polish the soul to finer graces. It had neither the physi¬
cal trial which makes heroes, nor the spiritual endurance
which forms saints. To be too long in opposition engenders
... a habit of magnifying little points of difference
into questions of vital importance. When such men, with
the self-conscious glow of martyrdom, emerge from obscurity
to publicity, and exchange weary contumely and defeat for
truculent victory, they are unable to wield their paver
with moderation, for they mistake fanaticism for earnestness,
^-Graham, Social Life, p. 2jhr.
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and in pious hostility to opponents 'confound their
antipathies with their duties.'
Such was the prevailing temper of the ministers at
the beginning and during the first quarter of the
eighteenth century, although they were earnest and
honest men. . .
During the reign of William, the Church was held in
check by civil authority. This situation was the cause of
much bitter wrangling among the various groups in the churches
and some contended that the General Assenbly had lowered the
flag of Christ to the authority of the king. But there were
also dissatisfied groups outside the Established Church of the
Revolution Settlement. The Episcopal hierarchy and its ad¬
herents, by openly pledging allegiance to King James, had
sealed their own doom. Being looked upon as Jacobite sus¬
pects, the Episcopalians were forced to worship and conse¬
crate new bishops in secret. Their grievances were kept
before their fellow believers in England but to no avail
until a new Episcopal dissenting church arose in Queen Anne's
reign.
Another group under disabilities was the Society
People, composed of Left Wing Covenanters and Cameronians.
They objected to the Settlement because it had, in their
opinion, ignored the Covenants and was founded on the in¬
clinations of the people rather than on the authority of
Scripture. Banding themselves together into a separate
community called the Reformed Presbytery, the Cameronians
and Covenanters refused to take an oath of allegiance, and
continued to oppose the Established Church.
Ibid. , pp. 276-277.
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When the Westminster Confession of Faith was put on
the statute book, unbelievers found themselves under reli¬
gious persecutions. The strong feeling in Scotland against
unbelief brought about a sad event in the year 1696 when
Thomas Aikenhead, a student at Edinburgh University, on the
basis of testimony from fellowstudents, was convicted of
blasphemy and executed.^ Mathieson declares that this tale
of cruelty and injustice is paralled only in the blood-
stained records of witch-persecution. This intolerant
attitude towards those who expressed thoughts contrary to
accepted beliefs or questioned the validity of certain doc¬
trines continued far into the eighteenth century and had a
profound influence on the religious outlook of David Hume.
When Anne ascended the throne, the Scottish Parliament
passed an Act securing Protestant religion and Presbyterian
Church government in Scotland. This was considered necessary
because of the danger of Jacobite intrigues which the Pres¬
byterians believed would arise from anticipation of favors
from the daughter of King James. The Church again asserted
the intrinsic power of its courts to deliberate in all spiritual
matters on their sole authority. The Act of Security "safe¬
guarded for all time the National Church of Scotland as it
had been established at the Revolution.Although the Queen
was inclined to give kindly consideration to the Episcopalians,
-^•Hume Brown, op. cit. , p. 32.
2Mathieson, Scotland and the Union, pp. 220-221.
3Hume Brown, op, cit. , p. 9^-«
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there was very little she could do for them. The debates of
the next few years indicate that the subject in which Anne
and her advisers were most anxiously interested was the
union of England and Scotland. The Presbyterians of Scotland
were not unnaturally concerned lest their ecclesiastical
polity should be displaced by an English establishment.
"It is evident . . . that the Church, if not an opponent of
the Union, was at least a most unfriendly critic. . . .
After much difficulty and stormy negotiations the provisions
of the union were finally agreed to by the Parliament of
Scotland which adjourned to meet no more.
The Act of Security, accepted by the English as well
as the Scottish legislators, ordained that the government of
the Church by kirk sessions, presbyteries, synods, and general
assemblies should continue unalterable and be the only govern¬
ment of the Church within the kingdom of Scotland. "By this
solemn pledge for the immunity and perpetuity of their
Church, its sager heads were gained for the Union; but no
pledges could satisfy the majority of the country clergy, who
all through the prolonged debate spared no endeavors to
O
bring it to naught." Most of the ministers were young and
zealous and lacked experience, "/hen we realize that the
Union was very little in harmony with the clergy's ecclesias¬
tical traditions and with popular feeling, it says much for
the prudence, vigilence, and capacity of the Church's leaders,
^Mathieson, Scotland and the Union, pp. 180-188.
p
Hume Brown, on. cit., p. 9k.
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"that they adhered on the whole to the path of neutrality—
unsympathetic and even menacing neutrality as it was--marked
out for them by the Commission."
Fearing an Episcopal attempt to gain power, the
General Assembly of 1707 passed an Act against the use of
Episcopalian forms of worship in Scotland. No toleration was
permitted for forms of worship other than those which were
established by law. Nevertheless, the Reverend James Green-
shields, an Episcopal clergyman who came to Edinburgh in
1709» drew around him a congregation of his own persuasion.
A number of Englishmen had settled in the city after the
Union and now desired the liberty of attending the type of
services to which they had been accustomed at home. Conse¬
quently, Greenshields boldly made use of the Anglican liturgy.
A complaint, signed by two hundred persons, was presented to
the Commission of the Church, and Greenshields was cited be¬
fore the Presbytery. Although he denied the Church's juris¬
diction, he was suspended "for officiating as a minister
without warrant and for violating the uniformity of worship
2
established by law." The clergy of the Established Church
regarded Greenshield's actions as "a wanton defiance at once
of their jurisdiction and the law of the land--an opinion in
which they were supported by the civil authorities of the
town." The Episcopal minister refused to comply with the
Hlathieson, Scotland and the Union, p. 188.
2Ibid. , pp. 199-198.
^Hume Brown, on. cit., p. Il6.
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sentence of the Church court and continued holding services.
The Presbytery received the endorsement of the magistrates;
but C-reenshields still continued obdurate, forcing the authori¬
ties to arrest and imprison him in the Tolbooth. After two
unsuccessful petitions for redress to the Church courts,
Greenshields appealed to the House of Lords who reversed the
decision of the Court of Session on March 1, 1710.The magis¬
trates of Edinburgh, by whose instigation the minister had
been imprisoned, were found liable in heavy fines.
The outcome of the Greenshields case naturally
caused jubilation among the Episcopalians. But this was only
the first blow to the Presbyterians; farther humiliation was
destined to folio?;. The Government, impelled by the prelati-
cal party in Scotland and by general opinion, resolved to
pass an Act by which the liberty of the Episcopalians to
celebrate their religious rites should be formally declared.
In 1712 the Jacobites introduced a bill into the Commons
expressly designed for the protection of Episcopacy in Scot¬
land. The Act of Toleration was passed through both houses
of Parliament by a large majority. And although it was
passed with ulterior motives on the part of both Jacobites
p
and English Tories, the Act was both reasonable and just.
Episcopal worship in Scotland was declared lawful provided
all ministers were ordained by Protestant bishops, held
1Ibid., p. 116.
p
Hume Brown points out that the Act was not really
for^toleration but was intended as an invasion of the Church's
jurisdiction. [Hume Brown, op. cit. , p. 117•]
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their assemblies openly, and took the oaths of allegiance
and abjuration. The Episcopal priest who administered bap¬
tism, or performed the ceremony of marriage was no longer
subjected to imprisonment or exile. One provision of the
Act gave particular offence to the Presbyterians—civil
penalties were not to follow upon ecclesiastical censures.
Hitherto, religious offenders were turned over to the civil
authority for punishment."'" The Toleration Act put an end to
the imposition of the old civil penalties and more tolerant
views and enlightened conceptions of spiritual censures
came into the Church of Scotland.
In the opinion of the Presbyterian clergy the Church's
independence had been assailed by the Act of Toleration.
'Alien the Abjuration Oath was added on March 3> 1712 the
Presbyterians were up in arms. "That a Presbyterian should
be required to take an oath implying that the sovereign should
be an Episcopalian, was naturally regarded as an outrage on
O
his Church and his individual conscience." The Oath of Ab¬
juration caused serious trouble for some time. However,
during the reign of George I, modifications were made to
meet scrupulous consciences. "Ministers were still required
to abjure the Pretender, but they were no longer made to
affirm that the sovereign must be an Episcopalian."-^
"'"Greenshields had been imprisoned for an ecclesiasti¬
cal offence and Thomas Aikenhead had been executed for his
so-called religious infidelity.
^Hume Brown, op. cit., pp. I88-I89.
3Ibid., p. 189. There were still dissatisfied
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There was yet another Act which was destined to have
an even greater influence on the fortunes of the Church of
Scotland. "Unfortunately, in 1712, contrary to the Treaty
of Union and against a strong body of opinion in the Church,
and really in the interest of Jacobite and Episcopal land¬
owners, patronage was once more restored.""*" The practice of
patronage had taken its rise from the custom of grants of
land and money being given to the Church by lay proprietors
in order that their vassals should be instructed in reli¬
gious principles. Such benefactors retained the right of
p
appointing ministers to their own benefices. Lay patronage
had been abolished in 1690 and the Church of Scotland was
surprised when a Bill to restore patronage was introduced
into the Commons. The statute came into force on May 1,
1712 and, as Mathieson states,
... restored to all patrons who had not renounced
it their right of presentation, and at the same time
allowed them to retain the advantages which had been
given to them in return for their loss. If the patron
did not present within six months, his right was to
pass to the presbytery; patrons who had not already
taken the abjuration oath were to take it on signing a
presentation; and those of them who were known or sus¬
pected to be Papists were debarred from presenting till
they had renounced the Roman Catholic faith.3
ministers in the south-western shires; the oath was considered
as an impious invasion of the privileges of the Kirk. The
authorities of the Church for the most part prudently ignored
these intractable brethren.
^G. D. Henderson, The Kirk Through the Centuries, p. 20.
^Eor a brief history of patronage in Scotland, see
Mathieson, Scotland and the Union, pp. 20)..l-209*
3Ibid., p. 210
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It appears that pure political expediency had prompted
the legislators in their action on the question of patronage.'*"
The welfare of the Church was not considered. Rather, the
intention of the Government was to bring about a weakening
of the Church's political influence. The lay patrons could
be depended upon to see to it that no minister should be
placed in a parish where he might work mischief against the
Government. The measure which restored patronage resulted
in much distress in the Church of Scotland, and many of its
troubles in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were
connected with this question. But the disorder was to be
traced not so much to patronage itself, as to the unreason¬
able and uncompromising manner in which it came to be adminis¬
tered by influential churchmen in succeeding years.
The Scottish Presbyterians were particularly grati¬
fied at the accession of George I who from the first was
markedly disposed to show them favor. George fulfilled the
requirements of the Act of Security in regard to the Church
by taking the oath required by that Act without hesitation.
When the General Assembly met in 177-!-, the King gave the
fullest assurance of his determination to preserve inviolate
the privileges of the Church. In return the Presbyterian
divines drew up an address in which they declared their
loyalty to the Government and their attachment to the King's
person. The Church was beginning to recognize that Presby-
terianism was bound up with the fate of the existing
Illume Brown, on. cit., p. 118.
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government; consequently, scarcely any ministers identified
themselves with the Rebellion of 1715* Prom this period
Presbyterians were looked upon as friends of the King in
contradistinction to the Episcopalian party, who had proven
themselves hostile."'" Presbyterians were taken into confidence
by the State and became loyally attached to the reigning
powers. The landed proprietors were disposed in general to
support the Established Church so that to some extent the
clergy became reconciled to the measure by which patronage
was re-imposed.
This was the state of ecclesiastical affairs when
David Hume was born in the year 1711* We must now consider
the theological opinions and religious practices which were
then in prominence.
Religious Life^
The prevailing temper of doctrinal teaching in Scot¬
land during the first quarter of the eighteenth century was
As Episcopalianism closely allied itself with the
Jacobite party, intolerance again became prevalent. After
the uprisings of 1715 and 17^4-5 the Episcopalians found them¬
selves under the ban of severe laws; hard times confronted
those ministers who would not take the oath of allegiance.
The harsh laws imposed on the Episcopalians allowed their
opponents to pull down or burn their meeting houses. When
the fear of Jacobitism and insurrection no longer frightened
Parliament into intolerance, conditions were improved. Prince
Charles died in 1788 and by 1792 the old penal statutes
against the Scottish Episcopal ministers were repealed. See
Mathieson, Scotland and the Union, po. 313-316; 318-321; 369-
370; Hume Brown, op. cit., pp. 260-261.
^For a complete account of the theological opinions
and the religious and ecclesiastical life of the period, see
Graham, Social Life, pp. 267-l|-17.
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a popularized version of Calvin's theology. Emphasis was
placed on the darker features of that system and its main
thoughts were distorted and exaggerated. To get a fair idea
of the religion which was taught by the ministers and be¬
loved of the people it is necessary to read no more than a
few of the devotional and theological writings of the time.
In these collected sermons, pamphlets, tracts, catechisms,
and treatises on ecclesiastic controversies there are few
variations in doctrine; the themes may alter, the style may
vary but the dogmas remain the same--the fall of man, original
sin, total depravity of human nature, redemption of the elect,
the punishment of hell and the joy of heaven. Each author
freely gave his opinion on these great themes; there was no
hesitation whatsoever in explaining and deciding every question
from the secret decisions of the Divine Mind before the be¬
ginning of time to the minute details of the eternal fate of
man. But the Confession of Paith was always interpreted in
its most rigid sense and diversity of opinion as to the mean¬
ing of its phrases was not allowed. The suggestion that
there should be any natural virtue or knowledge in the human
soul was regarded as heresy and subject to punishment by the
Church courts. One historian has given the following picture
of the condition of religion in Scotland:
During the seventeenth century Scottish religion had
fallen greatly under the influence of English Puritanism;
and when to this we add the memory of the bitter strife
of sixty years, and the economic misery of the moment,
we can perhaps understand why at the Union, and for many
years after, religion was seen in its grimmest form.
Scottish religion depicted God as an implacable despot,
swift to wrath. ... It held by the doctrines of
election and reprobation in all their severity. .
. . Both in Church and in home the most relentless
discipline was maintained. . . . The observance
of the Sabbath was enforced with penalties. All
other sacred times and seasons were deliberately
ignored. . . .1
It has been said that the Scots of the early eighteenth
century were a "priest-ridden" race, but the evidence seems
to indicate that Scotland was really suffering from a
p
"people-ridden" clergy. There were frequent outbreaks of
stubborn resistance to patronage; riots sometimes occurred
when a minister was inducted whom the people had not chosen.
Presbyteries were often too much afraid of the parishioners
to ordain an unwelcome presentee. Consequently, the General
Assembly was eventually forced to appoint what were called
"riding committees"to ins tallministers who were unacceptable
to the members of a church. This was an age characterized
more by a tyranny of the laity than of the clergy; and as
the kirk sessions were usually composed of six elders to
one minister, there was nothing for the clergyman to do but
carry out the decision of the laymen.
Illiterate men gained prominent positions in the
Church because of their piety and austerity of life and doc-
3trine. Certain individuals were looked upon as peculiarly
holy and specially gifted by divine grace; some were even
1Andrew J. Campbell, Two Centuries of the Church of
Scotland 1707-1929 (Paisley: Alexander Gardner, Ltd., 1930),
p. 2b.
2
Graham, Social Life, pp. 366-368.
3Ibid., p. 370.
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regarded as possessing abilities to foretell the future.
These pious leaders determined the spiritual temper of the
individual churches. The minister who was rustic, familiar
in style, rude and uncultivated in manners and education was
highly regarded."'" His sermons were evaluated by the parishion¬
ers and any teaching of moralit?/- was denounced as causing men
2
to trust in their "filthy rags of self righteousness."
Preaching had to be purely doctrinal, emphasis being placed
on the teaching that salvation was won by trusting to the
atonement and in making a bargain with Christ. Such was the
power and influence of the "saintly" elders in determining
theological thought that it may be said that religious teach¬
ing in Scotland was vulgarized and levelled down until it
came within the comprehension of the stupid and illiterate.
The life and work of a ministers in those days is
fully portrayed in the Memoirs of Thomas Boston who died in
1732.6 Clergymen were thoroughly upright individuals and
eminently respected by their parishioners. But although they
were pious and faithful, many ministers were narrow, uncouth
and even superstitious during the first decade of the century.
The intellectual level of the clergy improved rapidly, how¬
ever, and by the middle of the century ministers were regarded
as learned men and capable leaders.
"'"John Ramsay of Ochtertyre, Scotland and Scotsmen in
the Eighteenth Century (Edinburgh & London: William Blackwood
and Sons, 16(3(3), II, 3fa.
^Graham, Social Life, p. 369.
3see also Graham, Social Life, pp. 280-28L.
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The Scottish Sabbath was given almost superstitious
veneration. Sunday in Scotland acquired "a sanctity which
far exceeded that of the Sabbath of the Jews in their most
Pharisaical days—equalling in austerity the Puritanism of
New England, and surpassing the Puritanism of England. .
The day was completely devoid of beauty, liberty and joy.
Children were checked and thwarted and not allowed to exer¬
cise their minds and bodies by running, skipping, laughing,
singing, whistling, or even walking—except to church and
home again. Such activities were considered sinful on the
Sabbath. Solemn preparations were made the day before and
even Saturday night was sedate and grave. Attendance at
services was compulsory and non-attenders were reported to
the kirk session,by elders who went out on morning and even¬
ing patrols to discover offenders. Assisted by the town
councils, the "protectors" of the Sabbath were hard on
Sabbath desecrators. Civil and ecclesiastical authorities
joined in disciplinary measures; there was no escape from the
dreaded inquisitional intrusion of the Church, supported by
Acts of Parliament, resolutions of town councils and deci¬
sions of sheriffs. Pines were imposed for loitering in the
streets or idly gazing out of windows, and certainly nothing
•was permitted that suggested the idea of labor. Even the
minister had to walk circumspectly or find himself before the




It is recorded that the minister of New Machar was
67
The Sabbath began with the six o'clock ringing of
the kirk bell after which the household assembled for prayer
and the reading of the Scriptures. No cooking was permitted
until evening, so a cold breakfast was eaten before the family
walked soberly to church. There was never to be any laughter
and no one was allowed to talk except on spiritual themes.
At the ringing of the second bell, usually between nine and
ten o'clock, the people entered the kirk and were led in the
singing of a metrical psalm. -Then the bell rang a third time
the minister came into the building, ascended the pulpit
stairs, and took charge of the service.
Before beginning his sermon, the preacher stood and
prayed at great length extempore. In this way it was be¬
lieved that the words uttered were given by God's Spirit.
Should a minister forget or fumble over his words, this was
regarded as a sign of God's displeasure with His servant.
The clergy and the people manifested a boundless belief in
prayer, which was entered into with pious fervor. Prayer was
considered a divine gift and ministers who coiild continue
with fluency and holy ardor were considered "great wrestlers.""
They continued long and wept as their voices rose and fell in
libelled before the Presbytery in 1735 for powdering his wig
on the Sabbath. [A. Campbell Eraser, Thomas Reid (Edinburgh
and London: Oliphant Anderson & Perrier^ 139" )> P. 31 •]
•'■See Robert Wodrow, Analecta, or Materials for a His¬
tory of Remarkable Providences mostly relating to Scotch
Ministers and Christians (Glasgow: Maitland Club, lbij.3).
Ill, 303.
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cadence with a peculiar whine. This mannerism was evidently-
retained from Covenanting times when it had been particularly
effective in the open fields and on the hillsides. The rise
and fall of the voice was now used to play on the emotions of
the congregation. The pious were often moved to awe by
grotesque and preposterous prayers which fanatical ministers
vigorously offered as addresses to the Deity.
Following prayer, the minister gave a lecture con¬
sisting of a passage from a chapter of Scripture read slowly
with long, confused comments on each verse. Then, after
praying again, he began his unwritten "ordinary" sermon
based on a fixed text and timed by an hour-glass. One or
two verses formed the subject of discourse for weeks or even
months. A preacher was not highly esteemed unless he made
his "ordinary" last for many weeks. The themes of the
teaching invariably included the fourfold state of man and
the essential points of the plan of salvation (i.e., what
man was in the state of innocence; what he was after the fall;
what he is under the gospel of grace; what shall be his eternal
state). Each text was twisted so that these dogmas were found
p
in every verse of Scripture. Many of the preachers wept as
they preached their sermons which, like their prayers, were
delivered with the professional whine. At the close of the
sermon, attention was diverted to the pillory--a raised plat¬
form or stool in front of the pulpit--and the minister
1roid. , III, 36.
^Graham, Social Life, p. 29h*
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admonished the offenders, warning them of their great punish¬
ment unless they repented. A prayer was offered again, not
for the pardon of the guilty but for greater punishments to
teach them to overcome evil desires. A benediction brought
the three hour service to a close and the worshippers made
their way home for another cold meal.
Before returning to the kirk for the afternoon ser¬
vice, the people were expected to question and instruct each
other on the sermon of the morning and to peruse devout (but
usually depressing) books. Conduct indoors as well as out
was under restrain. School children were rigorously super¬
vised and, with the servants, catechized on the doctrines of
the Confession of Faith or examined on the minister's lectures
and discourses. Answers were repeated from the Catechism,
psalms were sung, and the Scriptures were expounded. These
spiritual exercises were carried on until after five o'clock
when the family enjoyed its first hot meal of the day. The
Sabbath was brought to a close with family devotions consisting
of psalms, long prayers, questions from the Catechism, and a
lecture from the Scriptures or a devotional book. All these
dreary religious duties completed, private prayers were said
and the weary Christian retired.
On most Sundays someone appeared upon the pillory or
cutty-stool (the stool of repentance) to be publicly rebuked
for some moral delinquency or breach of the Lord's Day.
Weekly meetings of the kirk sessions were chiefly concerned
with such cases and many hours were consummed in minutely
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examining the evidence against an offender. For discipline
the sinner might have to stand before the kirk in sackcloth
for several Sundays. When someone was ordered to "compear"
(appear in answer to a summons" before the kirk session the
comparatively innocent suffered most whereas the shameless
suffered little; leniency was usually available to the rich
but not to the poor. Refusal to obey the orders of the pres¬
bytery to stand rebuke incurred the dread sentence of ex¬
communication. This involved the mysterious "being delivered
over to Satan," banishment from the Church, and denial of its
sacraments.The threat of being an outcast from society
and the infamy connected with excommunication usually brought
the most contumacious individual to his knees. With the
support of the civil magistrates, the Church had far reaching
powers, and its fanatical authorities meted out judgments
with equal gravity on all sins—even the most trivial.^
Philosophers and literary men were not beyond the supposed
authority of the Church, and David Hume personally experienced
something of the bitter persecution which Christians directed
against those who were bold enough to speak in opposition to
their tenets and practices.
In the midst of eighteenth century spiritual enthusiasm
and fervor, individuals of extreme religious devotion made
dedications of their lives, their children, and their earthly
^Graham, Social Life, p. 321}..
O
^Ministers were recuired to make repentance before
their congregations and presbyterial visitations of the
churches were made to examine ministers and parishioners alike.
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goods to God. "Trysts" or Covenants were written down and
renewed year by year usually on the eve of Communion. In
these pathetic documents one may read of the awe, the spiritual
strivings and fear and trembling of a person lest he should
not really belong to Christ.1 Religious observances for even
the simplest acts of social life were followed with almost
superstitious concern. Blessings were asked for every refresh¬
ment, whether it be coffee, tea, or ale. Prayer was offered
for anything and everything—especially by the devout and
clergy. Guidance was sought for each journey or each decision,
for the choice of a sermon text or when in states of grave
spiritual doubts. If one was faced with problems, all he
needed to do was prayerfully look to the Scriptures and
Providence would guide him to the right passage to calm his
mind. "In the early decades of the century the intense
religious fervour and faith which characterised the covenant¬
ing days retained all its influence and hold over great masses
of the people of all classes, and the belief in the potency
of prayer and in the constant interference of Providence with
every act of existence, however minute, was unbounded.The
laws of nature were regarded as conventional arrangements of
Providence which could be changed, stopped or reversed simply
by a prayer. In this egotistic concept, the Divine Being
1Por examples, see James Fraser, Memoirs of the Rev.
James Fraser of Brea, Minister of Culross (Aberdeen: George &
Robert King, 1560), p. 212; Wodrow, Analecta, I, 79J Selections
from the Family Papers preserved at Caldwell, ed. William Mure
(Glasgow: The Maitland Club, l'i.9 ), I, 2^5.
^Graham, Social Life, pp. 336-337.
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moved all creation to the events of each individual's private
affairs; every calamity, every good fortune was "sent." The
moods of the mind and the state of the body were interpreted
as divinely ordained. If a minister's spirits were low, this
was a sign of God's displeasure; if he was in good spirits
and preached with vigor this was regarded as the Lord's
approval. "There was nothing that occurred, no incident
however trivial, no circumstance however natural, which was
not believed specially directed to help, punish, or discipline
2
each mortal's life."
In times of general calamity such as famine or flood,
various alternative sins were listed and fasts were instituted
a common practice when faced with perplexity or emergency.
Often it was difficult to determine whether an event had been
wrought by the finger of Providence or the hand of Satan; and
it was a matter of no small consequence to decide if a particu
lar hardship was due to the Devil who was vexing a man or to
Heaven who was punishing him. In this credulous age the Princ
of Darkness held immense sway in the universe, in fact, the
general view of that day appears to have been one of a duel be
tween the powers of good and evil--each wielding the world of
nature for opposing purposes. Unseen spiritual agents were
Alexander Garlyle, The Autobiography of Alexander
Carlyle of Inveresk, ed. John Hill Btirton (London & Edinburgh:
T. N. Poulis, 1910), p. 21|_.
O
^Graham, Social Life, p. 339* For accounts of some of
these so-called miraculous events see Wodrow, Analecta. I, 12;
1.90.
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thought to influence man's life from birth to death,"'" and
every extraordinary event was viewed with awe. Omens, charms,
and relics of paganism and popish days still survived; and if
assistance was not forthcoming from Heaven, many individuals
sought aid from charmers and sorcerers. In the first quarter
of the seventeenth century, witchcraft was looked upon with
2
horror and profound belief and a number of charges were
brought before the kirk sessions, resulting in the death or
banishment of many withered, old women.
As a result of the austerity and intensity of reli¬
gious teaching which was inculcated by the ministrations of
the Church and the spiritual exercises of the home, even the
most upright individual had strange alternations of mood.
The stern doctrine of election was given such a place of
prominence that people found themselves at one time in abject
despair and anxiety, doubtful of their salvation and at other
times in inexnressible joy, confident that they belonged to
Christ. A man's spiritual well-being was made to rest upon
his emotions, and he believed he was saved or damned according
to his varying mood or spirit. Piety was forced into a child's
life and all that was bright and cheerful in religion was
%/odrow, Analecta, II, 330.
^In 1736 the Act against witchcraft was repealed. The
Seceding ministers denounced the repeal as a godless deed and
a repudiation of the Scriptural command not to allow a witch
to live. Although a fear of witchcraft continued among the
lower classes for some time, the educated people and most of
the clergy soon gave up such a belief. See Thomas Somerville,
My Own Life and Times 17-h-l-lSl.L (Edinburgh: Edmonston & Douglas,
I06I), p. 366.
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excluded.-*- The good life was a negative life—somber and
morbid—lacking in every enjoyment.
. . . the pleasures of the world were taken sadly;
boyish frolics were eyed askance, and sometimes with
keen ,reprehension; dancing was a carnal excitement,
cards a dangerous pastime, dicing was an impious game
(for lots were appointed by God for holy purposes as
recorded in Holy Writ), the theatre was the devil's
play-ground, and dancing assemblies were the recruiting
quarters for Satan's ranks. Books could not be too
carefully chosen, for poetry was fanciful, and tales
were frivolous and untrue; and such papers as the Tatler
and Spectator were not fit for well-disposed minds.
Even tolerant evangelicals did not venture to offend
pious conventionalities. . . .2
Advocating enlightenment and lending his efforts to
the "reawakening of Scotland," David Hume did not support
the popular religious views and practices of his day. We
shall see in subsequent chapters of this thesis that he made
explicit statements against the superstition and ignorance
manifested in the Church of Scotland and condemned the
theological systems which fostered bigotry and fanaticism.
We turn our attention now to the conflict which resulted from
a reaction to the narrow theological thinking of the Scottish
Church when the secular and scientific spirit began to grow
and material interests began to challenge the authority of
religion.
-kvodrow, Analecta, I, 86; 11^-115; II, 336.
Graham, Social Life, pp. 3^-5-3^-6. See also Ramsay
of Ochtertyre, op. cit. , II, passim; Caldwell Papers, II, 2o2;
Carlyle, op. cit. . p. l|_7.
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Theological Conflict
The central doctrines of Scottish Calvinism may be
found in the Westminster Confession of Faith.
According to this document, Adam as the federal
representative of the human race had determined its fate
once and for all by violating that unfortunate covenant
which he and the Deity had contracted with regard to the
forbidden fruit. The vicarious sacrifice had indeed been
offered; but the power to avail themselves of his expia¬
tion was to be communicated to only a few of the minority
to whom it had been made known; and these were to be
saved to show that God was merciful, as the rest were to
be damned to show that he was just.-*-
The prominent theologies formulated on the basis of this Con¬
fession emphasized the negative aspects of Calvinism. This
may be seen in the works of Professor Thomas Blackwell of
p
Aberdeen, a typical exponent of the old Scottish Theology.
The works of Thomas Boston also represent the teachings of
the Church at this time. Boston was popular both as a preacher
and a writer; his communion services attracted many worshippers
to hear his exhortations. Other Scottish ministers accepted
his theology without question, and his books--the Crook in the
Lot and the Fourfold State--were widely read throughout the
century. Boston's grim theology was the theology of the
Church and of the people; he is representative of the prevalent
type of thought and feeling. The Analecta and Correspondence
of Robert Wodrow provide excellent descriptions of the follies
and virtues of the age. Wodrow was saturated with old notions,
pious superstitions and quaint bigotries. Every tale of wonder,
■^■Mathieson, Scotland and the Union, p. 225.
p
For a brilliant picture of the theology of Blackwell
and other divines of this period, see Graham, Social Life, no.
393-1P.6.
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every word of a "saintly" man filled him with awe, reverence
and devout conviction; and these incidents are faithfully re¬
corded for the reader's edification.
Theological works, as well as the sermons of the day,
turned upon the "Fourfold State of Man"—the state of innocence
or primitive integrity; man's present helpless and sinful
condition; redemption through the mediator; the future life
of the elect and the reprobate."*" The Schema Sacra of Profes¬
sor Blackwell illustrates the legalistic view of religion which
held complete sway over the minds of the people. The creed
was mean and brutal; the beauty and significance of the
Scripture were destroyed by legal phraseology, and religion
resembled a process in a civil court. For example, in the
story of creation, Blackwell formulates the "motions" and
"resolutions" of the Council of the Trinity whose procedure
resembles the meeting of a presbytery. The Divine Mind found
that He could get "an additional revenue of glory by creating
rational creatures who should sing eternal hallelujahs." "A
motion was made" to this effect and was agreed to by the
Council of the Three-in-One. The Trinity a.gain assembled
and created man to fill the blank in the architecture of
the world: firstly, to declare God's perfections; to be a
"covenanting party to transact with the Trinity"; to bring
"'"The minister's choice of a text was largely acciden¬
tal, and the phrases of the Scripture were distorted to fit
the familiar doctrines of the creed. Consequently, there
was very little fresh thoxight put into the sermons, which
always concluded with practical applications and reflections.
[See Carlyle, op. cit.. p. 106.]
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wild beasts to subjection "by the stateliness of his person,
the majesty of his countenance, and the carefulness of his
voice"; to prevent angels supposing all things were created
for themselves; and, lastly, to "produce double return of
declarative glory to God.
In the present state of nature man finds himself
utterly depraved and corrupt, under the wrath of God. This
applies to every man, woman and child; nothing the natural
or unregenerate man does avails him anything. If it should
be objected that God was not fair in holding millions guilty
for a fault committed by one man, we are told that it was
"extremely kind" of God to make the fate of all future genera¬
tions depend on Adam's conduct. In the words of Professor
Blackwell:
What could be more kind than for the Creator to accept
the obedience of one man in the room of millions, and in¬
stead of exacting perfect obedience from each individual?
What could be more fair than to make a covenant with a
being formed perfect, and therefore the most likely to
keep the bargain, than to require it of each and all, who
would be more liable to break it? Surely if all mankind
had been present in the garden of Sden, they would
unanimously have agreed to such a proposal, and have
chosen Adam as their representative.2
Thomas Boston agrees with this. "It was certainly an act of
grace, favour, and admirable condescension in God", he says,
to enter into a covenant, and such a covenant, with his own
creatures." The Divine contract is, indeed, binding on all
•'•Thomas Blackwell, Schema Sacra: or, A Sacred Scheme
of Natural and Revealed Religion (Aberdeen: George King, lbb-1),
PP. .'4.1-51; 72-7it.
2Ibid. , pp. 169-19^-.
^Thomas Boston, Human ITature in its Fourfold State; of
?8
Adam's descendants because his posterity were present in his
loins and thus parties to the bargain. "The Lord put all
mankind's stock, as it were, in one ship; and, as we ourselves
would have done, he made our common father the pilot."'''
Since man's nature was considered as totally corrupt,
it was stated that no good thought or desire could possibly
2
enter the human heart. Acts of virtue, desirable as they
were, coiild not help towards salvation. It was the minister's
solemn duty to show that unregenerate morality can never
please God; to think otherwise was mortal sin. In man's present
state of wrath and curse, to believe in the value of his own
efforts at goodness was regarded as damnable heresy. Boston
addresses the unregenerate in this fashion: "All thy religion,
if thou hast any, is lost labour, as to acceptance with God,
or any saving effect on thyself. Art thou yet in thy natural
state? Truly, then, thy duties are sins. . . ."
Descriptions of the consequence of total depravity
were expressed with vigor and remorseless plainness of speech.
All the descendants of Adam deserve everlasting and infinite
torture. If an infant died before he reached an age to under¬
stand the mysteries of Calvinism, he must stand condemned for
all eternity. Such a doom was just and deserved, it was
incessantly argued; babes were lumps of wrath, children of
Primitive Integrity; Entire Depravity; Begun Recovery; and Con¬
summate Happiness or Misery (Edinburgh: Thomas ITelson, lcUi.2) ,
p. 22.
llbid-> P. 26. 2Ibid., p. 109. 3Ibid., pp. 116-117.
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hell."'" Men destroy cockatrices in the egg or kill serpents
at sight; God is just in condemning newly-born infants be¬
cause of their original corruption as heirs of hell.
Ministers seemed to revel in descriptions of the
eternal woes. With vivid imaginations they depicted the
horrors of the nether world and the terrors of the Lord.
"Everything in God is perfect of its kind and therefore no
p
wrath can be so perfectly fierce as his." Sermons con¬
tained blood-curdling details of the doomed enduring and
watching untold agony;^ it was emphasized that every sense
would be tormented but it would be impossible to tell which
was tormented the most. The miseries of the reprobate will
never awaken compassion in God, angels, or saints.^" Ghostly
^Ibid., p. 112.
p
Ibid. , p. lip.. Graham makes an interesting observa¬
tion concerning the use of the word "wrath" in his edition of
Boston's Fourfold State. It is stated that the word occurs so
often that "the printer, in his despair at every W in all types
having been used up--italics, capitals, and romans—has been
obliged to employ two Vs: thus, "Wrath." [Graham, Social
Life, p. I4.OO.J
^The lost "are chained in everlasting horrible dark¬
ness: and, whilst others triumph in the presence of God and his
angels, they have no other associates but grim and grizly devils
. . . and, while others sing the song of Moses and the Lamb,
these miserable creatures must howl and roar in everlasting
despair." Qjilliam Crawford, Dying Thoughts; in Three Parts
(Edinburgh: Alex. Brown, 1782), p. 2b{J ~
^""The godly wife shall applaud the justice of the
Judge, in the condemnation of her ungodly husband: the godly
husband shall say 'Amen' to the condemnation of her who lay
in his bosom: the godly parents shall say 'Hallelujah' at the
passing of the sentence against their ungodly child: and the
godly child, shall, from the bottom of his heart, approve the
condemnation of his wicked parents, the father who begat him,
and the mother who bore him." |3oston, on. cit., pp. lp.5-lp.6ij
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pictures of the torments of the lost and vivid descriptions
of the tortures of hell and the terrors of judgment to come
occupied a prominent place in almost every sermon. It was
fear the minister chiefly trusted to bring sinners to repen¬
tance. Such a creed had disastrous effects on morals, leading
many self-conscious individuals to melancholy despair whereas
those who considered themselves "elect" often lived a life
of indifference to duty."'"
According to the doctrine of election, God has arbi¬
trarily chosen some out of the multitudes of the lost to be
saved for His own pleasure and glory. The rest of humankind,
however virtuous, are everlastingly doomed to hell. The elect
only escape their righteous doom of endless torment by a sacri¬
fice to God and by sufferings equalling in intensity those
which the saved would otherwise be required to endure. In¬
finite vicarious agony being required to placate a holy God,
the sacrifice could only be offered by One who was at once
2
God and man--Jesus Christ. The atonement made by the Son of
God Is treated as a legal transaction, in which God, Christ,
and men are the several "parties" to a bond. The whole Cal-
vinistic process of salvation is detailed in dry, technical,
•'"It is said that lazy farmers left their crops to grow
in weeds on the supposition that they should not interfere with
the divine curse on the soil for Adam's sin. [Graham, Social
Life, p. 399.]
2There were some clergymen, called the "affectionate
preachers" who turned their hearers to love and gratitude for
One who bone so much agony for sinners. Their tender appeals
to move the congregation to faith were based on the ineffable _
grace of Christ rather than on the terror of God. fibid., p.ko8J
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and legal phrases. Christ is called the "Tryst," and man's
"surety," having "stroke hands with God" to take man's place
of punishment. Redemption is reduced to a mercantile trans¬
action or vulgar bargain and the Deity is made to appear as
a sharp, suspicious, legal practitioner. All the beauty of
religion vanishes and the atonement is robbed of its finer
moral and religious meaning in this grim "lawyer's" theology.*'"
The doctrine of election led to a dilemma and caused
many individuals great concern over the assurance of their
salvation. It was taught that God must be left entire liberty
to choose whomsoever He pleased, and no credit could be given
to His wretched and corrupt creatures if they happened to be
elected. Yet, men were urged to seek grace and threatened
with terrible penalties for failure to do so. Ministers fer¬
vently and tearfully begged men "to close with Christ's offer,"
"to get a grip on Him," "to have an interest in Him," "to
embrace Him" or "to be espoused to Him." But if the Deity
chooses for reasons inscrutable, it is difficult to see what
a man could do to senure salvation. Logically and theologically
the elect need do nothing; and as for the damned, there was
nothing they can do. This emphasis on election led to alter¬
nating exultation and despair in pious Christians; one day they
were full of certainty, the next they were in doleful doubt.
Assurance of salvation was a matter of spiritual emotion and
varied with a change of health or mood. "It was nothing but
a game of chance for poor suffering humanity, and all the odds
"'"Graham, Social Life, pp. 1^07-^09•
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were heavily against them. There was no trusting God to
play fair—in any merely human meaning of the word."
In comparison to its conception of Hell the Calvin-
is tic view of Paradise was indeed disappointing. The imagina¬
tion of the divines seemed to fail them when they attempted
to describe the felicities of heaven. It 'was pictured with¬
out color or excitement; the joys and occupations of the
elect consisted of ceaseless praise to the Deity and mutual
discourse upon God's grace in saving them. Celestial happi-
2
ness bore a marked resemblance to the Sabbath. An everlasting
prolongation of a Scottish Sabbath was a dull prospect to
many minds. Praise, worship, and meditations ceasing neither
night nor day did not make heaven worth attaining. Such a
monotonous existence had its disadvantages in recommending
repentance to sinners. This may partially explain the great
emphasis placed on the torments of the damned. At least, the
imagination found less difficulty in describing the eternal
torments of the damned than in picturing the everlasting joys
of the blessed.
This old Scottish Theology was attacked from several
quarters and gradually gave way to more enlightened views.
By the year 1720 the theological controversy in Scotland was
gaining momentum. Prior to this time there had been fierce
^"Greig, on. cit., p. lj.0.
2
It was a serious and searching question of that day
whether one found the Sabbath here a burden and if so how he
could expect to enjoy it forever in heaven. See George Brown,
Diary of George Brown. Merchant in Glasgow, 17li5-1753 (Glasgow:
Thomas Constable, l95o)> PP. 218-220.
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and incessant controversy, but it had been ecclesiastical
rather than theological. As we have noted, it had to do
with the question of church government, whether by prelates
or presbyters, and not with the fundamentals of the Faith
or the doctrines of the Church. Speculations on these
themes and even free expression of opinion regarding them
were hardly known before the eighteenth century. There was
little encouragement of free thinking in Scotland where un¬
belief was considered a crime and blasphemy was punishable
by death. In such turbulent and stormy times, theological
studies were not widely cultivated, '.'/hen Stuart despotism
was brought to an end and the hostilities of civil and eccle¬
siastical 3trife died down, an age of tranquillity began to
dawn. The union of the two governments encouraged social,
commercial and intellectual enterprise, and both Scotland
and England benefited from an interchange of sentiment. One
historian has summarized the situation in this way:
The history of the Church of Scotland from the middle
of the seventeenth to the middle of the eighteenth century
may be described as that of the decline of fanaticism under
a succession of powerful forces operating from without.
Such a force were the victories of Cromwell which overthrew
the ascendency of the zealots; such--if we look to their
ultimate effect--were the persecutions of Charles II; such
was the constructive statesmanship of William; such was
the Darien agitation; such was the Union; and such ...
were the new conditions which the Union Introduced. In
so far as its effect can be traced in the speculative as
well as in the practical sphere, this course of discipline
tended rather to a loosening than to a disturbance of be¬
lief; but in the quiet years which succeeded the Revolution
the Church was alarmed from., time to time by incursions of
the sceptical spirit. . . .
^"Mathieson, Scotland and the Union, p. 218.
Qk
With the development of material interests in the
seventeenth century, there came the growth of a secular
spirit, and religion was gradually dethroned from its supreme
place in the public counsels. "Thus it is that, subsequent
to the Revolution, religion no longer constitutes the warp and
woof of the story of the Scottish people, and becomes but one
of the diverse strands of which the entire web is composed.""*'
There were a number of concurrent factors which combined to
bring about the subordination of spiritual interests. The
Union of the Parliaments had been accomplished for the wel¬
fare of the nation in all its interests, and resulted in the
development of trade, commerce, industry and natural re-
2
sources. As men and women became acquainted with the manners
of other nations, prejudice was lessened and new notions
were introduced into gardening, farming, syle3 of clothing
and modes of living. With the changes in work and dress,
there came also changes in ways of thinking. Communication
with England brought more knowledge of literature and, conse¬
quently, wider views in religion.
The developing thought fostered by a scientific
spirit began to question the "foundations on which Christian
Europe had hitherto based its faith and its hopes.The
^Hume Brown, op. cit.. p. l8£.
^There were some individuals who reacted against these
developments and regarded improvements in human life as detri¬
mental to the welfare of the soul. See Robert Wodrow, 'The
Correspondence of the Rev. Robert Wodrow, ed. Thomas M'^rie
(Edinburgh: Wodrow Society, 18Ij.2-13.Il3), I, 67; Wodrow, Analecta,
I, 218-219. '
3Hume Brown, op. cit., p. 186.
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speculative spirit of such philosophers as .uescartes, Hoboes,
and Spinoza had opened the way to a critical evaluation of
man and nature and consequently, of traditional religion
which claimed to answer questions about God and man. By the
eighteenth century, thinkers throughout Europe were more or
less openly assailing both the origin and the content of the
Christian faith. In the Church of England the 1atitudinardan¬
ism of Archbishop Tillotson dominated English theology and
gave rise to controversies as to the nature and operation of
the Trinity."*" The Deists—Lord Herbert of Cherbury, Blount,
Tindal and Toland--raised the question of the rival claims
of natural and revealed religion. Hume Brown points out that
the Deistic position found its "definitive expression in the
Theologia Haturalis of Christian Wolff, in which it was pro¬
claimed that reason was the philosopher's stone by which all
knowledge and experience must be tested."^ The watchword and
battle-cry of the Aufkl&rung was reason and it was not long
until a rational interpretation of theology began to arise.
With the publication in 1696 of John Toland's Christianity
not Mysterious, a mass of rationalist opinion became focussed
on religious questions. The spread of rationalistic thought
divided the theologians of every country and excited con¬
siderable alarm in Scotland. The Deistic controversy affected
the life of Christianity not only as a system of doctrine but
as a system of ethics. "In the history of religion in Scotland
•Hlathieson, Scotland and the Union, pp. 219-220.
?
Hume Brown, oq. cit., p. 186.
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throughout the eighteenth century we discern the conflict of
these tendencies underlying all the controversies that
harassed and dismembered her national Church.""'"
The religious writings of the period indicate with
what vividness the growing spirit of scepticism was recognized
as an enemy of the foundations on which the Christian Faith
had hitherto rested. Those individuals who followed the
strict Covenanting path were grievously offended by latitudin-
2
arianism. Nevertheless, the growing temper of the age made
a reaction against a strict religion inevitable. The Church
under Calvinism had taken much too narrow a view of its
functions; its theocratic spirit was more Judaistic than
Christian. The exacting supernaturalism of the Kirk had
caused widespread discontent, and its concepts of the earthly
reign of "saints" and a commonwealth based on the laws of the
Bible had come to be questioned, even within the Church itself.
Attempts were now being made to modify theology and to harmon¬
ize it with the new intellectual and social attitudes.
llbid.
^Robert Wodrow reflects the perplexity confronting a
devout person who is curiously inquisitive of the novelties
of speculation [["Correspondence, II, 361, 3912 » and yet reads
with fear and trembling the works of the arch-seeptic Pierre
Bayle [[ibid., II, 12, 213]] • Wodrow is extremely disturbed that
the Divinity Students of Glasgow "very openly oppose the Confes¬
sion of Faith, and this spreads extremely through the young
merchants and others. ..." [Analecta, III, 170.] There are,of course, other events in the development of an enlightened
attitude towards religion which distress him even more. Not
only does he hear from Edinburgh of "secret Atheisticall Clubs"
imitated from the Hell-fire Club In London[ibid., 30S] , but
also he witnesses the entrance into the ministry of clergvmen
known as "Bright Youth" or the "Oratoriall Preachers" [[ibid.,IV, 238.J ^who feed their congregations the husks of heathen
morality instead of the substance of sound doctrine.
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There were, however, differences of opinion regarding
the manner in which the Church should encounter these tenden¬
cies.^" One class of ministers—the spiritual successors of
the Covenanters—contended that the human intellect should
not be allowed to examine Christian mysteries. They clung to
"the Faith" that had been handed down to them, without in
any way questioning its validity. They believed their reli¬
gion to be true and that was the end of the matter; to suggest
the possibility of error was a menace to the very foundation
of belief. Like the Jansenists of France and the Pietists in
Germany, these men held that religion could remain pure only
as man renounces the unnecessary distractions of this life and
looks forward to the tremendous prospect of the day of judg¬
ment. The Church could dwell with security within a rigidly
defined sphere; to venture outside this entrenched ground
would mean capitulation to the emeny. "In religion, as in
theology, they conceived, the only security against the new
O
peril lay in walking the way of their fathers."
In another class of theologians it seemed that the
opponents of Christianity should be met in quite a different
way. Instead of withdrawing from the field of battle, the
Christian should meet the enemy with the weapons of reason
and accommodation. Once the doctrines of religion were
adapted to common sense and its rules of conduct adjusted to
the life of the average man, the impugners of Christianity
^Hume Brown, op. cit., pp. 187-188.
2Ibid.
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would be disarmed. It was indeed possible and necessary to
place religion on a foundation from which it could not be
dislodged. The opposition of these two approaches to the
threat of rationalistic thought is discernable during the
first half of the eighteenth century in Scotland, and the
final result of their fundamental antagonism was the emergence
of two mutually repellent and irreconcilable types of reli-
1
gion.
The Church at this time was without a commanding mind
to control opposing tendencies and give unity to its actions.
Confronted with troubles from within the Kirk, the General
Assemblies were unable to agree upon the means of dealing
with the controversies which faced them.
As the history of religion has shown, the most dangerous
enemies of a church are the propounders of novel doctrines
within its own fold; and its gravest responsibility is
to mete judgment with charity to its erring sons. During
the quarter of a century that followed the accession of
George I, the absorbing business of the Church Courts
was the consideration of heresies which in the opinion
of the majority threatened the alternatives of schism or
disintegration.2
Peeling against heresy was still strong in Scotland.
In 1695! the Scottish Parliament ratified the Act of 16I4.9 which
made blasphemy a capital offence. In the following year the
General Assembly issued a warning against "the atheistical
opinions of the Deists." When we recall that as late as 169?
Thomas Aikenhead was hanged for blasphemy, it is with good
reason that Mathieson states that "the ministers who had
applauded the destruction of infidelity as represented by
1Ibid* 2ibid., p. 189.
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a penitent stripling were not likely to show much forbearance
when some of their own number attempted to loosen the shackles
of an iron-bound creed."*'*
The indirect cause of theological conflict in the
Church of Scotland was a dispute that arose among the English
Dissenters.2 As the writings of these controversalists were
being widely read, "the Scottish Church, so long ice-bound in
3
orthodoxy, was beginning to shake itself free."*^ The actual
disputes that arose during the first half of the century need
not detain us;^* the results of these controversies in bringing
^"Mathieson, Scotland and the Union, p. 222.
2
The occasion of the controversy was the republication
of the sermons of the Antinomian divine, Dr. Crisp. These
sermons raised the question whether a man believed instinctively
because he was justified, or whether he was justified on con¬
dition that he believed. Those who favored the second view
were called Neonomians because they regarded faith as a new
law distinct from the law of works. Neonomianlsm, allowing
some scope to reason, tended towards rationalism, an impossible
position for those who regarded faith as a supernatural gift.
"[See Mathieson, Scotland and the Union, pp. 226-227.3 Mathie-
son also points out that Arianism, the forerunner of Unitarian-
ism, took root among the Presbyterians at Exeter. The latitud-
? ianiarism spirit soon permeated the Presbyterians of Ulster,
and in 1705 at Belfast a society was established which insisted
"that conduct was more important than dogma, that honest doubt
or error could never be a crime, and that candidates for the
ministry should not be required to declare their assent to any
human standard of belief." [ibid., p. 227^ [Cf. W. E. H. Lecky,
A History of England in the Eighteenth Century (London: Long-
mans, Green and Co., 1902-0!}.), III, 20-22J The influence of
these new intellectual thoughts in England and Ireland extended
to Scotland also.
^Mathieson, Scotland and the Union, p. 228.
^*The main difficulties that faced the Church and called
for definite action on the part of the Courts were Bourignonism,
the teaching of John Simson, Professor of Divinity at Glasgow,
and the situation growing out of the condemnation of the
Marrow of Modern Divinity. See Hume Brown, op. cit., pp. 190-
191; Mathieson, Scotland and the Union, pp. 222-231}.; Henry P.
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about a more tolerant view in religion is of far more impor¬
tance for our study.
A strong party within the Church was dissatisfied with
the leniency shown in the treatment of the heretical teachings
of Professor John Simson of Glasgow. When the Marrow of Modern
Divinity (a favorite book of this party) was condemned, it be¬
came evident that a schism was inevitable. Conflict "elicited
and accentuated an antagonism of tendencies within the national
Church which was to be disastrous in the immediate future.""'"
The result was the secession of a group of extremely zealous
evangelicals. Men like Ralph and Ebenezer Srskine, James Hog
of Camock and Thomas Boston revolted against the authority
of the Church, contending that the Covenants had been neglected
2
and the Establishment had become defective.
For a year or two the Assembly tried various measures
of conciliation in order to reclaim the Seceders. But the
efforts of the Church to meet the Seceders' scruples and to
Henderson, The Religious Controversies of Scotland (Edinburgh:
T. & T. Clark, 1905), pp. 5-16; 20-Il3.
■'"Hume Brown, op. cit. , p. 191*
2
The main contention of the Seceders with the Church
was over the question of patronage and the settlement of
ministers. They claimed fop the people a voice in the selection
of pastors; consequently, when the Assembly of 1732 passed an
Act decisively showing that its sympathies were no longer with
popular election, the immediate occasion for secession was
provided. Doctrinal differences were, of course, contributing
factors to the schism, and eventually the time came when the
General Assembly could no longer humor and coerce Erskine and
his followers into subjection. See Hume Brown, op. cit.. pp.
192-195; Mathieson, Scotland and the Union, pp. 237-2/;9? William
Law Mathieson, The Awakening of Scotland (Glasgow: James Macle-
hose and Sons, 1910), pp. lb.5-157; Graham, Social Life, pp. 371-
91
win them back were futile; they were not to be placated. The
Church could not possibly meet their extravagent demands. In
the year 1736 they published a manifesto called the "Judicial
Testimony" which reviewed at great length the defections of
the Established Kirk since the fall of Ultra-Presbyterianism
in l65l. This verbose and fanatical work is an indictment
of the Church and society at large and provides a declaration
of the principles of the Seceders as well as a denouncement
of the want of principle in the Establishment."*"
Tiie fanaticism of the Secession document indicated
that these men could not have remained long in a Church which
was moving onward with the times and was soon to be governed
by a Moderate Party. The Seceders' position was in the
Covenanting tradition which resisted change whether in dress,
in farming, in social customs or in theology and worship.
These stern fanatics clung to the old ways of the past with
Its hard and repulsive features and refused to recognize
anything in progress but defection. They seemed to want the
bitterness and ignorance, even the superstition and cruelty,
Some of the sins enumerated v/ere: the failure to de¬
clare Presbytery to be of divine right; the failure to renew
the Covenants; the failure to mourn for the sins of the land;
Episcopal hirelings allowed to remain in their parishes; a
union with England which was not on the lines of the old
Covenanting union; toleration established by law; restoration
of patronage; the condoning of heresy in the professor's chairs;
condemnation of the Marrow of Modern Divinity; widespread Im¬
morality and sinful occasions of wantonness such as balls and
night assemblies; repeal of the penal statutes against witches—
a defiance of the law of Cod which said, "Thou shalt not suffer
a witch to live." [Act, Declaration and Testimony for the Doc¬
trine, Worship, Discipline and Government of the Church of
Scotland; (Edinburgh: James Jaffray, 1737)*j
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of the seventeenth century reproduced in the eighteenth.
They were stubborn and bigoted and their religion was repul¬
sive because it arrogated to itself the exclusive possession
both of principle and of piety. In a very real sense the
Secession was an advantage, for it carried off many ill-
humored individuals who would have disturbed the quiet and
hampered the progress and development of the Church if they
had remained in it."*" Schism finally became complete in 17!l0
when the Seceders were formally deposed by the General
2
Assembly, the majority of its members accepting the princi¬
ple that no order could be maintained in the Church if minis¬
ters refused to submit to the decisions of the Supreme Courts.
We shall see later how the conduct of the zealots
greatly irked David Hume, who was himself a man of sociable
and kindly disposition. He opposed religious enthusiasm as
strongly as he did superstition and ignorance and became
furiously angry at times--perhaps not without good reason.
Hume was encouraged by the growth of a secular spirit in Scot¬
land and agreed with certain aspects of the Moderate teaching
"^Graham, Social Life, p. 3^0.
p It is interesting to note the subsequent history of
the Secession Church . The Covenants were renewed and imposed
as a passport of admission for both ministers and members;
separation was rigidly enforced by making it penal for any
members to worship in a parish church. £See Mathieson, The
Awakening of Scotland, p. 232.J Eventually the stubborn temper
which had given rise to the Schism led to quarrels and con¬
troversies over points which were pointless and questions
not worth answering. There were schisms within the Schism and
secessions from the Seceders. [Ibid., pp. 232-233; Hume Brown,
on. cit., p. 291; Graham, Social Life, pp. 376-79; Mathieson,
Scotland and the Union, pp. 271-273.]]
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of the Church, which we now examine in more detail.
Growth of Moderatism^
The Covenanting tradition continued to be cherished
by the masses and the Seceders were able to gather around
them congregations composed largely of individuals who had
become dissatisfied with the milder moral preaching of the
"legal oreachers." "One of the main points iri the Secession
reasons of disruption from the Established Church—and they
sooke the mind of the Scottish evangelicals--was the intro¬
duction by the semi-rationalists of a utilitarian theory of
2
morality and religion." Many individuals felt that when the
Assembly condemned the Marrow it identified itself with the
growing humor of the times to turn religion into a mere moral¬
ity.-^ But the influences of culture and learning were rapidly
superseding the narrowness of thinking which had characterized
previous ages. Patronage continued a burning issue and was
opposed by a party of Evangelicals in the Establishment. It
was claimed that patronage allowed the admission of ministers
popularly supposed to be lukewarm or unsound. However, as
-'-See the following works for extensive treatments of
Moderatism: Hume Brown, op. cit., pp. 258-297; Mathieson,
Scotland and the Union, pp. 2^0-263; Mathieson, The Awairenine;
of Scotland, pp. 100-229; 21l0; Graham, Social Life, pp. 357-
355; klk-klb.
2H. F. Henderson, Religious Controversies, p. hr2. In
1726 on the motion of Willison, who complained "that a scan¬
dal was like to arise from legal preaching of morality, and
sermons where nothing of Christ was," an Act was drafted
against the new style of preaching, [wodrow, Correspondence,
III, 2I4.7, 257.]
^Hume Brown, op. cit., p. 191.
9h
Moderatism became dominant in the universities, there was a
growing reluctance to admit the popular claims.
The old theology in its endeavor to make God supreme
in all aspects of life had depreciated and opposed the revival
of learning and literature. Attempts were made to keep the
universities subservient by making all professors subscribe
to the Westminster Confession of Faith, and freedom was
restricted in matters of science and philosophy. As latitudin-
arian ideas spread throughout Scotland, "a natural reaction
took place against Calvinistic teaching, emphasising the
sovereignty and abiding presence of God, the insufficiency
of reason, and the continual need of the Holy Spirit's help
for the highest life,"-'- The national mind woke up to the
necessity of cultivating the intellectual as well as the in¬
dustrial side of life. Edinburgh, which had been gloomy and
lethargic since the beginning of the century, began to revive.
Citizens looked ahead as talk of improvements circulated. Old
ways and ideas were criticized, and men and women sought a
livelier existence. Less attention was given to the strict
prohibitions of the Church as the fierce spirit of fanaticism
disappeared under milder influences. Ignorance and supersti¬
tion were finally giving away. Even the power of the "wild
clergy" diminished; the old school of gospel ministers, with
their stern doctrines and menaces of judgment, were less
reverenced—their denunciations no longer terrorized, their
whine ceased to impress the educated classes.
3-Rose, op, cit., p. Il6.
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The spirit of moderat ism can be traced as far back as
the reign of William in 1690 when intolerance began to wane.1
Professor Simson is usually considered the true pioneer of
liberalism, but there were others who also contributed to the
2
growth of a moderate spirit in the Church. The temper of
the universities changed as men with broad and genial princi¬
ples of toleration and respect for conscientious conviction
entered the professorial ranks. Doctrines "which formerly
set forth the Deity as despotic, arbitrary, and vengeful—
even though they might be logically true to their creed--were
placed in an aspect more in harmony with humanity and not less
true to divinity. Gradually, as abetter quality of men
went to the universities, ministers with refinement, culture,
and breeding took their places among the clergy. Pulpit
Mathieson, Scotland and the Union, p. 251.
^-Professor Chalmers of Aberdeen and Professor Hamilton
of Edinburgh strongly supported Simson. The year of Simson's
suspension, Francis Hutcheson was appointed to the Chair of
Moral Philosophy in Glasgow. Hutcheson developed Shaftesbury's
idea of a moral sense "which approves and recommends such dis¬
positions as tend most to the public good." In Hutches on's
philosophy there was an attempt to prove the existence of a
"most benign Universal parent." His optimistic ethical teach¬
ing tended to harmonize Christianity with paganism—emphasis
was placed upon the beauty of moral virtue, the harmony of the
passions, and the dignity of human nature. See William Robert
Scott, Francis Hutcheson, His Life, Teaching and Position in
the History of Philosophy (Cambridge: University Press, 1900).
William Leechman, Professor Campbell of Aberdeen, the
two William Wisharts, George Wishart, and Robert Wallace were
also outstanding leaders in the early years of the Moderate
movement. See Ramsay of Ochtertyre, op. cit. , I, 2I4.O, 2lx9, 279;
Nathaniel Morren, Annals of the General Assembly of the Church
of Scotland (Edinburgh-: John Johnstone, 183^, I0I1O), I, 310;
II, 392-395.
^Graham, Social Life, p. lf.15.
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eloquence developed and coarseness of diction, manner and
thought gave way as learned clergymen began to enjoy the es¬
teem of the people.1 The young Scottish ministers differed
from the older fanatical evangelical preachers and tended
to adopt an ethical and undogmatic style of preaching. Criti¬
cism was often directed against them for their milder type
2
of sermon with less damnation and more morality. In the
Church courts heated debates often arose between the two
parties—the legal preachers or moralists and the evangelicals
or high-flyers.
The Moderates, revolting against both the theocratic
ideal of Scottish Presbyterianism and its narrow moral code,
led a movement within the Church for the raising of the intell¬
ectual and social status of the clergy, for the elimination of
enthusiasm and superstition, and for the harmonious relations
between Church and State. Moderatism was another manifestation
of the general movement known as the awakening of Scotland. In
sympathy with the spirit of Latitudinarianism in England and
the spirit of Enlightenment in Germany, the Moderate Party
attempted to effect an understanding with the world. Indus¬
trial expansion had diverted the minds of many individuals
from the theological interests of the past; there was a concern
■^■Ramsay of Ochtertyre, op, cit., I, 219-308.
^Caldwell Papers, I, 268. Wodrow regarded the new
school of clergy as "vivid sparks," "bright youths," "conceited,
exacting and dogmatic," men who "woefully evaporate on ques¬
tions and debates too high for them" and advocated a paganized
Christianity savoring of Socrates and Seneca. Jj/odrow, Corres¬
pondence, I, ij.6-6l.]
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for the problems of this life and less thought about the next.
Tendencies of scepticism and inquiry, widely prevalent among
the educated classes, called for an effort to adjust the Church
to the new scene of thought manifested in theology and reli¬
gion as well as in speculative philosophy, Moderatism attempt¬
ed to meet this demand for adjustment and gave its character
to ecclesiastical policy during the latter half of the eighteen¬
th century,"'"
The creed of the Moderate Party was not formally stated
2
and wide latitude of opinion was allowed. Such individuals as
William Robertson, the famous historian, Hugh Blair, the dis¬
tinguished preacher, and Thomas Reid, the great philosopher,
indicate that men of culture, taste, and broadmindedness were
now in the ranks of the Party. To a large degree the Moderates
left theology and dogma alone, ana in contradistinction to
traditional theology they preached the plain duties of daily
life--honest, charity, and good-neighborliness. One of the
salient characteristics of the group was an emphasis on good
works rather than faith, and on the ethical teaching to be
found in the Bible rather than on its mysteries.3 The crude
opinions of the old school of theology was left to the Seceders.
"'"Hume Brown, op, cit. , p. 289#
Individual professors adjusted the creed to the idio¬
syncrasies of their own minds and tempers. Some ministers
were content to preach "heathen morality" [see Carlyle, op.
cit., p. 290j, whereas others faintly tinged their sermons
with emotion which had its source in their own sympathetic
temperament, rather than in any spiritual rapture. [Hume
Brown, op. cit. , p. 289.J
3 Ibid.
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The harsher tone of the past changed to milder strains in con¬
formity to the reaction among the educated laity against the
fanatical spirit and teaching. Enthusiasm in religion was dis¬
trusted, and zeal was looked dorm upon as savoring of a self-
righteous attitude. Many of the Moderate clergy attached no
mystical significance to faith and tended to minimize the
supernatural. The more philosoohical members of the clergy
magnified reason and emphasized the natural goodness and self-
sufficiency of man's nature and its power under the guidance
of reason and culture to reach the highest results."*" Human
nature being naturally good, man is capable of gaining salva¬
tion by good behavior, in obedience to conscience and reason.
Thus, from a doctrinal point of view, the tendency of
the Moderates was towards a relaxation of the rigid theories
of Calvin and the adoption of undisguisedly rationalistic
views. This drift to "mere morality" and rationalism, with
its emphasis upon reason and good works rather than upon the
"mysteries of revealed religion," led to charges of Socinian-
ism and Deism against the Moderate Party.^ The movement of
rationalism became a dominant one in the eighteenth century
and in Scotland the Age of Reason produced Moderatism.^ Being
rooted in the rationalism of the period, Moderatism embraced
the doctrine of the all-sufficiency of human reasoning. This
^•Rose, on. cit., p. Il6.
^Robert Rait and George S. Pryde, Scotland (2nd ed.,
London: Ernest Benn, Ltd., 195>1l) , p. 263.
^A. J. Campbell, op. cit., p. 3I4..
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concept David Hume completely repudiated, but he found it easy
to ally himself with the Moderates in their literary endeavors.
In so far as Moderatism formulated a standard of
Christian conduct it was removed from the traditions of the
Covenants. The pleasures of life were not banned and the
clergy came into closer contact with society. A member of
the Church was taught "to realize that he was also a member of
Society which had its own legitimate sphere and function."
By identifying themselves with the growing taste for litera¬
ture, philosophy and science, the Moderates were able to
contribute to the great and wholesome change wrought by the
Awakening in Scotland.
During the years 1750-1770 the Church held a high
place in attainments, position, and esteem. Its literary
and cultured clergy expended practical energy for advancement
and improvement - in trade and agriculture as well as in litera-
p
ture. The General Assembly was composed of men of ability,
and ministers of distinguished talents entered into debates
with elders who were among the most accomplished and brilliant
Scotsmen.^ The Assembly of 1751-!- included among its elders,
nine peers and five lords of session; a great many of the
"'"Hume Brown, on. cit. , p. 290.
2
The Moderates had what the Evangelicals lacked--
the genius of literary expression. Most of the evangelical
literature of the eighteenth century was entirely divorced
from letters and was written in a local style which soon
passed away. Many of these theological treatises defied
both grammar and philosophy.
3Henry Mackenzie, "An Account of the Life and Writings
of John Home," prefixed to The Works of John Home, Esq. (Edin¬
burgh: Archibald Constable and Co., Ic322), p. 61.
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other members were baronets, lairds, and advocates of high
standing at the bar and in society."*" In Edinburgh the clergy,
by their rank and ability, were in the highest circles of
society and exerted great influence both socially and in¬
tellectually.
The policy of the Moderates was largely determined
by their type of religion. They endeavored "to fill the Church
with ministers who by their teaching and social qualities
would commend religion to the classes whose adhesion it was
2
the interest of a national church to secure." To effect
harmonious relations between Church and State, supremacy was
given to the civil law and strict observance of the powers of
the various bodies within the Church was required. The latter
scheme meant a due subordination of the Church's different
Courts, "involving the supreme jurisdiction of the General
Assembly in all matters -under dispute. It was argued that
just as discipline was a keystone of the social fabric and
when ."denied led to rebellion and anarchy, so also the sub¬
ordination of inferior courts was necessary to the very
existence of the Church. Indifferent to the scruples of the
evangelical clergy and to the wishes of the people, the
Moderates carried out the law of patronage. The ri^its of
patrons to presentation were rigidly enforced, since the
congregations as a whole tended to select bigots of the strict
^-Graham, Social Life, p.
2Hume Brown, op. cit., p. 290.
3Ibid., p. 292.
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covenanting faith. Thus, doubting the capacity of the people
to judge what kind of minister would be best for them, the
Moderates were reconciled to patronage which tended to favor
their own type. In spite of protests and secession, the
Church advanced towards a complete acceptance of the patron¬
age laws,"'" and Moderatism entered its heyday, chiefly because
p
"it reflected the tone of the educated opinion of the day."
Meanwhile the Kirk of Scotland was by no means with¬
out its Evangelical Party viiich gained support from the masses
who desired a more devotional type of preaching than that
supplied by the Moderate clergy. The popular party, sometimes
disparagingly called the Highflyers or Wild Party, "made
o
their voices heard in the Assembly, and not ineffectually.
They "repudiated the doctrine of their opponents as worthy
of 'priests beyond the Sea,' and as raising ecclesiastical
rule to a pitch which had never been attained in civil
affairs • . . and they insisted that both conscience and
private judgment must be stifled if a man was to yield un¬
questioning obedience up to the point at which he became
"'"The Moderate policy was so strongly advocated and
vigorously carried out that unfortunate results ensued. In
1752 Thomas Gillespie was deposed for disobeying the orders
of the Assembly while others as contumacious as himself were
left unpunished. This harsh, high-handed measure of the Mod¬
erates to make Gillespie the scapegoat eventually led to the
formation of the Relief Church in 1761. See Graham, Social
Eife, PP» 379-80J Mathieson, The Awakening of Scotland, pp.
165-169; Hume Brown, 00. cit., p. 293.
2Ibid. , p. 293.
8ibid. The Highflyers were the cause of much animosity
being directed against David Hume. See infra, pp. 27li~279.
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willing to withdraw from the Society or to concur in its
dissolution. "■*■ Many people to whom religion was of prime
importance resented the loss of a right to choose their o?m
ministers; consequently, the number of meeting-houses outside
the Establishment increased as worshippers joined the Seceders.
This ominous outlook for the future of the Church was seized
upon by the Evangelicals as an opportunity of pressing home
what they alleged was the main cause of defection, and by
// 2
17o6 the reign of the Moderates began to be disputed. In
1781 Robertson resigned the leadership of the party and four
years later the Evangelicals came into power.
Moderatism had been the result of a general movement
of thought— the Intellectual Revival which swept over Europe.
A later evangelical generation deplored the reign of the
Moderates "as a period of spiritual deadness, of neglected
parishes, of unvisited people, of forsaken death bed and
comfortless preaching.But in point of fact, Moderatism
even with all its faults, brought about many good things in
Scotland. It directed attention to science, philosophy, and
literature and did much to broaden men's minds. The discipline
of the Church was relaxed and public penance abolished; toler¬
ance and culture were advocated and moral principles preached.
The Moderates offered a religion that was cool, respectable
and rational; they disbelieved in overmuch zeal. Yet, their
■^Mathieson, The Awakening of Scotland, p. 15>7«
2
Hume Brown, op. cit♦ , p. 29^-.
^Graham, Social Life, p. 383.
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gospel of culture rested on a superficial estimate of human
nature and was insufficient when confronted with the grim
realities of life. The theory of the natural goodness of
man proved to be a poetic imagination and met with considerable
evangelical opposition during the time of the French Revolu¬
tion. "In l?Sl appeared Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, which
gave the deathblow to the rational philosophy of Wolff of
which Moderatism was only a modified manifestation.""'" Hence,
the ultimate defeat of the Moderates' doctrine of the all-
sufficiency of reason was brought about, and the way was made
for new waves of evangelicalism to sweep Scotland in the
following centTJry.
The following estimate was made by the historian,
William Law Mathieson:
... the Moderates, for the most part, were undogma-
tic preachers, polished gentlemen, men of the world; ...
the chief object of their policy was to foster in the
Church an enlightened, rational, tolerant spirit; and
. . . —if we may compare small things with great—they
had no more compunction In using patronage to crush
popular prejudice and passion than had a Pombal or a
Joseph II in employing for a similar purpose the resources
of absolute power. We may smile at liberalism so illiberal;
but the alarm excited by the up-rising of the masses and
the tyranny of half-educated ooinion, which followed their
partial emancipation, were equally detrimental to the
progress of thought; and some three-quarters of a century
were to elapse before religious and scientific specula¬
tion recovered the freedom it had lost.^
Religion in Scotland in the eighteenth centtry was
characterized by the rivalry of two main theological positions.
The sentimental type of religion, exemplified in the Calvinism
"'"Hume Brown, op. cit.. p. 293#
^Mathieson, The Awakening of Scotland, p. 2I4.O.
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of the early years of the century and carried on in the
thought of the Seceders, based its system primarily on feeling
and tended to foster superstition and fanaticism. In opposi¬
tion to this the Moderates in the Church formulated a reli¬
gion based on reason and emphasized the importance of morals
in life here and now. David Hume did not entirely accept or
completely repudiate either of these views. He saw the
truth in the sentimentalist's claim that religion is a matter
of faith or belief and rests more on feeling than on reason;
but he was perturbed at the excesses of fanaticism and enthu¬
siasm which developed in the lives of people vho advocated
this view. Hume denied one of the basic postulates of the
Moderate Party—that reason is the basis of religion--but he
agreed whole-heartedly with their ecclesiastical policies of
patronage and tolerance, with their desire to advance learning
and to bring about an enlightenment in Scotland and with
their ideas concerning the importance of morals in the reli¬
gious life. As we shall see later, Hume believed there was
a definite place for reason in the formulation of moral and
religious systems, but he did not agree that they could be
based on reason and defended rationally—as the Rationalists
and Deists attempted to do. We are now ready to study the
life and work of David Hume in an effort to understand his
attitude towards religion as he experienced it in his own
age.
CHAPTER III
DAVID HUME - STUDENT OP HUMAN NATURE, 1711-173ij.
Introduction
David Hume was without doubt greatly influenced by
the ecclesiastical events of the eighteenth century. The
formative years of his life were exposed to theological
opinions and religious practices which had a lasting effect
upon his thought. It will only be possible to indicate, in
a general way, the nature of these religious influences be¬
cause we have very few particulars concerning Hume's youth.
But since the education of every man begins at home, it is
of the utmost importance to learn as much as we can about
the early training of David Hume, the erudite scholar and
bold man of letters.
Boyhood Years at Ninewells
Hume says no more about his education than that he
"passed through the ordinary course of education with success.""'"
His father, who died when David was still an infant, had no
opportunity of aiding in the intellectual development of his
youngest son. Hume tells us in his short autobiography:
My Family, however, was not rich; and being myself a
younger Brother, my Patrimony, according to the Mode of my
Country, was of course very slender. My Father, who passed
for a man of Parts, dyed, when I was an Infant, leaving me,




Mother, a woman of singular Merit, who, though young
and handsome, devoted herself entirely to the rearing
and education of her Children.
This was written when Hume was sixty-five years of
age and indicates that his mother had much to do with the
training of her children. Although we cannot determine the
full extent of this influence on David, it may be stated that
he owed a heavy debt of obligation to his mother for a great
deal of his early intellectual training. That he recognized
this and that the mother was held in tender affection by her
son is illustrated from two extant letters. Writing in the
year 17^1-3 to Alexander Home, David Hume says, "I shall en¬
deavour to make the Town some Amends, Tho' later than I at
first intended, because of my Mother's bad State of Health,
whom I am unwilling to leave for any time, in her present
Condition."^ Again in a letter of 17^-5 he mentions "My
Mother's Death, which makes such an immense void in our
3
Family."^ There is also the story of his reaction when the
announcement of her death reached him in London. Alexander
Carlyle repeats what Patrick Boyle, one of Hume's most in¬
timate friends, told him on the subject:
When we were talking of David, Mrs. Carlyle asked Mr.
Boyle if he thought David Hume was as great an unbeliever
as the world took him to be? He answered, that the world
judged from his books, as they had a right to do; but he
thought otherwise, who had known him all his life, and
mentioned the following incident. 'When David and he vie re
both in London, at the period when David's mother died,
Mr. Boyle, hearing of it, soon after went into his apart¬
ment—for they lodged in the same house—when he found
^•Letters, I, 1. ^Letters, I,
^New Letters, p. 17.
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him in the deepest affliction and in a flood of tears.
After the usual topics of condolence, Mr. Boyle said to
him, 'My friend, you owe this uncommon grief to your
having thrown off the principles of religion; for if you.
had not, you would have been consoled by the firm belief
that the good lady, who was not only the best of mothers,
but the most pious of Christians, was now completely
happy in the realms of the just.' To which David replied,
'Though I throw out my speculations to entertain and em¬
ploy the learned and metaphysical world, yet in other
things I do not think so differently from the rest of
mankind as you may imagine.'1
There are three points in this passage which have an
important bearing on our present study. First, in reference
to his mother's death, Hume was said to have been deeply
grieved which leads us to conclude that he had a high regard
for her and cherished her memory; he was conscious of the pro¬
found influence she had exerted over his life. Second, if we
are to take Boyle's comments as trustworthy (and there is no
reason why we should think otherwise in this connection),
Hume's mother was regarded as a pious Christian as well as a
devoted parent. It is highly probable", then, that in her
concern for the spiritual development of her children, David's
mother was the first person to introduce religious topics to
his mind. Third, (and there is some difficulty as to what we
are to take the statement really to mean) Hume says that his
speculations were directed towards the "learned and metaphysi¬
cal world" and that in the other things of life his thoughts
were very much like the rest of mankind. A discussion of
this third observation will be presented in a subsequent chap¬
ter. At this point, we wish to examine the religious influences
3-Carlyle, op. cit. , p. 287.
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Hume met in his home and in the parish school and kirk at
Chirnside.
The ecclesiastical controversies and the theological
teachings which Hume encountered in Scotland in the beginning
of the century have already been discussed in Chapter Two; the
problem now before us has to do with the effect of eighteenth
century religious life upon him. In religion, the Home"*"
family were Presbyterian, members of the Established Church.
It is quite certain that the three children of Joseph and
Katherine Home were baptized as infants and remained members
of the Church of Scotland throughout their lifetimes. An
entry in the Edinburgh baptismal Register runs as follows:
"Edinburgh, 26th Aprile 1711 fo. sj] . Mr. Joseph Home of
Ninewells, advocat, and Katherine Ffalconer, his lady. A
S[on]N[araed2 David. w(itnessesj : George, Master of Polworth,
Sir John Home of Blackadder, Sir Andrew Home, advocat, and Mr.
Alexander Pfalconer Junior, advocat. Born this day." In the
margin an annotator of the Register has written: "The child
here registered is the celebrated David Hume Historian and
David Hume made the change in the soelling of his
name sometime between the years 1726 and 173fi_. Greig surmises
that there were hidden motives for the change and suggests that
it dates from a time of crisis when Hume had fallen out of sym¬
pathy with his family. He had disappointed them in their plans
for his occupation and even went so far as to repudiate their
religious beliefs. All this points to an emotional rather than
a rational motive and Greig contends the change in spelling
symbolizes revolution or independence and a break with what was
past. [See J. Y. T. Greig, David Hume (London: Jonathan Cape,
1931) > P» 25-26.1 That the change in spelling did not take
place before 1726 is indicated by the fact that in a set of
Shaftesbury's Characteristics there is the signature "Da:
Home" with that date. See infra, p.ll6.
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Philosopher.
As far as David was concerned, he appears to have felt
no close ties with the Church after his university days when
a new scheme of thought was opened to him. He had very little
to do with the clergy until about 1753 when be became friends
with some of the members of the Church of Scotland. That Hume
remained, nevertheless, a member of the Church may be inferred
from the overture brought before the General Assembly in the
year 1755. The Assembly was requested to censure Hume for his
heretical writing and those demanding trial contended that he
had been baptized by the Church and had never renounced his
baptism. They went on to argue that he frequently referred
in his books to "our holy religion" and that he was known to
associate with professing Christians who voluntarily communi¬
cated with him. Some clergymen were even in the habit of
visiting him, which it was presumed they would not be likely
to do if he had openly separated himself from the Church. In
effect it was complained that Hume "retained the Christian name,
when he had forfeited all right to it." For these and other
reasons, it was argued that he should be formally excluded by
2
the Assembly.
Although the Assembly under the leadership of the
Moderates declined to prosecute Hume, there is no evidence
that he did not in fact consider himself a rightful member of
-'-"Parochial Registers, Co. of Edinburgh. B. 1708-ll{.";
Vol. 685 (i), no. 15, New Register House, Edinburgh.
P "An Account of the debate upon the motion for cen¬
suring infidel writers," in Scots Magazine, XVIII, (June 1756),
280-2ol|.. See infra, pp. 281-2%.
110
the Church. There was much that he felt compelled to criti¬
cize in the rationalistic apologetics of natural religion and
the attempts to establish the Gospel of Christ on principles
of human reason. Likewise, there certainly were doubts in his
mind as to whether the human ecclesiastical institutions which
had been established up to that time had had any value as
agencies for the expression of religious ideas. As far as
Hume was able to determine, the Church had not done much for
the betterment of human morality, a basic interest for him.
There was a deep conflict between Hume and the Church of Scot¬
land; betv/een Hume and the religion of his day. But, as far as
we can discover, Hume was not opposed to a religion based on
faith and it appears that he hoped to establish the grounds
for a philosophical theism by means of his own religlous en¬
quiries. Until some better means of expressing a true religion
of mankind was found, Hume seems never to have felt it necessary
to renounce his membership in the Church. He did, in fact,
associate with various members of the Moderate party from ?/hom
he received much enjoyment in intellectual discussions and
social fellowship. But this is to get ahead of the story; we
must go back to the years of Hume's boyhood.
The quiet country dwelling at Ninewells was the scene
of David's early training. It was here that he returned many
times in later life; he seemed to find its retirement profit¬
able for his abstract thinking and historical studies. David
owed a large part of his education to his mother, and she
would be likely to recognize very early his intellectual ability
Ill
and originality of thought. John Hill Burton describes her
in the following terms:
. . . Mrs. Home was evidently an accomplished woman,
worthy of the sympathy and respect of her distinguished
son, and could not have failed to see and to appreciate
from its earliest dawnings the originality and power of
his intellect. Her portrait . . . represents a thin but
pleasing countenance, expressive of great intellectual
acuteness.l
Ernest Campbell Mossner, a present day biographer of Hume,
conjectures that David's mother must have been independent
and firm of mind and affectionate of nature. "The Nfnewells
family presumably attended church regularly (as they were, in
fact, required to do by lav;) and were regarded as religious
and god-fearing people. All surviving comment on Katherine
2
Home indicates that she was sincerely and deeply religious."
But for more than such general descriptions we are at a loss
to characterize the lady who had such a great influence on
our philosopher-to-be.
There has been much speculation concerning the meaning
of a reputed saying of Hume's mother: "Our Davie's a fine good-
natured crater, but uncommon wake-minded.Huxley finds this
utterance perplexing and cannot believe Hume's mother was so
obtuse as to make such a statement about her great son,^-
Burton tries to explain it as resulting from an observation of
"'"John Hill Burton, Life and Corre soondence of David
Hume (Edinburgh: William Tait, 131-j.b), I, 2%-n. The portrait
Burton was describing has seemingly disappeared.
O
Ernest Campbell Mossner, The Life of David Hume
(Edinburgh: Nelson, 19£ij.), p. 27.
^Burton, op. cit., I, 29lpn. ^"Huxley, op. cit., p. 2.
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David's phlegmatic and unimpassioned disposition and states
that "the anecdote is not characteristic of either party."
Calderwood's treatment of this supposed judgment by Hume's
p
mother is indeed both interesting and plausible. He believes
the saying could hardly be an invention and attempts to explain
it in terms of Hume's questioning and doubting when others had
no doubt. It would be the natural thing for a mother, affec¬
tionately interested in her son's intellectual well-being, to
notice the character of many of his questions. These utterances
were seemingly too advanced for a child and demanded some deep
thinking on the part of the parent if any answer was to be
given. Calderwood concludes that Himte's mother "would have
been startled, probably irritated, had she been told that she
meant to suggest 'stupidity' as characteristic of her David,
even when his talk showed a disregard of common sense. His
was an uncommon weakness, associated with uncommon acuteness."3
J. Y. T. G-rei^4-also deals with the traditional saying
and regards it as at least well invented and very possibly a
genuine one. His reasoning differs from Calderwood's however,
in regard to the meaning of the statement. Greig argues that
David's mother was concerned with her children's firm establish¬
ment in life and it was her younger son "who was proving to be
a wayward and eccentric child." He had abandoned law in order
"^"Burton, op. cit., I, 291]-.
^Calderwood, op. cit., pp. 12-11]..
3ibid., p. lip. "hlreig, op. cit., p. 66.
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to spend his time in reading and writing down his thoughts.
It is suggested that laxity in attending Church services, argu¬
ments with Hume's minister uncle, and disputations about holy
Gospel truths would cause consternation to Mrs. Home's mind.
Not only had David appeared to have lost his religion but he
was also ambitious to be a famous man of letters—a thing
which the wife of a Scots laird would consider "foreign, Eng¬
lish and unnecessary." Mossner quite aptly remarks: "The good
Lady of Ninewells may be forgiven for her seeming obtuseness
in view of her son's mental and physical anguish of the follow¬
ing five years [after his abandoning the law in 172^3 and of
his financial problems of the following fifteen years.Of
course anything that may be said about the statement of Hume's
"uncommon wake-mindedness" must be merely speculative, and the
several explanations may each, in fact, contain an element of
the truth. But if we accept Greig's interpretation of the
statement, it should be kept in mind that Hume's "complete
loss of religion" was simply the judgment of a very pious
mother and need not have expressed his own feeling about the
matter.
We cannot tell for certain where the family lived
between the years 1711-1713 when Joseph Home was still alive;
but it seems probable that when he died, the widow and her
children resided most of the time at Ninewells until the sons
were old enough to attend the University, when they would then
move to their own Edinburgh house. The library to be found at
•^Mossnsr, The Life of David Hume, p. 66.
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Hinewells was no doubt meager; it very probably contained some
of Joseph Home's books on law, the Bible, (and the Catechisms),
together with some Latin classics. Greig makes the following
conjecture about the books contained in the house where Hume
grew up:
It is pretty certain that his mother would possess, and
now and then read, several pious works, such as Geddes's
The Saint's Recreation, and a few books of sermons; she
might also have the Book of Palmistry, a herbal, and at
least one Rules of Good Deportment. Of real literature
the house is not likely to have boasted more than twenty
volumes all told—let us say a Virgil, and a Livy, Cicero's
Orations. Pliny's Natural History, Dryden's Poems, half a
dozen Tatlers and Spectators, and more doubtfully a
Shakespeare.f
Greig is inclined to believe that it is very unlikely
that Hume acquired his passion for literature at home; neither
is there reason to suppose that he met with the authors of
polite letters at the parish school at Chirnside where he
and his brother John probably received their first formal
education. The Laird of Ninewells was the chief man of sub¬
stance in Chirnside; he and the parish minister George Home,
who was David's uncle by marriage, decided where there should
be a school and who shoxild be the teacher. It would certainly
not be to their interests to have someone who was other than
completely orthodox, as a schoolmaster for their children.
Thus, Greig contends, we may feel pretty certain that Hume
did not become acquainted with the literature that was to
arouse in him the "ruling Passion of my Life, and the great
Source of my Enjoyment," until his university days or after.
1Greig, op. cit.. p. 33.
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Mossner, on the other hand, takes a somewhat different
view and believes that "the library of a family of upwards of
two centuries in the same place, though perhaps no scholar's
haven, would not have been inadequate for the early education
of the children; and with so many lawyers in and connected with
the family, there would also have been a fair number of profes¬
sional works. Basing his argument on Hume's s tatextents that
he was reading at an extremely young age,^ Mossner remarks:
Without being fanciful and without attempting to en¬
dow him with the literary precociousness of the admirable
Crichton, or even of the more recent Bentham-Macaulay-Mill
variety, it is yet necessary to provide this 'infant' David
with home-reading materials in literature beyond the ob¬
vious school textbooks, the family Bible and Catechisms
and religious works, and the ancestral legal tomes. I
have little hesitation, therefore, in furnishing Nine-
wells with a fair range of the Latin Classics in prose
and poetry, a few of the Greek, a few more of the French,
and a miscellaneous lot of the English, including, certain¬
ly, Shakespeare, Milton, and Dryden, as well as the more
recent Tatlers and Spectators and Pope .... Yes, be¬
yond all fear of contradiction, David Hume acquired his
passion for literature and nurtured his ambition to be¬
come a man of letters at the family home.3
Be this as it may, the youth David Hume was vitally
interested in letters by the year 1727 when he wrote, ". . .
•^•Mossner, The Life of David Hume, p. l6.
^"You must know then that from my earliest Infancy, I
found alwise a strong Inclination to Books and Letters."
[Letters. I, 13.]"I . . . was seized very early with a passion for Lit¬
erature which has been the ruling Passion of my Life, and the
great Source of my Enjoyments." [Letters, I, 1]
"Had I a Son I shou'd warn him as carefully against the
dangerous Allurements of Literature as K James did his son
against those of Women; tho' if his Inclination was as strong
as mine in my Youth it is likely, that the warning would be to
as little °urpose in the one case as it usually is in the
other." [Letters, I, li6l]
3Mossner, The Life of David Hume, p. 30-31.
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just now I am entirely confined to my self & Library for Di¬
version. . . This, by the way, was a lad of only sixteen
speaking and from the tone of the rest of the letter it is
quite apparent that the writer had been employed in intellectual
pursuits for quite some time. A further piece of evidence con¬
firming Hume's early acquaintance with literature has recently
2
been discovered. In the library of the University of Nebraska
there is a three-volume set of Shaftesbury's Characteristics,
third edition (1723). Sach volume is signed "Da: Home" and
dated 1726 indicating that Hume had acquired the set at the
age of fifteen. Whether he was actually interested in litera¬
ture before the university years of 1722-23 is difficult to
say, but David certainly was introduced to philosophical works
at this time as we shall note very shortly. His phrase "earliest
Infancy" may or may not be taken as literally referring to the
very beginnings of his intellectual activities. Nonetheless,
the age of eleven years is an early age to be seized with a
passion for literature which was to continue throughout a life¬
time. Hume frequently spoke of returning "to Books, Leizure,
& Solitude in the Country," and of "an inward reluctance to
leave my books, and leisure and retreat." In 17^4-7 he was con¬
fronted with the decision whether to "return to my Studies at
3Ninewells" or to remain in London.
In his biography of David Hume, G-reig makes the statement
1Letters, I, Q.
2
Mossner, The Life of David Hume, p. 31•
^Letters, I, 9> 111; New Letters, p. 25.
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that the question of religion in Hume's life is important and
"we can never hope to understand David Hume the man, and his
ways of thought, without an understanding of the Scottish Kirk,
its discipline, its form of worship, and its doctrines.He
then proceeds to describe the Scottish Calvinism of the early
eighteenth century. This presentation, though somewhat specu¬
lative at times, is on the whole a good analysis of the reli¬
gious influences that were brought to bear on Hume when still
a boy. But Greig accepts the traditional interpretation of
Hume as an infidel or atheist and endeavors to show how infi¬
del opinions first arose in Hume's mind and fructified in the
Treatise. It would be well for us to note briefly some of the
influences Greig has pointed out and then go on to see upon
what evidence the traditional view of Hume as an infidel is
based. Hume certainly repudiated the kind of religion he was
acquainted with in his youth, but it is by no means certain
that this change of attitude can be taken to mean a complete
rejection of all religion.
During the years 170[j.-17l-l-l the kirk at Chirnside was
pastored by the Reverend George Home who had married Joseph
Home's sister.-^ Being David Hume's uncle, we may feel quite
certain that George Home would be concerned with his nephew
David's religious training. We are unable to tell with cer¬
tainty what type of theology he stood for, but Greig presents
a number of good reasons for believing that Home was one of
1Greig, op. cit.t p. 36. 2Ibid., pp. 63-108.
^Hew Scott, op. cit., II, 3^-35>.
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the zealots, "the godly ministers" or Evangelicals of that day."^"
For one thing, the parish at Chirnside was known for a Presby-
terianism of the truculent, uncompromising attitude. In 1676
some forty Covenanters were proscribed for attendance at con¬
venticles and later in 1689 the Reverend Henry Erskine, father
of Ralph and Ebenezer, the Seceders, was the Chirnside minister;
p
he had been imprisoned several times for non-conformity. After
Erskine's death in 1696, no doubt his parishioners held in
memory the influence of preaching such as his, which Thomas
Boston is said to have warmly praised. Even as late as 1873
Chirnside was the only parish in Berwickshire to have a Cam¬
eron!an Church and congregation. George Home himself could
boast a covenanting father, Alexander Home of Kennetsidehead,
who had suffered martyrdom for his religious beliefs in the
year 1682. Thus, having this family tradition in a parish
where he served for forty years, George Home at least outwardly
must have been an enthusiastic, fanatical, and intolerant
zealot, the type of Christian which David Hume came to dis¬
like so violently.
Greig pictures the Calvinism of Hume's childhood in a
very dark light and fails to see any positive contributions to
the boy's development from this legalistic Presbyterianism.
"We shall not go far wrong, therefore, in assuming that the
sermons David Home the boy listened to (or made pretence of
listening to) when he went to kirk at Chirnside, did not
^Greig, on. cit., pp. 36-37.
2Hew Scott, op. cit., II, 3I4..
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differ in theology or manner, though perhaps a great deal in
qualitjr, from the sermons preached by Thomas Boston in his
lonely parish on the moors of Selkirkshire about the same
time; or that the doctrines inculcated daily by his mother
and his schoolmaster, and from time to time by George Home,
his uncle, on a round of catechising, were in substance those
1
that I have just sketched." The holy Sabbath is described
p
as "a day devoid of beauty, liberty and joy." In short,
this presentation of religion in Scotland leads to the conclu¬
sion that it is no wonder Hume afterwards assailed Puritan
and Presbyterian enthusiasm with bitterness.
The discussion of Hume's Calvinistic environment is
modified in Mossner's book. He pictures the Homes of Nine-
wells as enlightened political liberals "unreceptive to the
religious 'enthusiasms' of the Covenanters and of the Evangeli¬
cals in general." This enlightened spirit prevailed at Chirn-
side as well where "the Kirk was heavily under the domination
of the family. . . ."3 Moderation was maintained here even
when dour and religiously bigoted Scotsmen were putting
witches to death in Sutherland and Ross as late as 1722 and 1727.
The witch-hunt was never up in Chirnside--possibly because
it could get no official sanction. . . . Whatever the state
of popular superstition may actually have been, the Kirk
Session Book during the ministry of the Reverend William
Miller, 1698-1702, reveals that before the repeal of the
Witches Act in 1736, intelligence and understanding were
already exorcising superstition and bigotry.4
2
^•G-reig, op. cit. , p. i|_3. Ibid. , pp. L3-L8.
3Mossner, The Life of David Hume, p. 32.
'-i-Ibid. , p. 16.
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Allowance is made for turbulent times at Chirnside before the
somewhat enlightened and tolerant ministry of William Miller.
The deposition in 1689 of the incumbent by the Privy Council
for refusing to offer public prayer in behalf of William and
Mary is mentioned. His successor, Henry Erskine, is pictured
as "a Presbyterian of the 'true-blue' school."^ But in so
far as the Reverend George Home of Broadhaugh is concerned,
Mossner concludes:
Nothing specifically is known about the religious
beliefs of this uncle of David Hume nor how far he was
affected by the evangelicalism of his father. . . . Con¬
sequently nothing is known about the influence that this
uncle may have exerted upon David either at home or at
church . . . . As a young boy David had no prepossessions
against religion and, therefore, probably no dislike of
the Reverend George Home as a minister. How he fancied
him as an uncle is again unknown.2
As for the "Scottish Sabbath" there seems to be general
agreement that it was much too rigorous, depressing and gloomy,
and placed severe restrictions upon an individual's personal
freedom. Too often, however, this analysis has been carried
to the extreme and has embraced the prejudiced view of Cal¬
vinism as a hindrance to all progress in intellectual, social
and literary efforts. It is true that there was much to be
condemned in the religious thought and practices of the early
eighteenth century, especially the "popularized version of
Calvin's teaching, retaining its darker features, and repre¬
senting even these in a distorted and exaggerated form.
However, to regard the Calvinism of those days as wholly
3-Ibid., p. 33. ^Ibid.
3Kemp Smith, Introduction to Hume's Dialogues Concern-
ing Natural Religion (2nd ed., London, 19^7), p. 3.
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detrimental is a false view. The darker aspects may have
captured the minds of the uneducated masses (chiefly in the
closing years of the seventeenth century), but there was an
awakening of the intellect coming about. Men like Francis
Hutcheson and Adam Smith, as well as David Hume, associated
with the Moderates of the Scottish Kirk and found their con¬
versation extremely stimulating. The advancing attitude of
the eighteenth century was one of critical analysis applied
to all fields. It is not difficult to see how this critical
mode of thinking came from the intellectualism of Scottish
Calvinism. The parishioners listened with attentiveness to
the minister's sermons and spent the Sunday in critical eval¬
uation from the point of view of orthodox Calvinistic dogma.
This criticism of theological thought created a habit of mind
that came to be applied in all fields—philosophy, economics,
politics and particularly for Hume, morals. Thus, it appears
religious training contributed a great deal to the literature
produced in Scotland during the golden age of letters.
By the 1720's the intellectual level of the clergy
was considerably higher than it had been in the latter years
of the seventeenth century. It is likely that David Hume met
a number of able-minded ministers of the Kirk of Scotland. At
any rate, he was not in the habit of looking down on the Scot¬
tish clergy; he had not done so in his youth and he did not do
so in his maturity. In later life, he (as well as Adam Smith)
had as some of his best friends and colleagues members of the
clergy. Consequently, any anti-clerical spirit which may be
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evinced in Hume's works should be recognized in its true
light as an opposition to a specific type of clergyman--
the fanatical zealot or enthusiast.
In precisely what way Hume came to be acquainted with
Presbyterian enthusiasm, we have no way of determining with
certainty. From the scanty evidence which is available, how¬
ever, we can make a few conjectures. If the type of religion
which Hume's mother and uncle advocated was not of the en¬
thusiastic and fanatical brand, it was at least strong enough
to cause David to think seriously about religious and moral
questions. He would have had ample opportunity of becoming
acquainted with religious thought—Galvinistic teaching, if
not fanaticism and evangelicalism. Hear the end of his life
when visited by James Boswell, Hume stated that he was at one
time religious, Boswell records the following conversation
with Hume:
I asked him if he was not religious when he was young. He
said he was, and he used to read The Whole Duty of Man;
that he made an abstract from the Catalogue of vices at
the end of it, and examined himself by this, leaving out
Murder and Theft and such vices as he had no chance of
committing, having no inclination to commit them,-*-
It may have been in the library at the Ninewell's home where
David first became acquainted with this book.
The Whole Duty of Man^ was first published in 1658 and
was probably written by the Royalist divine, Richard Allestree
(1619-81). The teaching contained within the volume is
1Boswell, Private Papers. XII, 227-228.
2The^¥hole Duty of Man (London: William Norton, 1709),
was the edition consulted for use in this paper.
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certainly orthodox. Yet the fanaticism we find in the ser¬
mons of Boston is omitted and the more difficult Calvinistic
doctrines are given in a mild tone without departing from
the essentials. The work is divided into seventeen chapters
and is designed to be read one chapter every Lord's Day so
that the whole book is covered thrice in the year. The author's
purpose is to show the necessity of caring for the soul. The
duty of man is presented according to the light of nature and
the light of Scripture and is treated in reference to God, to
self, and to others. The author has added a section contain¬
ing "Private Devotions for several Occasions" and it is in
this that we find the catalogue of vices-*- to which Hume refers,
entitled: "Brief Heads of Self-Examination, especially before
the Sacrament, collected out of the foregoing Treatise, con¬
cerning the breaches of our Duty." It is stated that the use
of this catalogue of sins is,
Upon days of Humiliation, especially before the Sacrament,
read them consideringly over, and at evening particular
ask thine own heart, 'Am I guilty of this?' And whatso¬
ever by such Examination thou findest thy self faulty in,
Confess particularly, and humbly to God, with all the
heightening circumstances, which may any ways increase
their guilt, and make serious resolutions against every
such Sin for the future. . . •
We have no way of determining what vices Hume included
in the abstract by means of which he examined himself. Cer¬
tain ones were excluded, because, as he said, he had no chance
or inclination of committing them. At any rate, the breaches
of man's duty concerning God must have greatly influenced
•*-Ibid., pp. lj.12, I|-25>. ^Ibld., p.
121}.
Hume's early thinking on religion. The following are a few
of the vices listed: not believing there is a God; not believ-
His Word; not believing it practically, so as to live accord¬
ing to our beL ief; not desiring to draw near to Him in His
ordinances; not longing to enjoy Him in Heaven; not fearing
God so as to keep from offending Him; neglecting to read the
Holy Scriptures; not marking when we do read; placing reli¬
gion in hearing of sermons, without practice; breaking our
Vow made at baptism; by resorting to witches and conjurers,
i.e., to the Devil; not worshipping God; omitting prayers,
public or private, and being glad of a pretence to do so;
neglecting the duty of repentance; not assigning any set or
solemn times for humiliation, and confession, or too seldom.
The list of vices committed in reference to ourselves and our
neighbors might have served to arouse in Hume an interest in
morals. We need enumerate only a few: being puffed up with
high conceits of ourselves, in respect of natural parts, as
beauty, wit, etc., of worldly riches and honors, of Grace;
greedily seeking the praise of men; uncontentedness in our
estates; greedy desires after honors and riches; making
pleasure, not health, the end of eating; drunkenness; wasting
the time or estate in good fellowship; using unlawful recrea¬
tions; being too vehement upon lawful ones; pinching our bodies
to fill our purses; being injurious to our neighbors; affright¬
ing him from godliness, by our scoffing at it; blasting the
credit of our neighbors by false witness; rash judging of
him; unthankfulness to benefactors; despising our spiritual
125
fathers; not loving them for their work's sake; not obeying
those commands of God they deliver to us; stubborn and irrev¬
erent behavior to our natural parents; unfaithfulness to a
friend; denying him assistance in his needs; not giving lib¬
erally and cheerfully. We may conclude from this sketch of
The Whole Duty of Man that, on the whole, it must have served
admirably as an introduction to traditional religion and
morality for the youthful David Hume.
Student Days at Edinburgh
During Hume's university days there was still wide¬
spread despair and gloom in Edinburgh and throughout the rest
of Scotland. Trade was stagnant and the population was de¬
clining; there was little to encourage the country to initia¬
tive. This temper naturally had its effect upon the life of
the Kirk, and the traditionally austere Calvinistic teaching
tended to become even more gloomy and dismal. Superstition
and fanaticism, thriving in such an atmosphere, made their
appeal to the masses, and it was these feelings which Hume so
much loathed. If Hume did not learn from his uncle the dark
aspects of the teaching of Scottish Calvinism, he had ample
opportunity of meeting it in many of the Edinburgh congrega¬
tions. Kemp Smith suggests that,
At the annual Communions in which the parishes of the dis¬
trict joined forces, he may even have listened to Thomas
Boston, the author of The Fourfold State. Boston was one
of the most popular preachers in the Borders, and was
much in demand at these services.
^Kemp Smith, Introduction to the Dialogues, p. 5»
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The university years, when Hume was between eleven
and fourteen years of age, are little known to us, David
Hume did not graduate and apart from his signature in William
Scot's Matriculation Book for 1722-23 there is no record of
what lectures he attended. Greig makes the conjectures,
based on Hume's own statement that he "passed through the
ordinary course of education with success," that he took the
ordinary course at college—(i) Humanity, (ii) Greek, (iii)
1
Logic & Metaphysics, and (iv) Ethics and Natural Philosophy.
Even if it be true that Hume did in fact enter these studies,
we are at a loss to know definitely what influence they might
have had on him. Except for the names of the professors and
some of the texts which they prescribed, we are without records
of what the teaching was like in the University of Edinburgh
between the years 1722 and 1725>. Yet, we can be sure that
the intellectual atmosphere prevailing at the university was
one concerned with new ideas in science, philosophy and litera¬
ture.
In Laurence Dundas' Humanity Class, studies included
Virgil, Horace, Terence, Cicero and Tacitus with the usual
Latin orations. William Scot's class had practically no effect
upon the students as we learn from Hume's own confession that
he learned very little Greek at this time and had to teach
himself some twenty years later. Alexander Grant gives us
"^Greig, op. cit., p. 58.
^Letters, I, 2. However, from the fact that in 1729
Scot transferred to the Chair of Ethics, it seems more than
likely that the bent of his mind towards ethics would cause
him to pass on some hints to his students. Scot had also
lectured on the law of nature and nations and had edited an
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little information on Colin Drummond who taught Logic and
Metaphysics other than "it is probable that {[he] taught . . .
according to the old tradition of the College of Edinburgh,
tempering Scholasticism with Ramism.""*" It seems, however,
that Drummond was interested enough in the "New Philosophy"
to subscribe in 1728 to Henry Pemberton's View of Sir Isaac
Newton's Philosophy and may have discussed Newton and Locke
in Hume's class four years earlier. Drummond's discussions
on applied logic in rhetoric and literary criticism were
bound to have caught David's interest, '//hat William Law,
the professor of Ethics, advanced is even more in doubt than
the teaching of the others, but he also was one of the sub¬
scribers of Pemberton's book. If Hume attended Robert Stewart's
Natural Philosophy class, he must certainly have been intro¬
duced to the thought of Isaac Newton. Stewart started as a
Cartesian but became a Newtonian, and in 171/-1 prescribed as
some of his texts Newton's Of Colours and Principia and
p
Gregory's Optics and Astronomy. It is not certain that this
change in his views came before the time Hume might have entered
abridgment of Hugo Grotius' De Jure Belli ac Pacis. Sugges¬
tions from Grotius' work would have provided Hume with material
for_ speculation. [cf. Mossner, The Life of David Hume, pp. Ipl-
[j-2.]
"^Alexander Grant, The Story of the University of
Edinburgh (London: Longmans, Green and Co., lbdlj.), II, 328.
^Ibid., I, 272. [£f. Robert Henderson, "A Short Account
of the University of Edinburgh, the present professors in it,
and the several parts of Learning taught by them," in Scots
Magazine, III, (17I4.I), 371-2.] Henderson as Library-keeper and
Secretary advertised Stewart's lectures at this time as em¬
phasizing the new developments in physics, including optics
and astronomy, from the works of Newton and his followers.
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his class, but it seems likely. As Greig points out, "a man
above forty does not change his mind so readily as one below."-'"
Stewart by 1728 had subscribed to Pemberton's interpretation
of Newton,and Hume no doubt heard from him at least the major
features of the system that was to influence powerfully his
own intellectual development. Newtonian!sm was expounded and
taught by James Gregory, the Professor of Mathematics, but by
1720, due to infirmity and old age, he had to resort to sub¬
stitute lectures. When he retired in 1725 Colin Maclaurin,
one of the earliest and most celebrated followers of Newton,
took Gregory's place. If Hume attended the mathematics class
he certainly had ample opportunity of hearing the "New
Philosophy."
Although we are unable to trace any direct influence
on Hume's thinking during these university years, we can,
nevertheless, regard this period as the time when he confirmed
his interest in the literature represented by Virgil, Horace,
Cicero and Tacitus. The passion for literature which was
born at Ninewells was without doubt nurtured at the University.
It may have been in reading Cicero that Hume first became
awakened to metaphysical problems which sowed seeds of doubt
in his mind.
It might be assumed that a student of the University
would have an opportunity of freeing himself from the in¬
fluence of Presbyterian enthusiasm now that he was no longer
confined to the preaching of a parish minister and the teaching
-'•Greig, op. cit., p. 59.
129
of a parish schoolmaster. But this certainly was not the
case. Edinburgh did not differ religiously from the country
parishes and the University did not limit its activities to
the merely secular. The Principal was expected to supervise
both the intellectual and spiritual welfare of the students.
That the Town Council endeavored to see that all went well
with the religious development of the University is evinced
in an Act of 1723: . . the Town Councill appointed the
professors and students in the Colledge of this city to be
accomodat with seats in the Lady Yesters Church to hear the
Word preached. . . .Professors of the college were re-
p
quired to SLibscribe the Confession of Paith and had to be
members of the National Church.^ They were expected to look
after the spiritual welfare of their students.
The practice of living in chambers in the colleges was
much encouraged by the universities, as conducing to the
moral and religious nurture of youth. ...
Once established in their college chambers, the students
came under the vigilant care and custody of the regents.
• . . At 6 a.m. all were summoned by the bell, and appeared
in the common hall to answer to their names, and after
prayer and religious instruction they proceeded to their
several class rooms. The pietistic character of the
period pervaded the colleges as well as the church, and
forced religion on scholars till it begot hypocrisy, cant,
or weariness. ...
Before a class began its work the students took their
turn to open the class with a prayer. ... So far from Sun-
Alexander Morgan and Robert Kerr Hannay, University
of Edinburgh: Charters, Statutes, and Acts of the Town Council
and the Senatus, 1553-1358 (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd. 1Q37).
P. 172.
^Graham, Social Life, p. Jplj-8. [cf. Mathieson, Scotland
and the Union, p. 18,
^Hume Brown, on. cit., p. 9^4-•
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day bringing any rest and relaxation to the youths, it
brought more burdens grievous to be borne. On the Sabbath
morning all assembled in their respective class-rooms,
and after religious exercises, clad in their scarlet gowns,
they followed the principal and professors to kirk both
morning and afternoon. At four o'clock the college bell
was rung, and they again appeared in their several class¬
rooms, where they were examined regarding the discourses
they had heard and the portion of theology which had been
prescribed for study; they were next questioned on the
Catechism, and listened to an exposition of the Confession
of Paith. Thereafter they were allowed to return, weary
and worn out, to their respective lodgings, their homes,
or their college chambers, whence, except to hear a lec¬
ture in the college kirk from a professor, they dared not
emerge; for to 'vague' in the street or garden entailed
a rebuke and incurred a fine. Even in Church they sat
under vigilant inspection of the regent's eye, and what
they put into the plate or ladle^was sharply noted, and
reported by the watchful elders.
Thus Graham pictures the life of an undergraduate; and al¬
though the sermons of the ministers of the Edinburgh kirks
might have been better phrased and less crude than the sermons
of the Reverend George Home, we may feel assured that the
services David Hume attended while a student at the University
were as drab and cheerless as those he sat through at Chirnside.
2
Greig and Kemp Smith suggest that Hume may have
3"tasted of the experiences of conversion" sometime during
these adolescent years. Greig bases his argument on the state¬
ment Hume made to Boswell concerning the religion of his youth,
and dates this serious change of mind in 172i{- or thereabouts.
It is hinted that Hume accepted religion somewhat in the
■^Graham, Social Life, pp. 1^7-L6l.
p
Greig, op. cit., pp. 6l-62.
^Kemp Smith, Introduction to the Dialogues, p. 6.
^Sunra, p. 122.
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spirit of his teachers, that is, in an attitude which may be
regarded as a spiritual conversion. Kemp Smith refers to the
evidence of some early letters which show that in his teens
Hume was shy and loved solitude. He is pictured as a lad
absorbed in his studies and anxious to confirm his moral
character. All this, Kemp Smith contends, points to a temper
that, quite conceivably, resulted in spiritual transformation.
"Is it likely that a serious-minded, introspective youth, who
sought to be religious and counted himself such, would alto¬
gether escape the more exciting and, as was then held, the
indispensable initial experiences of the avowed believer?""*"
Both Kemp Smith and Greig go on to argue that Hume at
an early date violently reacted against Calvinistic teaching
and rejected the religion he had formerly accepted. Hume is
said to have felt a strong aversion to Calvinistic enthusiasm
which typified for him what he meant by religion. Kemp Smith
believes this aversion was "an important factor in determining
the contrary character of the beliefs to which, as his philoso
phy matured, he definitively committed himself." Greig
attempts to account for certain paradoxical aspects in Hume's
thinking "by means of unresolved antipathies, rooted, though
perhaps not completely buried, in his past life."^ in Greig's
estimation,
. . . the most significant events, for an understanding
of the grown man, were his inconclusive struggles in
■'"Kemp Smith, Introduction to the Dialogues, p. 6.
^Ibid. -^Greig, op. cit., p. 376.
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religion. These, more than ought else, fixed his "men¬
tal climate" in the middle years. And themost important
fact about these struggles is their inconclusiveness;
for struggles that are not concluded by a victory (no
matter which way it goes) leave rancour. Hume's did.
Until about the age of forty-five, his bitterness against
churchmen, never mind of what sect or creed, exceeded
all reasonable bounds. It expressed, not so much convic¬
tions, as his half-conscious, half-suppressed memories
of all the fights that he had with pious Christians in
his youth. The "religious VJhigs"—these became the objects
of an almost blind aversion., which informs many pages of
the Essays and The Stuarts.3-
Much of this is, of course, merely conjecture, as
both commentators would very readily agree. Nonetheless, cer¬
tain aspects of the above arguments are not to be denied.
That Calvinistic teaching had a profound effect upon the forma¬
tion of Hume's own religious opinions is not to be doubted.
David was a serious-minded youth and was vitally concerned
with moral and theological questions. But to say that he
experienced a religious conversion seems to be a conclusion
without sufficient warrant. In maturity he came to dislike
violently the superstition and enthusiasm he had encountered
as a boy. Yet that he experienced an intense hatred for the
clergy and renounced all forms of religion in his university
years or even possibly before 17l\l±. is a presumption without
adequate proof. Mossner has summed up very admirably the
actual situation of Hume's early years as follows:
... of David's kicking over the sabbatical traces as a
boy, there is not the slightest indication. On his own
word, he was religious when he was young, apparently
accepting the stern Calvinistic doctrines of Original
Sin, the Total Depravity of Human Nature, Predestination,
and Election, without a tremor--which is only what was
to be expected of a normal boy.
1Ibid.
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Taking his religion unusually seriously, the young
David Hume r/as attracted to the task of soul-searching.
He went to the extent of abstracting a list of the vices
Catalogued at the end of . . . The Whole Duty of Man, and
of testing his character against them. . . . This, he
later acknowledged, 'was strange work; for instance, to
try if, notwithstanding his excelling his schoolfellows,
he had no pride or vanity' .... Strange work it assured¬
ly was, but that it is to be regarded as 'wrestling with
sin' in the recommended manner of the Evangelicals re¬
mains dubious.
The boy David Hume was, it is clear, already beginning
to think for himself and to deem moral issues of paramount
importance. This earnest and thinking boy it was who,
before his twelfth birthday, went up to Edinburgh Univer¬
sity to complete his formal education. And there can be
no doubt that his mind was so framed as to be receptive
to new ideas and new influence.3-
Evidence is lacking to warrant the view that Hume
had at one time been converted but very early renounced his
Christian faith and became bitterly opposed to the clergy.
And while it is the purpose of this thesis to show that David
Hume had a life-long interest in religious questions, it must
be recognized that the situation in which he found himself
was always that of a spectator rather than a participant.
Hume's books on religion are written from the standpoint of
the detached observer; religious experience seems to be an
aspect entirely lacking in his nature. His concern with
faith was merely intellectual. When he decided to study human
nature, he recognized that religious belief was an element of
man's experience. Consequently, he was interested in reli¬
gion as an aspect of his field of study. Kemp Smith is
correct in his analysis of Hume's religious sentiment:
Religion was brought to his attention not by anything in
his own personal needs or convictions, but by the prominence—
•^Mossner, The Life of David Hume, p. 3k.
13k
so surprising, as it seemed to him—with which it bulked
in the*lives of others, and by the strange vagaries of
belief, observance, and conduct to which it gave rise.
Both as a philosopher and as a historian he was constrained,
ever and again, almost in spite of himself, to speculate
anew upon it. It was so many-sided and so ambiguous in
its manifestations, so puzzling in its lack of conformity
to the other, more ordinary, aspects of human existence
If Hume had really experienced conversion, he might
have been able to appreciate the thoughts and actions of the
zealots and enthusiasts and his dealings with them in his
historical and philosophical works would no doubt have been
less prejudiced. Hume' s religious thoughts and comments
were given, however, from outside the Christian community.
He was not an orthodox Christian; his life was devoid of the
faith and beliefs that are basic to Christianity. But that
he was deeply concerned with religion, his attention to reli¬
gious subjects proves. He tried his best to comprehend theo¬
logical doctrines, but always from the standpoint of an ob¬
server. If Hume had claimed to have been a theologian, we
could very likely criticize his treatises as lacking the
essential insights which come only from the actual living
through an event. Unless there is belief, the theologian
has no object for study; the process of believing must con¬
tinue even while faith is being examined. Perhaps Hume's
treatment of spiritual topics can only be fully appreciated
v/hen we realize that his standpoint was that of a mere ob¬
server completely lacking in devotional experiences. He v/as
unable to understand the meaning of Christian fellowship with
God, and the lack of belief in his own life limited his
3-Kemp Smith, Introduction to the Dialogues, p. 1.
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appreciation of the religious experiences of others.
The fact that Hume was not a Christian in no wise
warrants the conclusion that he was an atheist or even anti-
religious. In fact he claimed the very opposite. The state¬
ments made to Boswell that "he never had entertained any
belief in Religion since he began to read Locke and Clarke"
and that "the Morality of every Religion was bad, and, . . .
when he heard a man was religious, he concluded he was a ras¬
cal, though he had known some instances of very good men
being religious,""*" may be taken as referring to superstition,
fanaticism and Calvinistic enthusiasm. David Hume, knowing
the type of religious man Boswell was, 'would take great pleasure
in speaking thus. But in his more serious moments, Hume pre¬
sented himself as a man concerned with reaching truth in the
religious sphere of human nature. It may be a deficiency in
his investigation that he did not go to a theologian or be¬
liever for the material necessary to explain religious exper¬
ience in men, since he himself did not have such a faith; but
Hume did at least attempt to give an explanation—one based on
an analysis of human nature. He believed that religion as an
aspect of man's experience could be studied by means of the
experimental methods 'which were proving to be successful in
the study of the natural sciences. It is not my purpose to
criticize the legitimacy of such an endeavor but rather to
emphasize what it was Hume intended in his works on religion.
Any nominal assent Hume may have at one time given to
^Boswell, Private Papers. XII, 227-228.
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beliefs taught in his home was probably given up while he was
at college or shortly thereafter. He stated that after read¬
ing Locke and Clarke he abandoned his religious views, and. we
have no reason to doubt that he very early disapproved of
the enthusiastic and zealous faith of eighteenth century Rres-
byterianism. Hume had undoubtedly heard lectures on both
these philosophers at college; the actual reading of their
books may not have taken place until later. Likely enough,
he had been influenced stafficiently by his readings in moral
philosophy to become irked by the air of piety in the college
classes and the requirement of praying before learning. He
saw too much hypocrisy in it all to accept the common reli¬
gious view.
Although Locke and Clarke had a vast importance for
Hume as a youth, it is not likely that they alone turned him
away from Christian enthusiasm. He had doubtlessly read other
books which counted too; and events had been taking place
around him the effects of which were afterwards forgotten or
minimized. Change was in the air, and clubs and societies
sprang up for the purpose of discussing such works as those
of Locke, Clarke, Butler, and Berkeley."^" One such group was
called the Rankenian Club of which the mathematician Colin
Maclaurin was a leading member. C-reig states that "the exis¬
tence of discussion clubs such as the Rankenian, and others
less public and perhaps more disreputable, very soon excited
■^■See Ramsay of Ochtertyre, op. cit., I, 195-196.
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the suspicions of the godly."-'- Hume presumably was influenced
by these clubs and the changing spirit of his age.
David Home, though singular in his precocity and in the
fearlessness with which he followed up his own reasoning
wherever it might take him, was only one out of many
young Scotsmen who were now examining the basis of their
fathers' faith, and were tending, under influences mainly
English in their origin, towards an attitude of mind less
fanatical, less narrow, more humane and humanistic, than „
had been the rule in Scotland since 12ie days of John Knox.
We may be sure that the strong literary bent of the Edinburgh
clubs strengthened Hume's native passion for literature and
their philosophical interest in the "New philosophy" no doubt
had an influence in centering his attention in Newton, Locke,
Clarke, Butler, Berkeley, and perhaps Shaftesbury, Mandeville,
and Hutcheson.
Literary Ambition
In the story of "My Own Life" Hume states that he
very early developed a passion for literature and this became
the ruling passion of his life. His family desired him to
enter the legal profession but his mind was bent rather to
"the pursuits of Philosophy and general Learning; and while
they fancyed I was poring over Voet and Vinnius, Cicero and
Virgil were the Authors I was secretly devouring."-^ Hume
soon gave up the study of law and turned to a whole-hearted
search of the writings of philosophers. In a letter to his
friend Michael Ramsay written in 1727, Hume stated that he
was
. . . entirely confind to my self 5: Library for Diversion,
. . . & indeed to me they are not a small one; for I take
1G-reig, op. cit., p. 73. 2Ibid., p. 76. ^Letters, I, 1.
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no more of them than I please, for I hate task-reading,
& I diversify them at my Pleasure; sometimes a Philoso¬
pher, sometimes a Poet; . . . indeed this pastoral &
Saturnian happyness I have in a great measure come at,
just now; I live like a King pretty much to my self; . . .
This Greatness and Elevation of Soul is to be found only
in Study & Contemplation, ... You must allow £me3
to talk thus like a Philosopher; tis a subject I think
much on & could talk all day long of. • . ,1
Hume by this time had completed his university courses
and was engaged in independent study; he was then in his six¬
teenth year. The chief interest of his mind was philosophy,
Y/hich he regarded as a part of literature. To be a philosopher,
then, was to be a man of letters. Hume was spending his time
and energy in the company of Cicero, Virgil, Milton, Longinus,
Locke, Clarke and Bayle. Informing Piamsay that he was read¬
ing "sometimes a philosopher, sometimes a Poet," Hume intimated
that he might have a contribution of his own to make in the
realm of philosophy. But he inquired:
Would you have me send in my loose, uncorrect thoughts?
Were such worth the transcribing? All the progress that
I made is but drawing the outlines, in loose bits of Paper;
here a hint of a passion, there a Phenomenon in the mind
accounted for, in another the alteration of these accounts;
sometimes a remark upon an Author I have been reading,
And none of them worth to any Body & I believe scarce to
my self.2
It Is important to know how Hume became interested in
poets, orators, philosophers and critics and how these kindled
and inflamed in him an entirely new ambition—literary fame,
his "ruling passion." If we can discover the motives behind
his study In this period of life, it may be possible to see
definitely what problem was actually uppermost in his mind—
what it was he had in view in his own works. What was the
■^•Letters, I, 9-10. ^Letters, I, 9
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scheme or guiding purpose which gave direction to Hume's argu¬
ments? What determined his choice of topics for examination?
These are, of course, fundamental questions, and the answers which
are given to them will determine the interpretation of Hume's
philosophy and the regard given him in the history of philosophy.
There are two letters written by Hume--one to Gilbert
Elliot in 1751; the other to a Scottish physician, thought by
Hill Burton to have been Dr. George Cheyne^--v/hich serve to
throw valuable light on this early period of his interest in
philosophical problems. Let us examine first the letter to
Elliot. Hume was writing concerning the Dialogues and asked
for suggestions as to how he might strengthen the argument
of Cleanthes, the philosophical theist. He indicated that
any propensity toward Philo the sceptic had entered against
his will. The letter continues:
. . . tis not long ago that I burn'd an old Manuscript
Book, wrote before I was twenty; which contain'd Page
after Page, the gradual Progress of my Thoughts on that
head. It begun with an anxious Search after Arguments,
to confirm the common Opinion: Doubts stole in, dissi¬
pated, return'd, were again dissipated, return'd again;
and it was a perpetual Struggle of a restless Imagination
against Inclination, perhaps against Reason.2
When these statements are compared with those in the
^Mossner identifies the physician as Dr. John Arbuth-
not and discredits Cheyne on the grounds that he was not in
London at the time and because he would have taken offense at
Hume's remarks on philosophy and religion, [cf. Mossner, The
Life of David Hume, p. 8I|.; Mossner, "Hume's Epistle to Dr.
Arbuthnot, 173^: The Biographical Significance," Huntington




letter to the physician, the picture of Hume's youthful ques¬
tionings begins to become significant. He was seeking advice
concerning the condition of his health, and believed a kind
of story of his life would help the physician to make a proper
diagnosis of the situation. The personal history begins:
You must know then that from my earliest Infancy, I
found always a strong Inclination to Books & Letters. As
our College Education in Scotland, extending little fur¬
ther than the Languages, ends commonly when vie are about
lip or lj? Years of Age, I was after that left to my own
Choice in my Reading, & found it encline me almost equally
to Books of Reasoning & Philosophy, & to Poetry & the
polite Authors. Every one, who is acquainted either
with the Philosophers or Critics, knows that there is
nothing yet established in either of these two Sciences,
8c that they contain little more than aidless Disputes,
even in the most fundamental Articles. Upon Examination
of these, I found a certain Boldness of Temper, growing
in me, which was not enclin'd to submit to any Authority
in these Subjects, but led me to seek out some new Med¬
ium, by which Truth might be establisht. After much
Study, & Reflection on this, at last, when I was about
18 Years of Age, there seem'd to be open'd up to me a
new Scene of Thought, vhich transported me beyond Measure,
& made me, with an Ardor natural to young men, throw up
every other Pleasure or Business to apply entirely to
it. ... I cou'd think of no other way of pushing my
Fortune in the World, but that of a Scholar & Philosopher.
I was infinitely happy in this Course of Life for some
Months; till at last, about the beginning of Sept 1729,
all my Ardor seem'd in a moment to be extinguisht & I
cou'd no longer raise my Mind to that pitch, which for¬
merly gave me such excessive Pleasure. . . •
There was another particular, which contributed more
than any thing, to waste my Spirits & bring on me this
Distemper, which was, that having read many Books of
Morality, such as Cicero, Seneca & Plutarch, & being
smit with their beautiful Representations of Virtue 8c
Philosophy, I undertook the Improvement of my Temper &
Will, along with my Reason and Understanding. I was con¬
tinually fortifying myself with Reflections against Death





Hume then told about his physical condition, stating
that he had suffered from scurvy spots on his fingers and a
wateriness in his mouth. Under medical advice and regimen,
his health sufficiently improved to allow him to study in
moderation.
I no?; began to take some Indulgence to myself; studied
moderately, & only when I found my Spirits at their
highest Pitch, leaving off before I was weary, & trif¬
ling away the rest of my Time in the best manner I
could.1
There follows, in quite some detail, remarks about
the changes in Hume's appetite and general appearance. He
was no longer tall and lean but had become sturdy, robust
and healthful looking with a ruddy complexion and cheerful
countenance. The letter continues:
Thus I have given you a full account of the Condition
of my Body, & . . . shall explain to you how my Mind stood
all this time, which on every Occasion, especially in this
Distemper, have a very near Connexion together. Having
now Time & Leizure to cool my inflam'd Imaginations, I
began to consider seriously, how I shou'd proceed in my
Philosophical Enquiries. I found that the moral Philoso¬
phy transmitted to us by Antiquity, labor'd under the
same Inconvenience that has been found in their natural
Philosophy, of being entirely Hypothetical, & depending
more upon Invention than Experience, Every one consulted
his Fancy in erecting schemes of Virtue & of Happiness,
without regarding human Nature, upon which every moral
Conclusion must depend. This therefore I resolved to
make my principal Study, & the Source from which I wou'd
derive every Truth in Criticism as well as Morality. I
believe 'tis a certain Fact that most of the Philosophers
who have gone before us, have been overthrown by the Great¬
ness of their Genius, & that little more is requir'd to
make a man succeed in this Study than to throw off all
Prejudices either for his own Opinions or for this of
others. At least this is all I have to depend on for the
Truth of my Reasonings, which I have multiply'd to such
a degree, that within these three Years, I find I have
scribled many a Quire of Paper, in which there is nothing
1Letters. I, lbr-l5.
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contain'd but my own Inventions. This with'-the Reading
most of the celebrated Books in Latin, French & English,
& acquiring the Italian, you may think a sufficient
Business for one in perfect Health; & so it wou'd, had
it been done to any Purpose: But my Disease was a cruel
Incumbrance on me. I found that I was not able to follow
out any Train of Thought, by one continued Stretch of
View, but by repeated Interruptions, & by refreshing my
Eye from Time to Time upon other Objects. Yet with this
Inconvenience I have collected the rude Materials for
many Volumes; but in reducing these to Words, v/hen one
must bring the Idea he comprehended in gross, nearer to
him, so as to contemplate its minutest Parts, & keep it
steddily in his Eye, so as to copy these Parts in Order,
this I found impracticable for me, nor were my Spirits
equal to so severe an Employment. Here lay my greatest
Calamity. I had no Hopes of delivering my Opinions with
such Elegance & Neatness, as to draw to me the Attention
of the World, & I wou'd rather live & dye in Obscurity
than produce them maim'd & imperfect.
Such a miserable Disappointment I scarce ever remember
to have heard of. The small Distance betwixt me & per¬
fect Health makes me the more uneasy in my present Situa¬
tion. Tis a Weakness rather than a Lowness of Spirits
which troubles me, & there seems to be as great a Differ¬
ence betwixt my Distemper & common Vapors, as betwixt
Vapors & Madness.
I have notic'd in the Writings of the French Mysticks,
& in those of our Fanatics here, that, when they give a
History of the Situation of their Souls, they mention a
Coldness & Desertion of the Spirit, which frequently
returns, & some of them, at the beginning, have been
tormented with it many Years. As this kind of Devotion
depends entirely on the Force of Passion, & consequently
of the Animal Spirits, I have often thought that their
Case & mine were pretty parralel, & that their rapturous
Admirations might discompose the Fabric of the Nerves &
Brain, as much as profound Reflections, & that -/armth or
Enthusiasm which is inseperable from them.-*-
In concluding, Hume informed the Doctor that he had
decided to enter business as a merchant in order to rid him¬
self of "this distemper." He was on his way to Bristol and
took this opportunity to seek the physician's advice. Hume
enquires what he may hope for in the way of recovery, whether
he must wait long for it, and whether his recovery will ever
^Letters. I, 15-17.
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be perfect and his spirits regain their former spring and
vigor, "so as to endure the Fatigue of deep and abstruse
thinking."
From these letters we may gain insights into the early
progress of Hume's thought. He told Elliot that questions
concerning religion arose in his mind before he was twenty
and that he had written several pages in a manuscript book
on the subject. The progress of his thought had been one of
anxiously searching for arguments to substantiate the common
beliefsrin a Deity and of raising doubts concerning such be¬
liefs. Hume was inclined to the common opinion, but his rest¬
less mind imagined various possibilities; consequently, he
could not confirm himself in the Christian faith. Being
tossed between doubt and inclination to assent, he could for
a time only make a record of these conflicting attitudes in
his notes. He saw some validity and usefulness in religious
beliefs, otherwise we may be sure that he would have entirely
given txp such questions and turned his attention to other
problems. The decision to study philosophy was made by Hume
about the time of his eighteenth year. It seems, then, that
his introduction into philosophical thought as a career came
as the result of an interest in the religious beliefs of his
day.
Hume said that he burned the manuscript containing
his notes on the progress of his thinking in the religious
sphere. Nevertheless, he seems to have overlooked a few
m
pages on vihich are recorded some of his speculations."'' Al¬
though it is difficult to determine the exact date of their
p
composition, these notes may be regarded as indicating some
of Hume's early thoughts and also as clearly reflecting his
wide reading. Although these memoranda do not provide us
with a complete outline of Hume's intellectual development
in this crucial period, they are useful in leading us to a
fuller understanding of the Treatise and its author. Most of
the reading and thinking embodied in the Treatise goes back
to the years 1729-173^; consequently, any evidence that may
relate to this time of creation should not be overlooked. It
is indeed unfortunate that the most important manuscript
collections on the subject of religious scepticism^ were
These notes were printed in part by Burton, op. cit.,
95>-9&; 12k-135>. They are to be found in the Calendar of Hume
MBS in the possession of the Royal Society ofEdinburgh (Edin-
burgh: 193 2 *), compiled by J.Y.T.Greig and Harold Beyon, IX, lip.
For use in this thesis I consulted the edition by Mossner,
"Hume's Early Memoranda, 1729-17kO: the Complete Text," in
Journal of the History of Ideas. 'iX. (19^8), Ip92-5l8.
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Burton dates the bulk of the notes subsequent to the
composition of the Treatise and prior to the publication of the
first volume of the Essays (i.e., between 1739—17^1-1) - Only the
items entitled "Natural Philosophy" are regarded as preceding
the year 1739. jBurton, op. cit.. I, 95-96; 12lp-135j Kemp Smith
mentions watermarks of 173k> 1739 and 17)p3 on the sheets and
apparently agrees with Burton's dates. JKemp Smith, Introduction
to the Dialogues. p. 35n3»]Hendel also agrees with this dating.
tHendel, op. cit.. p. 28ff»3 Mossner, on the other hand, believes
Burton's dating is late. Prom a review of certain pertinent
facts in Hume's letters, Mossner arrives at the following dates:
The section of "Natural Philosophy" may have been begun as early
as 1729 and completed in 173k; the section on "Philosophy" be¬
longs to the years 1730-3^-; the section on miscellaneous subjects
is the latest and is dated between 1737-lpO. {"Mossner, "Hume's
Early Memoranda, " pp. k93-li-95j
3". . . in which there is nothing contain'd but my
own Inventions." [Letters. I, 16J]
destroyed by Hume in 175>1 we now Have only a few surviving
sheets of notes on his reading.
The extant memoranda consist of notes of Hume's ideas
ana comments on his studies classified -under the subjects of
"Natural Philosophy," "philosophy" and miscellaneous topics
(the last section lacking a title in the manuscript). Many of
these ideas turned up later chiefly in the "Natural History
of Religion" and the essay "On the Populousness of Ancient
Nations," while some others appeared in Essays, Moral and
Political, pubxished in 17^-1-1 • A few of the references in
the "Philosophy" section were used in the Treatise. The
largest section, consisting of twenty of a total of twenty-
six sheets, deals with a variety of subjects but is of rela¬
tively minor importance in so far as providing information
about Hume's own religious views. There are a few notes
which refer to the following religious topics: the doctrine
of the Trinity; opinions concerning the origin of the world;
design and Deity; the powers of the priests and clergy. Quite
a number of references are recorded concerning the religious
practices and beliefs of the ancient world. But except for
indicating that Hume had an interest in religious topics, the
"miscellaneous" section of the memoranda does not furnish any
definite data for our study.
The section entitled "philosophy," however, does pro¬
vide some insights into Hume's speculative religious thought.
. . most of the celebrated Books in Latin, French,
& English, & the Italian. ..." ^Letters, I, l6 7]
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Thirty-five of the forty notes in this section deal with
religious questions; at least sixteen references are from
the French sceptic, Bayle. Besides indicating a vital interest
in theological problems, these notes suggest that the annotator
was still in the developmental stage of his thought, possibly
between the years 1730-173ij-. The memoranda on philosophy,
then, may constitute part of the "new scene of thought" which
opened to Hume in 1729. One of the chief topics in these
notes is the Deity; the proofs for God's existence were caus¬
ing considerable concern in Hume's mind. From Bayle and Cud-
worth he was able to acquaint himself with the various atheis¬
tic discussions. And these arguments no doubt led to questions
concerning the origin of the world and subsequently to one of
the chief problems in philosophy for Hume—the explanation
of order in the universe.
The traditional theological view in Hume ' s day stated
that the arrangement which Nature appears to have in all its
parts was given by God. The Cartesians, arguing from design,
conceived God as a Being whose existence is infinite, necessary,
and real--a Being greater than Nature. Hume was not convinced
by any of these arguments but rather tended to the position of
Strato. Stratonican atheism regarded matter as ordered from
the beginning. There is as much order and necessity as the
theist claims without searching for a Providence to shape and
direct Nature. It would be unnecessary, then, to go beyond
Nature; reason requires simply an affirmation of order as the
essential character of the events of the natural world. If
llj-7
Nature is sufficient in itself, then there is no need to
search for a significance behind things as they appear. The
memoranda notes disclose that Strato's naturalism exerted a
powerful force in raising doubts in Hume's mind. He was
unable to find enduring satisfaction in the attempts of
philosophers and theologians to establish the existence of
God by means of rational proofs. Thus, his restless mind,
while attempting to establish the common religious opinion,
found itself dravm towards sceptical doubts. During this
period of personal concern over the religious views of the
world, Hume was reading Bayle, and it may have been through
Bayle's articles in the Dictionary that he first became ac¬
quainted with Strato's naturalism.
Other of the memoranda notes deal primarily with the
human side of religion and treat such topics as man's sin
and punishment, God and the origin of sin, vice and virtue in
religion, the various kinds and causes of ill in the world,
the eternity of the soul and its pleasure in Heaven, liberty
and necessity, divine and human reason contrasted, the prac¬
tice of observances as necessary to a vigorous religion, and
the strictness of priests in enforcing these rather than
moral duties. To sum up, then, we can be sure that David
Hume was very much concerned with the question of religious
experience and was attempting to arrive at some personal con¬
clusions on this vital part of human life. In clarifying his
own thoughts he scribbled "many a quire of paper," some of
which have fortunately been preserved for posterity.
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Referring once again to the letter to the physician,
let us emphasize that Hume likened his state of mind to that
of the French mystics or the fanatics of Britain. His ex¬
perience had been one of doubting the findings of philosophers
and critics; their sciences seemed to contain nothing but
personal disputes even in fundamental articles. The direction
of his thought was away from fanciful constructions without a
basis in experience. While seeking some new way to truth,
Hume speaks of a "new scene of thought" which dawned upon him
and "filled him with joy." He was soon to recognize the role
played by human nature in both moral and natural philosophy.
Yet, he lost sight of his vision and despair took the place of
spiritual exaltation. He felt he had made a discovery; but
his mind, unable to comprehend the full significance of the
vision, became exhausted.
There appears to have been two distinct periods in
the development of Hume's thought. In the first, he was con¬
cerned with the fundamental questions which seemed to cause
so much dispute among philosophers. Since they were unable
to come to any agreement, Hume decided to examine for himself
in the hope of finding some certainties or at least a method
of arriving at truth. Actuated by a desire for certainty,
he began to study seriously those matters which had a bearing
upon human nature. His attitude was one of self-examination
and optimism regarding man's ability to discover something
about himself. In the spring of 1729 after spending three
arduous years in study and reflection, Hume believed a new
ll+9
medium of truth, had been opened to him. In the second period,
he engaged himself in working out the details of this new
approach to philosophy. His reacting and thinking were no
longer desultory, and details began to fall into place as a
system started to emerge. The contribution which he intended
to make concerned an analysis of man's nature.
Hume's mind was made up once and for all--he -would be
a man of letters, "a Scholar & philosopher." But this in¬
volved toil; and that he might succeed in the struggle to
keep his mind constantly employed, Hume placed himself
under a Stoic discipline of self-mastery suggested to him by
the books of Cicero, Seneca, and Plutarch. At first he met
with a fair amount of success. The program which he set for
himself was an extensive Investigation into human nature while
avoiding the prejudices of one's own opinions or those of
others. He was convinced that most of the errors in philoso¬
phy arose from the fact that imagination determined men's
thoughts much more than they suspected. In order to reach
truth, Hume believed it was necessary to explore the various
aspects of human experience; upon human nature "every moral
conclusion must depend." He had discovered many interesting
things and had written several quires of paper containing his
ideas; but, due to physical and mental fatigue, he was unable
to express his opinions in a form capable of conveying his
thoughts to the public. All attempts to bring his thoughts
to clear expression upon paper seemed to fail. Here was a
calamity; he believed he had something valuable to say, yet
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he could not say it with exactitude. For Hume, one of the
primary requisites of a thinker with original thoughts was
the presentation of these thoughts so that others could under¬
stand them. His literary taste led him to insist upon a cer¬
tain standard of arrangement and presentation. Finding that
he was unable to meet this standard of elegance, Hume deter¬
mined not to submit his discoveries in an imperfect form—he
felt he would rather live and die in obscurity than produce
his ideas "maimed and imperfect." Hume the artist overruled
Hume the philosopher. Not abandoning hope that someday he
might be able to present his opinions in an acceptable form,
Hume sought medical aid in the hope of regaining the vigor
necessary for "the Fatigue of deep and abstruse thinking."
It is possible that Hume's break in body and mind had
an intimate connection with his departure from the Presbyterian
religion of his home. There is no evidence, however, to sup¬
port the often made assumption that Hume turned to a reli¬
gious scepticism at an early age or without emotional struggle.
Greig makes some not altogether unfounded conjectures con¬
cerning Hume's troubles in this period.^" Regarding Hume's
disturbance as emotional rather than intellectual, Greig says,
... no boy, however controlled and independent in spirit,
can break away without severe emotional disturbances from
the religion that his family, his friends, and almost all
the world around him are committed to. It is not at all
remarkable that David suffered from 'desertion of the spirit'
in the years following his great discovery of 1729; on the
contrary, it would have been remarkable, and indeed much
to be regretted, if he hadn't.2
1Greig, oo. cit.. pp. 80-83. 2Ibid.t p. 80.
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Hume's adventures and spiritual rebellion in the years 1725-
29 did not meet with adequate expression, for he was living
in conditions which forced him in self-defence to repress his
feelings--his family's beliefs, the Kirk, the bigotry and
narrow-mindedness of the country in general. In the years
immediately succeeding he found a vent for his thoughts and
regained his equilibrium "except in one particular: he could
never think or write coolly and without prejudice about reli¬
gious zealots."^ Greig attempts to explain this unreasoned
disapproval of the views and conduct of Presbyterian and
Puritan zealots. He sees bias and injustice in Hume's treat¬
ment of religious and ecclesiastical topics in the Essays,
the History and some other works; his writing is not at all
2
sober but betrays animus and sarcasm.
Greig believes the instances of anti-clerical and anti-
Christian bias were due to the fact that Hume "carried for¬
ward into later life an unresolved hostility to Christian
ministers and their associates; hostility acquired between
1725 and 173b-, and probably before 1729—a kind of prejudice,
emotional and in the main unconscious, a blind spot, or what
in psycho-analytic jargon we should call a complex."3 If
Hume had back-slidden from the faith at this time as it
"'"Ibid., p. 81.
2
Hhe earliest trace of such feelings appeared in a
letter Hume wrote September 12, 173b- from Rheims to his
friend Michael Ramsay. "Devotees feel their Devotion en-
crease by the Observance of trivial Superstition, as Sprink¬
ling, Kneeling, Crossing &c, . . . ." [letters. I, 2l7j'
3Greig, op. cit.. pp. 8l, 82.
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appears he did, he would have been subjected to reprobations,
threats, and bulling from his uncle, George Home, and from
nearly every minister who discovered how he stood. These
exhortations, denunciations, and wrathful admonitions would
explain how Hume's prejudices grew and hardened. The mock¬
ing irony of his works was a result of his inability to free
himself from a Calvinistic dominion over his ''emotions, habits
and unconscious attitudes of mind"; he rejected "Calvinism
Calvinistically.
The traces of Hume's origin and of his first 'enthusiastic
rebellion'—for that is what it was, although against
1 enthusiasts'--were still apparent when he reached middle
age. His irony, directed at the zealots, priests, and
ministers, 'enthusiasts' and superstitioners, appeared
very cool and quiet. But it tore; there were claws con¬
cealed in it.^
Greig concludes, "this at least is certain: David Hume the
man did not always realize the full force of his attacks on
Christians, and when these retaliated on him, he was often
taken by surprise. A fully conscious prejudice is not a
prejudice in any real sense."3 What has been stated by Greig
is admittedly only guesswork; but, nevertheless, it seems to
provide at least a partial explanation for the emotional re¬
sentment perceptible in many of Hume's references to religion.
Mossner agrees that Hume finally gave up his early
religious beliefs about the year 1729 but- contends that "the
process was one of rational education."^ Hume slowly and re¬
luctantly gave up his religion against his will because logic
Ibid., p. 82. ^Ibid., p. 83. t p# 82.
^-Mossner, The Lif e of David Hume, p. 61]..
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required it. Hume, agreeing with Butler and Hutcheson, re¬
garded the a uriori argument of Clarke as having no validity.
But doubts began to steal into his mind concerning "the argu¬
ment from probability based on the empirical philosophy of
Locke and Newton," even though this argument "always remained
for Hume the only philosophical argument concerning religion
worthy of serious consideration. The letter to Gilbert
Elliot is cited as evidence that Hume realized that the
sceptical side of the Dialogues of Natural Religion stood up
well enough but that the empirical argument needed to be
strengthened. But an even more important indication is "that
the youthful Hume relinquished his religious beliefs gradually
over the course of years rather than immediately upon reading
Locke and Clarke. And it is also clear that those religious
beliefs were relinquished under philosophical pressure—that
3Hume reasoned himself out of religion." A change in ethical
standards is regarded as having had a major part in bringing
about this "reverse-conversion" as Mossner calls it. Hume
came to evaluate his moral fibre by reference to the pagan
Cicero's offices rather than the pietist Whole Duty of Man.^~
What are we to conclude from these two opposing argu¬
ments? The evidence from Hume's early letters seems to up¬
hold the view that he reasoned himself out of the beliefs of
a strict Calvinistic faith. He no longer could think of
•*-Ibid. ^See supra, p. 139*
^Mossner, The Life of David Hume, p. 6>Ip.
^"See Letter to Francis Hutcheson, Letters, I, 3^!-*
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placing any personal belief in revealed theology or a rational
system that attempted to bring in the supernatural although he
still allowed for the possible validity of such belief. Hume
was opposed to religion being grounded in reason. But he seemed
still to regard his position as being orthodox (as we shall
see later in reference to his bid for the Chair of Moral
Philosophy in 171(1)-) • He continued to be interested in reli¬
gious questions although his life was seemingly devoid of any
personal devotion. And what he had to say about natural
religion was, as far as he could discover, in no way contra¬
dictory to orthodoxy. Hume evidently considered his philoso¬
phy as opposed to atheism and deism; and that, if it added
nothing to true religion, at least it took nothing away from
a religion based on faith.
/
Resume
In the previous analysis we found that David Hume had
an early introduction into religious thought. He was brought
up in a deeply religious home and received his earliest in¬
tellectual training from his mother, a pious Christian. In
attendance at the parish school and the services of theChirn-
side Church where his uncle was minister, Hume became ac¬
quainted with religious ideas and Presbyterianism; and although
he remained nominally a member of the Church, he later repudia¬
ted strict Calvinism and came to think of religion in terms
of those beliefs he had known as a youth. During his univer¬
sity da7/s, Hume was still under the influence of the Church
of Scotland, and it is likely that the religious influences in
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Edinburgh differed very little from those encountered in
Chirnside. Thus, in the home, at the school and kirk of
Chirnside, and even in the University, Hume was confronted
with religious thought which certainly must have influenced
him profoundly.
With this background as preparation for an entry
into a career, Hume found himself drawn to literature. He
began to read philosophy, all the time attempting to estab¬
lish the common opinions of religion and to arrive at funda¬
mental truth. The evidence derived from Hume's letters
leads us to conclude that he entered the field of philosophy
by means of questioning the religious beliefs of his day.
His first philosophical interest seems to have been in classi¬
cal ethics and quite possibly in the questions raised in the
Deistic controversy which was raging at the time. This was
the way things stood in 173b when Hume was in his twenty-
third year. In the next chapter we shall consider the develop¬
ment of his new scheme of thought as it came to be expressed
in the Treatise and the Essays.
CHAPTER IV
HUME1 S FIRST LITERARY PRODUCTIONS, l?3k-17
Introduction
In 173i}- Hume journeyed to Bristol to enter a mer¬
chant's life. He made this decision in the hope of recover¬
ing his health so that he could resume and continue his
studies more effectually. In his autobiography he states
that this business was totally unsuitable to him and that he
went to France "with a View of prosecuting my Studies in a
Country Retreat; and I there laid that Plan of Life, which I
have ste&dily and successfully pursued: I resolved to make a
very rigid Frugality supply my Deficiency of Fortune, to main¬
tain unimpaired my Independency, and to regard every object
contemptible, except the Improvement of my Talents in Litera¬
ture. "■*"
For some time Hume found himself completely at a
loss to express his thoughts on the fundamental articles of
philosophy and criticism which had been the subject of his
enquiry. Articles of philosophy were In his day those on
which the truths of natural religion, as distinguished from
revealed religion, were made to rest. And as these articles
were more important than those of criticism, he planned to




Hume believed he had found the new medium by which he could
establish truth and he desired to put his discovery in writ¬
ing in order to convey it to the world. He thought a stay in
Prance would perhaps enable him to present his ideas in an
acceptable literary form. Therefore, he secluded himself in
a small Jesuit College at La Pleche and began to study and
write in his chosen field of letters and philosophy. He
settled down to compose the book that had been germinating
in his mind for a number of years.
The New Scheme of Thought
It is not certain what Hume meant by the new scheme
of thought which he felt he had reached. Most commentators
assume that he was referring to the theory of causation. C.
V/. Hendel, for instance, claims,
. . . the initial discovery that filled Hume with such
transports of joy and opened a whole new prospect to him
was the fact that man is merely presuming whenever he
uses the maxim of cause and effect. When Hume gained
this great insight, he turned his thought to study the
nature of man with all its presumptuous impulses.1
Greig has this to say concerning the new method of thought:
[jlumeJ is talking of the theory of causation; he has dis¬
covered, for the first time, what he afterwards maintains
in all his Y/ritings, that the supposed necessary connec¬
tion between a cause and its effect lies, not in the things
themselves, but in the mind observing them. He has2thus
gained a Wholly new direction for his speculations.
Hendel, op, cit., p. 25. Hendel paints an imaginary
portrait of how Hume came to ask the significant question,
"Why is a Cause Always Necessary?" and contends that Hume was
v/restling earnestly with the arguments to confirm, in his own
mind, the "common opinion" of the existence of a personal God.
Jjbid.» PP. 57-62.3 See Supra, pp. Ij.Off.
2Greig, op. cit., p. 76.
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Kemp Smith takes a similar view."*" In dealing with
the question of the primary sources of Hume's teaching, he
argues for the thesis that it was under the direct influence
of Francis Hutcheson that Hume was led to recognize that
judgments of moral approval and disapproval, and in fact
judgments of value of whatever type, are based not on rational
insight or evidence but solely on feeling. What opened up to
him the "new scene of thought" and gave birth in due course
to the Treatise was the discovery that this point of view could
be carried over into the theoretical sphere, and could there
be employed in solving several of the problems which Locke
and Berkeley had been triable to answer satisfactorily. Kemp
Srai th con tend s :
If knowledge be strictly limited to those relations which
are derived from the contemplation of ideas, and if all
other judgments (those concerning matters of fact and
existence) be taken out of the field of knowledge, and
treated as judgments not of knowledge but of belief; and
if further it can be shown that belief, as thus distinguish¬
ed from knowledge, rests always on feeling, and never in
ultimate analysis on insight or evidence, the principle
illustrated in morals will be strengthened and confirmed
by proof of its equal applicability in these other fields.
If this thesis be correct, Sections 1 to 6 of Book I of
the Treatise are of an introductory nature, and their
argument is predetermined by purposes which Hume has in
view, but which are not there disclosed .... The open¬
ing sections of the Treatise ... while essential, are
of a preliminary character; when taken by themselves they
give a very misleading impression, alike in regard to
Hume's ultimate purposes and in regard to the bearing of
the conclusions to which they more immediately lead.2
The topics occupying Hume's attention during his visit
to France constituted the subject matter of the Treatise of
3-Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume, p. 13.
2Ibid., pp. 13-![(..
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Human Nature. In this book we have his unique contribution
to philosophy which was "the extension of sentiment or feel¬
ing beyond ethics and aesthetics (to which it was limited by
Hutcheson) to include the entire realm of belief covering
1
all relations of matter-of-fact." All judgments upon truth,
beauty, and conduct depend upon the nature of man; without
knowledge of human nature there would never be any true under¬
standing or happiness. Hume considered that he had made an
advance towards such fundamental knowledge—a science of man.
Hume believed he had made a discovery of momentous
import in his definition of belief as "A lively idea related
to or associated with a present impression." In the "Appendix"
he states: "This operation of the mind, which forms the belief
of any matter of fact, seems hitherto to have been one of the
greatest mysteries of philosophy; tho' no one has so much as
p
suspected that there was any difficulty in explaining it."
The chief application of this discovery in the Treatise was to
3
the principle of cause and effect. It was this body of truth
which he feared would come into the world "maimed and imper¬
fect" unless he could regain his health. Nevertheless, he
published the Treatise, choosing to risk its imperfections
■^•Mossner, The Life of David Hume, pp. 76-77-
2t, 96; 628.
6'.7hen Hume composed An Abstract of a Book lately Pub¬
lished Entituled, A Treatise of Human Nature, &c, he sought to
illustrate and explain further "The Chief Argument of that Book";
this argument was clearly centered upon the analysis of cause
and effect. See An Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature , i7i1o:
A Pamphlet hitherto unknown by David Hume, reprinted with an
introduction by J. M. Keynes and P. Sraffa (Cambridge: At the
University Press, 1938).
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rather than to live and die without even attempting to convey
his discover;' to mankind.
We have already noted the intense excitement which
Hume experienced at his discovery concerning the nature of
causation. He did not regard this as a mere metaphysical no¬
tion but as affecting the very foundation of knowledge and hav¬
ing the greatest of all possible practical consequences.
Causation as the basis of moral philosophy as well as natural
philosophy (that is, all matter of fact), meant that these
enquiries were all grounded in belief. Consequently, the
certainty of knowledge upon which philosophy had prided it¬
self became as nothing--a matter of fact could never have
absolute certainty. But in the "Introduction" to the Treatise,
Hume endeavored to indicate that there was a constructive ele¬
ment in his thoughts as well as a criticism of the old and
outworn concepts of previous philosophy:
There is no question of importance, whose decision is
not compriz'd in the science of man; and there is none,
which can be decided with any certainty, before we become
acquainted with that science. In pretending therefore to
explain the principles of human nature, we in effect pro¬
pose a compleat system of the sciences, built on a founda¬
tion almost entirely new, and the only one upon which they
can stand with any security.^
The early reflections and studies which had led Hume
to his momentous discovery are not explicitly mentioned by
him. The Treatise does not tell us how he actually came to
ask its chief questions—they are simply proposed and dis¬
cussed. Hume does not record the thoughts which led him to
this new philosophy. The lack of such an introduction on his
-*-T, xx.
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part may partially explain why his contemporaries were unable
to see what he really meant by his statements. It may also
be that if we ever hope to grasp fully his intentions and the
rationale of his philosophy, we will be forced to discover
something of these early thoughts as nearly as we possibly
can. Kemp Smith contends that this is the case. He has done
much to bring about a new interpretation based on an examina¬
tion of Hume's entrance into the field of philosophy."'" There
are indications, as we have already noted, that Hume was con¬
cerned with questions about religion when he became interested
in philosophical works. He was examining the "fundamental
articles" which had been endlessly in dispute, and studying
how he might by a new means establish truth in the fields of
literary criticism and philosophy. Now we shall consider the
possible origins of Hume's new scheme of thought in order to
see what light they might shed on his attitude towards religion.
Sources for Hume's Ideas
In pointing out some of the more important authors
which Hume dealt with and was influenced by during the period
of the creation of the Treatise, Mossner stresses the danger
of looking for any one unique source.^ Hume's earliest extant
letter indicates that he was reading books sent to him
-'-Kemp Smith, The philosophy of David Hume.
2
Mossner, The Life of David Hume, pp. 78-79* B. M.
Laing pointed out in his book that Hume was influenced by
writers other than Locke and Berkeley. Tb. M. Laing, David
Hume (London: Ernest Benn Limited, 1932 r, p. 69q —
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at Ninewells from Edinburgh.1 While his interest in philosophy
was first aroused by problems of theology and works in classi¬
cal ethics, he soon turned to general philosophical writings.
Not only was he studying the ancient philosophers but also
2
Bayle, Cudworth, Duvos, Penelon, ana King. In a letter
written about 1730 Hume refers to the books of two modern
French historians.^ He speaks of reading at this time most
k
of the celebrated books in Latin, French, EngLish and Italian.
The common assumption that Hume's earliest interest v/as pri¬
marily in the epistemology of Locke and Berkeley is without
support. From the Treatise we can see that Hume's reading
g
of modern philosophy was wide, he read as we might expect
a man to do who was devoting himself to philosophy and polite
literature.
Bayle was consulted by Hume as early as 1732 and no
doubt furnished him with much of the sceptical reasoning ex¬
pressed in the Treatise. It is difficult to know what he was
studying in Bayle's collections, but it seems likely the
Dictionnaire historique et critique (1698) and Oeuvres diverses
7(1727-1731) were used by Hume. In the Treati se there are
^Letters, I, 9»
^The evidence for these sources is found in Hume's manus-
criot memoranda. See Mossner, "Hume's Early Memoranda," op.
5oo-5ok.
^Letters, II, 337* ^Letters, I, l6.
^Hendel discusses the influence of Leibniz on Hume.
[Hendel, op. cit. , pp. 139-
^Letters, I, 12.
?For a further discussion of Bayle's influence on Hume,
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frequent references of the kind common in Bayle's dictionary
such as "materialistic," "modern metaphysics," "philosophers
of the schools," "academic sceptics," "Pyrrhonians^1 and the
reader's understanding of these terms is taken for granted.
'The most interesting reference to Bayle is found in Book I,
Part iv, Section v^" where Hume criticizes the argument of
Spinoza in the Dictionary > Fenelon appears to have influenced
Hume largely in reference to thoughts on atheism and the
proofs for the existence of God. Dubos' main interest was
in aesthetics; he erected a system on the feelings rather
than on reason and thus provided Hume viith. the type of think¬
ing which he also found in Hutcheson's work. William King
likely influenced Hume by means of references to John Cray's
dissertation in which ethical utilitarianism is combined with
psychological associationism.
The task of tracing influences on Hume is extremely
arduous simply because he was distinctly a man of letters and
as such concerned himself with all topics of current interest
from that point of view. He was not primarily interested in
polemical writing in the same sense that both Locke and Berke¬
ley directed their arguments against the Cartisians and mathe¬
maticians. References to other authors in Hume's works are
made, for the most part, simply as passing literary allusions.
He refers to Seneca, Plutarch, Longinus, and Virgil and to the
see Kemp Smith, The.. Philosophy of David Hume, pp. 325-338J





French literary men such as Montaigne, La Buryere, Fenelon,
and Boileau. The most specific references are to be found
in Hume's discussion of morals for it is here that he definite¬
ly opposes the point of view of a school. As one commentator
puts it:
Hume's knowledge of the ethical discussions of his con¬
temporaries is so thoroughly attested by his citations
of them that it would be superfluous to give illustra¬
tions. Although his early reading was done in compara¬
tive isolation, it led him into the very center of those
subjects that were of greatest contemporary interest.1
In the more metaphysical parts of his work Hume men¬
tions Locke and Berkeley and refers to the Cartesians, parti-
cularly Malebranche, upon several points. There is direct
evidence that Hume knew the disputes being carried on in
3
theology. He had read Tillotson's sermons on miracles; and
Cudworth and Clarke are quoted on causation.^" In Cudworth's
The True Intellectual System of the Universe: The First Part;
Wherein, All the Reason and Philosophy of Atheism is Confuted;
and Its Impossibility Demonstrated (1678) Hume could get much
information on the atheistical arguments of both ancient and
modern thinkers, for their positions were quoted at length by
the Cambridge Platonist, There is a reference to the modern
sceptic Huet in the Dialogues.5
"'"Mary Shaw Kuypers, Studies in the Eighteenth Century
Background of Hume's Empiricism (Minneapolis: University of
Minneapolis Press, 1930), pp. 12-13. See also pp. 6)l-6o.
p^C. W. Hendel contends that Hume learned a religious
scepticism from Malebranche, especially in terms of the imper¬
fections and limitations of man's mental endowment. jvplendel,
op. cit., pp. 31-57.]]
3e, 108. Ij-T, 80; S, 73. ^D, 133.
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Hume had some direct acquaintance with scientific and
mathematical works, but it is probable that his knowledge "did
not go far beyond those books which were counted as literature
or which had aroused sufficient controversy to be popular."-'*
Hume refers to Newton's theory of the ether2 and quotes from
3
the Principia. His philosophy shows comprehension of the
metaphysical questions which Newtonian science had raised.
In his discussion of mathematics, reference is made to
Malezieu's Elements de Geome'tria de Mr, le due de Bourgogne^"
and Barrow's Mathematical Lectures. The Dialogues indicate
that Hume knew Galileo's Dialogue concerning the Two Great
Systems of the World.
What then may we conclude from these literary allusions
and references? Certainly they indicate rather significantly
that Hume read widely in both ancient and modern works. Be¬
sides this, the references serve to shed some light on his
knowledge of contemporary discussion and on the character of
his reading. Mary Shaw Kuypers has summarized the situation
very well in the following statement:
This scattering of names, taken alone, indicates little
more than that Hume had the kind of acquaintance with the
books of his day that v/e should expect of a man of letters
whose main devotion was to philosophy. Pie knew directly
some of the great scientific works which occupied so im¬
portant a place in the intellectual life of his time; he
had more intimate knowledge of the philosophic tradition
which had developed in the interpretation of science. The
internal evidence which the Treatise and Enquiry furnish
bears out this view.7
-'-Kuypers, op. cit., p. 12. 2E, 73n.
3T, 638-639. k-T, 30. -*T, Ij-6-ip7. 6D, 151.
7Kuypers, 00. cit., p. 66.
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Kemp Smith has given us good reason to disregard the
commonly held supposition that Hume approached his questions
in Book I of the Treatise through the examination of the gen¬
eral problems of the Cartesian philosophy."'" Although the tradi¬
tional supposition may be plausible, there are factors involved
in Hume's thought which point to an interest in moral theory
as his introduction to philosophy. It appears that a reversal
of the roles hitherto ascribed to reason and to feeling res¬
pectively is what is truly distinctive and central in Hume's
teaching; he subsequently attempted to apply this point of
view in the treatment of all judgments of matters of fact and
existence. Kemp Smith gives evidence to substantiate the view
that Books II and III of the Treatise are in date of first
composition prior to the working out of the doctrines dealt
with in Book I. The first book is a result of the extension
of Hume's doctrines, first noted in connection with moral and
aesthetic judgments, into the theory of knowledge. Kemp
Smith's argument is based on the often unrecognized influence
of Francis Hutcheson upon Hume. Hutcheson's works appeared
between 1725-1728 and were the immediate occasion of Hume's
awakening, according to Kemp Smith. There is a great amount
of circumstantial evidence to support this argument. Francis
Hutcheson was the dominant figure in Scottish philosophy dur¬
ing Hume's formative years, and it was to him that Hume turned
for advice on the composition and publication of the Treatise.^
"'"Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume, pp. 3-20,
^Letters, I, 32-35; 36-iiO.
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As we shall see later, It was Hutcheson's failure to support
him in his bid for the chair of moral philosophy in the Univ¬
ersity of Edinburgh that hurt Hume very deeply.
Francis Hutcheson, in collaboration with the early
Moderates in the Church, advocated tolerance and humanism in
place of the bigoted creed and fanatical enthusiasm of the
Covenanters. His influence as a professor resulted in the
growth of a powerful group of his students among the Church's
ministers.^" Hutcheson constructed on the system of Locke a
p
defence of Shaftesbury whose views he expounded and systema¬
tized; Shaftesbury was represented as the enemy of fanaticism.
By the aid of Locke's philosophy, Hutcheson thought it possible
to retain enough theological doctrine to constitute a kind of
natural religion; experience and the study of human nature were
to take the place of the fervid supernaturalism of the Confes¬
sion of Faith. The supernatural was not denied but more or
^•Accounts of Hutcheson's popularity as a professor may
be found in Henry Grey Graham, Scottish Men of Letters in the
Eighteenth Century (London: Adam & Charles Black, 190b), Chap-
ter II; Carlyle, op. cit., pp. 5>9-6o.
2
Shaftesbury opposed the doctrine of election by postu¬
lating the existence of a God whose ruling desire was the
happiness of His creatures. Enthusiasm and ecstatic utterances
were criticized and theology was stripped of its mystical qual¬
ities in favor of morality. Shaftesbury's humanism based
conduct on sentiment rather than on reason. As an unqualified
optimist, Shaftesbury asserted that humanity is endowed with
a moral sense which is instinctive but capable of cultivation;
and viewed as a self-reliant being, man is capable of fulfilling
the purpose of his existence. There can be no conflict between
social and individual welfare, since a certain harmony between
the self-regarding and the disinterested affections is essen¬
tial to both. Virtue is identified with beauty, morality with
aesthetics; man is conscious of an inward harmony and conceives
the possibility of a society no less exquisitely attuned.
[.See W. R. Scott, op. cit., pp. lk8-l8l.J
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less Ignored, and the deity was used as a kind of philosophic
figure-head.
Experience—not revelation—was made the starting point
in Hutcheson's ethical teaching. While he maintained that God
had inrolanted in mankind a desire for a beauty in character,
Hutcheson insisted that in manners the pleasure to be derived
from virtuous emotion does not detract from its disinterested¬
ness. The doctrine of natural depravity was opposed with an
optimistic utilitarian theory of morals; the sanctions of
morality were to be found in the constitution of human nature.
He taught that the soul of man was inclined more to virtue
than to vice. The law of benevolence was in his opinion as
universal as that of gravitation; of each of these "tendencies"
it could be affirmed that it "increases as the Distance is
diminish'd, and is strongest where Bodys come to touch each
other. "■*"
In Hutcheson's teaching Locke's theory of ideas is
modified; the distinction between inner and outer sense is
restated so that the inner senses (or impressions of reflections
which are not copies of impressions but arise from the mind
itself antecedent to impressions) are extended to include
moral and aesthetic senses. We are determined in our judgments
[Francis Hutchesori] , Inquiry into the Original of our
Ideas of Beauty and Virtue; In Two Treatises (London: J. and
Knapton, et.al., 1?29) , p. 222. "I doubt we have made
Philosophy, as well as Religion, by our foolish management of
it, so austere and ungainly a Form, that a Gentleman cannot
easily bring himself to like it; and those who are strangers
to it, can scarcely bear to hear our Description of it." Tlbid,
"Preface," p. xvj
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of good and evil as well as in aesthetic judgments of beauty
and deformity by the original character of human nature.
All such judgments are the same in that they are involuntary
(not determined by the will) and distinterested (they lack any
sort of rational justification). Moral and aesthetic judg¬
ments, resting exclusively on feeling, are non-cognitive or
non-rational; they are not based on rational grounds and are
arrived at immediately upon the apprehension of their object.
It was Hutcheson's contention that these empirical judgments
rest not on reason or on reflectively considered data, but
solely on feeling. Ivemp Smith maintains that this idea con¬
stituted the main influence in opening to Hume his new scheme
of thought in which passion or feeling took over the place
formerly assigned to reason. In adhering closely to the
criticism of moral theory found in Francis Hutcheson, Hume
formed the central unity In his own philosophy—the subordina¬
tion of reason to feeling and instinct made dominant through¬
out. In placing the major derivation of Hume's philosophy
on that of Hutcheson, Kemp Smith limited the influence of
the sources which tradition had been accustomed to stress.^-
We need not discuss Kemp Smith's arguments in detail;
it will serve our purpose here to state briefly the evidence
cited to confirm his conclusions. For external evidence the
letter addressed to a physician is cited in which, Kemp Smith
•*-Sce Kemp Smith's discussion "Hutcheson's Teaching and
its Influence on Hume," In The Philosophy of David Hume, pp.23-
2Suora, pp. 1I}.0-1Il2.
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contends, Htime has informed us that his philosophy originated
in his preoccupation with moral questions. There are also
clues in the "Introduction" to the Treatise where Hume mentions
Locke, Mandeville, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Butler as having
preceded him in the tasks he now endeavors to undertake. It
seems strange that he would specifically refer to these philoso¬
phers if his ethics, as is generally assumed, is merely an
application of the principles reached in his epistemology.
Hume's description of the Treatise in its sub-title as "An
Attempt to introduce the experimental Method of Reasoning into
Moral Subjects" also bears out the suggestion of a primary
moral interest in his thought. The fact that in later life,
when evaluating his literary works, Hume regarded the Enquiry
Concerning the Principles of Morals as his best book likewise
points to a predominance of moral interest in his philosophy.
Kemp Smith believes this new approach to Hume enables us to
arrive at an appropriate explanation of many features of his
teaching which otherwise would be difficult to interpret. Hume's
varying treatment of the self in Books I and II of the Treatise
and his manner of envisaging causality as an independent law
of association are two concepts which Kemp Smith feels can now
be satisfactorily explained. Much that had previously been
obscure or strangely worded in the opening sections of the
Treatise takes on new meaning when seen in the light of
Hutcheson's influence on Hume.
There are, of course, other sources for Hume's philosophy
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as Kemp Smith proceeds to point out."*" Although Hume derived,
to a great extent, the formulation of his philosophical prob¬
lem from Francis Hutches on, the philosophical method came from
Newton and Locke. It is quite evident that Hume modelled his
associationist explanation of mental phenomena on the pattern
of the Newtonian physics. Also traceable to Newton was Hume's
emphasis on experiment and the complementary doctrine that
there are ultimate human experiences resting for us on secret
causes. Kemp Smith contends that these doctrines conflict
with the concepts acquired from Hutcheson and involve Hume in
some of his more obvious and Important difficulties. Locke's
influence was mainly in the matter of terminology and in the
sensationalist basis of Hume's thought. Locke's theory of
ideas was used by Hume to show our dependence on instinct and
feeling in the moral and aesthetic as well as in the epistemolo-
gical realm; thus, the information we receive through the senses
is restricted in content. The influence of Berkeley on Hume
is discounted by Kemp Smith as a misrepresentation; Hume did
not follow Berkeley to the extent of a complete denial of the
material world. Hume's central problem was simply to show that
belief in the world does not rest on logical proof; to assert
further that therefore external reality does not exist would
be beyond Hume's purpose. Hume is indebted to Berkeley primari¬
ly in respect to the question—""/hat part do images play in
abstract thinking and how do they function as though they were
■*-Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume, pp. £3-76.
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universals.But to argue that it was Hume's sole purpose to
carry out logically the principles of Locke and Berkeley is to
miss completely the more important positive contributions Hume
has to offer.
The true objective towards which Hume's philosophy was
directed seems to have been a complete study of the science of
man. Kemp Smith's The Philosophy of David Hume has emphasized
this fact, and a great deal has been done in this book with
respect to an explanation of Hume's conception of human nature
and his positive philosophy. Suggestions for interpretation
are made by Kemp Smith which should be used for a proper
understanding of Hume's views on religion. In the light of
this interpretation we now turn our attention to an investiga¬
tion of Hume's attitude towards religion at the time of the
composition of the Treatise.
The Years in Prance
Hume met while in Paris a fellow countryman, the
Chevalier Ramsay, disciple of Fenelon, author of The Travels
of Cyrus (1727) and Philosophical Principles of Natural and
Revealed Religion unfolded in a G-eometrical Order (17^4-8—Ij_9),
a former tutor of Prince Charles Edward Stuart and a cousin
2of Hume's boyhood friend, Michael Ramsay. Judging from a
letter written sometime afterwards to an unknown correspondent,
1Ibid., p. 2£7n.
^Greig, op. cit., pp. 91-92. See G. D. Henderson,
Chevalier Ramsay (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd.,
1952), p. 7.
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Ramsay did not form a high opinion of Hume. Ramsay wrote:
A Gentlemen we speak of sent me his Essay upon humane
ITature about 15> Months ago by one Sir John Ramsay, a
Countryman of ours no1;/ at Angers. I have neither had time
nor health to peruse such an obscure, dark, intricate per¬
formance. . . By the litle I heard from & read of that
young Gentleman he seems to me far from being a True mas¬
ter of metaphysiks .... That bright Ingenius young
Spark does not seem to me to have acquir'd a sufficient
Stock of solid Learning, nor to be born with a fund of
noble Sentiments, nor to have a genius capable of all
that Geometrical attention, penetration and Justness,
necessary to make a True Metaphysician. I am affrayd
his spirit is more lively than solid, his Imagination
more luminous than profound, and his heart too dissipated
with material objects & spiritual Self-Idolatry to pierce
into the sacred recesses of divine Truths. ...
He seems to me one of those philosophers who think to
spin out Systems, out of their own brain, without any re¬
gard to religion, antiquity or Tradition sacred or pro¬
fane. . . .1
This is, of course, a prejudiced estimate by a convert
from Presbyterianism to Catholicism of the mystical variety
called Quietism. Ramsay undoubtedly was opinionated and dog¬
matic and his mystical religious views would not allow him to
2
accept the enthusiastically sceptical young Hume. But we
can, with some assurance, regard the Hume of 1731-1- as both
Andrew Michael Ramsay, MS letter, 2k Aug. 171-1-2, in
Report on the Laing Manuscripts preserved in the University
of Edinburgh (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1Q25), II, 330-
333.
2
It is interesting to note Hume's estimate of Ramsay
as "an author of taste and imagination, who was surely no enemy
to Christianity ... a writer, who had so laudable an Inclina¬
tion to be orthodox, that his reason never found any difficulty,
even in the doctrines which free-thinkers scruple most, the
trinity, incarnation, and satisfaction: His humanity alone,
of which he seems to have load a great stock, rebelled against
the doctrines of eternal reprobation and predestination."
After quoting the Chevalier at quite some length, Hume concludes,
,TI thought the opinions of this ingenious author very curious;
but I pretend not to warrant the justness of them." jG.G. IV,
3ffi-356nJ L
1714-
aggressive and spiritually self-idolatrous. He had just left
his home in Scotland and had, in effect, asserted his indepen¬
dence for the first time, turning his hack on the religious
enthusiasm which surrounded him in Scotland.
A common topic of conversation in Prance during these
years was that of the recent miracles of the Abbe' Paris at
St. Medard. These happenings at the tomb of this Jansenist
filled society and the church with excitement. The Abbe' had
been noted for his sanctity and charity and when he died
many admirers came to his tomb to pay their respects. It was
discovered that their devotion was rewarded; sick, halt, and
blind were miraculously cured. For quite some time the Jesuits,
who resented these events, were unable to discredit the evidence
for the miracles. Finally they were able to persuade the
government to close the gates of the cemetery to the public
in 1732. All this occurred just two years before Hume visited
France. The references to these events made an impression on
his mind and he began to meditate on the topic of the miraculous
in relation to religion. 'That he heard about these miracles
and that his interest was aroused is evident from the fact that
the "Abbe' Paris occurrences" are prominently referred to in the
essay "Of Miracles." In a footnote there is a special reference
to the importance of the subject in the minds of the people of
France at that time.-1- Hume's critical frame of mind and interest
in scientific method and. history would cause him to take an
interest in such matters and the result was his famous essay.
1G. G., IV, 101-103n.
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After visiting Paris, Hume travelled to Rheims and
then made his way to La Fleche in Anjou, famous as the site
of the Jesuit College where Descartes was educated. Despite
the vast difference in their respective outlooks, Hume evi¬
dently was able to maintain cordial relations with the Jesuits.
He walked in the cloisters of the college and on one occasion,
at least, discussed the subject of miracles with one of the
priests. It was probably while the stories of the Abbe' Paris
were fresh in his memory that Hume began to form the principal
theory of his essay "Of Miracles." In reporting the incident
at the college to the Reverend George Campbell in 17&2 Hume
says,
I wasvwalking in the cloisters of the Jesu.it's College of
La Fleche, a town in which I passed two years of my youth
and engaged in a conversation with a Jesuit of sane parts
and learning, who was relating to me, and urging some non¬
sensical miracle performed in their convent, when I was
tempted to dispute against him; and as my head was full of
the topics of my Treatise of Human Nature, which I was at
that time composing, this argument [in the essay "Of
Miracles"3 immediately occurred to me, and I thought it
very much gravelled my companion; but at last he observed
to me, that it was impossible for that argument to have
any solidity, because It operated equally against the
Gospel as the Catholic miracles;—which observation I
thought proper to admit as a sufficient answer.-*-
The argument that had caused the Jesuit so much consternation
p
was directed against the proof of miracles. We may well see
the reason for Hume's argument after we have considered the
basic postulates of the Treatise of Human Hature.
^■Letters, I, 361. E, 115-116. See infra, pp. 23lp
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The Treatise of Human Nature
Most of the actual composition of the Treatise was
completed during Hume's residence in Prance and the manuscript
was virtually ready for the press when he returned to London
in 1737 to arrange for publication. "By the middle of 1737*
after nearly three years of intensive writing, the Treatise
of Human Nature was substantially completed. The ideas which
earlier in Scotland had proved so recalcitrant had finally
fallen into place."1 While he was waiting for the booksellers
to accept his book, Hume revised certain portions that no
longer pleased him. In a letter to Henry Home of Kames, he
wrote:
... I began to feel some passages weaker for the style
and diction than I could have wisht. The nearness and
greatness of the event roused up my attention, and made
me more difficult to please, than when I was alone in
perfect tranquility in Prance.^
Hume became concerned about the possible consequences
of some of the daring implications of the original thoughts
contained in the Treatise. He knew that his views would cause
a strong reaction, for they indeed would be regarded as sub¬
versive not only to traditional moral philosophy but also to
the doctrines of established religion. He felt that the
passage in which he had made an analysis of miracles would al¬
most certainly give offence. Hume, withdrawing this section,
enclosed it in a letter to Home and said,
Having a frankt letter, I was resolved to make use of
it; and accordingly inclose some "Reasonings concerning
^Mossner, The Life of David Hume, p. 1Olp•
^Letters, I, 2l|_.
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Miracles," which I once thought of publishing with the
rest, but which I am afraid will give too much offence,
even as the world is disposed at present. . . . the force
of the argument you'll be judge of, as it stands ... I
beg of you to show it to nobody, except Mr. Hamilton, if
he pleases; and let me know at your-leasure that you have
received it, read it, and burnt it.
It appears that Hume was keen upon having the opinion
of Bishop Joseph Butler who had, in the immediately preceding
year, published The Analog:/" of Religion, Natural and Revealed,
to the Constitution and Course of Nature. Hume was impressed
O
with Butler and his teaching and when the Treatise was finished,
he obtained a letter of introduction to the reverend philosopher
in the hope of eliciting some opinions on the merit of the
work on human nature. However, a mere accident prevented the
meeting. The choice of such a man is indeed curious if Hume
had actually turned completely against religion and the Church,
a view that is all too commonly held even today.
Fearing that some of his opinions might repel the de¬
vout moralist, Hume tried to tone down the manuscript before
attempting to meet Butler. In the letter to Henry Home,Hume
says,
Your thoughts and mine agree with respect to Dr Butler,
and I would be glad to be introduced to him. I am at
present castrating my work, that is, cutting off its
nobler parts; that is, endeavouring it shall give as
little offence as possible, before which, I could not
pretend to put it into the Doctor's hands. This is a
piece of cowardice, for which I blame myself, though I
believe none of my friends will blame me. But I was
^-Letters, I, 2)i-25.
^Mossner suggests that Hume had Butler in mind in the
arguments of the Dialogues Concerning Hatural Religion and that
Cleanthes is representative of Butler's teaching. See E. C.
Mossner, "The Enigma of Hume," in Mind, XIV (1936), 339-3^9.
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resolved not to be an enthusiast in philosophy, while I
was blaming other enthusiasms.
It was regard for Butler's opinion that caused Hume to cut
out the section on miracles which he had evidently composed at
La Fleche. These thoughts, having been sent to Henry Home for
criticism both as to argument and style, were not published
until eleven years later and then against Home's advice that
they be totally suppressed. The argument on miracles was never
restored to its original place in the Treatise, a fact that skowlci
not be overlooked when one attempts to account for the clamor
the essay caused in the camps of orthodoxy. Hume was right
when he told Home, "There is something in the turn of thought,
and a good deal in the turn of expression, which will not per-
haps appear so proper, for want of knowing the context."
Perhaps if the essay "Of Miracles" had appeared where it was
originally intended, Hume would not have been charged with
desiring notoriety at all costs. One cannot help believing
its relevance would have been much more apparent within the
Treatise than it ever was as one of the Philosophical Essays.
It is unfortunate that Hume was never able to meet
3Butler, we know that he tried at least once, but when Butler
was made Bishop of Bristol, Hume evidently felt that a mere
1 2
Letters, I, 25. Letters, I, 21)..
3"I shall not trouble you with any formal compliments
or thanks, which would be but an ill return for the kindness
you have done me in writing in my behalf, to one you are so
little acquainted with as Dr Butler; and I am afraid stretching
the truth in favour of a friend. I have called upon the Doctor,
with a design of delivering him your letter, but find he is at
present in the country. I am a little anxious to have the
Doctor's opinion." ^Letter to Henry Home. Letters, I, 25.J
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letter of introduction was not sufficient to gain an audience
with a bishop. Relinquishing his attempt at personal acquain¬
tance, he had to be content with any second hand comments But¬
ler might be willing to make. Referring to the Treatise Hume
says, "I have sent the Bishop of Bristol a copy; but could not
wait on him with your letter after he had arrived at that dig¬
nity. At least I thought it would be to no purpose after I
begun the printing."^" Whether Hume would have seen fit to
make any major changes in the Treatise on the basis of Butler's
advice is difficult to say, but it is more than likely that he
would have taken a very different view of clergymen had he
been able to know Butler. One commentator makes the following
observation:
jjiume' s] experience of Churchmen was unfortunately limited.
As far as we can tell, he had known only rather harsh and
unenlightened Presbyterians in Scotland, whom he heartily
disliked, and even less enlightened Roman Catholic priests
in Prance, whom he heartily despised. Butler was a church¬
man of a different stamp. Devotit without bigotry, courteous
and enlightened, gentle but acute, he could hardly fail to
have impressed Hume in conversation; the more so as he had
already prepossessed him in his favour by his books. The
result of several meetings might have been a softening of
Hume's bitterness against churches; which would not have
done him any harm as a philosopher, or in later years, as
a historian.2
The seventeen thirties in London wore a period of
philosophical-religious controversy between the Deists who ad¬
hered to the "Religion of Nature or Reason" and the Christian
apologists with their "Religion of Revelation." Matthew Tin-
dal's Christianity as old as the Creation: Or, the Gospel, a
Republication of the Religion of Nature, published in the first
^Letters, 1, 2?. 2Greig, op. cit., pp. 9^-97.
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year of the decade, drew a number of replies from the orthodox,
of which Butler's Analogy was the most influential. In 1739
orthodox Christians published the Boyle Lectures entitled A
Defence of Natural and Revealed Religion. If Hume had retained
the section "Of Miracles" in the Treatise, he would inevitably
have been involved in the midst of this religious controversy.
As it was, the religious implications of his argument were for
the most part overlooked. If he had not used the surgical
knife in cutting off the "noble Parts . . . endeavouring it
shall give as little offence as possible," we may be assured
that the religious import of his philosophy would have been
more apparent to his contemporaries. There might even have been
a few who would have recognized that his principles put an end
to the controversies between Deists and Christians. Both sides
were wrong, according to Hume's analysis; a rationalistic
proof of matters of fact is insufficient whether it be based
on natural religion or on authoritarian arguments.
To discover Hume's attitude towards religion by an
examination of some relevant passages in the Treatise is a dif¬
ficult task due to the fact that he eliminated much of his
original theological thought before publication. Nevertheless,
an attempt to arrive at an understanding of the place of reli¬
gion in his philosonhy is necessary for a proper understanding
of his religious attitude.» We have observed in the progress
of Hume's life and thought a separation from philosophic and
religious tradition and the development of a sceptical frame
of mind. Hume himself appears to have regarded his own
iSl
scepticism as a vital part of his system and, as Constance
Maund has pointed out, "he took the greatest trouble to state
it as clearly as he could [so that] it is probably the best
expressed of all his views. . . •
Considering scepticism to be one of the most important
of his doctrines, Hume used (in Book I of the Treatise) a
critical and negative method of approach which he hoped would
serve to clear the field of error. He was correct when he
admitted that the Treatise had suffered from the arrangement
of the argument, for the critical element is so prominent
throughout the discussion that the reader gets the impression
that Hume is merely negative or sceptical. Mien we carefully
examine the thought, however, we see that there is also a
positive theory of the understanding. This leads to the sug¬
gestion that the destructive argument was purposely introduced
to make clear Hume's problem and the proposed solution to it.
O
His discussion of space and time gives a clue to what he was
doing. There he pointed out that, if mathematical points and
physical points were the only possibilities, infinite divisi-
bilitjT" wo til d have to be accepted. But in fact infinite divis¬
ibility need not be accepted because it was not the sole re¬
maining possibility. For Hume it was quite clear that there
was a way out of his criticism, destructive of all three
views; the solution was an empirical one. Scepticism, then,
^Constance Maund, Hume's Theory of Knowledge, A Criti¬
cal Examination (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1937), p. 233.
2T, 26-68.
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was not caused by empiricism but was due to the difficulties
and contradictions into which reason fell. Empiricism in
Hume's thought was a means of obviating scepticism.
If we analyze the succeeding topics in the Treatise
a similar view is found underlying the arguments. The idea
of causation is not intelligible or explicable on the basis
of reason, but an empirical solution can be formulated to
explain our belief in cause and effect."'" Likewise, the same
method of argument Is followed in the treatment of the prob-
2
lems of the self and of an external world. In ethics Hume
attacked rationalism and substituted as his solution an em¬
pirical theory of moral sense and a concept! on of utility;
reason is not the judge of moral Issues.3 It is evident that
he was not maintaining a sceptical position nor did he consi¬
der himself a total sceptic for he sa.id concerning Berkeley
in an often overlooked footnote in An Enquiry Concerning the
Human Understanding,
. • . most of the writings of that very ingenious author
form the best lessons of scepticism, which are to be found
either among the ancient or modern philosophers, Bayle not
excepted. He professes, however, in his title-page (and
undoubtedly with great truth) to have composed his book
against the sceptics as well as against the atheists and
free thinkers. But that all his arguments, though other¬
wise intended, are, In reality, merely sceptical, appears
from this, that they admit of no answer and produce no
conviction. Their only effect is to cause that momentary
amazement and irresolution and confusion which is the
result of scepticism.•






of the Treatise Hume formulated scepticism with the view of
refuting it. Throughout his writings he made explicit state¬
ments of his attitude towards scepticism. In a letter to
James Balfour, who had made a criticism of Hume's theoiy of
morals, he said, "I have surely endeavoured to refute the
Sceptic with all the force of which I am master; and my refuta¬
tion must be allowed sincere, because drawn from the capital
principles of my system.""*" In the Treatise in dealing with
Sceptical Philosophy he made the following statement:
"Jhoever has taken the pains to refute the cavils of this
total scepticism, has really disputed without an antagon¬
ist, and endeavour'd by arguments to establish a faculty,
which nature has antecedently implanted in the mind, and
render'd unavoidable.
My intention then in displaying so carefully the argu¬
ments of that fantastic sect, is only to make the reader
sensible of the truth of my hypothesis, that all our reason¬
ings concerning causes and effects are deriv'd from nothing
but custom; and that belief is more properly an act of the
sensitive, than of the cognitive part of our natures.^
Hume defined scepticism primarily as a spirit of in¬
quiry or as a method of examination. The reason for scepticism
becomes apparent when we understand Hume's teaching about man
as primarily an active and only secondarily a reflective being.
Man is a believing animal and, in consequence of this, also
a credulous animal. Belief as a passion conspires to bring
man into subjection to influences which are unconsidered and
often malign. It Is as a safeguard against these evils (which
are reinforced by the influences of the state, of education,
and especiallyy of religion) and, in modest collaboration
with nature, that Hume advocates a sceptical attitude. Kemp
1Letters, I, 173. 2T, lS3.
^Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume, pp. 130-131.
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Smith points out that "when Hume lays claim, as he indeed
does, to the title 'sceptic,' he means thereby not a self-
defeating scepticism, which in discrediting reason blunts the
weapons that have to be relied upon in the battle with the
forces of fanaticism and superstition, but a scepticism of
the aristocratic, academic type—what Hume himself also en¬
titles a 'mitigated' scepticism--the scepticism which lias its
source in a fastidious insistence that while our standards of
judgment must indeed be appropriate to the kind of problem which
is being dealt with, these standards must be held to with the
uttermost rigour."
The aim of Hume's scepticism was not to shake belief
but only to make it clear that it is mere belief, and not, as
hitherto held, demonstrative or factual knowledge. By doubting,
we can define the boundary between knowledge and belief and
thus destroy that absolute confidence which is a hindrance
rather than a help to investigation. Hume's problem in the
Treatise involved the formulation of a logic which would leave
room for taste and sentiment without giving any encouragement
to the visionary. He endeavored to develop a scepticism deep
enough to dispel the presumption that a developed science
would be purely "rational," but sufficiently "mitigated" to
allow for the supremacy of science over superstition. Hume
was faced with the task of describing the reasonableness of
science without falling into either scepticism or rationalism.
Hume directed his criticism not only against the
1Kemp Smith, "David Hume, 1739-1939," p. xii.
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arguments of the theologians and moralists but also against
what he took to be the philosophic bearings of contemporary
science."'' It is not only in religion and morals, Hume con¬
tends, that man believes according to the special contacts of
his experience but also in his science. Belief, not reason,
is the basis of man's knowledge of the world. Hume's argu¬
ments undermined every rationalistic structure which had been
raised upon the foundations of the Newtonian science.
Keeping Hume's intention and hypothesis in mind, we now
endeavor to examine the effect of his scepticism on the prob¬
lems of religion. Beginning with a sceptical analysis, Hume
attacked the intelligibility of both philosophical and reli¬
gious ideas. The rationalistic theology of Hume's day found
its best ally in science, and in combating the one, he found
2
it impossible to avoid condemning the other. Hume rules out
the types of rationalism which identified causes with logical
grounds. He denied the possibility of extending knowledge,
by means of the causal inference, to objects beyond experience.
Therefore, neither God nor matter, defined as beyond the reach
of the sense, can be inferred from the facts of experience.
In the criticism of the idea of a Divine Being,^ Hume's
attack was directed against dogmatism or rationalism. The
rationalists were usually theologians interested in discover¬
ing indubitable foundations for the code of Christianity. They
wished to make morality or "natural religion" the basis for a
^See Kuypers, op. cit., pp. 66-6?.
2Ibid. , p.72. 3T, 214.0-2I4.9.
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defence of revealed religion."'" Rationalism served as the
technique of dogmatism in ethics and politics as well as in
theology. Hume opposed these rationalistic arguments and con¬
tended that there are no rational grounds for beliefs in these
spheres. In denying the accepted rationalist basis for the
religion of his day, Hume did not advocate science in opposi¬
tion to religion but rather pleaded for an empiricism in
which natural belief was basic.
Hume contends that the belief in a God is full of
difficulties when we try to defend it by reason. A dogmatism
that attempts such reasoning is really impious and leads in¬
to the grossest absurdities. It either involves the acknow¬
ledgment "that the deity is the author of all our volitions
and perceptions .... and thus the supreme being is the
real cause of all our actions, bad as well as good, vicious
as well as virtuous," or else it limits the divine power by
limiting our knowledge of the nature of this power to an idea
"deriv'd from particular impressions, none of which contain
any efficacy, nor seem to have any connexion with any other
existence."-' Hume found that the conception of a cause is
rationally indefensible as is the notion of external bodies.
The incorporeal is also incomprehensible and the soul of man
is just as unintelligible as external bodies. The doctrines
of religion are likewise incapable of metaphysical or rational
justification; there is no rational demonstration for the exis¬
tence of God. Scepticism had shown this to be so.
iKuypers, op. cit., p. 93. 2T, 2lj_9. 3T, 2^8.
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Hume makes his anti-rationalistic position evident in
the treatment of the simplicity of the soul and the relations
of that problem to free-thinking materialism.1 He boldly
charged his opponents with atheism comparable to Spinoza's.
Any attempt to establish the simplicity and immateriality of
the soul leads inevitably to atheism. As these views are held
on the basis of reason, Hume's criticism of them, as well as
of Spinoza, is an attack on rationalism. Scepticism indicates
that material and immaterial things are incomprehensible from
the side of both sense and reason.
In speaking of Spinoza's "hideous hypothesis" it is
apparent that Hume does not regard himself as being an atheist.
He mentions a "true religion" and claims that natural religion
2
is "in some measure dependent on the science of Man." Hume
admits that the things men think about the "Deity" and the
"Life to come" are important to them. There is no denying
the fact of men's beliefs. The real question concerns the
meaning of religious beliefs and the way in which they have
arisen. Hume manifests a genuine concern over the "momentous
consequences" of his own theory. He wants to know what it is
that induces men to believe in providence and immortal life.
He finds it necessary in his study of human nature to examine
the special experiences and interests of humanity impelling
men to believe in religious verities.
The results of Hume's studies in religion lead him to
believe that there is no explicit natural theology in the sense
1T, 23l+ff. 2T, xix.
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of a definite, stable science of the Deity and His relations
to man. But neither religion nor morals suffer from the un¬
avoidable imperfections of our ideas concerning the Deity.1
The order of the universe proves an omnipotent mind; that
is, a mind whose will is constantly attended with the
obedience of ever?/ creature and being. Nothing more is
requisite to give a foundation to all the articles of
religion, nor is it necessary we shou'd form a distinct
idea of the force and energy of the supreme Being.2
For the most part Hume was very prudent in his state¬
ments about religion in the Treatise. It appears that he
did not want to contradict the common religious beliefs. At
the close of Section vi, Part IV, Hume claims,
There is only one occasion, when philosophy will think it
necessary and even honourable to justify herself, and that
is, when religion may seem to be in the least offended. . . .
If any one, therefore, shou'd imagine that the foregoing
arguments are any ways dangerous to religion, I hope the
following apology will remove his apprehensions.
... If my philosophy . . . makes no addition to the
arguments for religion, I have at least the satisfaction
to think it takes nothing from them, but that every thing
remains precisely as before.3
Reception of the Treatise
That Hume regarded his philosophy as revolutionary and
expected the Treatise to cause a great stir in the intellectual
world may be seen in the reference to his work when he informed
Henry Home,
I am sorry I am not able to satisfy your curiosity by
giving you some general notion of the plan upon which I
proceed. But ray opinions are so new, and even some terms
I am obliged to make use of, that I could not propose, by
any abridgement to give my system an air of likelihood,
or so much as make it intelligible.M-
XT, 633n. Cf. 160. 2T, 633n. 3t, 250-251.
^-Letters, I, 23-21}..
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And writing to Home again after the Treatise was published
he says, "My principles are also so remote from all the vul¬
gar Sentiments on this subject, that were they to take place,
they would produce almost a total alteration in philosophy?
and you know, revolutions of this kind are not easily brought
about.1,1
Anxiously awaiting the effect of his first literary
attempt on the world, Hume listened eagerly for the discussions
he was sure his theories would create; he had issued a challenge
to the philosophers of Europe. But instead of a storm, his
book failed to arouse interest. "Never literary Attempt was
more unfortunate than my Treatise of Human Nature," he wrote
in "My Own Life"; "It fell dead-born from the Press; without
reaching such distinction as even to excite a Murmur among
P
the Zealots." Except for a few obscure reviews which were
3
quite abusive, the Treatise was, for the most part, neglected.
1 / 2
Letters, I, 26. Letters, I, 2.
"3
For a discussion of the reviews of the Treatise, see
S. C. Mossner, "The Continental Receotion of Hume1s Treatise,
1739-171+1," in Mind LVI (191+7), 31-1+3; E. C. Mossner, "First
Answer to Hume's Treatise: An Unnoticed Item of 171+0," in Jour¬
nal of the History of Ideas, XII (1951), 291-29)+; and Mossner,
The Life of David Hume, pp. 119-125;128-131; 618-619. Mossner
suggests that William Warburton may have written the review for
the History of the Works of the Learned, [bf. Burton, op. cit. , I,
109 and Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume, p. 523n.J
03ere it is intimated that Warburton may have been the reviewer!]
A perusal of the article reveals two violently opposed themes
which led Kemp Smith to suggest that it may have been written
by two different men. Jjlf. Quarterly Review (I8I4.6), Art. XXVI,
362, 378. ". . . criticism of Hume'1 s Treatise--in The Works of
of the Learned--is such a mixture of censure and sarcasm, with
a prognostication of future fame, that it has been thought to be
the^joint contribution of two authors. "J This "somewhat abusive"
review (as Hume termed it) set the standard for the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries misrepresentations of the Treatise in
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Those individuals who did read the book were seemingly unable
to understand the argument. One critic refuted the Treatise
mainly "on the grounds that it was so completely incomprehen¬
sible as to delude the weak-minded into accepting it as high
philosophy."^" Hume was attacked on elementary points of arith-
matic and basic ignorance of scientific method. The foremost
complaint was made against his manner of expression and exposi¬
tion. Style seemed to attract more notice than content, and
Hume's attempt to reach his contemporaries' understanding had
succeeded merely in raising their literary prejudices. The
readers of the Treatise, however few they may have been, failed
completely to see the point of Hume's thoughts.
The immediate reception given to the Treatise was dis¬
appointing to Hume. Its failure to awaken any marked interest
was such as to lend an author anything but encouragement. Un¬
willing to see his principles fade away into oblivion, Hume
prepared his own abstract of the Treatise which appeared in
I7I4.O as a pamphlet--An Abstract of a Book lately Published;
Hntituled a Treatise of Human Nature, &c. Wherein the Chief
Argument of that Book is Farther Illustrated and Explained.
The Abstract is certainly valuable In that it shows clearly
and forcefully what Hume had Intended as the chief argument
of the Treatise. In the preface of the pamphlet he points out
the basic respects of restricting interest to Book I, of delib¬
erately misrepresenting the text, and of entering into ridi¬
cule and abuse rather than attempting to refute the book by
argument.
-'-See Ivlossner, "The First Answer to Hume's Treatise,"
p. 293.
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the revolutionary nature of his thinking:
The book seem'd to me to have such an air of singularity,
and novelty as claim'd the attention of the public; es¬
pecially if it be found, as the Author seems to insinuate,
that were his philosophy receiv'd, we must alter from the
foundation of the greatest part of the sciences. Such
bold attempts are always advantageous in the republic of
letters, because they shake off the yoke of authority,
accustom men to think for themselves, give new hints, which
men of genius may carry further, and by the very opposi¬
tion, illustrate points, wherein no one before suspected
any difficulty.
In the Abstract both the revolutionary and the con¬
structive sides of Hume's thinking stand out clearly. The
opening pages emphasize the systematic and constructive aspects
of his system:
Beside the satisfaction of being acquainted with what
most nearly concerns us, it may be safely affirmed, that
almost all the sciences are comprehended in the science
of human nature, and are dependent on it. The sole end of
logic is to explain the principles and Operations of our
reasoning faculty, and the nature of our ideas; morals and
criticism regard our tastes and sentiments; and politics
consider men as united in society, and dependent on each
other. This treatise therefore of human nature seems in¬
tended for a system of the sciences. The author has finished
what regards logic, and has laid the foundation of the other
parts in his account of the passions.^
In the following passage the destructive element in
the Treatise is. noted:
By all that has been said the reader will easily per¬
ceive, that the philosophy contain'd in this book is very
sceptical, and tends to give us a notion of the imperfec¬
tions and narrow limits of human understanding. Almost
all reasoning is there reduced to experience; and the be¬
lief, which attends experience, is explained to be nothing
but a peculiar sentiment, or lively conception produced
by habit. Nor is this all, when we believe any thing of
external existence, or suppose an object to exist a moment
after it is no longer perceived, this belief is nothing
but a sentiment of the same kind. Our author insists upon
several other sceptical topics; and upon the whole concludes,
3-A, .Preface.
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that v/e assent to our faculties, and employ our reason
only becavise we cannot help it. Philosophy wou'd render
us entirely Pyrrhonian, were not nature too strong for it.
Hume is quite emphatic that the critical tendency of his thought
is not to be taken as a scepticism which excludes all knowledge.
He believes there is something constructive to be found, and
at the close of the Abstract he discusses the determinants
of resemblance, contiguity and causation as subordinate parts
of his principle of the association of ideas. The pamphlet
concludes:
'Twill be easy to conceive of what vast consequences
these principles must be in the science of human nature,
if we consider, that so far as regards the mind, these
are the only links that bind the parts of the universe
together, or connect us with any person or object exterior
to ourselves. For as it is by means of thought only that
any thing operates upon our passions, and as these are
the only ties of our thoughts, they are really to us the
cement of the universe, and all the operations of the
mind must, in great measure, d,epend on them.2
A perusal of the Abstract indicates that Hume has
reiterated the argument of Book I of the Treatise—a true
notion of cause and effect leaves us without absolute certain¬
ty in our knowledge of matter of fact. He had been led to
write the Treatise by the discovery that some of man's strong¬
est beliefs (especially religious beliefs) cannot be supported
by observable facts. It was his concern to distinguish such
presumptive beliefs from those which are not. The difference,
Hume contended, could best be discovered by comparing these
ideas with their corresponding impressions, thus greatly limit¬
ing the extent of man's supposed knowledge. He made it clear
that he did not intend his thinking to terminate in scepticism;
XA, 2k. 2A, 32.
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he believed that a new science could be built on an empirical
rather than a rationalistic foundation. Hume's system is
naturalistic in the sense that it is based upon an attempt
to understand the functioning of the human mind and the whole
being of man. And although man is primarily a feeling rather
than a reasoning creature, he is still capable of philosophic
thought. Hume hoped to carry out his science of human nature
continuing with the study of morals, of criticism, and of
politics, which for him included both social relations and
history. It was in connection with both morals and social re¬
lations that Hume found It necessary to discuss the religious
beliefs of man.
It was no wonder that Hume, in looking back to the
publication of the Treatise, made the remark that it fell
dead-born from the press. Not only did critics fail to under¬
stand it but they also failed to have any sympathy for his
new system of thought. Pew of the Treatise's readers ever
got beyond the analysis of cause and effect In Book I, and
as to an empirical and naturalistic moral philosophy and
religion, their minds seemed completely unresponsive. The
Treatise, although not totally ignored, was nevertheless
totally misunderstood. It was badly misrepresented by all
who found time to take any notice of it, Hume himself was
regarded as a dogmatic and egotistical author and his work
was said to be so abstruse as to be entirely unintelligible.
He must have been extremely dismayed to see that his great
discoveries were universally ignored by philosophers competent
19)+
to deal with them while critics confined their comments to
the author's style.
Correspondence with Hutcheson
After telling how the Treatise fell dead-born from
the press, Hume continued in "My Own Life": "But being natural¬
ly of a cheerful and sanguine Temper, I very soon recovered
the Blow, and prosecuted with great Ardour my studies in the
2
Country." Hume had no intention of abandoning the life of
letters. The failure of the Treatise he attributed to his
own overwhelming desire to get it published quickly; he felt
certain that more caution on his part in the matter of literary
expression would have insured the book's success. Now it was
necessary for him to find a new method of expressing his
thoughts, a method that would satisfy the taste of the pub¬
lic. His immediate literary programme included the publica¬
tion of the third book of the Treatise. By September 1739
Hume sent the manuscript of Book III to Francis Hutcheson for
criticism. Admiring Hutcheson's personal conduct as well as
his philosophy, Hume believed the professor was the individual
who could help most in literary and professional advice. And
although Hutcheson was in danger of incurring the wrath of the
rigidly righteous against himself,3 he corresponded with Hume
•*"See Mossner, The Life of David Hume, pp. 131-132.
^Letters, I, 2.
3liutcheson had been in trouble in 1737 with the zealous
party of the Glasgow Presbytery for his liberal theology. It
was stated that Hutcheson was involved in teaching his students
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and sent some reflections on the principles set out in the
book on morals.
Friendly relations developed between Hume and Hutcheson
even though they differed in their doctrines. Hume excluded
theological reasonings from his strictly naturalistic system
of ethics whereas Hutcheson attempted to ground his ethics on
Christian benevolence. This difference between the two
moralists may be seen in a paragraph from Hume's letter of
thanks to Hutcheson for the latter's reflections on the
manuscript.
I cannot agree in your Sense of Natural. Tis founded
on final Causes; which is a Consideration, that appears
to me pretty uncertain & unphilosophical. For pray, what
is the End of Man? Is he created "for Happiness or for
Virtue? For this Life or for the next? For himself or
for his Maker? Your definition of Natural depends upon
solving these Questions, which are endless, & quite wide
of my Purpose. I have never call'd Justice unnatural,
but only artificial.^
Then, after stating that the question whether natural abilities
3
are virtixes or not is simply a dispute of words, Hume continues,
Were Benevolence the only Virtue no Characters cou'd be
mixt, but wou'd depend entirely on their Degrees of Benev¬
olence. Upon the whole, I desire to take my Catalogue of
Virtues from Cicero's Offices, not from the Whole Duty of
Man. I had., indeed, the former Book in my Eye in all my
Reasonings.U
heresy in two false and dangerous doctrines: (1) That the stan¬
dard of moral goodness was the promotion of the happiness of
others; and (2) that vre could have a knowledge of good and evil
without and prior to a knowledge of God. &• R. Scott, on. clt.,
pp. 83-85.J See also John Rae, The Life of Adam Smith (London:
Macmillan & Co., 189^), pp. 12f.
■%. R. Scott, op. cit., pp. 116-126. ^Letters, I, 33.
3see T, Book III, Part III, Section I.
^-Letters, I, 3l|_.
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Despite their opposing views on the place of theologi¬
cal doctrines in morals, Hume and Hutcheson continued in cor¬
dial relationship between the years 1739 and 17!-- On March
lq, 17^4-0 Hume sought Hutcheson's advice in the choice of a book¬
seller for the third volume of the Treatise. It appears that
Hume was somewhat afraid that "Of Morals" might offend the
Christian zealots and he wanted to avoid such offense if possible,
for he tells Hutcheson,
Perhaps you may not care to recommend even to a Bookseller
a.Book that may give Offence to religious People: Perhaps
you may not think it calculated for public Sale. I assure
you, therefore, that I shall not take in the least amiss,
if you refuse me. I shall only say with regard to the
first Article, that the Book is pretty much alter'd since
you saw it; & tho' the Clergy be always Enemys to Innova¬
tions in Philosophy, yet I do not think they will find
any great Matter of Offence in this Volume. On the con¬
trary I shall be disappointed, if Impartial Judges be not
much pleas'd with the Soundness of my Morals. I have sent
you the Conclusion, as I have alter'd it, that you may see
I desire to keep on good Terms even with the strictest &
most rigid.1
Following this correspondence with another letter on
March l6, Hume raises a question concerning certain statements
in the Treatise on feeling or sentiment as the basis for moral
2
judgments. Hume writes,
I must consult you in a Point of Prudence. I have
concluded a Reasoning with these two Sentences. "When
you pronounce any Action or Character to be vicious, you
mean nothing but that from the particular Constitution of
your Nature you have a Feeling or Sentiment of Blame from
the Contemplation of it. Vices & Virtue, therefore, may
be compar'd to Sounds, Colours, Heat & Cold, which, accord¬
ing to modern philosophy, are not 'Qualitys in Objects, but
Perceptions in the Mind: And this Discovery in Morals, like
that other in Physicks, is to be regarded as a mighty
Advancement of the speculative Sciences: tho' like that
-^-Letters, I, 37. 2T, lji>9
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too, it has little or no Influence on Practice." Is not
this laid a little too strong?1
Asking Hutcheson's opinion on this, Hume states, however, that
he cannot promise to conform to it and continues, "I wish from
my Heart, I cou'd avoid concluding, that since Morality, accord¬
ing to your Opinion as well as mine, is determin'd merely by
Sentiment, it regards only human Nature & human Life." Hume
was unable to follow Hutcheson's attempt to retain a super¬
natural sanction in ethics and concludes this letter with the
following questions:
If Morality were determined by Reason, that is the same
to all rational Beings; But nothing but Experience can
assure us, that Sentiments are the same. What Experience
have we with regard to superior Beings? How can we as¬
cribe to them any Sentiments at all? They have implanted
those Sentiments in us for the Conduct of Life like our
bodily Sensations, which they possess not themselves. I
expect no Answer to these Difficultys in the compass of
a Letter.2
When Hutcheson' s Philosophia moralis institutio cora-
pendiaria was published at Glasgow in December, 17ll2 a copy
was sent to Hume by the author. Hume writes, "I receiv'd
your very agreeable Present; for which I esteem myself much
oblig'd to you" and gives Hutcheson some reflections on the
central issue of the ethics. The letter closes with the fol¬
lowing words which reveal an aspect of Hume's attitude toward
religion at this time: "I must own I am pleas'd to see such
Philosophy & such instructive Morals to have once set their
Foot in the Schools. I hope they will next get into the World
& then into the Churches."3 Hume's interest in the spread of
betters, I, 39-LlO. 2Letters, I, ItO. ^Letters, I, I4.8.
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the modern philosophy from the university into the world and
ultimately into religious practice is important in understand¬
ing his statements on religion in some of his later works.
The Essays Moral and Political
In the years 1739 and 17l(-0 Hume was already laying
plans to reach a more popular audience; the result was the
Essays Moral and Political published anonymously at Edinburgh
late in 17^-1 • The Essays sold extremely well in both Edin¬
burgh and London. A new edition with a few unimportant
changes came out in 17-1-2 together with a second volume con¬
taining twelve new essays. Originally designed for publica¬
tion in periodical form, the essays constitute an experiment
towards the possible recasting of the philosophy of the
Treatise in a new literary form. In Hume's mind the failure
of that work had been due to style and form."*" He had never
given up the philosophical principles which had been so sadly
misunderstood. He now hoped his ideas would find acceptance
in a more popular form--the essay.
Bishop Butler, who had seemingly ignored the Treatise,
praised the Essays, and recommended them to his friends.
This pleased Hume exceedingly and gave him hope that the
principles of the Treatise would be accepted. On the 13th
of June 17^4-2 he wrote to Henry Home,
"*■"I had always entertained a Notion, that my want of
success, in publishing the Treatise of human Nature, had
proceeded more from the manner than the matter; and that I
had been guilty of a veyy usual Indiscretion, In going to
the Press too early." {Letters, I, 3.J
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The Essays are all sold in London, as I am informed by
two letters from English gentlemen of my acquaintance.
There is a demand for them; and, as one of them tells
me, Innys, the great bookseller in Paul's Churchyard,
wonders there is not a new edition, for that he cannot
find copies for his customers. I am also told that Dr
Butler has every where recommended them; so that I hope
they will have some success. The-^ may prove like dung
with marl, and bring forward the rest of my Philosophy,
which is of a more durable, though of a harder and more
stubborn nature.1
Success in essay-writing and the approbation of the public
gave Hume confidence in his literary ability. In "My Own
Life" he remarks, "The work was favourably received, and soon
2
made me entirely forget my former Disappointment."
In the first chapter of this thesis it was noted that
Hume received criticism for turning from philosophy to essay
writing. He was regarded as having an illegitimate literary
ambition and in his autobiography he admits that he was anxious
for fame. Hume's contemporaries regarded Ms "love of literary
fame" as a craving for mere notoriety, and for the most part,
critics in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries dealt
very harshly -with him because of this literary ambition. Hume
has not been without champions, however, and recent study has
tended to defend him as manifesting the highest motives in
3
seeking literary recognition. The accusation that he forsook
philosophy for easier forms of writing (i.e., the essay and
history) when he found that the Treatise did not make him
^■Letters, I, 1[_3. 2Letters, I, 2.
3see Hendel, op, cit.t pp. 10-13; Laing, on. cit., pp.
7-8; Kemp Smith, "David Hume, 1?39-1939>" PP» i-xxiv; E. C.
Mossner, "Philosophy and Biography: The Case of David Hume,"
in the Philosophical Review, LIX (19.90), l81|.-201.
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famous, is ill-founded. As Greig says, "We might as well
charge him with forsaking literature for theory of know¬
ledge.""*" Hume's interests were divided almost equally be¬
tween "reasoning and philosophy" on one side and "poetry
p
and polite literature" on the other. If he had been forced
to choose between literature (includ.ing history) and meta¬
physics (and allied branches of philosophy), Hume would
likely have chosen literature; but we may feel sure his writ-
ings would have revealed a philosophic spirit. The charge
that he published his revolutionary ideas through a desire
for notoriety or public notice at all costs is a misconcep¬
tion which
. . . began with his contemporaries most of whom never
read a chapter of the Treatise in their lives. It has been
far too common since, not only among critics who have
shown themselves antagonistic for religious reasons, but
even among those sympathetic on the whole with Hume's
philosophic point of view.P-
If we turn to Hume's own statements about the desire
for fame, an entirely different picture of his motives appears.
In a letter to Henry Home he wrote:
In looking over your Letters I find one of a twelve¬
month's Date, wherein you desire me to send down a great
many copys £of the Treatise]to Scotland. You propos'd no
doubt to take the Pains of recommending them, & pushing
the Sale. But to tell the Truth there is so little to be
gain'd that way in such Works as these, that I wou'd not
have you take the Trouble. If you know any body that is
a Judge, you wou'd do me a sensible Pleasure in engaging
him to a serious Perusal of the Book. Tis so rare to
meet with one, that will take Pains on a Book, that does
not come recommended by some great Hame or Authority,
that, I must confess, I am as fond of meeting with such a
^•Greig, op. cit., p. 67. ^Letters, I, 13.
3Greig, op. cit., pp. 67-68. 4lbid., pp. 162-167.
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one, as if X were sure of his Approbation. I am, however,
so doubtful in that particular, that I have endeavour'd
all I cou'd to conceal my Name; tho' I believe I have not^'
been so cautious in this respect as I ought to have been.
There is certainly no indication of an inordinate interest in
mere popularity here.
Some years later in the Enquiry Concerning the Princi¬
ples of Morals Hume stated:
By our continual and earnest pursuit of a character, a
name, a reputation in the world, we bring our own deport¬
ment and conduct frequently in review, and consider how
they appear in the eyes of those who approach and regard
us. This constant habit of surveying ourselves, as it
were, in reflection, keeps alive all the sentiments of
right and wrong, and begets, in noble natures, a certain
reverence for themselves as well as others; which is the
surest guardian of every virtue.
... And our regard to a character with others seems
to arise only from a care of preserving a character with
ourselves; and in order to attain this end, we find it
necessary to prop our tottering judgment on the corres¬
pondent approbation of mankind.2
This seems an admirable reason for desiring public recogni¬
tion, and there is no cause to doubt Hume's personal sincerity
in it. In any event, he certainly did not forsake his philoso¬
phical principles, for the Bssays contain numerous direct
applications of prime theses from the neglected Treatise.
The essay is a form of literature which often is
highly personal and revealing. This is certainly true in the
case of David Hume; the Essays Moral and Political tend to re¬
veal the man to us. In the words of one biographer:
Clhe Essays]] disclose in their author a radical opposition
to ecclesiastical authority of every kind, and in particu¬
lar, impugn the ethical, political and theological opinions
commonly held by the Scottish clergy in Ms day. This does
not appear only intermittently; it forms a sort of under-
•^New Letters, p. Il 2G.G., IV, 251.
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current flowing through the book.-'-
This is an overstatement of the case apparently due to Greig's
tendency to picture Hume as a total sceptic and infidel. While
it is not to be denied that there are some rather pointed jabs
at fanatical and zealous religionists, the tone of the Essays
is not as anti-religious as the above quotation would lead us
to believe. Bishop Butler, it will be remembered, praised
the Essays. Presumably, he regarded Hume's criticisms of reli¬
gion as honest and well-founded. Actually, Hume at this time
had very little reason to bear a grudge against the clergy.
Later he began to entertain suspicions that the Treatise, even
though deprived of its noble parts, was exciting opposition
^Greig, on. cit., p. 121.
p
"In all controversies, we find, without regarding the
truth or falsehood on either side, that those v/ho defend the
established and popular opinions, are always the most dogmati¬
cal and imperious in their stile: while their adversaries affect
almost extraordinary gentleness and moderation, in order to
soften, as much as possible, any prejudices that may lye against
them. Consider the behaviour of our free-thinicers of all de¬
nominations, whether they be such as decry all revelation, or
only oppose the exorbitant power of the clergy; Collins, Tindal,
Foster, Hoadley. Compare their moderation and good manners
with the furious zeal and scairrility of their adversaries, and
voti will be convinced of the truth of my observation." Tg. g.,
III, ll8nj
"Now, there has been a sudden and sensible change in
the opinions of men within these last fifty years by the pro¬
gress of learning and of liberty. Most people, in this island,
have divested themselves of all superstitious reverence to
names and authority: The clergy have (entirely) lost their
credit: Their pretensions and doctrines have been ridiculed;
and even religion can scarcely supoort itself in the world."
CG. g., Ill, 125j (In a later edition Hume altered "entirely"
to "much. u)
. . we may observe that our ancestors, a few centuries
ago, were sunk into the most abject superstition, last century
they were inflamed with the most furious enthusiasm, and are
now settled Into the most cool Indifference with regard to reli¬
gious matters, that is to be found in any nation of the v/orld."
cg. g., Ill, 251.3
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from churchmen. When unfortunate circumstances convinced him
that this was the case,1 Hume's enmity toward narrow-minded
religionists became exceedingly uncompromising. But the real
cause of this personal animosity did not appear until three
years after the publication of the Essays at which time Hume
experienced bitter disappointment as the direct result of the
antagonism of clergymen.
The underlying motive of Hume's religious statements
in the Essays appears to have been a desire to destroy super¬
stition and dogmatic fanaticism ana to establish a liberal
philosophical religion. Two kinds of false and pernicious
religions are discussed in the essay "Of Superstition and En¬
thusiasm"; both are corruptions of true religion and are to
be reprehended, but for different reasons. If one is forced
to make a choice between the two, enthusiasm is the lesser
evil.^
The severity with which Hume views superstition may
be seen from the following reflections in the essay: Firstly,
"Superstition is favourable to priestly paver, and enthusiasm
not less or rather more contrary to it, than sound reason and
philosophy.Secondly, "religions, which partake of enthusiasm
1Infra, pp. 216-223.
2 In Hume's day the term "enthusiasm" was employed in a
hostile sense as "a misconceit of inspiration." It became a
byeword applied in opprobrium and derision to all who laid
claim to spiritual power or divine guidance and outstepped all
the rightful bounds of reason. See Charles J. Abbey and John
H. Overton, The English Church in the Eighteenth Century (London:
Longmans, Green and Co., 1378), I, f?30-531»
3o. G., III, Ik5-lii6.
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are, on their first rise, more furious and violent than those
which partake of superstition; but in a little time become
more gentle and moderate.""'" Thirdly, "superstition is an
2
enemy to civil liberty, and enthusiasm a friend to it."
Superstition finds its sources in weakness, fear, melancholy,
together with ignorance. On the other hand, enthusiasm arises
from hope, pride, presumption, a warm imagination, together
with ignorance. One of the chief criticisms Hume makes of
enthusiasm is that "being founded on strong spirits, and a
presumptious boldness of character, it naturally begets the
most extreme resolutions; especially after it rises to that
height as to inspire the deluded fanatic with the opinion
of divine illuminations, and with a contempt for the common
rules of reason, morality, and prudence.There is "nothing
but philosophy able entirely to conquer these unaccountable
terrors" which arise in superstitious and fanatical religions.^"
Hume is particxilarly outspoken against the shortcomings
of early Christianity and the Roman Catholic Church. In the
essay "Of Parties in General" he observes:
. . . the Christian religion arising, while principles
directly opposite to it were firmly established in the
polite part of the world who despised the nation that
first broached this novelty; no wonder, that, in such
circumstances, it was but little countenanced by the civil
magistrate, and that the priesthood was allowed to engross
all the authority in the new sect. So bad a use did they
make of this power in those early times, that the primitive
persecutions may, perhaps, in part be ascribed to the
violence instilled by them into their followers. And the
same principles of priestly government continuing, after
1C. G., III, ll-t-8. 2g> m, lk9.
3G. G. , III, 1!l9. Jj-G. G. , III, 1I4.7.
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Christianity became the established religion, they have
engendered a spirit of persecution, which has ever since
been the poison of human society, and the source of the
most inveterate factions in every government. Such divi¬
sions, therefore, on the part of the people, may justly
be esteemed factions of •principle; but, on the part of
the priests, v;ho are the prime" movers, they are really
factions of interest.
... as philosophy was widely spread over the world,
at the time when Christianity arose, the teachers of the
new sect were obliged to form a system of speculative
opinions; to divide, with some accuracy, their articD.es
of faith; and to explain, comment, confute, and defend
with all the subtilty of argument and science. Hence
naturally arose keenness in dispute, when the Christian
religion came to be split into new divisions and heresies:
And this keenness assisted the priests in their policy
of begetting a mutual hatred and antipathy among their
deluded followers. Sects of philosophy, in the ancient
world, were more zealous than parties of religion; but
in modern times parties of religion are more furious and
enraged than the most cruel factions that ever arose from
interest and ambition.1
In the essay "Of the Standard, of Taste" Hume remarks:
It is essential to the Roman Catholic religion to
inspire a violent hatred of every other worship, and to
represent all pagans, mahometans, and heretics as the
objects of divine wrath and vengeance. Such sentiments,
though they are in reality very blameable, are considered
as virtues by the zealots of that communion. . . .2
Criticism of priests and clergymen in the Essays indi¬
cates an inability on the part of Hume to understand the
thoughts and actions of religious individuals. He tends to
make hasty generalizations from superficial observations,3 and
1G. G., III, 131-133. In a footnote Hume adds, ". . .
we may entertain a suspicion, that those furious persecutions
of Christianity (joy the RomansJ were in some measure owing to
the imprudent zeal and bigotry of the first propagators of that
sect; and Ecclesiastical history affords us many reasons to
confirm this suspicion." pEbid.J
2G. G., Ill, 28I4..
3"As to ecclesiastical parties; we may observe, that,
in all ages of the world, priests have been enemies to liberty;
and it is certain, that this steady conduct of theirs must have
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regards all Christians as being bigoted and hypocritical. His
judgment against ecclesiastics is only slightly mitigated when
he notes "that all prudent men are on their guard, when they
meet with any extraordinary appearance of religion; though
at the same time, they confess, that there are many exceptions
to this general rule, and that probity and superstition, or
even probity and fanaticism, are not altogether and in every
instance incompatible."''' In the essay "Of Superstition and
Enthusiasm" Hume explains that he intends the term "priests" to
mean "only the pretenders to power and dominion, and to a
superior sanctity of character, distinct from virtue and good
morals." He then observes that priests are "very dif ferent
from clergymen, who are set apart by the laws, to the care of
sacred matters, and to the conducting our public devotions with
greater decency and order. There is no rank of men more to be
p
respected than the latter." Hume grants a limited value to
the labors of a curate when he asserts: "Even the clergy,
as their duty leads them to inculcate morality, may justly be
thought, so far as regards this world, to have no other useful
object of their ins titution. "3
been founded on fixed reasons of interest and ambition. Liber¬
ty of thinking, and of expressing our thoughts, is always
fatal to priestly power, and to those pious frauds, on which
it is commonly founded; and, by an infallible connexion which
prevails among all kinds of liberty, this privilege can never
be enjoyed, at least has never yet been enjoyed, but in a
free government." JJ5. G., III, 1353
In the essay "Of National Characters" Hume adds a long
footnote dealing with the character of priests of "all religions.
He questions the sincerity of clergymen and regards their
disposition as lacking amiableness. See infra, pp. 25>7-2£8.
1G. G. , III, 2k6. 2G. G., Ill, II17. 3G. G. , III, Hip.
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The essay "Of the Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature"
offers a vindication of the argument of Hutcheson against the
Calvinistic doctrine of original sin. Hume advocates a view
of human nature that closely conforms with the position held
by the Moderate clergy in the Church of Scotland. The
following paragraph is of particular interest in this respect:
I am far from thinking, that all those, who have de¬
preciated our species, have been enemies to virtue, and
have exposed the frailties of their fellow creatures with
any bad intentions. On the contrary, I am sensible that
a delicate sense of morals, especially when attended with
a splenetic temper, is apt to give a man a disgust of the
world, and to make him consider the common course of human
affairs with too much indignation. I must, however, be of
the opinion, that the sentiments of those, who are inclined
to think favourably of mankind, are more advantageous to
virtue, than the contrary principles, which give us a mean
opinion of our nature. When a man is prepossessed with a
high notion of his rank and character in the creation, he
will naturally endeavour to act up to it, and will scorn
to do a base or vicious action, which might sink him below
that figure which he makes in his own imagination. Accord¬
ingly we find, that all our polite and fashionable moralists
insist upon this topic, and endeavour to represent vice as
unworthy of man, as well as odious in itself.1
It was Hume's earnest desire to see a liberal system of opinions
2
introduced into the churches, but he believed that it was first
of all necessary to deal superstition and fanaticism a death
blow. This was evidently the aim of his statements on religion
in the Essays.
Religious Revivals in Scotland
There were spectacular events in the ecclesiastical
world that without doubt attracted Hume's attention and affected
his attitude towards religion while he was preparing the Essays
1G. 0., Ill, 151 2Supra, p. 197
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at Ninewells. In 171l1 the great English evangelist George
Whitefield came to Scotland on the invitation of the Seceders.
He soon discovered that his friends were pure fanatics who felt
they had a monopoly on Divine Grace. Whitefield considered
church government a matter of indifference; the Seceders
thought the presbyterian system divine and tried to force the
Solemn League and Covenant on him. An open breach occurred
when they demanded that the evangelist confine his ministra¬
tions to the members of the Associate Presbytery, because they
alone were the "Lord's people"; his business, he told them,
was rather with the devil's."'" Whitefield visited Edinburgh
where he associated with the Evangelicals within the Estab¬
lished Church and then began a thirteen week tour throughout
2
Scotland.
While In Edinburgh Whitefield preached in the open air
in the Orphan Hospital Park on the west slope of Calton Hill.
Large crowds came to hear him, and it appears that David Hume
attended one of the meetings, for it is reported that he de¬
clared that it was worth going twenty miles to hear Whitefield
preach. John Gillies in the Memoirs of Whitefield includes
the name of David Hume in an assembly arranged by the Countess
•'■John Gillies, Memoirs of the Life of the Reverend
George Whitefield (Falkirk: W. Burns, 1793), p. 6Lf.. £cf.
Donald Eraser, Life and Diary of the Reverend Raloh Erskine
vEdinburgh: William Oliphant & Son, 133';.), pp. 237-336\J
2
Whitefield's biographer states that he preached with
great success in about thirty towns and villages. See Gillies,
op. clt., pp. 67-86.
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of Huntingdon."'" Hume is said to have made the following com¬
ments on the preacher;
Once after a solemn pause, he thus addressed his
audience: "The attendant angel is just about to leave the
threshold of this sanctuary, and ascend to heaven. And
shall he ascend and not bear with him the news of one sin¬
ner amongst all this multitude reclaimed from the error
of his way?" To give the greater effect to this exclama¬
tion, Whitefield stamped with his foot, lifted up his
hands and eyes to heaven, and cried aloud, "Stop, Gabriel*
stop, ere you enter the sacred portals, and yet carry with
you the news of one sinner converted to God." This address
was accompanied with such animation, yet natural action,
that it surpassed anything I ever saw or heard in any
other preacher.^
At the very least these reports indicate an interest
in religious events on the part of Hume. He felt there was
more to religious belief than met the eye and apparently en¬
deavored to get at the root of the matter. But due to a lack
of faith and devotion in his own life, Hume was unable to
understand and sympathize with those individuals who talked
about their spiritual experiences. He must certainly have
been perplexed by the strange incidents viiich occurred soon
after Whitefield left Scotland.
The Cambuslang and Kilsyth Revivals in 17^4-2 came about
as indirect results of Whitefield's first to^^r in Scotland and
were the reason for his return. The meetings lasted for months
"It is also said, that David Hume, Esq; of Edinburgh,
was a hearer of Mr. Whitefield's, and was much taken with his
eloquence. Such testimonies are set down, not for their weight,
but their singularity." ^Ibid., p. lljlim.]]
^James Paterson Gledstone, George ''.hitefi eld M.A.,
Fie Id-Preacher (London: Hodder and Stought on, 1900), p. 2)i7.
(Gf. Luke Tyerman, The Live of the Rev. George Whitefield (London:
Hodder and Stoughton, l»76-77), II, 210-211.J
210
and were attended by extraordinary scenes which doubtlessly
caused Hume to wonder if Scotsmen could ever be satisfied, with
a sound philosophical religion. "Most of those who were 'awaken¬
ed' by the terrors of the law gave vent to their agitation in
cries and tears, and a considerable proportion, estimated at
one in five, underwent the severest bodily as well as mental
distress."^* Some fainted, some went into convulsions or bled
profusely at the nose, and others cried "that they saw hell
opened for them and heard the shrieks of the damned. . . . "
Congregations wept, prayed and moaned, and the report of such
excitement brought people from all sections of Scotland to
Cambuslang, many of them continuing their devotions all night
in the fields. The young were particularly affected by the
religious fervor. "We read of children forsaking their
sports to hold devotions in a barn; of schoolboys from eight
to thirteen asking their master to let them 'sing psalms and
pray' . .. ."^ Little boys and girls were exhorted to "flee
from the wrath to come," to "get a grip on Christ," and to
sign the Covenant of Grace. Evangelical preachers came from
great distances to assist in the meetings, and frequent com¬
munion services were held, attended by 30,000 to 1l0,000 people.^"
The Seceders fiercely denounced the "Cambuslang Work"
and George Whitefield as an irresponsible emissary of a gospel
-'•Mathieson, Scotland and the Union, p. 266.
p
Graham, Social Life, p. 3^6.
^Mathieson, Scotland and the Union, p. 267.
^Ibid., p. 268.
211
that ignored the Covenants. He was stigmatized as a cheat,
an imposter, an agent of the Devil. "On July l£, 171-1-2, four
days after the first communion at Cambuslang, |j;he SecedersJ
instituted a public fast for the satanic agency there mani¬
fested in 'bitter outcryings, faintings, severe bodily pains,
convulsions, voices, visions, and revelations.' and for 'the
fond reception' accorded to a priest of the Church of England
who had sworn the oath of supremacy and abjured the Solemn
League. "3- This bitter rivalry between two groups of zealous
believers must have caught Hume's attention. Possibly, he
sympathized with the English evangelist; for Whitefield, al¬
though an evangelical was not a fanatic. The historian
William Law Mathieson considered Whitefield's ministry bene¬
ficial to the Church. "The process of enlightenment was con¬
tinued by Whitefield; for the great preacher, whose Calvinism
endeared him to the Evangelicals, and whose influence was
responsible for the extraordinary scenes at Cambuslang, was
not a Presbyterian, much less a Covenanter, but an Anglican
priest; and it was a principal object of his mission to pro¬
mote the vital principle of religion as 'a superiority to
those grovelling prejudices which centre in externals.'"
Perhaps Hume agreed with the estimate of Whitefield and his
work recorded in the Edinburgh Evening Courant :
As he was frequently very explicit in opening the miseries
of Popish tyranny and arbitrary power, and very warm in
exhorting his hearers to loyalty and courage at home, .and
1Ibid.
^Mathieson, The Awakening of Scotland, pp. 228-229.
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in stirring then up to pray for the success of his Majes¬
ty's forces both by sea and land abroad, we have reason
to believe that his visit at this juncture has been
particularly useful.
Acquaintance with a Liberal Theologian
Towards the close of the same year in which the reli¬
gious revivals occurred in Scotland Hume corresponded with
William Mure, who apparently tried to lead him to accept ortho¬
dox religious principles. Hume jokingly refers to Mure as "My
Disciple in Religion & Morals" and asks why he should not be
so in politics. Hume continues in an ironical tone saying,
"I entreat you to get the Bill about Witches repeal'd, & to
move for some new Bill to secure the Christian Religion, by
2
burning Deists, Socinians, Moralists, & Hutchinsonians•"
This is a reference to the repeal in 1736 of a lav/ which for¬
merly made witchcraft a capital offence. It was, of course,
pleasing to Hume to see these signs of a growing enlighten¬
ment, and he took this opportunity of ridiculing the narrow-
minded Seceders who regarded such actions as evidence of in¬
fidelity in the Church and the nation.
In his reply, Mure recommended that Hume read certain
"Dialogues on Devotion" and sent a copy of William Leechman's
celebrated sermon on prayer.^ As a close friend of Hutcheson,
^■Quoted in the Scots Magazine XVIII (1736), JLj.6k.-65.
^Letters, I, Ijij..
•^Leechman had been a pupil of Hamilton of Edinburgh
and Hutcheson of Glasgow and through the influence of the latter
secured a chair at Glasgow Universit;/ in 17^4-3• Ramsay of
Ochtertye regarded Leechman as an instrument of a "memorable
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Leechman shared in the new and enlightened spirit which was
gaining influence among the Scottish clergy. A party in the
Church opposed his admittance as a member of the Glasgow
Presbytery, and he was charged with heretical opinions pro¬
mulgated in a pamphlet entitled "On the Nature, Reasonable¬
ness, and Advantages of Prayer." In this pamphlet Leechman
had condensed the substance of a course of sermons on prayer.
The principal objection to his presentation was that he did
not refer to the merits and intercession of Christ "as the
sole ground of our acceptance with God in prayer" and that he
taught "Christians to look for pardon and acceptance on other
grounds than this.""'* Leechman1 s defence was that he had used
only such arguments for prayer as were calculated to meet the
objections of a certain infidel tract which maintained the use-
lessness of prayer as absurd and unreasonable and a profane
attempt to interfere with the established laws of nature. He
declared that his pamphlet dealt with only one phase of the
doctrine, i.e., that prayer was alike consistent with the
revolution" and stated that as a liberal teacher of theology
he sought to educate, not to convince, delivering "no dicta¬
torial opinion, no infallible or decisive judgment." fRamsay
of ^chtertye, op. cit. , I, 279-85.1 Leechman was more a moral¬
ist than a theologian but added to Francis Hutcheson's "sense
of terrestrial beneficience a vivid anticipation of celestial
bliss." LMathieson, Scotland and the Union, p. 2553 According
to his biographer, William Leechman was a man who united settled
religious principles with a calm conscientious inquiring mind;
he had too much respect for truth to hate or contemn a man who
was led to opposite opinions by purely metaphysical inquiries.
LJames Wodrow, "Account of William Leechman's Life and of His
Lectures," prefixed to Leechman1s Sermons (London: T. Strahan
and T. Cadell, 1789), I, 31+3
1James Wodrow, op. cit.. p. 23.
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dictates of reason and the precepts of Scripture. The fact
that he had not emphasized the "Name" in which prayer was to
be offered in no way demonstrated, as his opponents had alleged,
that Leechman's views on that particular point were heterodox.
At any rate, charges were dismissed by the Synod of Glasgow
and Ayr,"*" a decision hailed by Leechman's students at the
University as the defeat of the over-zealous and the triumph
of the liberals.
Prom the general tenor of a letter from Hume to William
Mure it appears that Leechman was seeking suggestions on the
preparation of a second edition of the sermon. Leechman had
evidently met Hume at the home of the Mure/ s of Caldwell,
where the professor had been William Mure's tutor around the
year 1727. Leechman, Hume's senior by five years, was one of
the earliest Moderate theologians with whom the philosopher
formed a friendship. A mutual esteem developed between them,
although Leechman opposed Hume's heretical opinions by warn¬
ing his students in a sermon of 17against Voltaire, Rousseau,
Bollngbroke, and Hume, whom he distinguished as "the most
celebrated men In some species of writing that are perhaps in
2
Europe at present."
Hume regarded Leechman's sermon as "a very good one";
but, following Plato's discussion of atheism, he considered
the argument as manifesting the type of atheism which asserts
■^■Morren, op. cit. , I, Ip6—6l.
^William Leechman, Sermons, ed. by James Wodrow (London:
T. Strahan and T. Cadell, 1779), II, l8£.
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that the Deity is influenced by prayers or sacrifices.'1' After
offering some advice on the style and composition, he criti¬
cized the substance of the sermon. Hume'3 remarks here are
revelatory of his own attitude towards religion. He objects
to "Devotion & Prayer, & indeed to every thing we commonly
call Religion, except the Practice of Morality, & the Assent
of the Understanding to the Proposition that God exists."^
It must be acknowledg'd that Nature has given us a
strong passion of Admiration for whatever is excellent,
k of Love k Gratitude for whatever is benevolent & bene¬
ficial, & that the Deity possesses these Attributes in
the highest Perfection & yet I assert he is not the natural
Object of any Passion or Affection. He is no Object either
of the Senses or Imagination, k very little of the Under¬
standing, without which it is impossible to excite any
Affection. ... A man . . . may have his Heart perfectly
well disposed towards every proper & natural Object of
Affection, Friends, Benefactors, Countrey, Children &c,
& yet from this Circumstance of the Invisibility & Incom¬
prehensibility of the Deity may feel no Affection towards
him. And indeed I am afraid, that all Enthusiasts mightily
deceive themselves. Hope k Fear perhaps agitate their
Breast when they think of the Deity: Or they degrade him
into a Resemblance with themselves, & by that means render
him more comprehensible. Or they exult with Vanity in es¬
teeming themselves his peculiar Favourites. Or at best
they are actuated by a forc'd & strain'd Affection, which
moves by Starts & Bounds, k with a very irregular disorderly
Pace. Such an Affection can never be requir'd of any Man
as his Duty.3
Prayer must be excluded from religion because it has no in¬
fluence on God and is merely a kind of rhetorical figure which
can never be a duty. Such a figure is ultimately dangerous
and "leads directly & even unavoidably to Impiety & Blasphemy."
Tis a natural Infirmity of Men to imagine, that their
Prayers have a direct influence, & this Infirmity must be
extremely foster'd & encouraged by the constant Use of
^Letters, I, 5>0. ^Letters, I, 5>0. 3petters, I, 5>1.
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Prayer. Thus all wise Men have excluded the Use of Images
& Pictures in Prayer; tho they certainly enliven Devotion;
because til found by Experience, that with the vulgar these
visible Representations draw too much towards them, & be¬
come the only Objects of Devotion.^
This discussion exemplifies Hume's lack of personal
religious devotion, but the fact that he was willing to dis¬
cuss the topic of devotion and prayer indicates that he desired
to examine all the arguments and evidence in support of that
side of religion which he was unable to accept. Hume scrutin¬
ized the orthodox position; and in some respects it appears
that his own sceptical views were advanced in order to call
forth the opponent's arguments. He was earnestly endeavoring
to arrive at truth in the religious sphere.
Academic Disappointment
In the year l?li2 Dr. John Pringle, Professor of Moral
2
and Pneumatic Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh, was
appointed physician to the Earl of Stair, commander of the
British troops in the Low Countries. Contemplating a vacancy,
David Hume decided to try to secure his own appointment to
the chair. But he soon experienced the intolerance of the
ecclesiastical world, and the unfortunate candidature became
3
a crucial affair in the formation of his anti-clerical zeal.
^Letters, I, 52.
2,
"Pneumatics dealt with such questions as "the being and
perfections of the one true God, the nature of Angels and the s
of man, ..and the duties of Natural religion. " [Grant, op. cit. ,
II> 33"j
^Mossner suggests that Hume should have recalled what
he had written Hutcheson in 1739: "Except a Man be in Orders,
or be immediately concern'd in the Instruction of Youth, I do
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The Lord Provost, John Coutts, mentioned Hume's name
to several members of the Town Council, many of vhom knew
David Hume and liked him. If the vacancy had been filled
immediately, the position would likely have gone to him;
however, Pringle was seemingly not ready to resign but hoped
to obtain another year's absence. Consequently, correspondence
back and forth between Pringle and the Town Council delayed a
final decision, all of which proved fatal to Hume's chances.
The Scottish clergy became alarmed when they heard that Hume
was seeking the position; they believed his philosophy to be
opposed to orthodoxy and charges of infidelity were brought
against him. Hume's principles were said to be atheistic or
at least deistic and naturally he was ill-qualified to teach
morals and the philosophy of the soul to the youth of a Chris¬
tian country, to young men who would become pasters of the
Kirk of Scotland.
Continued postponements and loss of the influence of
Coutts and of his successor, Archibald Stewart, made possible
a strengthening of the opposition to Hume. Writing to William
Mure in August, I7I4J4-, flume informs him about the situation and
says, "the accusation of Heresy, Deism, Scepticism, Atheism,
&c, &c, &c. was started against me; but never took, being bore
down by the contrary Authority of all the good Company in
town."1 It appears that even the Moderates concurred with
not think his Character depends upon his philosophical Spequla-
tions, as the World is now model' d. ..." [Letters, I, 3I1J
CSee Mossner, The Life of David Hume, p. ISP]
^Letters, I, 57-53.
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these charges against Hume. He was deeply hurt when he heard
that Francis Hutcheson and William Leechman had been asked
for their opinion and had given it against him:
. . . what surnrizd me extremely was to find that this
Accusation was supported by the pretended Authority of
Mr Hutcheson oc even Mr Leechman, who, tis said, agreed
that I was a very unfit Person for such an Office. 'This
appears to be absolutely incredible, especially with re¬
gard to the latter Gentleman. For as to Mr Hutcheson,
all my Friends think, that he has been rendering me bad
Offices to the utmost of his Power. . . . Mr Couts now
speaks of that Professor rather as my Enemy than as my
Friend. What con be the meaning of this Conduct in that
celebrated & benevolent Moralist, I cannot imagine. I
shall be glad to find, for the Honour of Philosophy, that
I am mistaken; & indeed, I hope so too: and beg of you to
enquire a little into the Matter, but very cautiously,
lest I make him my open & profess'd Enemy, which I woud
willingly avoid.1
Hume states that he is not certain whether Hutcheson "really
entertains a bad Opinion of my Orthodoxy, or is only unwilling
that I should be Professor of Ethics in Edinburgh; lest that
Town being in the Neighbourhood of Glasgow, shou'd spread its
Contagion all around it, & even infect the Students of the
latter University."^
A rather perplexing question arises concerning Hume's
conception of his own religious views. It is evident that he
regarded himself as a suitable candidate for a university
chair in which he would be required to instruct the youth on
religious raatters--pneumatics. Met we have seen in the Essays
that he did not countenance superstition and fanaticism and
regarded the chief duty of the clergy to be an inculcation of
morality. At this time Hume had not explicitly stated his
1Letters* I, 58. ^Letters, I, 58
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personal theological position; possibly, the question had not
been entirely settled in his thinking. He had written to
Hutcheson that it was his desire to see liberal principles
introduced into the churches. Perhaps, Hume felt he could
contribute to an ecclesiastical enlightenment by entering the
university, even though he had not taken a definite stand
concerning spiritual problems. He evidently did not consider
the accusations of infidelity to be -valid, otherwise it seems
likely he would not have attempted to procure a position which
required him to make statements of religious significance.
In a letter to Matthew Sharpe of Hodaam, Hume requests
him to persuade Lord Tinwald to bring influence to bear upon
the members of the Town Council. This was in April, 17l|-5j and
Hume informs Sharpe "that such a popular Clamour has been
raisd against me in Edinburgh, on account of Scepticism,
Heterodoxy & other hard Fames, which confound the ignorant,
that my Friends find some Difficulty, in working out the Point
of my Professorship, which once appear'd so easy."^ Hume
then suggests: "Did I need a Testimonial for my Orthodoxy I
shoud certainly appeal to you.In the meantime, the Council
had elected Francis Hutcheson to the position. The leading
ministers of the City, in response to a request for their
'hvisamentum"or advice, declared themselves well pleased.
Hutcheson, however, declined and another "avisamentum" was
sought. Hume tells Sharpe, "There is no Time to lose ....
A word to the Wise."3 All this delay had given the "Popular"
^Letters, I, 59* ^Letters, I, 5>9» ^Letters, I, oO.
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or Evangelical Party time to muster their forces and the
ministers advised against the election of David Hume. Even
William Wishart, the Edinburgh Principal, decided against
Hume and determined that he must be kept out of the chair.
The precise charge made by Wishart against Hume is not known
but it was based upon the teaching of the Treatise. Hume
described the attack of the principal in a letter to Henry
Home:
The Principal found himself reduc'd to this Dilemma;
either to draw heresies from my Principles by Inferences
& Deductions, which he knew wou'd never do with the
Ministers & Town Council. Or if he made use of my Words,
he must pervert them & misrepresent them in the grossest
way in the World. This last Expedient he chose, with
much Prudence but very little Honesty.^
When he heard of Principal Wishart's charge and of the
minister's "avisamenturn," Hume "hastily compos'd" a letter to
Coutts, for the charge, in Hume's own words, was "so weak,
that it did not require much time to answer it, if the Matter
3
had been to be judg'd by Reason." This letter of self-de¬
fence which he "scarce had time to revise" was put into print
by Henry Home J"'" But even "this last frantic effort on the
Wishart was the son of the elder William Wishart,
Principal of the University during Hume's student days. He
had been Professor of Divinity and in 1737 was elected Principal.
2
Hew Letters, p. 15>. Writing after the affair was settled,
Hume informs Sir James Johnstone of Wester-hall that "unluckily
before my friends in Edinburgh could be inform'd of my resolu¬
tions [[to continue as a tutor to the Marquis of AnnandaleJ] ,
the matter was brought to an issue, and by the cabals of the
Principal, the bigotry of the clergy, and the credulity of the
mob, we lost it." [Letters. I, 6l-62j
^Uew Letters, p. 13.
^"It was announced in both the Caledonian Mercury and
the Edinburgh Evening Courant for May 21, 17L\.£. Mossner
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part of Hume's friends to stem the rising tide against his
candidacy""1 was all in vain. Enough opposition was raised
by the inquisitorial zeal of the Evangelicals and Wishart
to keep him out; the power of the city ministers was effectual
and his application was ignored. The vacancy was filled on
the 5th of June 17^5 hy the appointment of Mr. William Cleg-
2
horn, who had acted for Pringle in his absence.
The early biographer of Hume, T. E. Ritchie, makes
the following comments on the whole affair:
The interest of Hume's friends proved unsuccessful: his
philosophical opinions were misrepresented, his character
was traduced, and so great an outcry raised by the reli¬
gious zealots as to endanger his personal safety. The
clergy were particularly active on this occasion, some
of whom represented Mr. Hume's principles to be those
of an atheist, while others charitably branded them as
the dogmas of deism. Their remonstrances succeeded;
but the event gave rise to a rooted antipathy on the part
of Hume towards the Scottish clergy. . . .3
Ritchie apparently agreed with the opponents of Hume for he
states: "From the observations of the philosophical and
ethical writings of [Hume]] . . . the reader, who bears in his
recollection that Hume's reputation rested as yet on these only,
will, perhaps, join with us in thinking that the university
suggests that this Pamphlet, which has never been located, "may
well constitute an important document in the further interpre¬
tation of some aspects of the Treatise." jMossner, The Life of
David Hume, p. l6oJ
1Ibid.
pFor further details of the proceedings concerning Hume's
candidature, see Mossner, The Life of David Hume, pp. l5k-l62.
3t. E. Ritchie, An Account of the Life and Writings of
David Hume (London: T. Gadell and W. Davies, 1507), p. Ll9.
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was no loser by the issue of the contest.""*"
Thus the most able Scottish philosopher of the time
was frustrated in his attempt to enter a field of activity
for which he, perhaps rightly, deemed himself suitable. From •
the time of this event, Hume, as was only natural, developed
a strong antipathy to the generality of the Scottish clergy¬
men. The grounds upon which he had been rejected as a
professor were such as to create a bitterness that continued
throughout the rest of his life. This animosity was lessened,
it is true, as a result of his intimate friendships with the
Moderates almost ten years later, but he could never bring
himself to evaluate fairly the thought and activities of any
member of an enthusiastic or evangelical religion.
It was probably an impropriety on Hume's part to think -
of becoming, in Huxley's terms, "a presbyterian teacher of
O
presbyterian youth," especially in view of the power of the
Church in educational matters. The religious spirit of Hume's
countrymen was not yet at a point where the general tenor of
his writings could be sympathized with or even understood in
their true light. The fanaticism of that time was unwilling
to tolerate in an orthodox chair a voice so uncertain as his
upon theological questions confronting the Church in days of
transition. And even if the charges of infidelity, atheism,
and deism were false, as we believe they were, Hume had not
in fact presented the positive theological doctrines which
followed logically from his basic philosophical principles.
-*-Ibid. ^Huxley, on. clt., p. 27.
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He had so far been strangely silent as to what his religious
beliefs actually were. The instance of the Edinburgh profes¬
sorship forcibly impressed upon Hume's mind the necessity of
stating his thoughts concerning religion.
Re sume'
Hume's first literary production, the Treatise of
Human Nature, met with a disappointing reception and the new
method of thought failed to arouse the public interest anti¬
cipated by its originator. Certain theological speculations
were deleted for fear that religious people would misunderstand
or be offended by such thoughts. Yet, the Treatise was the
chief cause of Hume's thwarted attempt to obtain a much desired
position in the university. The primary criticism against him
was seemingly based on the fact that he failed to declare his
own religious views; consequently, his opponents were able
to claim that he was an atheist or infidel. In the Essays
Hume ventured to criticize the types of religion which he re¬
garded as detrimental to mankind, but again he neglected to
state explicitly the theological position he intended to sub¬
stitute for these pernicious systems. That problems of reli¬
gion held a place of interest in Hume's mind is evinced from
1-The university affair also indicated that the Treatise
was not strictly dead. The reputation of the book, as Mossner
states, "was such as to brand the author as unfit to teach the
young. Ill-fated work that it was, The Treatise not only failed
to catch the attention of thinkers capable of dealing with its
ideas, but was beginning to be read by those who could not under¬
stand it, yet could make personal trouble for the author. Little
wonder that Hume's feelings against the Treatise, which were
already strong, became intensified to such a degree that, after
rewriting some sections of it, he ultimately disowned it pub¬
licly." \Mossner, The Life of David Hume, p. l6l^
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the fact that the topic of miracles occupied his thinking
while in Prance, from his statements about George Whitefield,
and from his correspondence with William Leechman on the sub¬
ject of devotion and prayer. The disappointment of his hopes
for the Edinburgh Professorship together with the poor recep¬
tion of the Treatise convinced Hume that it would be necessary
to clarify his ideas on religious matters; his views would
have to be presented to the general public. In the next
chapter we 3hall discuss Hume's attempts to elucidate the
religious standpoint which, he felt, might be derived logically
from his basic philosophical principles.
CHAPTER V
DAVID HOME - MAN OP LETTERS, 1!$$-17$1
Introduetion
In this chapter of our study we shall examine David
Hume's attitude towards religion as it is expressed in his
life and works after 17^5* It is necessary to notice the in¬
fluence of certain events in this period of Hume's life if we
expect to interpret properly his attitude towards religious
belief. As a man of letters he took all knowledge as his
province and sought to revolutionize the study of human nature.
The prime motivation of his life was the overturning of the
rationalistic tradition in order to make way for the new
science of man. Hume went against the common current of
thought and sought to bring about an intellectual revolution.
His opposition to traditional views was most conspicuous when
he applied his technique to theology. The establishment of a
new basis for religion was involved in his criticisms; conse¬
quently, it was on that subject that he was most often attacked.
The numerous answers to him which appeared in his lifetime
bear no evidence at all that the general purpose of his work
was understood; certainly the design of his arguments in the
religious sphere was not comprehended by his contemporaries
as we shall see in the ensuing pages.
2.2$
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The Death of Katherine Home
In the year 17k-5> Hume accepted an engagement to act as
tutor to the Marquis of Annandale. The unfortunate outcome
of this association need not concern us here, but another
event, which took place in this period, profoundly influenced
David Hume. 'That was the death of his mother.1 After Hume's
own death, stories were circulated by some pious zealots con¬
cerning his reactions to the death of Katherine Home. These
tales tended to malign his character, and the episode was
2
exploited to his disadvantage by his adversaries. One story
by an American traveler reported that after Hume turned from
the religious education received from his mother to a confirmed
infidelity, he "applied himself with unwearied, and unhapuily
with successful efforts, to sap the foundation of his mother's
faith." The report continues:
Having succeeded in this dreadful work, he went abroad
into foreign countries; and as he was returning, an express
1The exact date of Katherine Home's death is unimov/n,
but a letter to Henry Home indicates that it was before June
l£, Hk.%: "I receive very melancholy Letters from my Brother,
which afflict me very much. My Mother's Death, which makes
such an immense void in our Family, along with my absence, &
his Disappointment In Love, sink him I find very much." [New
Letters. p. 17."] Hume's biographers have incorrectly dateS
his mother's death In 17)4.8 or i7because of a misleading
statement in "My Own Life": "I went down In 17^9 and lived two
years with my Brother at his Country house: For my Mother was
now dead." [Letters, I, 3.J See T'ossner, The Life of David
Hume, pp. 173-17k. ~ ~ " "*
pSee Robert Chambers, A Biographical Dictionary of
Hminent Scotsmen (Glasgow: Blackie & Son, 105)!-) , Article on
"Hume," V, 102-133.
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met him in London, with a letter from his mother, inform¬
ing him that she was in a deep decline, and could not long
survive: she said, she found herself without any support
for her distress; that he had taken away that source of
comfort, uoon which, in all cases of affliction, she used
to rely, and that now she found her mind sinking into des¬
pair. She did not doubt but her son would afford her some
substitute for her religion; and she conjured him to has¬
ten to her, or at least to send her a letter, containing
such consolations as philosophy can afford to a dying mor¬
tal. Hume was overwhelmed with anguish on receiving this
letter, and hastened to Scotland, travelling day and night;
but before he arrived his mother expired. Ho permanent
impression seems, however, to have been made on his mind
by this most trying event; and whatever remorse ho might
have felt at the moment, he soon relapsed into his wonted
obduracy of heart.^
Burton regards this story as "totally at variance with
2
Hume's character." David Hume was not one to deprive a fellow
creature of a faith in Christianity. He was accepted by reli¬
gious individuals who never had to fear that he would maliciously
undertake to change their sentiments. The above account was
the cause of a remonstrance from Hume's nephew, Baron David
Hume.^" The younger Hume quotes from the manuscript memoirs of
Alexander Carlyle^ the story of Hume's reactions to his mother's
death as related by the Honorable Patrick Boyle. Mossner states
■*""Silliman's Travels," quoted in Burton, on. cit., I,
292.
2Told. , I, 293. See also: Ibid. , II, IjjS-Ijia.
3 "The philosophers of Scotland have no nostrums. They
tell what they know, and deliver their sentiments without dis¬
guise or reserve. This generous feature was conspicuous in
the character of Mr. Hume. He insulted no man, but, when the
conversation turned upon particular subjects v/hether moral or
religious, he expressed his genuine sentiments with freedom,
with force, and with a dignity which did honour to human nature."
IJVilliam Smellie, Literary and Charactcristical Lives of
Gregory, Karnes, Hume, and Smith (Edinburgh. IcjOO) ,r>JLb2.J
^-Quarterly Beview, XVI, 279*
^See sunra, pp. 106-107.
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that this report "bears every evidence of the truth and was
indeed accepted as fact by the philosopher's nephew.We can
well imagine the deep remorse and self-accusation of a devoted
son for being absent during his mother's time of need; he was
indeed overcome with grief. It is not entirely impossible that
he even repented of having, grieved a Christian mother by his
supposed infidelity. But it is certainly improbable that Hume's
reply was an Indication that his doubts were insincere and that
he had thrown them out merely "to entertain and employ the learn¬
ed and metaphysical world." Hume had always raised questions
for the expressed purpose of arriving at truth and not merely
for the purpose of confusing his antagonists.
Boyle and Carlyle persuaded themselves that Hume was a
good Christian at heart. Mossner declares that such a posi¬
tion will not do and presents the following argument against it:
David Hume had long since renounced the Christianity of
revelation and acknowledged "the character of an infidel."
That he retained the characteristics of a good and moral
nature is no evidence to the contrary, nor is his remark
[to Patrick Boyle3 , presuming that it has been faithfully
reported. Supernaturalism Hume rejected along with the
philosophy implicit in what he termed "the religious hypo¬
thesis," yet social and family ties always remained strong,
and, above all, devotion to his mother.2
In the three years following the death of his mother,
Hume participated in military and diplomatic missions, but his
spare time was spent in the revision of the principles contained
In the unfortunate Treatise. He continued to read, study and
speculate, but intellectual activities did not dominate his
•'•Mossner, The Life of David Hume, p. 173.
2Ibid.t p. 17k.
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mind. For six years he had published nothing except a short
pamphlet. The occasion of this tract was the unfortunate trial
of the Lord Provost of Edinburgh, Archibald Stewart, who was
charged with neglect of duty in allowing the Young Pretender
to gain control of the city in the Rebellion of 17lj-b» Hume
came to Stewart's defense and turned pamphleteer on his behalf.
The main section of the paper, which is relatively unimportant,
is dated October 20, 1714-75 the postscript, added after the ver¬
dict of not guilty had been returned, is dated November II.
This postscript is valuable in furnishing further indications
of Hume's views regarding religious enthusiasts. He writes:
... I shall further explain to you the great Difference
betwixt a political and a religious Whig. . . . The Idea I
form of a political Whig is, that of a Man of Sense and
Moderation, a Lover of Laws and Liberty, whose chief Re¬
gard to particular Princes and Families, is founded on a
Regard to the publick Good: The Leaders of this Party
amongst us, are Men of great Worth. . . .
The religious Whigs are a very different Set of Mortals,
and in my Opinion, are much worse than the religious Tories;
as the political Tories are inferior to the political Whigs.
I know not how it happens, but it seems to me, that a Zeal
for Bishops, and for the Book of Common-Prayer, tho'
equally groundless, has never been able, when mixt up
with Party Notions, to form so virulent and exalted a Poi¬
son in human Breasts, as the opposite Principles. Dissimula¬
tion, Hypocrisy, Violence, Calumny, Selfishness are, gen¬
erally speaking, the true and legitimate Offspring of this
kind of Zeal.1
Hume had good reason for his violent dislike of religious
enthusiasts. He had experienced this kind of zeal against him¬
self in the affair of the Edinburgh professorship. It seems the
1 {pavid Hume]], A True Account of the Behaviour and
Conduct of Archibald Stewart, Esq; Late Lord Provost of
Edinburgh, In a Letter to A Friend (London: M. Coooer, I7I48),
pp. IlY-50. *
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remembrance of that event now served to barb his pen against
religious enthusiasm.
Publication of the First Enquiry
Between lll\.2 and 17I4.8 Hume slowly rewrote Book I of the
Treatise. Without abandoning the principles on which it rested,
he cut out long passages and reworded the whole in a lighter
style. He was willing to admit that he had been too ambitious
in attempting to present an entirely new system of philosophy.
With his change of attitude there also came a change of title—
the term "treatise" sounded much too final, self-assured and
pretentious. Hoping to please the public, Hume gave his work
the tentative and modest title--PhilosoPhical Essays Concerning
the Human Understanding*"*" He had worked several years on the
revision and had discussed the arguments of the book with
p
Henry Home, who strongly urged against its publication. Home
presumably felt it was better to leave the Treatise in oblivion
rather than to excite fresh hostility from clergymen and philoso-
3
phers. Hume did not take his friend's advice but went ahead
with the publication of the first instalment of his design to
recast the Treatise book by book.
Discussions on two new subjects are introduced in the
■'•The title was changed in 1758 to An Bnquiry Concerning
the Human Understanding.
^Letters, I, 106.
8Hume wrote: "In the first place, I think I am too
deep engaged to think of a retreat. In the second place, I
see not what bad consequences follow, in the present age, from
the character of an infidel; especially if a man's conduct be
in other respects irreproachable." fib id J)
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Enquiry. It was on this occasion that Hume promulgated his
opinions on miracles, which he had not been bold enough to pub¬
lish in the Treatise. The other new topic added was entitled
"Practical Consequences of Natural Religion," the title being
changed in the 17^1 edition to "Of a Particular Providence and
of a Future State." Hume had been considering the question of
miracles for quite some time J he was interested in the problem
while living in France from 173U- 1737. Now he felt the
time had come for him to state his case.
Hume has often been severely criticized because of the
famous essay "On Miracles," which brought its author a trouble¬
some notoriety. The passage infuriated every section of
theological opinion from Roman Catholicism to Scottish Pres¬
byterdanism."*" Hume became a scandal to the orthodox; he was
attacked, denounced and vilified, and his name became anathema.
As G-reig states, the essay "provoked so much hostility that
both friends and foes of David Hume have granted it an unbe-
2
coming prominence." John Wesley in his Journal described it
as "an insolent book." James Somerville wrote: "Plume's metaphy¬
sics would readily excite that suspicion of sophistry which
naturally arises in every mind acquainted -with his inveterate
3
enmity to religion." T. H. Huxley asserted that by this
"*"By 1761 all Hume's works were placed on the index of
prohibited books of the Roman Catholic Church. Index Librorum
Prohibltorum (Rome, 1911), p. l6o; "Hume, David. Opera omnia.
Deer. 19ian. 17&1; 10 Sept 1827." [cited by Mossner, The Life
of David Hume, p. 228.3
20rreig, on. cit., p. 162.
3James Somerville, Remarks on an Article in the "Edinburgh
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essay on miracles Hume lost "the crown he might have won" be¬
cause of his "craving after mere notoriety and vulgar success.""''
L. A. Selby-Bigge described the sections on theology added in
the Enquiry as superfluous and judged them to be a bold bid on
Hume's part to "attract attention, and excite that 'murmur a-
mong the zealots' by which the author desired to be distinguish-
2
ed." These judgments carry little weight, however, when we
recall that the essay on miracles was originally written for
the Treatise. The argument was considered by Hume as a part
of his new system of philosophy. But the essay was one of
the "nobler parts" cut off to avoid giving "too much offense"
to the godly.
A. E. Taylor's condemnation of the essay^ has been
severely criticized and refuted by Greig. In Taylor's examina¬
tion the essay is considered as crammed with fallacies, as
superfluous within its setting, and as inconsistent with Hume's
general position. The only motive Hume could possibly have
had for publication, Taylor claims, was "a simple craving for
notoriety at any cost. The motive of anti-clerical zeal
(which is Greig's interpretation) is dismissed in the follow¬
ing words: "It is certain as anything in biography can be that
Review," in Thich the Doctrine of Hume on Miracles is Maintained
(Edinburgh: Oliphant, Waugh & Innes, 1813), p. 27.
^Huxley, op. cit., pp. 11-12.
p
Selby-Bigge, on. cit., p. xii.
3a. E. Taylor, David Hume and the Miraculous (Cam¬
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1927).
^Taylor, op. cit., p. 3.
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Hume was, in point of fact, no anti-clerical zealot, but an
amiable and easy-going man of the world whose chosen social
circle consisted largely of the 'Moderates' among the Edinburgh
Presbyterians."^" Greig demonstrates that this statement is
misleading:
It arises from Professor Taylor's bland indifference to
chronology—a matter of first importance to biographers.
The essay "Of Miracles" . . . was intended for the
Treatise; we may therefore date the first draft of it
about the year 1736. And it lay about in manuscript un¬
til the year 1?Il7, when it went to print.
Neither in 1736 nor in 1757 > nor indeed at any date
before 1752 at the earliest, had Hume any dealings that
we hear of with "the Moderates among the Edinburgh Pres¬
byterians." His intimacy with them did not start till
1753 on thereabouts; he offended several of them by the
very obvious "anti-clerical zeal" animating the first
volume of his history (175^)J and as late at 1761 he was
compelled to make it plain to Hugh Blair, one of his
"chosen circle," that religious topics of discussion must
in the future be forborne between them, since agreement
was impossible. In short, in any search after the motives
that induced Hume to print "Of Miracles" in 17)l8, his
friendship with a group of Edinburgh Moderates after
1753 proves exactly nothing.^
It may have been that Hume was actually suffering
from a prejudice against the churches and the clergy. If so,
it was only the natural reaction of a man who had been ill-
treated by the Edinburgh ministers in the matter of the
professorial position at the University. He had displayed
caution and constraint in the publication of the Treatise
but seemingly to no avail. Now he was no longer Tailing to
make his publications conform to the standards of narrow-
minded bigots.6 The"nobler parts" of his works were not
Ibid., p. 2. ^Gveig, op. cit., p. 163.
^Greig believes Hume wished "to shock and scandalize
his old antagonists, the clergy, the enthusiasts, and the
superstitioners of all kinds." [Ibid., p. 167^
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to be suppressed merely to please men who lacked the ability
to understand his argument. Hume, no doubt, was fully aware
that the essay "Of Miracles" was provocative and that its
publication would be dangerous to him. It is not impossible
that he entertained the hope that the essay would catch the
public eye, for the subject of miracles was certainly very
much in the air at this time. The Deis tic controversy had
brought the question into vogue.Perhaps Hume perceived the
question of miracles to be the real Issue between the theo¬
logians and the scientists and felt Intellectually bound to
advance his ideas on the subject. Whatever Hume's real
motive for inserting the sections on theology may have been,
the arguments, instead of being Irrelevant, fit in with
Hume's general point of view and are useful in pointing to the
main theme of the Enquiry. It might just as validly be argued
that their publication points to Hume's intellectual honesty
which led him to present what he considered to be a truth
established by clear and cogent thinking regardless of the
consequences. If this is the case, Hume demonstrated re¬
markable courage In publishing the essays even while he fore¬
saw a possible Injury to himself.
The substance of Hume's professedly "decisive" argument
against miracles is "that no testimony is sufficient to estab¬
lish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that
its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it
■'■Hume complained that the ferment occasioned by Dr.
Conyers Middleton's Free Enquiry, which dealt with the miracu¬
lous powers claimed to Inhere in the Church, ruined his own
sales. [See Letters, I, 3]]
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endeavours to establish; and even in that case there is a
mutual destruction of arguments, and the superior only gives
us an assurance suitable to that degree of force, which remains,
after deducting the inferior."*'" The merits and defects of
Hume's reasoning have received ample treatment by both
friends and foes, and we need not go into them here. It will
be our concern to analyze how the essay fits into the over-all
scheme of Hume's thought in the Enquiry. By so doing, we
believe his attitude towards religion will become more evident.
In the conclusion of the Enquiry Hume reviews the
basic principles of "mitigated scepticism or academical philoso-
2
phy." He claims that the certainty of demonstration is
limited to the pure realm of idea (i.e., the sciences of
logic and mathematics). All other sciences concerning matter
of fact or existence, which are based upon arguments from
cause or effect, are reduced to probability.
It appears that Hume's problem was one of finding
a way out of scepticism while admitting fully the validity
of the sceptical arguments. In the Treat is e he had selected
from various writers, for the purpose of refutation, argu¬
ments which were of a rational or dogmatic kind. He then
stated the sceptical argument to destroy these views before
presenting the opinions which gave support to his own con¬
structive argument. In the Enquiry scepticism provides him
with the weapon for attack on Deism, which regarded religion
as having its origin in reason and the consciousness of duty.
XE, 115-116. 2S, 161-165.
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For Hume religion might correspond to reason or contradict it,
but not proceed from it. At the end of the essay on miracles
he explicitly rejects the Deistic position in the following
words:
... I think it [Bacon's method of reasoning]] may serve
to confound those dangerous friends or disguised enemies
to the Christian Religion, who have undertaken to defend
it by the principles of human reason. Our most holy reli¬
gion is founded on Faith, not on reason; and it is a sure
method of exposing it to put it to such a trial as it is,
by no means, fitted to endure.
. . .upon the whole, we may conclude, that the Chris¬
tian Religion not only was at first attended with miracles,
but even at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable
person without one. Mere reason is insufficient to con¬
vince us of its veracity: And whoever is moved by Faith
to it, is conscious of a continued miracle in his own
person, which subverts all the principles of his under¬
standing, and gives him a determination to believe what
is most contrary to custom and experience.2
These quotations may be interpreted as ironical or
mocking deference to current theology but they certainly arrest
our attention nevertheless. They suggest possibilities of
thought beyond the regular operations of the intellect which
the rationalist and dogmatic philosophers had been analyzing.
The same effect is suggested by a footnote in the concluding
section of the Enquiry. In referring to experience as that
"which teaches us the nature and bounds of cause and effect,
and enables us to infer the existence of one object from that
of another," Hume states:
That impious maxim of the ancient philosophy, Ex nihllo,
nihil fit, by which the creation of matter was excluded
ceases to be a maxim, according to this philosophy. Not*
only the will of the supreme Being may create matter; but
for ought we know a priori, the will of any other being
might create it, or any other cause, that the most whimsi¬
cal imagination can as sign. 3
IE, 129-130. 2E, 131 3g, l61j.n
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There is something startling in Hume's declaration that
Divinity or theology, as it proves the existence of a
Deity, and the immortality of souls, is composed partly
of reasonings concerning particular, partly concerning
general facts. It has a foundation in reason, so far as
it is supported by experience. But its best and most
solid foundation is faith and divine revelation.
These remarks about religion have often been re¬
garded as exaggerated or insincere. Even if this indictment
be true, our attention is attracted and our minds are opened
to the opportunities for further research and knowledge based
on such a philosophical view. Hume's sole purpose may have
been simply to point out these possibilities. That he had a
serious meaning in making these statements is indicated by
the fact that he was personally concerned with the question
whether a Divine Being is the cause of the order of nature or
nature is the cause of itself and is the ultimate reality for
us. That he recognized the existence of religious thought
and honestly inquired into its nature and value cannot be
denied. There is no apparent reason to question Hume's sin¬
cerity in attacking the religious hypothesis of the Deist
whatever we may regard his personal thoughts on religion to
have been.
At the time Hume composed his Treatise, the Deistic
controversy was In full tide. Some thinkers were attempting
to formulate a reasonable creed which did not depend upon any
accidents of time, place or circumstances. The subject of
miracles, along with prophecy, was the vantage ground of the
more outspoken Deists. Following the doctrine that Christianity
1S, 165.
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is essentially reasonable, they proceeded to eliminate miracles
and revelation, and to reduce Christianity to belief in God
and a few broad principles common to all religions. There
were many debates about the irreducible articles of Christian
belief; the disputants claimed to base their arguments on
authority and made their appeal to reason. The Deists in¬
sisted upon the reasonableness of religion and upon the
necessity and possibility of establishing it on rational
grounds. On the other hand, the opponents of Deism, who were
still anxious to defend religious doctrines by means of argu¬
ments, maintained that a different kind of knowledge was in¬
volved in religion. They were not convinced that a man could
trust his cognitive powers; they were inclined to believe that
he could not confidently assert that he knew Divine nature.
In their estimation man's knowledge was merely probability
and analogical in kind.
Hume saw the common assumption in the arguments of the
Deists and their opponents—that religion is primarily a
matter of knowledge and of reasoning. If religion is a purely
rational matter, then miracles, Hume argued, must either be
rationally justified and understood and hence cease to be
miracles or else they must be rejected as mere superstitions.
Scepticism is the means of showing the inability of reason to
establish religion by rational arguments.
'.Vhile we cannot give a satisfactory reason, why we believe,
after a thousand experiments, that a stone will fall, or
3-See the discussion on the Deistic writers in John Laird,
Hume's Philosophy of Human Nature (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd.,
1932), pp. 119f.
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fire burn; can we ever satisfy ourselves concerning any
determination, which, we may form, with regard to the origin
of worlds, and the situation of nature, from and to eter¬
nity?1
Scepticism also brings freedom from superstition and points
towards the right kind of knowledge—the science of human nature.
Hume attempted to lift religion out of the sphere of reason;
religion must find its basis in human nature.
Hume took scepticism seriously and applied it with
destructive effect against the opinions of the Deistic theolo¬
gians and the Rationalist philosophers who worked with them.
In the concluding paragraph of the Enquiry the phrase "of
divinity or school metaphysics" indicates the antagonists
Hume had in mind.
When we run over libraries, persuaded of these princi¬
ples [which Hume had previously laid down], what havoc
must we make? If we take in our hand any volume; of
divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask,
Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity
or number? Ho. Does it contain any experimental reason¬
ing concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit
it then to the flames; for it can contain nothing but
sophistry and illusion.2
Observed objects cannot, of themselves, reveal the quality
which leads us to suppose one a cause, another an effect. It
is the observer who projects the quality from his own mind.
This strange process of projection works only for experience
and no further. It does not enable us to draw conclusions
about things themselves supposed to exist beyond the range of
experience. Consequently, natural theology is futile except
in so far as it concerns itself with what we can and do observe
in the creation. But just as futile is the scientist's
1s, 162. 2e, 165.
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pretension that fictitious entities—aether, electrons, quanta
and so forth--are more real and powerful in themselves than the
things that we observe in common life.
In a very real sense Hume challenged scientific as
well as theological dogmas. Prom his point of view, the man
of science, who builds a rational system on the uniformity of
nature, and the theologian, who appeals to the immutable attri¬
butes of God, are alike constructing dogmatic theories. The
militant rationalist assails religion in the name of science;
but in reality a science based on reason goes outside the
limits of a philosophy of pure experience in much the same way as
dogmatic theology. Both go beyond the limits of fact when they
argue for real connection when all that can be demonstrated is
mere conjunction. In the Treatise and here again in the Enquiry
Hume attempted to demolish the foundation of a rational science
of nature. "Our most holy religion" is founded on a faith
which has no foundation in reason; but the same faith is also
the foundation of science. Just as the Christian believer
stakes his hope on a mere promise of something to be fulfilled
in the future so the convinced believer in science stakes every¬
thing on a promise of the same kind which the course of events
may destroy at any moment. There is a close analogy between
the faith required for religious and for scientific purposes.
Save for what we may derive from figures or numbers, our knowl¬
edge of the facts of science is only a form of faith that things
having followed the "laws of nature" in a certain order must,
of necessity, continue to do so. It appears that flume recognized
2kl
the subject of miracles as being a crucial point in the scien¬
tific- tneological dispute and took this opportunity to strike
another blow at the rationalistic interpretation of the universe.
The Essay "Of Miracles" fits clearly into the rest of
the Enquiry^ and raises the important problem of human belief
and its foundation. Hume's argument is based on the doctrine
of belief modelled on analogies drawn from Newtonian physics.
His general point of view is that the uniformity of nature is
established by experience. He believes this even though he
has proved that we lack grounds in reason for believing in it.
There can be no event"contrary to uniform experience of the
course of nature in cases where all the circumstances are the
3
same." This argument may be correlated with the rules formu¬
lated in the Treatise for the discovery of causal connections.^"
The fact that Hume formed rules for the discovery of causal
sequence shows that he did not regard these sequences as some¬
thing to be accepted on the basis of uncritical observations.
The breaking of sequences, established by critical tests, would
undermine human knowledge and introduce uncertainty into human
life. This being the case, Hume tries to demonstrate that
miracles, properly so called, can never be justified by the
faculty of reason. National inquiry shows that miracles never
"'"See E, Io3-lo5.
^Mary Shaw Kuypers contends that the sections un theology
''certainly furnish a nice example of the application uf the em¬
pirical principle of causation to a specific problem.* tKuypers,
op, cit., p. 7l|-J '
3E, llipi. ^See T, 173-171*..
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have occurred, nor is it possible that they ever can occur. No
alleged miracle in sacred or profane history has enough evidence
for us to give it credit.
The predominately critical character of the essay on
miracles is in line with the rest of the book. Hume's attitude
is uncompromising. He argues that the evidence for a miracle
"carried falsehood upon the very face of it, and that a miracle,
supported by an:/ human testimony, was more properly a subject of
derision than of argument, His reasoning deals principally
with the credibility of testimony. Human testimony being what it
is, Hume declares that it is more probable that the witnesses to
miracles are lying or themselves deceived than that the so-called
miracles are true. He rejects both Christian and ecclesiastical
miracles on the general ground of the insufficiency and unreliable-
ness of human testimony. Hume reasons that the reports of the
occtirrence of miracles furnished by witnesses must always appear
unlikely to any one who candidly examines them, since experience
finds the uniformity of nature much more dependable than the
accuracy of human testimony. He states: ". . .no human testi¬
mony can have such force as to prove a miracle, and make it
p
a just foundation for any ... system of religion."
This interpretation, it must be admitted, does not
show the inconceivability of miracles. The additional factor
of a divine volition might lead someone to suggest that we
should recognize a new cause--the supernatural. Hume states




determining if a result is to be assigned to a divine volition.
Those interferences with natural order, on which theologians
rested the chief evidence of God's action, seemed to Hume to
detract from that action. If the exceptions to the laws of
nature are most conspicuously divine, then the laws themselves
are less divine. If Providence is removed from the series of
events before and after the miracles, then it appears that God
is not infinite. To believe in miracles means that one would
be forced to regard ordinary events as less divine than other
phenomena or else the Divine being, present in all, operates
less intensely, or to less purpose, through certain events
than through others. A miracle,, according to Hume, so far
from being consistent with and following from theism is really
opposed to it. A belief in miracles is really atheistic.
Furthermore, Hume appears to be suggesting that if
theism is to make use of the teleolop;Ical argument (the only
argument to which he gives any recognition), then the uniformity
of nature must first be established. If that becomes shaken,
then we must give up every hope of reaching God as First Cause
by a posteriori reasoning. Those individuals who profess be¬
lief in miracles are in effect substituting chance for regularity.
Thus, the very possibility for a posteriori arguments is des¬
troyed. Norman Kemp Smith suggests that
Hume's treatment of miracles has a premiss to vhich he has
not in this section referred--namely, that we have, and can
have, no grounds either in reason or in experience for
postulating the kind of God to whom alone the Scriptural
or other miracles can fittingly bo ascribed. This, and not
the sheerly logical considerations bearing on belief, testi¬
mony, and evidence generally, is the context within which
the Issues regarding miracles properly arise. To supply
?););r I
this context would, however, have left his argument very
much in the air. Hume's problem, therefore, in the En- ^
quiry, was to introduce it without yet saying too much.
Kemp Smith contends that Hume supplied the context for
miracles in Section XI of the Enquiry—"Of a Particular Provi¬
dence and of a Future State." This essay, written in the
form of a dialogue, in many ways anticipates the Dialogues
C one e rning Hatupal Rel igi on. The subject discussed in both
is similar. The essay in the 'Enquiry gives Hume's first treat¬
ment of the argument from design and shows his line of approach
to the problems of the Dialogues. "What Hume seeks to show,"
asserts Kemp Smith, "is that this argument, even if its own
explicit assumptions be not questioned, fails to establish the
kind of Deity that belief in a particular providence (or in
miracles) must require us to suppose.Hume invents a friend
"who loves sceptical paradoxes," and puts into his mouth doubts
regarding the teleological proof. The reasoning proceeds as
follows:
If the cause be known only by the effect, we never ought
to ascribe to it any qualities, beyond what are precisely
requisite to produce the effect: Korean we, by any rules
of just reasoning, return back from the cause, and infer
other effects from it, beyond those by which alone it is
known to us.h-
Kume argues that it is contrar?/ to the rules of analogy
to reason from human design to the procedure of the Infinite.-'
The subjects are infinitely different. In the one case, we
infer an extension of finite design from our partial experiences.
"'"Kemp Smith, Introduction to the Dialogues, p. 50.
2Ibid., p. 51. 3E, 132. ^E, 136. ^E, 137.
In the other, our inference is from the finite to the Infinite.
We know human contrivance by experience and can easily pass
from the effect to the cause. But it is totally different
with every inference drawn by -us as to the Deity. The uni¬
verse, which is supposed to yield us the inference, is a
"singular effect," with no parallel. The inference from a
unique effect (the world) to a unique cause (God) is branded
as unphllosophical.
All the philosophy, therefore, in the world, and all the
religion, which is nothing but a species of philosophy,
will never be able to carry us beyond the usual course
of experience, or give us measures of conduct and be¬
haviour different from those which are furnished by re¬
flections on common life. No new fact can ever be in¬
ferred from the religious hypothesis; no event foreseen
or foretold; no reward or punishment expected or dreaded,
beyond what is already known by practice and observation.1
If experience and observation and analogy be, indeed,
the only guides which we can reasonably follow in inferences
of this nature; both the effect and cause must bear a
similarity and resemblance to other effects and causes,
which we know, and which we have found, in many instances,
to be conjoined with each other. I leave it to your ownp
reflection to pursue the consequences of this principle.
The fundamental issue raised by Hume in the essay in¬
volves a challenge to the argument from design in any and every
form. The question arises "whether the argument from design,
as an argument from analogy, can allow of being formulated in
q
a tenable manner.IU This, as we shall see later, is the pri¬
mary problem of the Dialogues. The argument from design is the
fundamental proof in the theistic position and yet it appears
to be indefensible. Hume believes that he has arrived at the
1B, lh.6. 2S, llj.8.
^Kemp Smith, Introduction to the Dialogues, p. 56
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crux of the theological situation. "[He] is conscious," writes
Kemo Smith, "that he is attacking the very citadel of religion,
and not merely certain of its outworks."1
The result of the essay is more or less indefinite,
but it confirms the suggestion that Hume realized the diffi¬
culties of any attempt to base religion upon reason. Prom the
very nature of the case, immortality and theistic belief can¬
not be demonstrated as a mathematical proposition can be. The
immortality of the soul and the existence of God are not evi¬
denced as facts of sensible experience and so cannot be em¬
pirically verified. Hume recognized the problems inherent in
the argument from design and intimated that the acceptance of
theism is not a matter merely of reason but rests in a more
fundamental way upon the emotional nature of man. Religion is
a matter of faith or belief.
Disappointments and Further Literary Endeavors
The next fifteen years of David Hume's life are charac¬
terized by success and failure, side-by-side. Literary success
came to him, but with it came hostility from certain sections
of society. An undercurrent of bitter disappointment and
frustration accompanied the achievement of his ambition in
letters. He was not immediately encouraged by the sale of the
Enquiry and a new edition of the Essays, Moral and Political.
But in the year 17^4-9 his publisher, Andrew Millar, informed
him that his "former Publications (all but the unfortunate
•'■Ibid. , p. E>0.
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Treatise) were beginning to be the Subject of Conversation,
that the Sale of them was gradually encreasing, and that new
Editions were demanded. Answers, by Reverends and Right
Reverends, came out two or three in a Year: And I found by
Dr Warburtons Railing that the Books were beginning to be es¬
teemed in good Company." Although Hume exaggerated the num¬
ber of answers that appeared, there was evidence of interest
in the theological and metaphysical questions raised by his
reasoning. Mossner found that "answers to the two Enquiries
(including "Of Miracle^1) alone totalled two in 1751; foair in
1752; five in 1753; three in 175^; and two in 1755."^ Chris¬
tian apologists and theologians, alarmed by Hume's attack
upon the traditional foundations of religion, began to print
refutations of his views.
William 7/arburton did not himself publish any answer
to Hume's arguments about Cod and miracles although his ideas
were especially offensive to the theologian. In a letter of
September 28, lJk-9 > to his friend Richard Hurd, Warburton de¬
clared:
I am strongly tempted too to have a stroke at Hume in
parting. He is the author of a little book called "Philoso¬
phical Essays," in one part of which he argues about the
being of a God, and in another (very needlessly jon will
say) against the possibility of miracles. He has crowned
the liberty of the press. And yet he has a considerable
post under the Government. I have a great mind to do
justice on his arguments against miracles, which I think
might be done in a few words. But does he deserve notice?
Is he known amongst you? Pray answer me these questions.
For if his own weight keeps him down, I should be sorry
^Letters, I, 3.
^Mossner, The Life of David Hume, p. 286.
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to contribute to his advancement to any place but the
pillory.
On June l£th of the following year Warburton wrote to Philip
Doddridge: "Some persons of consideration would persuade me to
take to task at the end of the second volume of Julian a chap¬
ter of one Hume on Miracles in a rank atheistical Book called
Philosophical Essays: and as the subject of the second part
may be a little ticklish, perhaps it may be prudent to conciliate
2
warm tempers by such a conclusion." For some reason Warburton
held back and never published any attack on "Of Miracles." He
contemplated a criticism, and some remarks on the question are
to be found among his papers. But evidently he decided that
Hume was not sufficiently known or deserving of an answer at
this time.
During the period from 17^9 to 1791 Hume lived with
his brother in the country and there composed the Political
Discourses and the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals,
which was a refashioning of Book III of the Treatise. Moving
to Edinburgh, Hume published the Discourses late in 17,91 and
the Enquiry early in 17.92. The Political Discourses were, in
his own words, "successful on the first Publication"-^ and
William Warburton, Letters from a Late Eminent Prelate
to One of His Friends (2nd ed., London: T. Gadell and W. Davies,
1B09), p. 111.
2
Quoted in John Nichols, Literary Anecdotes of the
Eighteenth Century: Comprising Biographical Memoirs of William
Bowyer, etc. (London: Nichols, Son, and Bentley, 1512-1915),
V, oOl. [Bee Letters to and From Philip Doddridge, ed. T.
Stedman (Shrewsbury, 1790), p. 207.J
^Letters, I, L|,.
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profoundly influenced his contemporaries, especially those on
the continent. The second Enquiry, which in Hume's estimation,
"is of all my writings, historical, philosophical, or literary,
incomparably the best," did not sell and "came unnoticed and
onobserved into the world.Also in 175-1 the second edition
of the Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding; appeared.
Hume wrote a few squibs and pamphlets at this time,
2
but most of them have subsequently been lost. One pamphlet
entitled the Petition of the Grave and Venerable Bellmen, or
Sextons, of the Church of Scotland, To the Honourable House
of Commons, has been preserved and is valuable in the considera¬
tion of Hume's basic position on religion and the church. A
letter to John Clephane discloses the first reference to the
Petition. Hume writes:
... since I am in the humour of displaying my wit, I
must tell you that lately, at an idle hour, I wrote a
sheet called the Bellman's Petition: wherein (if I be
not partial, which I certainly am) there was some good
pleasantry and satire. The printers in Edinburgh re¬
fused to print it, (a good sign, you'll say, of my
prudence and discretion).3
The Petit!on is mentioned again in a letter written to Gilbert
Letters, I, Ij.. There appeared in 175>3* however, a
criticism of the Inquiry entitled A Delineation of the Nature
and Obligation of Morality, with Reflections upon Mr. Hume's
Book, etc. Published anonymously, 'the book had been written
by James Balfour, who occupied the Chair In Edinburgh University
for which Hume had been a candidate. Hume was pleased with the
treatment given his moral theory and left with the publisher a
note to^the author. In this letter Hume states that philosophi¬cal topics should furnish'hgreeable matter to discourse and con¬
versation" and adds, "I have surely endeavoured to refute the
Sceptic with all the force of which I am master; and my refuta¬
tion must be allowed sincere, because drawn from the caoital
principles of my system." [Letters, I, 173.]
2Note Appendix A in Letters, II, 31jj0.
3Lctters , I, lli9.
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Elliot when Hume states:
I send you enclos'd a little Endeavour at Drollery,
against some People who care not much to be jok'd upon.
I have frequently had it in my Intention to write a
Supplement to Gulliver, containing the Ridicule of Priests.
Twas certainly a Pity that Swift was a Parson. Had he
been a Lawyer or Physician, we had nevertheless been enter¬
tain' d at the Expense of these Professions. But Priests
are so jealous, that they cannot bear to be touch'd on
that Head; and for a plain Reason: Because they are
conscious they are really ridiculous. That Parts of the
Doctor's Subject is so fertile, that a much inferior
Genius, I am confident, might succeed in it.
Hume's satire, which illustrates his antipathy to
ministers at this time, is a part of a controversy of 17^4-8—
1751 on a clerical issue occasioned by the decision of the
General Assembly of the Church of Scotland to seek redress
from parliament for the clergy's small stipends. The attempt
was abandoned when the gentlemen heritors of the Church ob¬
jected to granting the increase which would have come out of
2
their own pockets. Hume had some years earlier declared
that "the Church is my Aversion"^ and his attitude towards
clergymen was made evident in a note appended to the essay
"Of National Characters" in 17b-8. He no?; mocks the ministers
in a parody on their representation. Hume claims to show that
oell-ringers have the same, or even greater claims on the
liberality of the public. The petition of the bellmen is
supported by the following reasons:
'That it can be proved demonstrably from Scripture and
reason, that the cause of religion is as intimately and
inseparably connected with the temporal interests and
^■Letters, I, l53«
p
See Mathieson, The Awakening of Scotland, pp. ll|_8-lp2.
3l-Jew Letters, p. 26.
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world grandeur of your Petitioners as with any of these
ecclesiastics whatsoever.
That your Petitioners serve in the quality of grave-
diggers, the great use and necessity of their order, in
every well regulated commonwealth, has never been called
in question by any just reasoner; an advantage they possess
above their brethren, the Reverend Clergy.
That their usefulness is as extensive as it is great;
for even those who neglect religion, or despise learning,
must yet, sometime or other, stand in need of the good
offices of this grave and venerable order. . . .
That as your Petitioners are but half ecclesiastics,
it may be expected they will not be altogether unreason¬
able or exorbitant in their demands.
That the present poverty of your Petitioners in this
kingdom is a scandal to all religion, it being easy to
prove, that a modern Bellman is not more richly endowed
than a primitive apostle, and consequently possesseth not
the twentieth part of the revenues belonging to a Pres¬
byterian Clergyman.
That whatever freedom the profane scoffers and free¬
thinkers of the age may use with our Reverend Brethren the
Clergy, the boldest of them trembles when he thinks of us;
and that a simple reflection on us has reformed more lives
than all the sermons in the world. ...
That your Petitioners trust the Honourable House will
not despise them on account of the present meanness of their
condition; for having heard a learned man say, that the
Cardinals who are now Princes, were once nothing but parish
curates of Rome, your Petitioners observing the same
laudable measures to be now prosecuted, despair not of
being one day on a level with the nobility and gentry of
these realms.
Ho doubt productions such as the above confirmed the
belief in the minds of Hume's contemporaries that he was the
chief destroyer of morality and religion. His analysis of
man's nature was not understood and his persistent enquiry
concerning the meaning of such terms as "causality", "personal
identity" and "external existence" aroused widespread prejudice.
Yet, it was not so much what he had said about religion but
what he had been reticent to say that brought so much opposition.
•^•Quoted in Mossner, The Life of David Hume, p. 236 and
in Burton, op. cit.. I, 317-319.
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On the whole he had been silent with regard to his personal
attitude towards divine reality. There are several intima¬
tions in his works that he had been thinking about these things
and his letters confirm this. Nevertheless, he stated nothing
definite because he felt it necessary to think through these
deep problems more thoroughly. It appears that near the age
of forty Hume decided to make an effort to eliminate the sus¬
picions surrounding him—suspicions that he was an atheist,
a deist, or an infidel; a person who had discarded religion
in all forms as a harmful system of superstitions and excesses.
It was at this time that he began to write Ms thoughts on
religion."** He had certain convictions; but he also had doubts,
and his expression of these in the Dialogues Concerning Natural
2
Religion took fie form of a conversation. The Dialogues were
given to Hume's intimate friends for criticism. They admired
the literary excellence of the work but strongly advised
against publication. The relentless questions of a sceptical
attitude of mind were so easily misunderstood, and Hume's friends
feared that the zealots' hatred for him would be increased and
his prospects as an author permanently injured. The manuscripts
were not destroyed, however, and Hume continued to study the
problems involved, adding to and revising what he first wrote.
Opposition to David Hume, mainly for religious reasons,
"**Seo letter of March 10, 1751 to Gilbert Elliot, Letters,
I, 153-157.
pFor an intensive study of the thesis that the Dialogues
are an actual dramatization of Hume's mental conflict over
religious problems, see G. W. Hendel, Studies in the Philosophy
of David Hume.
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again frustrated his attempt to enter academic life. In 1752
he applied for the Chair of Logic at the University of Glasgow.
Hie clergy of the city followed the example set by their Edin¬
burgh brethren seven years earlier and very strongly advised
the college not to choose Hume. William Cullen, Professor
1
of Medicine, pressed Hume's claims with great vigor. Adam
Smith, who as yet hardly knew Hume, had some doubts and wrote
thus to Gullen: "I should prefer David Hume to any man for a
colleague; but I am afraid the public would not be of my
opinion; and the interest of the society will oblige us to
2
have some regard to the opinion of the public." Concerning
the tumult raised by the suggestion of his name, Hume reports
to John Clephane: "You have probably heard that my friends in
Glasgow, contrary to my opinion and advice, undertook to get
me elected into that college; and they had succeeded, in spite
of the violent and solemn remonstrances of the clergy, if the
Duke of Argyle had had courage to get me the least counten-
3
ance." A Mr. Clow was chosen for the chair, and thus ended
Hume's final endeavor to secure an academic post.
"'"Hume wrote Cullen: "The part which you have acted in
the late project for my election Into your College, gave me so
much pleasure, that I should do myself the greatest violence
did I not take every opportunity of expressing my most lively
sense of it. . . • Whatever the reverend gentlemen may say of
my religion, I hope I have as much morality as to retain a
grateful sentiment of your favours, and as much sense as to
know #iose friendship will give greatest honour and advantage
to me." [Letters, I, l635j
o
""John Thomson, Life, Lectures and Writings of William
Cullen (Edinburgh, 1832), I, 60b.
^Letters, I, 161l.
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Success in Society and Friendship with the Moderates
All was not disappointment and frustration in Hume's
public experience, for he was elected librarian of the Faculty
of Advocates even in the face of considerable opposition from
religious zealots."*" Hume writes humorously to his friends
concerning some of the episodes surrounding the incident.
He expresses much satisfaction at the outcome and says,
I have been ready to burst with vanity and self-conceit
this past week; and being obliged from decorum to keep a
strict watch over myself, and check all eruptions of that
kind, I really begin to find my health impaired by it. •
. . 'Tis not on my account alone you are to take part in
this great event; philosophy, letters, science, virtue,
triumph along with me, and have now in this one singular
instance, brought over even the people from the side of
bigotry and superstition.
Stating that his friends had submitted his name to fill the
vacancy of the library-keeper, Hume continues:
The President, and the Dean of Faculty his son, who used
to rule absolutely in this body of advocates, formed an
aversion to the project, because it had not come from
them; and they secretly engaged the whole party called
Squadrone against me. The bigots joined them, and both
together set up a gentleman of character, and an advocate,
and who had great favour on both these accounts. The
violent cry of Deism, atheism, and scepticism, was raised
against me; and 'twas represented that my election would
be giving the sanction of the greatest and most learned
body of meninthiscountry to my profane and irreligious princi¬
ples. But what was more dangerous, my opponents entered
into a regtilar concert and cabal against me; while my friends
were contented to speak well of their project in general,
without having once formed a regular list of the electors,
or considered of the proper methods of engaging them.
Things went on in this negligent manner till within six
days of the election, when they met together and found
themselves in some danger of being outnumbered; immediately
"*""The proposal to give Hume even this paltry place
caused a great outcry, on the old score of infidelity."
\Huxley, on. cit. , p. 32.3
Letters, I, l61p.
upon which they raised the cry of indignation against the
opposite party; and the public joined them so heartily,
that our antagonists durst show their heads in no companies
nor assemblies: expresses were despatched to the country,
assistance flocked to us from all quarters, and I carried
the election by a considerable majority, to the great
joy of all bystander s.
'Twas vulgarly given out, that the contest was be¬
twixt Deists and Christians; and when the news of my
success came to the play-house, the whisper ran that the
Christians were defeated. Are you not stirprised that we
could keep our popularity, notwithstanding this imputation,
which my friends could not deny to be well founded?
. . .next morning I had the drums and town music at
my door, to express their joy, as they said, of my being
made a great man. They could not imagine, that so great
a fray could be raised about so mere a trifle.2
About the same time that Hume became "a great man" in
his own city, he entered into friendship with the Moderate
group of Presbyterian clergymen. He came to live in the
strictest intimacy and the most cordial relationships with a
number of these ministers. The younger moderates seemed
little offended by the freedom of Hume's writing on theologi¬
cal and religious matters. Although they often disagreed with
his philosoohical and religious opinions, they always respected
his genius as an author and gave him due regard as a man of
letters.^
^Letters, I, l6£. ^Letters, I, 166-167.
^Mossner states: "There can be little doubt that, had
{[Hume] been intimately associated with this group earlier, his
famous note on the character of the clergy [see infra, p. 2^8 J
would not have appeared in the form that it did.11 [Jvlossner,
The Life of David Hume, p. 27l\.JJ
^"Alexander Carlyle describes the friendship of Hume with
liberal-minded clergy as follows: "He took much to the company
of the younger clergy, not from a wish to bring them over to
his own opinions, for he never attempted to overturn any man's
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Hume's acquaintance with Reverend Robert Wallace (1697-
1771) is an excellent illustration of how well Hume got on
with the Moderates. Wallace was a man of influence, prestige
and liberal principles. Ramsay of Ochtertyre spoke of him
as "one of the first of our philosophical clergy.""'" Thomas
Somerville called Wallace "the Philosopher" and claimed that
"his prayers breathed a seraphic spirit and his sermons were
remarkable not only for originality and vigour, but for a
2
glow of sentiment." He was a great admirer of Shaftesbury's
philanthropic views and style and did not always confine him-
•3
self in the pulpit to "Gospel topics." Wallace distinguished
himself as combining an interest in mathematical and theologi¬
cal subjects. Assistant to James Gregory (the Edinburgh Profes¬
sor of Mathematics in 1720) and member of the Rankenian Olub,
he was later on preacher in Moffat (1723), minister of New
Greyfriars Church, Edinburgh (1733) and New North Church,
Edinburgh (1739)* In 171-1-3 he was Moderator of the General
Assembly and in the following year was given charge of church
patronage in Scotland. He was also appointed one of the royal
chaplains for Scotland and dean of the Chapel Royal.
'The first mention we have of Robert Wallace in connection
principles, but they best understood his notions, and could
furnish him with literary conversation. . . . This intimacy
of the young clergy with David Hume enraged the zealots on
the opposite side, who little knew how impossible it was for
him, had he been willing, to shake their principles." fcarlyle,
op. clt., pp. 288-289.3
"'"Ramsay of Ochtcrtyre, 00. cit., I, 2)16.
Thomas Somerville, op. cit., p. 59*
^Mathieson, The Awakening of Scotland, p. 192.
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with David Hume goes back to the candidacy for the Chair of
Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh. Hume was not entirely undefend¬
ed by the ministers. This is evident from a letter written to
Henry Home in which Hume says, "I think Mr Wallace's conduct
has been very noble & generous; & I am much oblig'd to him."
Mossner has discovered confirmatory evidence of Wallace's de¬
fense of Hume in an unsigned letter to the printer of the
London Chronicle. 5-7 November 1776. The account gives the
following information.
... it is true that most of the clergy objected to the
electing of honest David, grounding their objection on
"A Treatise on Human Nature," published in 1739 > which had
been ascribed to him. All the body, however, did not con¬
cur in the measure. The late celebrated Dr. Wallace,
faithful to those generous sentiments which he had early
imbibed and uniformly professed, with an impartiallity as
will as dignity becoming them, declared to the counsellors
in strong terms, that he did not think himself entitled
to give his opinion, on pretext too of a juvenile as well
as anonymous performance, which had been little read, and'
which was less understood, against chusing that ingenious
gentleman, more than any of the other candidates. The
Doctor's liberal mind was elevated far above, and his
philosophic indignation was greatly raised at the in¬
quisitorial zeal discovered on this occasion.
Wallace's connections with Hume continued for many
years on a friendly basis.3 In an unpublished paper^ Wallace
^New Letters, p. 15.
^Quoted in Mossner, The Life of David Hume, p. 159«
3-'For a full account of the relations between Hume and
Wallace see E. G. Mossner, The Forgotten Hume (New York: Colum¬
bia University Press, 19lt-3)» po. 103-131 and Mossner, The Life
of_David Hume, pp. 260-268; 3P-352; 262-263. [cf. F. H.
Heinemann, David Hume; The Man and His Science of Man, Contain¬
ing Some Unpublished Letters of Hume (Paris: Hermann & Co..
19h0), pp. —7-22.Q
'•"A Letter from a Moderate Freethinker to David Hume
Esquire concern5-ng the Profession of the Clergy. In Which It
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attempts to refute Hume's attack against the clergy in the
essay "Of National Characters" which appeared in the 17lp8
edition of the Sssays Moral and Political.*^"The outcome of the
controversy has been summarized as follows:
Hume had attacked the clerical character by confining
himself to the fanatic. Wallace defended the clerical
character by confining himself to the Moderates. How
right both were, each in his way, will be observable in
the later attempts of the fanatics to excommunicate Hume
and in Wallace's reactions to those attempts. Yet, on
the basis of their own opinions, there was no reason why
Hume and Wallace should not be friends. And, indeed, they
took an immediate fancy to one another. Doubtless it was
this affinity that induced Wallace not to publish the
"Letter from a Moderate Freethinker," which had apparently
been completed shortly before he met Hume in the summer
of 1751.2
Wallace and Hume entered into correspondence and often
exchanged papers for comments before printing. "Both were
supremely conscious that in treating one another with tolera¬
tion and courtesy they were achieving the highest standards
3
set by the Age of Enlightenment." One exchange of letters
Is shewed that their Vices 'Ahat ever they Are Are Owing to
their Disposition and Not to the Bad Influence of Their Profes¬
sion." This unpublished tract is in the Edinburgh University
Library in the Historical Manuscripts Commission Reoort on the
Laing Manuscripts preserved in the University of Edinburgh, 11,98.
■^In a long digressive footnote on the character of clergy¬
men, Hume reinforces his attack by purporting to show that their
peculiar vices are caused by the very nature of their profession.
He accuses the clergy of feigning more devotion than they felt
at certain times. He claims they promote the spirit of super¬
stition by continued "grimaces," over-zealousness and hypo¬
crisy. Ministers are characterized by Hume as possessing a
proclivity towards an overwhelming conceit of themselves, an
exaggerated ambition, theological hatred, and a spirit of
revenge. J.G. G. , III, 2[j-5-2k?n3
2
Mossner, The Forgotten Hume, p. 111.
3Ibid., p. 112.
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reveals their attitude. Writing on September 22, 1751, Hume
tells Wallace:
I hope it will give Offence to no Body, that you & I
have a correspondence together on literary subjects.
There has been printed at London, but not yet pub¬
lish' d an Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals
of which I have order'd a Copy to be sent you; I hope
you will not find my Ethics liable to much Exception,
on the Side of Orthodoxy, whatever they may be on the Side
of Argument & Philosophy.^
Wallace responded with courtesy and respect:
I thank you for the present you have ordered me of a
Copy of your "Inquiry concerning the Principles of Moralls."
'Whether Orthodox or Heterodox I cannot answer but I dare
say it will be curious and give me a usefull instruction:
and I can be finely entertained with an ingenious vain
of thinking tho very different from my own & much out of
the common road (the more uncommon perhaps the greater
entertainment, if one is not a bigott & can make proper
allowances to a philosophical genius) ....
The letter concludes:
I will only add that I am not afraid our Correspon¬
dence will give any offence, nor do I believe that any
with whom I have any great connexion have such narrow
souls. But if they have it would be too great a sacrifice
to refuse what is so agreeable, the compliment of such an
ingenious & learned Gentlemen as Mr Hume & I hope I shall
allways have the boldness to do justice to Gentlemen of
your Character. . . .
Hume answered this "very obliging Letter" and queried, "Why
cannot all the World entertain different Opinions about any
Subject, as amicably as we do?"^~ Other letters to Wallace
indicate that Hume was still interested in the problem of
miracles and exchanged several pamphlets on the subject.^
-*-Hew Letters, p. 29. This letter is important in showing
that Hume had not abandoned hope that his ethics would be accept¬
able to Orthodoxy.
^Quoted by Mossner, The Life of David Hume, p. 265.
3Ibid. fy-New Letters, p. 30.
3>See New Letters, pp. 33-3k.
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In so far as Htomo identified himself with church
politics, he adopted the views of Wallace and the Moderate
party. He agreed with the Moderates' concept that by main¬
taining a high intellectual and social standard in the estab¬
lished clergy, the Church could be purged of bigotry, fanati¬
cism and extreme zeal. The Moderates stood solidly behind
the doctrine of patronage. Hume hoped that by means of
patronage the worst evils of the twin forms of false religion—
superstition and enthusiasm—might be mitigated. It was in
support of such a view that he had written the Bellmen's
Petition. Doubtlessly, Hume felt that men like Robert Wallace,
William Robertson, John Jardine, Alexander Carlyle, John Home,
and Hugh Blair were better judges of the type of minister to
be ordained than a congregation of superstitious, enthusias¬
tic, and illiterate zealots. But in emphasizing the promo¬
tion of sound morals and decorum in the church, Hume and the
Moderates failed to make allowance for the devotional elements
in religion. This, as we saw in Chapter II, was one of the
main reasons for the decay of Moderatism, and this is also
one of the major defects in the religious thought of David Hume.
Hume's prejudice against churches and clergy must
frequently have been the cause of debate with his Moderate
friends. They presumably preached at him and argued about
the necessity of revealed religion bait without enmity." On
one occasion Hume gave Hugh Blair the following remonstrance:
. . . permit me . . . the freedom of saying a word to
yourself. Whenever I have had the pleasure to be in your
•^Carlyle, op. cit.. p. 285.
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company, if the discourse turned upon any common subject
of literature or reasoning, I always parted from you both
entertained and instructed. But when the conversation
v/as diverted by you from this channel towards the subject
of your profession; tho I doubt not but your intentions
were very friendly towards me, I own I never received the
same satisfaction: I was apt to be tired, and you to be
angry. I would therefore wish for the future, wherever
my good fortune throws me in your way, that these topics
should be forborne between us. I have, long since, done
with all inquiries on such subjects, and am become incap¬
able of instruction; tho I own no one is more capable of
conveying it than yourself.^
An interesting incident is recorded concerning a visit
of Hume with John Jardine, one of his most attached friends.
Declining to be lighted down the stairs, Hume lost his way in
the darkness and was found by Jardine who remarked, "Davie, I
p
have often tellt ye that 'natural licht' is no sufficient."
i
According to one of Carlyle's anecdotes, Hume s good-natured
pleasantry sometimes touched upon religion:
Being at G-ilmerton, where David Hume w as on a visit,
Sir David Kinloch made him go to Athlestaneford Church,
where I preacheu for John Home. When we met before Dinner,
"What did you mean," says he to me, "by treating John's
congregation today with one of Cicero's academics? I
did not think that such heathen morality would have passed
in East Lothian." On Monday, when we were assembling
to breakfast, David retired to the end of the dining room,
when Sir David entered: . .."Take away the enemy first,"
says David. The baronet, thinking it was the warm fire
that kept David in the lower end of the room,rung the bell
for a servant to carry some of it off. It was not the
fire that scared David, but a large Bible that was left
on a stand at the upper end of the room. . . .3
The correspondence of David Hume with the Edinburgh
ministers occasionally turned to religious topics, and he ex¬
pressed his feelings about spiritual matters. During his resi¬
dence in Paris, he kept in touch with "my Protestant Pastors"
•^Letters, I, 351. ^Carlyle, op. clt., p. 285.
3Ibid., pp. 290-291.
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at Edinburgh and in a letter addressed to Hugh Blair he de¬
clares :
I am in debt to all my Friends in Letters, and shall
ever be so; but what strikes me chiefly with Remorse are
my great & enormous Debts to the Clergy. By this Neglect
of my Protestant Pastors, you will begin to suspect that
I am turning Papist. But to acquit myself at once, allow
me to write you a common Letter, and to address a few
Words to every one of you.
To Dr. Jardine^Hume relates the following incident:
In order to refute all Calumnies, hear a short Story. Not
long ago, as I came into a Company, I heard D'Alembert
exclaim, Et verbum caro factum est. And the Word was
made Flesh. This was thought a very good Jest on my
past & present Life; and was much repeated. A Lady in
"telling the Story, said Et verbum carum factum est. When
told of her Mistake, she wou'd not allow it to be one.
Informing Blair of the differences between England and
France, Hume states that France is characterized by "the general
Re-gard pay'd to Genius and Learning; the universal and pro¬
fessed, tho' decent, Gallantry of the Fair Sex; . . . the
almost universal Contempt of all Religion, among both Sexes,
and among all Ranks of Men. ..." Hume regards England as a
nation "relapsing fast into the deepest Stupidity, Christianity
3
& Ignorance." A few months later he writes Blair: "Mr Hume
recommends himself to Ferguson and Jardine and John Adams and
Mrs Adams, and to all the Poker, and desires the Prayers of
the Faithful for him on this Occasion."^" In another letter
Hume informs the minister:
I am told, that Lord Hertford's Intentions in my Favour
made a great Fray in London. The Princess Amelia said,
•^Letters t I, Ij-95. Letters, I, Ip9^>.
^Letters, I, I}-97—Ip9'3• ^Letters, I, 5>lli..
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that she thought the Matter might be easily accomodated.
Why cannot Lord Hertford says she make him a Bishop.
The Lord Lieutenant has many good Bishoprics to dispose
of.1
Hear the close of his life Hume jokingly wrote: "Two Ladies
of my Acquaintance have laid a Scheme of bringing Lady Hunting¬
don and me together for her or my Conversion. I wish I may
p
have Spirits to humour this Polly." Blair took this incident
seriously for he replied:
I would not wish you to have any thing to do with that
tribe [the Methodists]] either in joke or in earnest. You
can have no sort of intercourse with them that will not
be misrepresented. You are too conspicuous a figure to
be let pass without their fathering some foolish story
on you.3
In addition to revealing the close relationship of Hume
with the Edinburgh clergy, these letters indicate his interest
in the welfare of the Moderate Party. He conveys his sympathy
at the death of Jardine:
I cannot begin my Letter without lamenting most sin¬
cerely the Death of our Friend, Dr Jardine: . . . surely
we shall ever regret the Loss of a very pleasant Companion
and of a very friendly honest man. It makes a blank which
you must all feel, and which I in particular will sensibly
feel, when I come amongst you. I need not ask you, whether
the Miscreants of the opposite Party did not rejoice. For
I take it for granted.4-
When Hume occupied a place of authority in the govern¬
ment, he endeavoured to aid his Edinburgh friends. He informed
Blair on one occasion that he "shou'd willingly have seconded
Dr Wallace's Application for the Thistle. . . .Hume1s
interest in the affairs of the Church is indicated by such
•'■Letters. I, £l8. betters, II, 321.
^Quoted by Greig in Letters, II, 321.
^Letters, n, 50. ^Letters, II, 57.
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statements as these in his letters:
Tell Robertson, that the Compliment at the End of
General Conway's Letter to him was of my composing, with¬
out any Orders from him. He smild when he read it; but
said it was very proper, and signed it. These are not
bad puffs from Ministers of State, as the silly World
goes.1
... I learn that Willie Robertson is Candidate for
the Office of Procurator to the Kirk. How I lament my
Absence at so critical a time 1 Yet I aliow you to employ
my Hame and Interest, in all Sollicitations with the Mem¬
bers of the Assembly, which will, I^hope, have the same
effect as my personal Applications.
Hume's dealings with the Moderates were always cor¬
dial, and the inner circle of liberal divines remained his
good friends from the early 1750's throughout his life. Moss-
ner characterizes the relationship thus:
[[The Moderates]} helped to fight Hume's battles when he
was attacked by the bigots; and he, when in government
office, gave them his official patronage snd, alp/ays, the
weight of his prestige and influence. It was, to a con¬
siderable extent, their comaraderie that rendered Edin¬
burgh agreeable to Hume during the latter part of his
life, when alien forces were seeking to render it un¬
comfortable for him or even to drive him out.3
Hume as an Historian
While Hume was living in Edinburgh and held the posi¬
tion of Librarian to the Faculty of Advocates, he began to
compose his History of Great Britain. The first volume, which
dealt with the Stuarts, raised a storm of disapproval. Hume
could not help feeling discouraged. It seemed to him that his
works had utterly failed to advance the cause of truth; every¬
thing he attempted (except the Essays) met with the attacks of
1Letters, II, ikl. betters, II, 321.
^Mossner, The Life of David Hume, p. 278.
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blind prejudice. Writing in his autobiography concerning the
initial failure of the History, Hume admits:
I was, I own, sanguine in my Expectations of the Success
of this work. I thought, that, I was the only Historian,
that had at once neglected present Power, Interest, and
Authority, and the Cry of popular Prejudices; and as the
Subject was suited to every Capacity, I expected propor¬
tional Applause: But miserable was my Disappointment: I
was assailed by one Cry of Reproach, Disapprobation, and
even Detestation: English, Scotch, and Irish; Whig and
Tory; Churchman and Sectary, Free-thinker and Religionist;
Patriot and Courtier united in their Rage against the
Man, who had presumed to shed a generous Tear for the Fate
of Charles I, and the Earl of Strafford: And after the
first Ebullitions of this Fury were over, what was still
more mortifying, the Book seemed to sink into Oblivion.
Mr Millar told me, that in a twelvemonth he sold only
forty five Copies of it. I scarcely indeed heard of
one man in three Kingdoms, considerable for Rank or Letters,
that cou'd endure the Book. I must only except the Pri¬
mate of England,Dr Herring, and the Primate of Ireland,
Dr Stone; which seem two odd Exceptions. These dignifyed
Prelates separately sent me Messages not to be discouraged.
Although Hume was in deep despair, he kept working upon the
History with the result that the second volume met with fair
success. But again, this was only momentary good fortune,
for the two final volumes were not well received.
Apparently Hume did not at first believe that his
criticisms of religion had an appreciable influence in stop¬
ping the sale of Volume I. Before publication he claimed to
be impartial in his presentation and informed a friend:
A Few Christians (and but a few) think I speak like a
Libertine in religion: be assured I am tolerably reserved
on this head. Eliiot tells me that you had entertained
apprehensions of my discretion: what I had done to for¬
feit with you the character of prudence, I cannot tell,
but you will see little or no occasion for any such im¬
putation in this work. I composed it ad op-pulum as well
as clerum, and thought, that scepticism was not in its
place in an historical production.^
^-Letters. I, k. ^Letters, I, 189
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When Baillie Hamilton suggested to Hume "that the Stop in the
Sale of my History proceeded from some Strokes of Irreligion,
which had raisd the Cry of the Clergy against me,"1 he was taken
completely by surprise. Hume argued that the "Baillie's com¬
plaint must have proceeded from his own Misconduct, that the
Cause he assigned coud never have produced that Effect, that
it was rather likely to encrease the Sale, according to all
past Experience; that you {Andrew Millar] had offerd (as I
heard) a large Sum for Bolingbroke's Works, trusting to this
Consequence; and that the Strokes complaind of were so few
& of such small Importance, that, if any ill Effects coud have
been apprehended from them, they might easily have been re-
trenchd.
Critics seized upon two short passages in Volume I of
the History. The first dealt with the early Protestant Re¬
format ion- -which Hume characterized as exhibiting enthusiasm
and fanaticism--and the second dealt with the Roman Catholic
Church—which he called "Romish Superstition." Hume was antagon¬
istic to the Church of Rome because of its fostering of super¬
stition among the people, licentiousness among the priests
and intolerance towards all who valued freedom of thought.
The excesses of fanaticism, like those of superstition, Hume
considered as causing cruel disturbances in the body politic;
therefore, he condemned them on grounds of social utility. On
the basis of these passages, Hume's entire historical work
was stigmatized as irreligious or even atheistical. The tone
-'-Letters, I, 2^9. betters, I, 2li9-2£0.
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°f the History was indeed one of the grounds on which Hume
was attacked in the ecclesiastical courts."*"
Of the refutations of the History appearing during
2
Hume's lifetime one stands out as of particular interest for
our study. The Reverend Daniel MacQueen in Letters on Mr Hume's
History of Great Britain (1756) agreed more or less with Hume's
strictures on the Roman Catholic Church; if anything, he
thought them not severe enough. But MacQueen was alarmed by
the charges against Presbyterian enthusiasm. He refused to
allow that Protestantism and enthusiasm are identical. He
proposed "candid and calm debate" and proceeded to set forth
his complaint against Hume's "indecent excursions on the sub¬
ject of religion, the genius of the Protestant faith, and the
characters of the first reformers.MacQueen vindicated "the
right of private judgment in all matters of religion," with
the rejection of "splendour and glittering pomp of worship"
■*-See Infra, pp. 272ff.
^William Rose briefly commented on the two passages
in the March 1755 issue of the Monthly Review. When Hume
published the second volume, John Brown brought out in 1757
the lamenting and denunciatory tirade which was noted above.
L3ee supra, p. 9*] This fierce attack was virtually ignored
by Hume who said, "I doubt not but I coud easil?/ refute Dr
Brown; but as I had taken a Resolution never to have the least
Altercation with these Fellows, I shall not readily be brought
to pay any Attention to him: ... I fancy Brown will find it
difficult Matter to perswade the Public that I do not speak my
Sentiments in every Subject I handle, & that I have any View
to any Interest whatsoever. I leave that to him and his Gang:
for he is a Flatterer, as I am told, of that low Fellow, War-
burton. And any thing as low as Warburton, or his Flatterers, I
shoud certainly be ashamed to engage with. "[Letters, I, 2507]
^Daniel MacQueen, Letters on Mr. Hume's History of
Great Britain (Edinburgh: A. Kincaid 5; A. Donaldson, 175bT, p. li.
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and claimed for the Reformed faith deliverance of men from the
"delusion of an over-heated imagination."
This formal criticism of the History received Hume's
attention and MacQueen must be given credit for inducing him
to modify his references to religion. The more offensive pas¬
sages concerning the reformers and their beliefs disappeared
and the two controversial passages were deleted from the second
edition in 1759* Hume agreed that he had been needlessly im¬
polite;
I am convinced that whatever I have said of religion
should have received some more softenings. There is no
passage in the History which strikes in the least at
revelation. But as I run over all the sects successive¬
ly, and speak of each of them with some mark of disregard,
the reader, putting the whole together, concludes that I
am of no sect; which to him will appear the same thing as
the being of no religion.
Hume's suspicion of religion as a malignant force in human
affairs caused him to get the proportions of his picture wrong.
The vices stood out black and prominent and the virtues faded
until they could hardly be discerned at all.
In connection with Volume II of the History, Hume
drafted a preface in defence of his position. This appeared
in a shortened and toned-down version as a footnote in the
first editions but was omitted entirely in later ones.^ The
1Ibid. ^Letters, I, 237.
3̂Hume's friend, George Dempster, commenting on the note,
wrote in 1756 to Adam Ferguson: "Pray do you think this is a
sufficient justification for the liberties which Hume takes
almost at every turn with the religion of the ages whose his¬
tory he writes. It seems difficult for me (for me who dotes
upon David) to believe that he can have a great regard for even
the best mode of religion and the least extravagant, if we con¬
sider how destitute he is of that only support of it, Faith."
Greorge Dempster, Letters to Sir Adam Ferguson. 1756-1813, ed.
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suppressed preface lias value in the understanding of Hume on
both history and religion. It has been reproduced as follows
by Mossner:
It ought to be no matter of Offence, that in this
Volume, as well as in the foregoing, the Mischiefs which
arise from the Abuses of Religion, are so often mentioned
while so little in comparison Is said of the salutary
Consequences which result from true & genuine Piety. The
proper Office of Religion is to reform Men's Lives, to
purify their Hearts, to inforce.all moral Duties, & to
secure Obedience to the Laws & ^ivil Magistrates. 'While it
pursues these useful Purposes, its Operations, tho' in¬
finitely valuable, are secret & silent; and seldom come
under the Cognizance of History. That adulterate Species
of it alone, which inflames Paction, animates Sedition,
& prompts Rebellion, distinguishes itself on the open
Theatre of the World. Those unerefore who attempt to
draw Inferences disadvantageous to Religion from the
Abuses of it mentioned by Historians, proceed upon a very
gross & a very obvious Fallacy. For besides, that every¬
thing is liable to Abuse, & the best things the most so;
the beneficent Influence of Religion is not to be sought
for in History: That Principle is always the more pure &
genuine, the less figure it makes in those Annals of
Wars, & Politics, Intrigues, & Revolutions, Quarrels &
Convulsions, which It is the Business of an Historian to
record & transmit to Posterity.
It ought as little to be matter of Offence, that no
religious Sect is mentioned in this Work without being
expos'd sometimes to some Note of Blame and Disapproba¬
tion.. The frailties of our Nature mingle themselves with
everything, in which we are employ1d; and no human
Institution will ever reach Perfection. The Idea of an
Infinite Mind, the Author of the Universe seems at first
sight to require a Worship absolutely pure, simple, un¬
adorned; without Rites, Institutions, Ceremonies; even
without Temples, Priests, or verbal Prayer & Supplication;
Yet has this Species of Devotion been often found to de¬
generate into the most dangerous Fanaticism. When we
have recourse to the aid of the Senses & Imagination, in
James Fergusson (London, 1931-!-), p. 22^}
It was suggested that the note was omitted because
Hume considered it inconsistent with his real convictions.
[.See (S. J. Pratt), Supplement to the Life of David Hume, Esq.
(Ldndon: J. Bew, 1777), p. 20J
It is much more likely that the real reason for omission
of the note was that Hume, confronted on all sides by prejudice
and misunderstanding, finally gave up all hope of making his
contemporaries see the import of his thoughts on religion.
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order to adapt our Religion, in some degree to human
Infirmity; it is very difficult, & almost impossible, to
prevent altogether the Intrusion of Superstition, or
keep Men from laying too great Stress on the ceremonial
& ornamental Parts of their Worship. Of all the Sects,
into which Christians have been divided, the Church of
England seems to have chosen the most happy Medium; yet
will it undoubtedly be allowd, that during the Age, of
which these Volumes treat, there was a Tincture of Super¬
stition in the Partisans of the Hierarchy; as well as a
strong Mixture of Enthusiasm in their Antagonists. But
it is the Nature of the latter Principle soon to evaporate
and decay; A spirit of Moderation usually succeeds, in a
little time, to the Fervors of Zeal: And it must be ac-
knowledg'd, to the Honour of the present Presbyterians,
Independents, & other Sectaries of this Island, that they
resemble in little more but in Name their Predecessors,
who flourished during the civil Wars; 8s who were the
Authors of such Disorder. It woud appear ridiculous in
the Eyes of the judicious Part of Mankind to pretend that
even the first Reformers in most Countries of Europe,
did not carry Matters to a most violent Extreme, & were
not, on many Occasions, liable to the Imputation of Fana¬
ticism. Not to mention, that uncharitable Spirit, which
Accompanied Zealots of all kind, & which led the early
Reformers, almost universally, to inflict upon the Catho¬
lics, & on all who differed from them, the same Rigors,
of which they themselves so loudly complaind.^
In Hume's estimation, then, the proper function of
religion, as it exists In the modern world, is to purify the
heart by the inculcation of morality and to secure strict
obedience to the civil law. The thoughts expressed in the
preface and in the second Volume of the History give evidence
of the influence of the Moderates on Hume's thinking. He had
seen considerably more of Robertson, Blair, Jardine, and John
Home in the interval between the two publications. Greig sug¬
gests that although
Hume never consciously reviewed his prejudices against
the churches In the light of his increasing friendship
with the Moderate group, ... he could not but be In¬
fluenced unconsciously. His language when he now came
"4,:03sner, The Life of David Hume, pp. 306-307.
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to write about the various sects of Christianity was
accordingly more temperate and less ironical.1
Hume had not been entirely uncompromising in his treat¬
ment of religion even in the first volume of the History. It
was only when it became an obstruction to progress, and a
breeder of civil turmoil, that he vented his wrath on it. When
the actions of churchmen contributed to the cause of progress—
i.e., public tranquillity, material well-being, culture, and
virtue—Hume's attitude was both sympathetic and appreciative.
It is true that he condemned all out-bursts of popular "frenzy,"
as he called it; and he was ever on the alert to discover the
schemer behind the saint. He also lamented the tribute paid
to the memory of "pretended saints" while there was a lack of
regard for the man of genius and the wise legislator. But Hume
was open-minded enough to recognize that often the clergy
were the guardians of liberty and the protectors of society.
When he was not dealing with those individuals whom he regarded
as "enraged and fanatical reformers," Hume acknowledged that
"the precious spark of liberty had been kindled and was pre¬
served by the Puritans alone." "It Is to them that the English
2
owe the whole freedom of their constitution."
Despite concessions to the value of religion here and
there in the History, the work as a whole indicates the lack
of personal religiotis faith on Hume' s part. Consequently, he
1Greig, op. cit., p. 21?.
^David Hume, The History of England (New York & Ghicago:
Hooper, Clarke & Co., n.d.), III, 323.
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was unable to understand the workings of the religious mind
in history. Statements in connection with his treatment of
the execution of Archbishop Laud show how completely Hume had
reacted against the Calvinistic teaching of his early years.1
Even though his association with the Moderates lessened his
antipathy to churches and churchmen, he was still unable to
give Christianity a prominent place among the forces shaping
civilization. Proceedings in the ecclesiastical courts which
were directly concerned with Hume's teaching did not help mat¬
ters at all. In fact, Hume was driven further away from a
proper understanding of religious experience as a result of
attempts by the zealots to censure him.
Hume and the General Assembly
It is evident that quite apart from the first volume
of the History, and indeed prior to its publication, David
Hume was ill-treated by a goodly number of pious individuals
2
in Edinburgh. A restless feeling was stirring in religious
circles because of the sceptical and irreligious tendencies
manifested in Scotland. One author^describes this age as
1
lb id., IV, [|_10.
2
When Jaraine, Blair, and Robertson together with Adam
Smith and Alexander Wedderburn founded the Edinburgh Review in
1755, the most distinguished man of letters in Scotland--David
Hume--was excluded from the venture. There was fear that his
name would bring discredit on the Review and excite the pious
against it. His recent History of the Stuarts passed unnoticed
in its reviews. Q.lossner, The Life of David Hume, p. 338 J
3
John Campbell, The Lives of the Lord Chancellors and
Keepers of the Great Seal of England, from the earliest times
till the reign of King George IV (London: John Murray, 18U.7),
VI, 18.
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being in "a state of extraordinary ferment." Among Evangeli¬
cal men, Hume came to be suspected and feared; he was unreserved¬
ly denounced as an evil influence. His sceptical attitude was
resented with intense feeling and his association with the
Moderates was taken as an attempt to undermine the religious
earnestness for which the Scottish churchmen had been distin¬
guished from the time of the Reformation. In the eyes of the
Evangelicals Hume was the "arch-infidel"; to him they were the
type of zealots which he greatly despised and strongly opposed
in his writings. Hume was soon to be given fresh reason for
hating clergymen of this disposition.
with some of the writings of the period. In 1731 Henry Home,
Lord Karnes, published Essays on the Principles of Morality
and Natural Religion. The avowed purpose of the Essays was to
refute Hume's Philosophical Essays and to vindicate religion
or as the advertisement states: "to prepare the way for a
proof of the Deity." But the book excited the anger of the
zealots and Karnes was charged with infidelity. Antagonists
regarded his refutation as worthy of condemnation as well as
the argument which he attempted to refute."'" Hume aid Karnes,
being the chief individuals who had ventured to commit their
philosophical tenets to writing, were considered as the grand
"®"Hume saw the consequences of Karnes' Essays soon after
their publication and wrote to Michael Ramsay! "Have you seen
our Friend Harry's Essays? ... Philosophers must judge ofthe question; but the Clergy have already decided it, & say
he is as bad as me. Nay some affirm him to be worse, as
much as a treacherous friend is worse than an open Enemy."
The trouble began with efforts in the Church to deal
27k
apostles of infidelity. An attack, led by the Reverend George
Anderson,"*" was made against Karnes' Essays with the publication
in 175>3 of An Estimate of the Profit and Loss of Religion, Per¬
sonally and publicly stated: Illustrated with References to
Essays on Morality and Natural Religion. Although aimed pri¬
marily at Lord Karnes, this scurrilous production nevertheless
had much to say about "his assistant David Hume Esq." The
irascible, fiery Anderson attempted to brand with ecclesiastical
censure the writings of the two Humes. He stated his purpose
in writing An Estimate in the conclusion: "If religionists can
do atheists no good, it is a duty incumbent upon all who be¬
lieve in God the Father Almighty, to hinder these demented
men from doing harm to others." Anderson suggested how this
might be accomplished by proposing three questions for the
consideration of the ministers of the Church of Scotland:
I. Whether public teachers of atheism and infidelity
are to be continued and acknowledged members of their
church, or to be excommunicated?
II. Supposing that it is their opinion that such
ought to be excommunicated; whether the sentence ought to
be pronounced by an inferior, or by the supreme church-
judicature? The reason of this question is, that infidelity
is offensive to all christians, and atheism to all that
believe a God and a providence.
III. Which is best and most expedient, to take the case
of such doctors and teachers, residing w ithin their
"In 1755 Hume described this aged but vehement divine
to Allan Ramsay as "the godly, spiteful, pious, splenetic,
charitable, unrelenting, meek, persecuting, Christian, inhuman,
peace-making, furious Anderson, £whoJ[ is at present very hot
in pursuit of Lord Karnes. He has lately wrote to his son,
which they s ay i s a curiosity. He mentions his own great age,
which leaves him no hopes of being able long to survive the
condemnation of that atheistical, however just, judge. He
therefore leaves me as a legacy to his son, and conjures him,
as he expects his blessing, or the blessing of Heaven, never
to cease his pursuit of me till he bring me to condign punish¬
ment." [Letters. I, 221l-22£J]
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ecclesiastical Jurisdiction, immediately into judicial
consideration; or to delay for some time, (and how long?)
in hopes of their coming to themselves, and of their
spontaneous repenting and retracting their errors?^
The next assault came on May 23, 1755 with the
appearance of An Analysis of the Moral and Religious Sentiments
contained in the Writings of Sopho, and David Hume, Esq.; Address¬
ed to the consideration of the Reverend and Honourable Members
p
of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland. The Gen¬
eral Assembly is asked to consider:
... the public attack which in this country has of late
been made on the great principles and duties of natural
and revealed religion, in the works of DAVID HUME, Esq.;
and in the essays of an author who has been distinguished
by the name of SOPHO. . . . But as I am well assured, that
neither the art of the one, nor the power of the other,
will avail to overthrow those principles they so boldly
attack; so I am persuaded, that by neither will ye be
diverted from doing your duty; and your duty unquestion¬
ably it is, to give warning of the poison contained in
these volumes, and to testify to the whole Christian
world your abhorrence of such principles.->
Hume is charged with having maintained:
(1) All distinction betwixt virtue and vice is merely
imaginary. (2) Justice has no foundation further than it
contributes to public advantage. (3) Adultery is very
lawful, but sometimes not expedient. (If.) Religion and its
ministers are prejudicial to mankind, and will always be
Qleorge Anderson] , An Estimate of the Profit and Loss
of Religion, Personally and publicly stated: Illustrated with
Reference to Essays on Morality and Natural Religion (Edinburgh:
1753), PP. 339-391•
2
This pamphlet, usually attributed to Anderson, was
actually the work of the Reverend John Bonar, a member of the
Evangelical Party. See Mossner, The Life of David Hume, p. 3ll-l.
3 £john Bonar], An Analysis of the Moral and Religious
Sentiments contained in the Writings of Sooho, and David Hume,
Esq; Addressed to the consideration of the Reverend and
Honourable Members of the General Assembly of the Church of
Scotland (Edinburgh: 1755). p. 2.
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found either to run into the heights of superstition or
enthusiasm. (5) Christianity has no evidence of its being
a divine revelation. (6) Of all the modes of Christianity
Popery is the best, and the reformation from thence was
only the work of madmen and enthusiasts .3-
These charges were answered by Hugh Blair in Observa¬
tions upon a Pamphlet, intitled An Analysis of the Moral and
Religious Sentiments contained in the writings of Sooho, and
David Hume. Esq; £c.2 His comment on the treatment afforded
Hume is pertinent:
Were the author of the Analysis to meet with no greater
degree of candour than he has shewn to others; it were not
unnatural to conclude, from his extracts from Mr. Hume,
that his seal for religion was more affected than real.
Every fair reader must admit, and regret, that there are
to be found in the writings of this elegant Author some
principles by no means consistent with sound doctrine:
There was therefore no necessity for ascribing to him
positions which he does not advance, in order to support
the charge of irreligion against him.3
Blair contends:
Mr Hume's writings, to any candid reader, exhibit no de¬
fence of adultery; and are very far from containing any
principles of licentiousness. Justice demands this ack¬
nowledgment as due to an elegant and agreeable writer,
even though a Free-thinker; and it must at the same time
be observed, that it appears very like a contradiction
to accuse a man in one page of scepticism and infidelity,
and in the following page to tax him with an attachment
to Popery and superstition.
From the whole survey of this .Analysis, the misrepresen¬
tations and false quotations contained in it are evident.
• • • Lr
3-lb id. , quoted by Mossner, The Life of David Hume, p. 3l|-2.
O
This pamphlet is attributed to Blair by Alexander F.
Tyt1er, Memoirs of the Life and Writings of the Honourable Henry
Home of ICames. (Edinburgh: William Creech, 1807)» I, lit2.
[Hugh Blair]}, Observations unon a Pamphlet, Intitled An
Analysis of the Moral and Religious Sentiments contained in the
Writings of Sooho, and David Hume, Esq; he. (Edinburgh, 17Sf?),
pp. 22-23. " '
^Ibid., p. 27.
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Other pamphlets appeared intended to inflame the pub¬
lic mind against Hume. One by Andrew Moir was entitled The
Deist Stretched Uoon a Death-Bed; Or a Lively Portraiture of
a dying Infidel. Meantime the question of the infidelity of
Hume and Karnes had been referred to the Committee of Overtures
in the 175£ General Assembly. The Moderates skillfully headed
off a discussion and the Assembly contented itself with pass¬
ing a pious resolution, expressed in general terms:
The General Assembly of the Church of Scotland being
filled with the deepest concern on account of the prevalence
of Infidelity and Immorality, the principles whereof have
been to the Disgrace of our Age and Nation, so openly avowed
in several Books published of late in the Country and
which are but too well known amonst us do therefore
judge it proper and> necessary for them to express the
utmost abhorrence of those impious and infidel principles
which are subversive of all Religion Natural and Revealed
and have such pernicious Influence on life and morals,
and they do earnestly recommend it to all the Ministers
of this Church to exercise the Vigilance and to exert the
Zeale which becomes their Character, to preserve those
under their Charge from the Contagion of these abominable
Tenets, and to Stir up in them a Solicitous concern, to
guard against them, and^against the Influence of these who
are Infected with them.
The whole situation seemed to give Hume very little
disturbance, and he made light of it all. There is no men¬
tion of the proceedings in "My Own Life." His nonchalance
over the matter is indicated in a letter to Allan Ramsay:
They will not at once go to extremities with him
Karnes , and deliver him over to Satan, without any prepara¬
tion or precaution. They intend to make him be prayed for
in all the churches of Scotland during six months, after
which, if he do not give signs of repentence he is to be
held as anathema maranatha. . . . Meanwhile I am preparing
for the Day of Wrath, and have already bespoken a number of
1 quoted in Mossner, The Life of David Hume, p. 3I4.3
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discreet families who have promised to admit me after I
shall be excommunicated. . . .
. . . The last Assembly sat on me. They did not pro¬
pose to burn me, because they cannot. But they intend to
give me over to Satan, vhich they think they have the
power of doing. My friends, however, prevailed, and my
damnation is postponed for a twelvemonth. But next
Assembly will surely be upon me.l
Many, not content with the Assembly's general exhorta¬
tion against infidelity, pressed the instituting of a formal
process against David Hume. Again it was George Anderson who
led the campaign for excommunication by publishing Infidelity
a Proper Object of Censure (1756). The thesis of the pamphlet
is stated in the sub-title: "Wherein is shewn, The indispensible
Obligation that lies upon Church-rulers to exercise the Disci¬
pline instituted by Christ, upon such avowed Infidels as have
been solemnly initiated Members of the Christian Church by
Baptism; and, if irreclaimable, to cast them out of the Chris¬
tian Society." Anderson was persistent in his demands and
the zealots made a written overture for an inquiry into Hume's
infidelity. Anderson proposed that a committee be appointed
to inquire into the writings of Hume and that he be called be¬
fore them at the next Assembly. The overture read:
The General Assembly, judging it their duty to do all
in their power to check the growth and progress of infi¬
delity; and considering, that as infidel writings have
begun of late years to be published in this nation, against
which they have hitherto only testified in general, so
there is one person, styling himself David Hume, Bsq.,
who hath arrived at such a degree of boldness as publicly
to avow himself the author of books containing the most
rude and open attacks upon 'Sine glorious Gospel of Christ,
and principles evidently subversive even of natural reli¬
gion and the foundations of morality, if not establishing
direct Atheism; therefore the Assembly appoint the following
^•Letters, I, 22k.
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persons, - - - - , as a committee to inquire into the
writings of this author, to call him before them, and
prepare the matter for the next General Assembly.-'-
After a warm debate which lasted for two days, the
Moderates succeeded in suppressing the overture by a vote of
pO to 19 before it left the committee. Hume was strongly de¬
fended by Alexander Wedderburn who at this time delivered his
maiden speech before the Assembly.~ Wedderburn opened by
claiming extreme zeal for the "pure Presbyterian Church" and
then advised the Assembly to dismiss the overture and trust
to reason and Scripture for the refutation of Hume's errors
of conduct and faith. It was pointed out that many presbyters
had not read the writings in question, and those who had, did
not understand or agree upon the interpretation of them.
Therefore, they could not be properly judged.Furthermore, if
Hume were summoned to argue, the Assembly could not be certain
that he would not get the best of it. Wedderburn contended
that the opinions in question were already universally de¬
tested and could not injure any one's faith. To carry out
the overture would simply mean a process necessitating a
prolonged and arduous inquiry. There was even some question
about the justification of a punishment of metaphysical errors
just as if they were moral delinquencies. Wedderburn argued
that even if the charges were proven, nothing that the Assem¬
bly could do would be likely to convince Hume. A man who had
all along withstood the subtlest reasonings of philosophers
lporren, .Annals, II, 86-87.
2See John Campbell, op. cit., VI, 21-2^.
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and critics could not be forced to cry •oeccavi. If the Assem¬
bly were to pass the sentence of excommunication, Hume might
snap his fingers and the Church could do nothing. Civil
powers now refused to recognize this sentence and Hume could
not even be forced to compear. 'Thus, Wedderburn concluded,
no good purpose would be served by instituting a process
against him. His prosecution could have but one result,
namely, the increased sale of his books.
As a lawyer Wedderburn raised the question of the
Assembly's right of jurisdiction in this affair. It was
asserted that Hume did not even call himself a Christian..
Why are you to summon him before you ptfedderburn con¬
tended] more than any Jew or Mohometan who may happen
to be travelling within your bounds? Your libel, as we
lawyers call it, is ex facie inept, irrelevant, and null,
for it begins by alleging that the defender denies and
disbelieves Christianity, and then it seeks to proceed
against him and to punish him as a Christian. ... For
these reasons I move "That while all the members of the
General Assembly have a'just abhorrence of any doctrines
or pr inciples tending to infidelity or t o the prejudice
of our holy religion, that they drop the overture anent
Mr David Hume, because it would not, in their judgment,
minister to edification.
Discussion seemed to turn on the question whether Hume was a
Christian and amenable to the Courts of the Church. Those
demanding a trial denied that he was outside the pale of the
Church and not a subject for censure. The Evangelicals
reminded the Assembly that he had been baptized by the Church
and had never renounced his baptism. It was alleged that he
frequently spoke in his books of "our holy religion." A
further proof that Hume was still under the Assembly's
1Ibid.
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jurisdiction was the fact that professing Christians were
known to hold voluntary communion with him, which it was evi¬
dent they would not do if he were no Christian.
An account of the debates in the Committee of Over¬
tures was made public in the June, 17^6 issue of the Scots
Magazine. In response to this prejudiced article, Robert
Wallace composed his own account. He stated that he "was
clearly of the opinion that those who contended against the
Churches meddling in this matter had by far the better in the
Debate.""'" This pamphlet gives the personal views of Wallace
on the debate. He intended to give the public a more distinct
view of the matter and to correct the mistakes of the Scots
Magazlne reviewer, whom he believed to follow Anderson. "The
whole debate," Wallace claims, "turned on the necessity or
expediency of inquiring into the writings of Mr Hume or call¬
ing the author before the Church Courts." The problem, then,
became one of deciding whether Hume was capable of edification
and whether proceedings should be instigated against him in
particular.
Wallace Indicates that the Moderates regarded the
exercise of discipline against those who taught false or
pernicious doctrines a means of edification and not a punishment.
■""Robert Wallace, "The necessit;/ or expediency of the
churches inquiring into the writings of David Hume ""squire and
calling the Author to answer before the spiritual Courts. Con¬
sidered with some reflections on Christians being occasionally
in company with scepticall or Infidel Writers; In which there
are some animadversions on the account in the Scotch Magazine
for June, 175>6, of the Debates in the Committee of overtures
of^the General! Assembly 175>8 concerning these subjects."
Lainp; Ilanuscripts, II, 97» Edinburgh University Library.
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They considered David Hume insusceptible of edification on
the subject of religion. Public censure would not in any
way change the mind of this subtle, sceptical philosopher.
Wallace reasoned that if the doctrine of church censure is
valid,then Hume should not be singled out for investigation,
lie asks:
'Why do not the Gentlemen who insist on this argument act
impartially and carry it the full length it ought to go?
Is he the only man who deserves such correction? . . .
Are there not many criminalls in higher & lower life,
vitious, immoral, and abandoned in their lives, Drunkards,
revellers, whore-mongers, adulterers, containers of
Christian worship, dispisers of Christian Piety, open
supporters of impious, lewd, and immoral Principles in
Companies? . . . 'Why will they not therefore exercise
Discipline impartially against all who in the abstract
deserve high Censures according to the Christian, law,
or will the:/ stop short att David Hume and a few calm,
contsnplative, wronghead writers?-1-
Wallace agreed that in one sense Hume, having never formally
renounced his baptism, was still within the church; but,
practically, he had done so in his writings. By his public
utterances Hume had in effect already separated himself from
the church, and "there con be no necessity nor advantage in
ejecting such persons by a formall judgement." Technically.
speaking, the church had lost its prerogative of questioning
him.
Mossner thinks that "what especially piqued Wallace in
the Hume affair of 175>6 was the holier-than-thou attitude on
the part of the rigidly righteous that a Christian minister
must never so much as be seen in the company of unbelievers."^
1Ibid.
2Mossner, The Forgotten Hume, p. 119. (cf. Mossner, The
Life of David Hume" pp. 35>0-35l*J
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Wallace was particularly disturbed by what he describes as the
"impotent Sj ridiculous attack" upon the good character of cer¬
tain clergymen "that they had been seen accidentally standing
in the streets with Mr Hume or had been known to have been in
companies where he was present, especially as this Gentleman,
with all his errors, is confessed to be a very honest and bene¬
volent man in common life & entertaining in Conversation."
Wallace avers that we need to distinguish between the immorality
of the dissolute individual and the mistaken arguments of a
serious thinker. Furthermore, he urges that
The clergy need not be affraid to encounter Gentlemen of
this sort £i.e., serious thinkers]] be they ever so scep-
ticall or heterodox. If we suppose that they are rather
wrongheaded than wronghearted, that in their enquiries
Into nature & Philosophy they have been led into mistakes
by some unlucky train of thinking, that ihey are far from
rejoicing in such mistakes, that they secretly lament
(which I know well is the case with some); if we suppose
that they look upon themselves as unfortunate on this very
account & are sorry they cannot have the same confortable
view of nature and providence with other Gentlfemen; if
they are disposed to converse on these subjects with
learned & ingenious men, 'twer pity to debarr them from
the company of any of the Clergy with whom they would
wish to converse.2
This passage indicates that Wallace had an insight into Hume's
character and thinking on the subject of religion. If Hume
knew of the defense made in his behalf, he might well have
repeated his remark of a former time: "Mr Wallace's Conduct
has been very noble & generous; & I am much oblig'd to him.
The Wallace pamphlet provides valuable information
concerning an interesting episode in Hume's life and shows the
•'"Wallace, "The necessity or expediency of the churches
inquiring into the writings of David Hume ";c. . . ."
2 Ibid ^See supra, p. 2^7
28^
fairness and magnanimity of Wallace and the Moderates in the
affair. After considerable debate the Moderates emerged
victorious, convincing the committee that there was no pro¬
priety in proceeding against David Hume. The process was
dismissed, the matter dropped, and he escaped the dangerous
consequences of a clerical inquisition and church censure.
Prudent reserve was maintained in the exercise of ecclesiasti¬
cal authorit?/, and the Moderates vindicated freedom of thought
in the field of literature. Anderson, however, was indefati¬
gable and unrelenting. As he found Hume and Karnes above his
reach, he resolved to proceed against humbler persons and
lodged a complaint against Fleming, Kincaid, and Donaldson,
the printers and publishers of Karnes' book. Ten days before
the meeting of the Presbytery of Edinburgh, the aged Anderson-
died, and the case was dismissed. By this time the pious
Evangelicals had found another affair to consider,—the case
of a Moderate clergyman, the Reverend John Home, who had
written a play, and of Moderate clergymen who had compromised
themselves by attending the public performances. The case of
David Hume and Lord Karnes was allowed to lag and the new
campaign involved them only indirectly.*''
✓
Resume
Opposition from clergymen and religious individuals
accompanied Hume's successes in the realms of literature and
public service. During the period of his life between 17ii5
See infra, pp.297-302,
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and 1757, Hume continued to be concerned with the problem of
religion. He indicates his antagonism towards religious en¬
thusiasts in a pamphlet written in behalf of his friend, Archi¬
bald Stewart. In the Enquiry concerning the Human Understanding,
religious questions are explicitly discussed. In the essays
"Of Miracles" and "Of a Particular Providence and of a Future
State," Hume makes it clear that he opposes a rationalistic
treatment both of religion and of science. Deism is attacked
and shown to rest on the feeble basis of mere reason. 3y
means of the sceptical and critical method of the Enquiry,
he attempts to clear the way for a science and religion based
on human belief; faith, not reason, is the foundation of
scientific and religious knowledge. Even the argument from
design fails to give the kind of Deity required to satisfy
the emotional nature of man.
The publication of these thoughts on religion brought
Hume notoriety and the antagonism of many of the people with¬
in the Church. They considered him a destroyer of religious
faith and morality, and Christian apologists began to think
it necessary to bring out refutations of Ms irreligious
principles. Hume's antipathy towards ministers was apparent
in the Bellmen's Petition, and such anti-clerical zeal was a
contributing factor in Ms failure to acquire an academic
position in the University of Glasgow. Misunderstandings
of his ideas and frustrations of his aspirations caused by
opposition for religious reasons, caused Hume to begin the
composition of the Dialogues. Up to this time he had said
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very little about his own attitude towards divine realities.
Now, with changes of infidelity, deism, and atheism facing
him, he made an effort to eliminate the suspicions surround¬
ing him. But even in this attempt he was foiled by his
friends' advice against making his thoughts public.
Hume acquired the position of Librarian of the Faculty
of Advocates, but not without a fight from the zealots. Friend¬
ship with a number of the Edinburgh Moderates benefitted him
greatly and doubtlessly helped to influence him in the modi¬
fication of his views on religion in the History, in which he
had severely criticized Roman Catholicism and Presbyterianism
for causing disturbances in society. His correspondence with
these ministers gives valuable information concerning his own
attitude towards religion and the church. Hume agreed with
the Moderates on the matter of church polity and argued for
patronage in the Bellmen's Petition. When he held a place
of authority in the government, he gave his assistance to
these men. For him, as for them, the proper function of
religion was the inculcation of morality and the securing of
strict obedience to the civil lav/. Under the influence of
the Moderates, Hume's statements on religion and clergymen
became more temperate and less ironical in his later works.
It appears that Hume's lack of a personal religious
faith made it difficult for him to understand the thoughts
and actions of religious men, although he now and then praised
clergymen who contributed to the cause of social progress.
Consequently, he was prejudiced against Christianity as a
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force for good in the world. The deep conflict between Hume
and the Church of Scotland, between Hume and religion, came
to a head when the evangelical Party attempted to censure
him; here was fresh reason for hating religious zealots.
The incidents in the court proceedings of the General Assembly
provide information for estimating the influences affecting
Hume's attitude towards religion. Persecution by bigots was
a vital circumstance preventing him from ever arriving at a
real understanding of the religious affairs of others. His
experience with the Church and the clergy and with religious
individuals in general sufficed to make him a sceptic in this
direction and aroused an antagonism towards religion which
he never sticceeded in overcoming.
CHAPTER VI
DAVID HUME - DISTINGUISHED WORLD CITIZEN, 1757-1776
Introduction
After the publication of the essay "Of Miracles" in
171l8, Hume continued during the 1750' s to work out the various
applications of his philosophical principles in the religious
realm. Due to the widespread opposition to his thought, he
had difficulty in making public his philosophical and psycho¬
logical investigations in the field of religion. In this
final chapter we intend to point out Hume's attitude towards
religion as it is manifested in his works of these years. He
makes some of his most explicit statements on the subject in
the "Natural History of Religion" and the posthumous Dialogues
Concerning Natural Religion. A perusal of these two works,
which contain his most comprehensive and important contribu¬
tions to the study of religion, aids in a proper understanding
of his basic religious attitude.
As a distinguished world citizen, David Hume resided
in Paris from 1763 to 1766, in London from 17&7 1768, and
in Edinburgh from 1769 until his death in 1776. Some considera¬
tion will be given to events of religious significance which
occurred during these periods of his life. Relative to these
years a number of anecdotes were recorded having to do with
the disposition and social character of Hume. Many such
stories concern his feelings about religion. Very few of these
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have been included in this thesis because of the difficulty
involved in establishing their veracity. Attention has been
centered primarily on circumstances which are well substantiated.
Publication of Four Dissertations
In the year 1755 Hume wrote Andrew Millar:
There are four short Dissertations, which I have kept
some Years by me, in order to polish them as much as
possible. One of them is that which Allan Ramsay mentioned
to you. Another of the Passions; a third of Tragedy; a
fourth, some Considerations previous to Geometry & Natural
Philosophy.1
These four dissertations were probably composed sometime be¬
tween 17br9 and 1751 • "Of "the Passions" is a brief reworking
of the second book of the Treatise. "Of Tragedy" is simply a
short essay on the aesthetic problem of why grief in art is
enjoyable. The "Considerations on Geometry and Natural Philoso¬
phy," presumably a reworking of Book I, Part II, of the Treatise,
was never printed, and "Of the Standard of Taste" was finally
substituted after two other essays--"Of Suicide" and "Of the
Immortality of the Soul"—were suppressed. Having undergone
revisions, the "Natural History of Religion"—the essay "Which
Allan Ramsay mentioned"--appeared with the other three in 1757.
Friendly pressure as well as intimidation from official
sources brought about the suppression of the two essays "Of
Suicide" and "Of the Immortality of the Soul," which were
already in print when Hume sent orders to Millar for their
p
cancellation. Hume's own account of the episode appeared In
^Letters, I, 223.
^For a detailed discussion of the suppression see S.C.
Mossner, "Hume's Four Dissertations: An Essay in Biography,"
in Modern hllolo—, XLVII (1950). 17-37.
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a letter dated January 25>, 1772, to William Straham:
... I am told by a Friend, that Dr Millar said to him,
that there was a Bookseller in London, who had advertisd
a new Book, containing, among other things, two of my
suppress'd Essays. These I suppose are two Essays of
mine, one on Suicide another on the Immortality of the
Soul, which were printed by Andrew Millar about seventeen
Years ago, and which from my abundant Prudence I suppress'd
and would not now wish to have revivd. I know not if you
were acquainted with this Transaction. It was this: I in¬
tended to print four Dissertations, the natural History of
Religion, on the Passions, on Tragedy, and on the meta¬
physical Principles of Geometry. I sent them up to Mr
Millar; but before the last was printed, I happend to meet
with Lord Stanhope, who was in this Country, and he con¬
vinced me, that either there was some Defect in the Argu¬
ment or in its perspicuity; I forget which; and I wrote
to Mr Millar, that I would not print that Essay; but upon
his remonstrating that the other Essays would not make a
Volume, I sent him up thdse two, which I had never intended
to have publishd. They were printed; but it was no sooner
done than I repented; and Mr Millar and I agreed to suppress
them at common Charges, and I wrote a new-^Essay on the
Standard of Taste, to supply their place.
At one time there was, in the Advocates' Library in
Edinburgh, a bound copy of the proof-sheets of "Five Disser¬
tations" to which had been added a note, signed "A. R." and
believed to have been written by Allan Ramsay. T. H. Grose
apparently saw this document when he was preparing his "His¬
tory of the Editions" prefixed to Volume I of the Green and
Grose edition of The Philosophical Works of David Hume. The
note read in part: "This book contains a piece of Mr D. Hume's
of which there is, I believe, but another copy existing. Having
printed the volume as it here stands, Mr Hume was advised by a
friend to suppress the Dissertation upon Suicide; which he
accordingly did." Ramsay's testimony indicates that the
III, k7f.
1Letters, II, 2^2-2^3.
^Quoted by T. H. Grose, in Philosophical "orks of Hume,
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suppression took place in two stages, "Of Suicide" preceding
"Of the Immortality of the Soul" and that it was undertaken by
Hume voluntarily after friendly persuasion.
Information from other sources gives a different side
of the story. Hints of the suppression had reached Scotland
as early as June, 175>6 and were recorded by the Reverend
George Ridpath in his diary: "Robert Turnbull ... confirmed
what Brown had before been telling me, that David Hume had got
printed at London a Collection of Atheism which his bookseller
Andrew Millar dares not sell.""'" In a letter written December
7, 1776 to Mrs. Elizabeth Montague, James Seattle made the
following statement: "I know that Mr Hume printed two Essays,
many years ago, one to prove the lawfulness of suicide, and
the other to evince the mortality of the soul. These Essays
were printed; but suppressed by the Bookseller, in consequence
2
of a threatening message from the Lord Chancellor Hardwicke."
A writer in the Gentleman's Magazine for July, 1777, remarks,
"If report says true, and sometimes it does, the Essay/ on
Suicide had been published, and was suppressed by public author-
3
ity." More details are given in a later issue of this same
periodical:
These Essays C'Of Suicide" and "Of the Immortality
of the Soul"J it is well known, were printed and advertised
•'■George Ridpath, Diar" of George Ridoath, ed. Sir
James Balfour Paul (Edinburgh, 1922), p. 73.
2
Beattie MSS, Aberdeen University Library, Quoted by
Mossner, "Hume's Four Dissertations." p.'39b.
3"A Sketch of the Life of David Hume, Esq." in Gentle¬
man' s Magazine, LXVII (1777), 326.
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by Mr Millar, with, some others by Mr Hume, near thirty
years ago; but before the day of publication, being in¬
timidated by threats of a prosecution, the bookseller
called in some copies that he had dispersed, cancelled
the two Essays, and (with difficulty) prevailed on Mr
Hume to substitute some others less obnoxious.1
Further valuable evidence of public intimidation comes
from the letters of William Warburton, who had been vexing
Hume ever since 171-1-9• Warburton's unprinted letter of February
llj., 175>6, to the Reverend Thomas Balguy provides the earliest
known reference to the suppression:
Hume has printed a small Vol: which is suppressed, &
perhaps forever,—on the origin of Religion, on the Pas¬
sions, on su.icide, & on the immortality. The Vol. was
put into my hands & I found it as abandoned of all
virtuous principle, as of all philosophic force.--I be¬
lieve he was afraid of a prosecution, & I believe he
would have found one: For the Attorney is now in a dis¬
position to support the religious principles of Society,
and with vigour.—He finds a generou.3 connivance, in¬
famously abused--and the other day he told me, he was g
going to support defend us.— I said it was, high time.
Warburton's version is substantiated by William Rose, one of
the editors of the Monthly Review:
The Writer of this article knows that the essays here
mentioned D'Of Suicide" and "Of the Immortality of the
Soul "J were written by Mr. Hume. That almost thirty 7/ears
ago they m.ade a part of a volume, which was publicly
advertised to be sold by Mr. Millar; that, before the day
fixed for publication, several copies were delivered to
some of the Author's friends, who were impatient to see
whatever came from his pen; that a noble Lord, still living
threatened to prosecute Mr. Millar, if he published the
essays now before us; that the Author, like a bold veteran,
in the cause of infidelity, was not in the least intimi¬
dated by this menace, but that the poor bookseller was
terribly frightened, to such a degree, that he called in
all the copies he had delivered, cancelled the two essays,
•'•Ibid., LIV (173Il), 607.
2
Ouoted by Mossner, "Hume's Four Dissertations," o.
)i.O a 1 b. Also in The Life of David Hume, p. 323.
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and with some difficulty, prevailed upon Mr. Hume to
substitute some other pieces in the room of those ob¬
jected to by the noble Lord; that, by some means or
other, however, a few copies got abroad, and have been
clandestinely circulated. . . .
2
In suppressing "the two obnoxious Dissertations,"
3
and toning down some parts of the "Natural History of ReLigion,"
Hume acted with characteristic wisdom and prudence. He de¬
sired neither unpleasant notoriety nor martyrdom, and it was
at this time that the General Assembly was contemplating
the possible investigation of David Hume as an infidel writer.
If the "Five Dissertations" had been suppressed by public order
In London, the Scottish Highflyers would have had significant
testimony against him, and it would have been difficult, if not
impossible, for his Moderate friends to defend him. For these
reasons, it was not too difficult to persuade Hume to give in.
The publication of the altered work was prudently delayed un¬
til the beginning of 17,3? at which time he wrote Adam Smith:
I have got down a few copies of my Dissertations lately
publish'd at London; & shall send you one by the first
Glasgow waggon. I beg of you to do me the Favor of
accepting this Trifle. You have read all the Disserta¬
tions in Manuscript; but you will find that on the natural
History of Religion somewhat amended in point of Prudence.
I do not apprehend, that it will much cncrease the Clamour
apainst me.k
Hume was still concerned about the nroceedings of one
General Assembly against him and asked Smith:
Did you ever hear of such Madness & Folly as our Clergy
have lately fallen Into? For my Part, I expect that the
William Rose, Article in Monthly Review, LXX (173k),
^Letters., I, ^Letters, I, 2k£. ^Letters, I, 2k£.
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next Assembly will very solemnly pronounce the Sentence
of Excommunication against me: But I do not apprehend ^
it to be a Matter of any Consequence. What do you think?
Hume expected further attention from the Church courts, and
for some time deplored the restrictive attitude of his native
countrymen towards men of letters. In 1759 li© made the follow¬
ing statement to Adam Smith: "Scotland suits my Fortune best,&
is the Seat of my Principal Friendships; but it is too narrow
a Place for me, and it mortifies me that I sometimes hurt my
p
Friends." Here was a sober evaluation of the facts; Hume de¬
sired to live in tranquillity in Edinburgh, but religious bigots
made it increasing difficult for him and his friends.
Prior to publication, a copy of Four Dissertations
came into the hands of William Warburton. Even with the omis¬
sion of the two essays and the revision of some passages of
the "Natural History of Religion," Warburton was not satisfied
and tried to influence Millar for a second suppression:
Sir, I supposed you would be glad to know what sort
of book it is which you are about to publish with Hume's
name and yours to it. The design of the first essay that
on natural religion is the very same with all Lord Boling-
brolce's, to establish naturalism, a species of atheism, in¬
stead of religion: and he employs one of Bolingbroke's
capital arguments for it. All the difference is, it is
without Bolingbroke's abusive language.
All the good his mutilation and fitting it up for the
public has done, is only to add to its other follies, that
of contradiction. He is establishing atheism; and in one
single line of a long essay professes to believe Christian¬
ity. All this I shall show in a very few words in a proper
occasion.
In the meantime, if you think you have not money enough,
and can satisfy your conscience, you will do well to publish
it; for there is no doubt of the sale among a people so
feverish, that to-day they burn with superstition, and to¬
morrow freeze with atheism. But the day of the publication
^Letters, I, 2li6. ^Letters, I, 31^1
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and the fast day will be in admirable contrast to one
another.
I dare say yon knew nothing of the contents; but the
caution of poor Mr. K was admirable on a like occasion
with this very man, Hume. He wrote to Mr. K. to offer him
a copy, that had nothing to do with religion, as he said.
Mr. K. replied, that might be; but as he had given great
offence, and he (Mr. K.) was himself no judge of these
matters, he desired to be excused.
You have often told me of this man's moral virtues..
He may have many, for aught I know; but let me observe to
you, there are vices of the mind as well as of the body;
and I think a wickeder mind, and. more obstinately bent on
public mischief, I never knew.
Millar was not to be intimidated this time, and the book
finally appeared February 7> 1757. Warburton informed his
friend Richard Hurd:
There is an epidemic madness amongst us; today we
burn with the feverish heat of Superstition; tomorrow
we stand fixed and frozen in Atheism. Expect to hear that
the churches are all crowded next Friday; and that on
Saturday they buy up Hume's new Essays; the first of
which (and please you) is The natural History of Religion;
for which I will trim the rogue's jacket, at least sit
upon his skirts, as you will see when you come hither,
and find his margins .scribbled over. In a word, the Essay
is to establish an Atheistic naturo.lism, like Bolingbroke's
capital arguments, that Idolatry and Polytheism were before
the worship of one God. It is full of absurdities: and
here I come in with you; for they show themselves knaves:
but, as you will observe, to do their business, is to
shew them fools.
Warburton's answer took the form of a letter addressed
to himself, but Hurd had a considerable hand in the composi¬
tion. "/arburton, speaking of the work, wrote to Hurd:
It will make no more than a pamphlet; but you shall take
your own time, and make it your Summer's amusement, if
you will. I propose it to bear something like this title,
Remarks on Mr. Hume's late Essay, called the Hatural History
'"'arburton, Unpublished Papers, pp. 309-310.
Ô
'arburton, Letters from a Late Eminent Prelate, op.
233-239.
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of Religion, by a Gentleman of Cambridge, in a Letter to
the Rev. Dr. Warburton. . . . The address will remove it
from me: the author, a Gentleman of Cambridge, from you;
and the secrecy in printing, from us both.3-
The pamphlet is full of abusive language and speaks of Hume
as "a puny Dialectician from the North . . . who came to the
, 2
attack with a beggarly troop of routed sophisms.!! It is
remembered today solely as causing Hume's famous retort in
"My Own Life," concerning the publication ox oiie "Nattxral
History of Religion."
Its pxiblic Entry was rather obscure, except only that Dr
Hurd wrote a Pamphlet against it, with all the illiberal
Petulance, Arrogance, and Scurrility, which distinguishes
the V/arburtonian School. This Pamphlet gave me some con¬
solation for the otherwise indifferent Reception of my
Performance.3
A recent biographer of 7/arburton concurs in this judgment
against him:
When wu read these contemptuous words today, and contrast
the influence that the writings of the two men [Hume and
Warburton] have had upon the opinions of mankind it is
almost impossible to understand how Warburton could have
adopted an attitude of arrogant superiority so ludicrously
1
lb 1d., pp. 2k0-2)xl.
^William Warburton and Richard IiurcQ, Remarks on Mr.
David Hume's Essay on the natural History of Religion in the
Works of the Right Reverend William Warburton, D. D. (London:
T. Cadell and W. Davies, 1611), XII, 3^1-376.
3
Letters, I, 5>. Hear the close of his life Hume
wrote of Warburton that "He and all his gang, the most
scurrilous, arrogant, and impudent Fellows in the World, have
been abusing me in their usual style these twenty Years. . ..
It is petulance, and Insolence and abuse, that distinguish
the Warburtonian School, even above all other Parsons and
Theologians. Johnson is abusive in Company, but falls much
short of them in his writings. I remember Lord Mansfield
said to me that 7/arburton was a very opposite man in company
to what he is in his Books; then, replyd I, he must be the
most agreeable companionin Europe, for surely he is the most
odious riter." [Letters, II, 2ldi7J
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unwarranted. The only explanation is his manifest sin¬
cerity.!
Hume saw through the anonymity of the attack and
2
linked together the names of Hurd and Warburton. He deter¬
mined with himself not to answer their objections and wrote
William Strahan:
I am positive not to reply a single Word to Dr Hurd;
and I also beg of you not to think of it. His Artifices
or Forgeries, call them which you please, are such common
things in all Controversy that man woud be ridiculous who
woud pretend to complain of them; and the Parsons in
particular have got a License to practice them. I there¬
fore beg of you again to let the Matter pass over in
Silence.3
Hume summarizes his position in the matter in a letter to
Andrew Miliar:
As to my Opinions, you know I defend none of them
positively: I only propose my Doubts, where I am so un¬
happy as not to receive the same Conviction with the rest
of Mankind. It surprizes me much to see any body, who
pretends to be a man of Letters, discover .Anger on that
Account; since it is certain, by the Experience of all
Ages, that nothing contributes more to the Progress of
Learning than such Disputes & Novelties.
Apropos to Anger, I am positively assaird, that Dr
Warburton wrote that Letter to himself which you sent me;
and indeed the Style discovers him sufficiently. I shou'd
answer him; but he attacks so small a Corner of my Build¬
ing, that I can abandon it without drawing great Conse¬
quences after it. If he woud come into the Field, and
dispute concerning the principal Topics of my Philosophy,
I shou'd probably accept the Challenge. At present nothing
coud tempt me to take the Pen in hand, but Anger, of. which
I feel myself incapable, even pipon this Provocation.c-
One further feature of the publication of Four Disser¬
tations remains to be noticed--the dedication "To the Reverend
A. W. Evans, Warburton and the Warburtonians, A Study
in Some Eighteenth-Century Controversies (London: Oxford Univ-
versity Press, 1932), p. 21k.
^Letters, I, 5. ^Letters, I, 2p2. ^Betters, I, 265.
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Mr. Hume, Author of Douglas, a Tragedy." David Hume found
himself involved in a controversy raging in Scotland over the
activities of the Reverend John Home as an author of plays
and a frequenter of playhouses. The Edinburgh Evangelicals
furiously opposed all drama as a delusion of Satan and began
to criticize Home for composing the tragedy Douglas. His
opponents demanded punishment for his blasphemous play and
"formal accusations v;ere instituted in Edinburgh, not only
against John Home, but also against Alexander Garlyle and
others for merely having attended performances.""'" Hume and
some of the Moderate clergy regarded the play as a wonderful
addition to dramatic literature. The Church became divided
over the issue and the two groups began to assail each other
with sermons and pamphlets. On the one side were the liberal-
minded and fashionable; on the other, the whole body of the
evangelical clergy supported by some of the civil authorities.
The Moderates were not entirely agreed as to the question of
Christians attending plays, but many of them extolled John
Home's Douglas. The zealots damned the play as blasphemous
and designated the stage as "satan's school.
A battle was on between the Highflyers and the Mod¬
erates. 'The controversy involved David Hume in two ways;
first, as the literary patron of John Home; and second, as the
^Mossner, The Life of David Hume, p. 3^0.
2Mathieson, The Awakening of Scotland, p. l63jr. See
John Ifitherspoon, "a Serious Inquiry into the Nature and Effects
of the Stage," in The Works of John Witherspoon (Edinburgh:
Ogle & Aikman; J. Pillans & Sons; J. Ritchie; and J. Turnbull,
l80k-l80p), VI, 3I4.-I28.
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intimate and supposedly "infidel" friend of a number of the
Moderate ministers. Not being personally concerned with the
Church's turmoil, Hume could maintain a detached attitude.
But he resented the treatment meted out to John Home and
rushed publicly to Home's defense by dedicating the Four
Dissertations to him. The dedication was an attack upon in¬
tolerance and narrow-mindedness as expressed in the Scottish
ministers who objected to plays on religious pounds and in the
English producers who had refused to stage the Douglas in
London. Hume writes:
It was the practice of the antients to address their
compositions only to friends and equals, and to render
their dedications monuments of regard and affection, not
of servility and flattery. In those days of ingenuous
and candid liberty, a dedication did honour to the person
to whom it was addressed, without degrading the author.
If any partiality appeared towards the patron, it was at
least the partiality of friendship and affection.
/mother instance of true liberty, of which antient
times can alone afford us an example, is the liberty of
thought, -which engaged men of letters, however different
in their abstract opinions, to maintain a mutual friend¬
ship and regard; and never to quarrel about principles,
while they agreed in inclinations and manners. Science
was often the subject of disputation, never of animosity.
I have been seized with a strong desire of renewing
these laudable practices of antiquity, by addressing the
following dissertations to you, my good friend: For such
I will ever call and esteem you, notwithstanding the oppo¬
sition, which prevails between us, with regard to many of
our speculative tenets. These differences of opinion I
have only found to enliven our conversation; while our
common passion for science and letters served as a cement
to our friendship. I still admired your genius, even
when I imagined, that you lay under the influence of preju¬
dice; and you sometimes told me, that you excused my errors,
on account of the candor and sincerity, which, you thought,
accompanied them.1
Matters were stirred up even more by the inexpediency
1G. G., IV, J4.39-lii.LO.
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of the dedication, and the result was a further inflaming of
the fanatics. Hume was forced to admit to Millar:
The Dedication of my Dissertations to Mr Hume was
shown to some of his Friends here, Men of very good Sense,
who were seiz'd with an Apprehension, thau it wou'd hurt
that Party in the Church, with which he had always been
connected, and wou'd involve him, and them of Consequence,
in the Suspicion of Infidelity. Neither he nor I were in
the least affected with their Panic; but to satisfy them
v/e agreed to stand by the Arbitration of one Person, of
great Rank & of known Prudence; and I promis'd them to
write to you to suspend the Publication for one Post, In
case you shou'd have resolv'd to publish it presently.
The Moderates desired to help John Home and feared that the
dedication would arouse suspicions of infidelity. On their
advice, Hume temporarily suppressed the publication. However,
he apparently knew of John Home's intention to give up his
O
clerical career for that of a man of letters. Hume indicates
his determination to print the dedication in a letter to
William Strahan:
You will see by my Letter to Mr Millar that I mention
a Dedication, which may perhaps surprize you, as I never
dealt in such servile Addresses; But I hope it will not
surprize you, when jov. hear it is only to a Presbyterian
Minister, my Friend, Mr Hume, the Author of Douglas. I
was resolv'd to do what lay in my power to enable a Youth
of Genius to surmount the unaccountable Obstacles, which
were thrown in his Way. You will probably see it published
in a few Days. I hope the Goodness of the Intention will
apologize for the Singularity of the undetaking £sicj .3
After the publication of the Four Dissertations Hume
^Letters , I, 239-2k0.
pHome did in fact resign from the ministry rather than
risk deposition by the Highflyers. He left his charge at
Athelstaneford and went to London where he soon became the
secretary of Lord Bute. See Henderson, Religious Controversies,
pp. 65-oo. ' """" ~~ " ~ ~
^Letters, I, 2kl.
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complained to William Mure:
Pray, whether do yoti pity or blame me most, with re¬
gard to this Dedication of my Dissertations to my Friend,
the Poet? I am sure 1 never executed any thing, which was
either more elegant in the Composition, or more generous
in the Intention: Yet such an Alarm seiz'd some Fools
here (Men of very good Sense, but Fools in that Particular)
that they assaild both him'& me with the iitmost violence.;
and engag'd us to change our Intention, I wrote to Millar
to suppress that Dedication: Two Posts after I retracted
that Order. Can any thing be more unlucky, than that in
the Interval of these four days, he shoud have opend his
Sale, & dispos'd of 300 Copies; without that Dedication,
whence, I imagin'd, my Friend wou'd reap some advantage,
& myself so much Honor, I have not been so heartily vexd
at an}?- Accident of a long time. However, I have'insisted
that the Dedication shall still be publish'd.-*-
It is not difficult to see why alarm seized the Moderates,
John Home was still a minister and in conflict with the High¬
flyers. Hume "the Atheist" had narrowly escaped excommunica¬
tion from the Church the year before the publication of the
Four Dissertations. He could hardly be regarded as a help¬
ful or desirable ally in the battle against those who opposed
the drama. In point of fact the fanatics took advantage of
Hume's relations with the Moderates and regularly taunted them
for keeping company with an open and avowed infidel. Hume's
notoriety in religion was used by the Highflyers to discredit
the Moderate party. This attack by association took the form
of broadsides and pamphlets both farcical and serious.2 The
Four Dissertations received wide publicity with the zealots
spreading rumors concerning the affair of the suppressed
dissertations of 1756. David Hume received a great deal of
1hetters, I, 2k2-2li-3.
2
See Morren, op, cit., II, 112-130; Mossner, "Four
Dissertations," pp. libb-lir7b; Mossner, The Life of David Hume.
PP. 305-369. —— ,
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personal abuse In these "paper-bullets" of controversy which
were "flying with great vehemence,""'" but he bore the ordeal
with equanimity, endeavoring to uphold the position which he
considered to be right.
It remains for us to mention briefly the teaching of
David Hume in the three controversial works on religion in
"Five Dissertations." The two suppressed essays need not
delay us long. They are simply popular exemplifications of
implicit principles in Hume's general thought on the subject.
The opening statement of the essay "Of the Immortality of the
Soul" provides the main thesis of the work:
By the mere light of reason it seems difficult to prove
the Immortality of the Soul. The arguments for it are
commonly derived either from metaphysical topics, or moral,
or Physical. But in reality, it is the gospel, and the
gospel alone, that has brought life and immortality to
light.2
Hume contends: "Our insensibility before the composition of
the bod:/ seems to natural reason a proof of a like state after
3dissolution." The essay is concluded with the following
words:
By what arguments or analogies can we prove any state of
existence, which no one ever saw, and which no way resembles
any that ever was seen? Who will repose such trust in
any pretended philosophy as to admit upon its testimony
the reality of so marvellous a scene? Some new species of
logic is requisite for that purpose, and some new faculties
of the mind, that they may enable us to comprehend that
logic.
Nothing could set in a fuller light the infinite obli¬
gations which mankind have to Divine revelation, since we
find that no other medium could ascertain this great and
important truth.h-
^Dempster, op. cit., p. 28. 2g. Cr., IV, 399.
3g. g., IV, ko6. k-G. G., IV, 1(.06.
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Here again is another thrust at Christian revelation. Hume
makes his position quite clear--religious beliefs can never be
substantiated by reason. He did not refrain from fleering at
the Christians of his day who attempted to place Divine revela¬
tion on a rationalistic foundation. It is true that he
suffered much provocation to make such derogatory statements;
nevertheless, the omission of these paragraphs would have
strengthened rather than detracted from his argument.
In the essay on "Suicide" Hume advocates a philosophi¬
cal theism and asserts: "One considerable advantage that arises
from philosophy, consists in the sovereign antidote which it
affords to superstition and false religion.""*" He argues the
incapacity of man to commit any act against the will of Provi¬
dence and contends that there is out-and-out superstition and
even blasphemy in the notion that an individual cannot curtail
his misery by suicide as well as by any other act that Deity
2
has put in his power. In a footnote Hume adds that the action
3is not prohibited in the Scriptures. In short, he believed
that the ancient philosophers held more tenable views on the
subject than the Christians. He concluded that suicide need
not be regarded as an injury to God, to our neighbor, or the
society at large.^
"The Natural History of Religion" Is the source of
much information concerning Hume's attitude towards religious
faith and reverence. Besides showing how he occupied himself
1G. G. , IV, 1-1-07. 2G. G. , IV, lao-llll.
3g. G. , IV, laltn. ^G. G., IV, Lj-13-
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with the problems of religion, the essay gives some indica¬
tions of his personal faith and together with the Dialogues
Concerning Natural Religion constitutes his only sustained
contributions to the theory of religion. At the outset he
states the distinction between two sorts of inquiry bearing
on religion: "As every inquiry which regards religion is of
the utmost importance, there are two questions in particular
which challenge our attention, to wit, that concerning its
foundation in reason, and that concerning its origin in
human nature.""'" With regard to the first inquiry he is per¬
fectly explicit:
Happily, the first question, which is the most important,
admits of the most obvious, at least the clearest solu¬
tion. The whole frame of nature bespeaks an Intelligent
Author; and no rational inquirer can, after serious re¬
flection, suspend his belief a moment with regard to the
primary principles of genuine Theism and Religion.^
Hume assumes the validity of philosophical theism in
the form of the argument from design. But acceptance of this
argument is neither the origin of religion nor the factor which
has led men to accept theism. 'Theism must have an origin that
is different from the rational arguments formulated in its
support. It is the second inquiry, concerning the origin of
religion in human nature, that Hume now proposes to pursue.
The title of the essay was intended tc show that he meant to
examine the ps7y,pchological bases of religion and not the ab¬
stract rational proofs of theism. He makes this clear in the
1Gr. G. , IV, 309.
pG. G., IV, 309* Ike speculative aspects of religion
are diserased in detail in the Dialogues. See infra, pp»337ff.
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introduction:
. . . the other question, concerning the origin of religion
in human nature, is exposed to some more difficulty. The
belief of an invisible intelligent power has been very
generally diffused over the human race, in all places and
In all ages; but it has neither perhaps been so universal
as to admit of no exceptions, nor has it been, in any de¬
gree, uniform in the ideas \5;hich it has suggested. Some
nations have been discovered, who entertained no senti¬
ments of Religion, if travellers and historians may be
credited; and 110 two nations, and scarce any two men,
have ever agreed precisely in the same sentiment. It would
appear, therefore, that this preconception springs not
from an original instinct or primary impressions of nature,
such as gives rise to self-love, affection between the
sexes, love of progeny, gratitude, resentment; since every
instinct of this kind has been found absolutely universal
in all nations and ages, and has always a precise deter¬
minate object which it inflexibly pursues. The first reli¬
gious principles must be secondary, such as may easily be
perverted by various accidents and causes, and whose opera¬
tion, too, in some cases, may, by an extraordinary con¬
currence of circumstances, be altogether prevented. What
those principles arc, which give rise to the original
belief, and what those accidents and causes are, which
direct its operations, is the subject of our present inquiry.
Although Hume dealt primarily with the historical and
psychological aspects of religi on by analyzing the origin and
gradual development of the religions of the world into new
and ever-changing types, the "Natural History of Religion" con¬
tains various statements relative to Ms personal religious
convictions. He repeats and emphasizes the paramount thesis
of his philosophy, that is, the essential a-rationality of
human nature. Religious beliefs, Hume teaches, originate
independently of reason. As a natural product of the human
mind, religion has its basis in human nature--not in its
rational, but in its sensuous side; not in the speculative
desire for knowledge, but in practical needs; not in the
1Cr. (J., iv, 309
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contemplation of nature, but in looking forward with fear or
joy to the changing events of life."*" ^an's early approach to
p
religion, as manifested in polytheism or idolatry, was not
philosophical or scientific but was due to hope and anxiety
regarding "life and death, health and sickness, plenty and
3
want." Passions, emotions, sentiments precede reason and
philosophy in human nature and always remain dominant. The
origin or cause of religion lies in the hopes and fears "which
actuate the mind" and in "a concern with regard to the events
It
of life." Religion arises when the passions become linked
13
up with a special object—invisible, intelligent power.
Polytheism antedates monotheism and even after the
general acceptance of philosophy survives in the popular men¬
tality.^ The philosophical knowledge of God is a very late
product of mature reflection. Theism is an advanced concept
far beyond the primitive or popular mind in early or in later
7
ages. Primitive religion was superstition of an anthropomor-
8
phic cast. The human mind, ruled by hopes and fears, created
a religion of multifarious outside controlling forces; the
gods of man s early religion were like "the elves and fairies
of our ancestors"--atheistic in character.^ Hume traces
theism from these atheistic gods as it rises out of polytheism
by the perception of the unity of design in nature.-10 Monotheism
1G. G., IV, 315. 2G. G., IV, 310. 3G. G., IV, 316.
^"G. G., IV, 315-316. ^G. G., IV, 317; 335.
6G. G., IV, 210; 325. ?G. G., IV, 328. 3G.G., IV,325-27.
9G. G., IV, 320-32I1.. 10G. G. , IV, 330.
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as a popular religion did not arise from rational reflection,
although its chief principles are in agreement with the re¬
sults of philosophy, but from the same irrational motives as
1
polytheism.
As a critic Hume was conscious of the inconsistencies,
superstitions, and immoralities appearing under the name of
religion. In carrying out his enquiry, he has much to say
regarding the stiperstition and fanaticism which have appeared
In the natural history of religion. He freely castigated these
evils and often indulges in offensive language which called
forth adverse criticism from the friends of evangelical reli-
gion. Hume undertakes an historical comparison of polytheism
and monotheism3 and discovers that, although Christianity is
in its popular forms definitely theistic, theism Is not in
every respect the best religion. On the whole, polytheism
is bad philosophy whereas monotheism is good; but when the two
religious forms are compared in respect to tolerance and the
courage or heroism the:/ each develop, monotheism is inferior.
Theism is not only intolerant but also tends to make its
followers pusillanimous. The "monkish virtues" of submission
and abasement overwhelm individual and national courage.
Furthermore, theism's incomprehensible dogmas put faith to
very severe tests, and reason itself is often travest'ed. This
last evil, however, is also found in polytheism. Most of the
adherents of all popular religion exalt belief in foolish
1C-. G., IV, 329-330. 2Cr. G., IV, 335-361.
3G. G., IV, 335-336.
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mysteries, fanaticism, and the observance of customs above
1
the practice of virtue.
In theism, Hume claims, the very reasonableness of the
fundamental assumptions was a temptation to enter into an
alliance with philosophy and to ruin the philosophy of the
subject by turning it into popular theology. Often, in order
that mystery and amazement might not be banished, the advocates
of theism look for "whichever opinion" is most contrary to
p
plain sense." Reason aids in drawing the logical conse¬
quences of dogmas, but over the dogmas reason itself has no
control. Should it attempt to question these articles, the
reproach of heresy always rests on the side of reason. "It
is thus a system becomes more absurd in the end, merely from
3
its being reasonable and philosophical in the beginning.""
Hume Is here repeating a concept expressed In the Enquiry
Concerning the TTmnan Understanding: "This pertinacious bigotry,
of which you comlain, as so fatal to philosophy, is really
her offspring, who, after allying with superstition, separates
himself entirely from the interest of his parent, and becomes
her most inveterate enemy and persecutor."^" The "fanatical,"
"Intolerant," "grotesque," "scholastic" popular religion is
the monstrous, deformed offspring of reason and superstition.
But even more general and more Immediately operative
are the sins of religion In the moral sphere. All popular
religions as distinct from philosophical religions have baleful
1g. g., IV, 337-339. 2g. g. , IV, 3^-3^.
3g. g. , iv, 3-1-2. %•]., 133.
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effects on morality. By a spreading corruption in what was
best, "virtue, knowledge, love of liberty, are the qualities
which call down the fatal vengeance of inquisitors, and,
when expelled, leave the society in the most shameful ignorance,
corruption, and bondage."1 Conceptions of the Divine Nature
which arise in most of these religions have a bad influence on
morals. There is a tendency, characteristic of the traditional
religions, to multiply new and frivolous species of merit, in
the observance of rites or in the holding of abstruse beliefs.
These religious duties are treated as being of higher value
than the duties of everyday life and thus divide man's atten¬
tion and we aleen his attachment to the natural motives of
2
justice and humanity. The outward religious observances
followed in various rites and ceremonies Hume regards as the
less dangerous side of religion. It is the very essence of
religion—inner religious obligations—which he furiously de¬
nounces. The cultivation of certain feelings and the holding
of certain beliefs become the source of much insincerity. These
obligations cannot be voluntarily fulfilled but depend upon
"Grace." Professions of belief are falsely made and result
in the vice of hypocrisy, affecting the whole character. Hume
treats religious belief at its best as never more than half-
belief or make-belief treated as religious duty.
We may observe, that, notwithstanding the dogmatical,
imperious style of all superstition, the conviction of
the religionists, in all ages, is more affected than
real, and scarcely ever approaches, in any degree, to
that solid belief and persuasion which governs us in the
1G. G. , IV, 339. 2Ch G., IV, 3k-2 sqq.
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common affairs of life. Men dare not avow, even to
their own hearts, the doubts which they entertain on
such subjects: They make a merit of implicit faith,
and disguise to themselves their real infidelity, by
the strongest asseverations and most positive bigotry.
But nature is too hard for all their endeavours, and
suffers not the obscure, glimmering light, afforded in
those shadowy regions, to equal the strong impressions
made by common sense and by experience. The usual course
of men's condtxct belies their words, and shows that their
assent in these matters is some unaccountable operation
of the mind between disbelief and conviction, but^aoproach¬
ing much nearer to the former than to the latter.
Hume maintains that all popular religions, whether
"traditional or mythological," or "systematic or scholastic"
2
tended to become both impious and wicked. The apprehensive
and gloomy religions extol in the Deity actions they would
condemn in their fellow creatures. "It is certain," Hume
contends, "that in every religion, however sublime the verbal
definition which it gives of its divinity, many of the votaries,
perhaps the greatest number, mil still seek the divine favour,
not by virtue and good morals, which alone can be acceptable
to a perfect being, but either by frivolous observances, by
intemperate zeal, by rapturous ecstacies, or by the belief
3of mysterious and absurd opinions." It is the philosophic
duty to combat all these influences which so degrade human
nature. The general infirmity of the mind is such that this
is possible only for the few, and it is precariously maintained
even by them.
Whatever weakens or disorders the internal frame, promotes
the interests of superstition: And nothing is more destruc¬
tive to them, than a manly, steady virtue, which either
1g. g., iv, 3L7-3il8. 2g. g. , iv, 352-351)-.
3g. g., iv, 355.
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preserves us from disastrous melancholy accidents or
teaches us to bear them. During such calm sunshine of
the mind, these spectres of false divinity never make
their appearance.
Throughout the discussion of the history of religion,
Hume inclines towards a theistic position even though its in¬
tellectual form is speculative and nebulous. In Section I he
affirms:
The mind rises gradually, from inferior to superior: By
abstracting from what is imperfect, it forms an idea of
perfection: And slowly distinguishing the nobler parts
of its own frame from the grosser, it learns to transfer
only the former, much elevated and refined, to its divinity.
Nothing could disturb this natural progress of thought,
but some obvious and invincible argument, which might
immediately lead the mind into the pure principles of
theism, and make it overleap, at one bound, the vast
interval which is interposed between the human and the
Divine Nature. But though I allow, that the order and
frame of the universe, when accurately examined, affords
such an argument, yet I can never think, that this con¬
sideration could have an influence on mankind, when they
formed their first rude notions of :religion.2
At the beginning of Section II Hume asserts: "Were men led
into the apprehension of invisible, intelligent power, by a
contemplation of the works of nature, they could never possibly
entertain any conception but of one single being, who bestowed
existence and order on this vast machine, and adjusted all its
parts, according to one regular plan or connected system."3
In regard to the relation of religion and morality Hume suggests
that "the most genuine method of serving the Divinity is by
promoting the happiness of his creatures.
In the closing section Hume reiterates the argument
1G. G., IV, 359.
h'-G. G., IV, 357.
2g. g., iv, 311. 3g. g., iv,313
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from design:
A purpose, an intention, a design, is evident in every
thing; and vfoen our comprehension is so far enlarged as
to contemplate the first rise of this visible system, we
must adopt, with the strongest conviction, the idea of
some intelligent cause or author. The uniform maxims
too, which prevail throughout the whole frame of the
universe, naturally, if not necessarily, lead us to
conceive this intelligence as single and undivided, where
the prejudices of education oppose not so reasonable a
theory, liven the contrarieties of nature, by discovering
themselves every where, become proofs of some consistent
plan, and establish one single purpose or intention,
however inexplicable and incomprehensible.1
Hume declares that "the good, the great, the sublime, the
ravishing are found eminently in the genuine principles of
theism." Ihe belief in a Supreme Being, "if not an original
instinct, being at least a general attendant of human nature,
may be considered as a kind of mark or stamp, which the Divine
workman has set upon his work; and nothing surely can more
dignify mankind, than to be thus selected from all other
parts of creation, and to bear the image or impression of the
universal Creator."2
Hume's presentation of the various historical forms
of religion shews that the nature ascribed to Divine power
varies with man's intellectual development and knowledge of
events. It is on this side that reason comes in and plays
an important part in religion by discovering what is relevant
and beneficial. But, just as is the case with belief in an
external world, reason and critical reflection cannot destroy
the fundamental belief in the object of religion but must al¬
ways rest upon it. Hume quotes with approval Bacon's statement:
1C-. Or., IV, 360. 2G. G., IV, 361
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"A little philosophy makes men Atheists: A great deal recon¬
ciles them to religion.""'" Philosophy not only makes men
sceptical but also leads them to atheism# But scepticism and
atheism will not stand examination; in fact, each derives its
strength from the belief which it would overthrow. A little
more philosophy leads back to belief and to theism.
Without disputing the force of the argument from de¬
sign, Hume concludes:
What a noble privilege is it of human reason to
attain the knowledge of the Supreme Being; and, from the
visible works of nature, be enabled to infer so sublime
a principle as its Supreme Creator 1 But turn the reverse
of the medal. Survey most nations and most ages. Examine
the religious principles which have, in fact, prevailed
in the world. You will scarcely be persuaded, that they
are anything but sick men's dreams: Or perhaps will re¬
gard them more as the playsome whimsies of monkeys in
human shape, than the serious, positive, dogmatical
asseverations of a being who dignifies himself with the
name of rational.
Hear the verbal protestations of all men: nothing so
certain as their religious tenets. Examine their lives:
You will scarcely think that they repose the smallest
confidence in them.
The greatest and truest zeal gives us no security
against hypocrisy: The most open impiety is at bended with
a secret dread and compunction.
Ho theological absurdities so glaring that they have
not sometimes been embraced by men of the greatest and
most cultivated understanding. Ho religious precepts so
rigorous that they have not been adopted by the most
voluptuous and most abandoned of men#
The ending of the "Hatural History of Religion" is
in a sense a confession of Hume's personal faith. He is in
favor of religion in general but against the exclusive claim
of any one type or form of it. He maintained his conviction
in the inherent value of religion, even vhile tracing the
1G. G., IV, 329# 2C-. G., IV, 362-363.
3ll'r
inconsistencies which appear in its history among the several
nations. Hume's intellectual and emotional characteristics
induced him to treat scornfully these inconsistencies which
he regarded as traces of hypocrisy. He seems to be advocating
a true or philosophical religion, although even in the true
religion, much remains obscure. The difficulty of. coming to
any definite conclusions, except a very general one, along
with the inconsistencies between the opinions and the prac¬
tices of mankind, in reference to religion, led Hume to exclaim:
The whole is a riddle, an enigma, an inexplicable
mystery. Doubt, uncertainty, suspense of judgment,
appear the only result of our most accurate scrutiny
concerning this subject.-*-
He seems glad to escape from the realms of conflict and debate
among the several sects of religion, into what he calls "the
o
calm, though obscure, regions of philosophy."
David Hume and the Aberdeen Theologians
About the same time that Four Dissertations was pub¬
lished, Hume began to receive tributes from abroad, especially
from France. He regarded the critical and cultured French as
the acknowledged leaders in the world of literary achievements.
Consequently, when they began to praise his writings, Hume's
animosity towards the obtuse British grew stronger. Churchmen
like William Warburton and the bigoted and harsh Presbyterian
C-eorge Anderson caused him to despair of ever gaining a hearing
in Britain. There are indications that he even contemplated
leaving his native land and settling in Paris.^ But in the
1G. Cr. , IV, 363. 2G. g# , IVj 363.
3see Dempster, on. cit., p. 22.
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midst of bigotry and prejudice, Hume occasionally met indivi¬
duals with, whom he formed friendships. During his London
visits in 1758-59 and 17&1, he made many new friends. One
group consisted of the churchmen who had answered his writ¬
ings with courtesy and respect. At Hume's desire, the
learned clerics—William Adams, John Douglas, and Richard
Price--were invited to a dinner at Ihomas Cadells' house.
It is recorded that they "were all delighted with David,
who long remained on good terms with them, exchanging visits
and letters.
In 1758 the Philosophical Society was founded at Aber¬
deen and although David Hume was never a member, he had a
major part in its functioning. Thomas Reid explains how
this was true:
Your Friendly adversaries Drs Campbell & Gerard as
well as Dr Gregory return their compliments to you respect¬
fully. A little Philosophical Society here of which all
the three are members, is much indebted to you for its
entertainment. Your company would, although we are all
good Christians, be more acceptable than that of Saint
Athanasius. And since we cannot have you upon the bench
you are brought oftener than any other man to the bar,
accused and defended with great zeal but without bitter¬
ness. If you write no more in morals politicks or meta-
physicks, I am affraid we shall be at a loss for subjects.-^
George Campbell examined Hume's view of miracles in a
sermon which he preached before the Synod of Aberdeen in 1780.
When the ministers of the group desired him to publish it,
Samuel Rogers, Reminiscences and Table Talk of Samuel
Rogers, ed. G. H. Powell (London: 1903), p. 67.
^Mossner, The Life of David Hume, p. 393. See Letters,
I, 333.
3quoted in Mossner, The Life of David I-Iume, p. 273*
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Campbell putitihthe form of an essay entitled a Dissertation
on Miracles: Containing an Examination of the Principles ad¬
vanced by David Hume, 5sq; in an Essay on Miracles. Before
sending the work to the press, he gave a copy to Hugh Blair
with a request that he look it over and then try to get Hume's
comments and criticisms. Blair communicated to Campbell the
observations of Hume on the tone and matter of the essay.
Hume wrote:
I have perused the ingenious performance, which you
was so obliging as to put into my hands, with all the
attention possible; tho not perhaps with all the serious¬
ness and gravity which you have so frequently recommended
to me. But the fault lies not in the piece, which is
certainly very acute; but in the subject. I know you will
say, it lies in neither, but in myself alone. If that be
so, I am sorry to say that I believe it is incurable.
I could wish that your friend had not chosen to appear
as a controversial writer, but had endeavoured to establish
his principles in general, without any reference to a.
particular book or person; tho I own he does me a great
deal of honour, in thinking that any thing I have wrote
deserves his attention. For besides many inconveniences,
which attend that kind of writing, I see it is almost
impossible to preserve decency and good manners in it.
This author, for instance, says sometimes obliging things
of me much beyond what I can presume to deserve; and I
thence conclude that in general he did not mean to in¬
sult me: yet I meet with some other passages more worthy
of Warburton and his followers than of so ingenious an author.
. . . Your friend ... is certainly a very ingenious
man, tho a little too zealous for a philosopher. . . .1
Hume then criticized some passages in Campbell's work.
These criticisms indicate a few of Hume's own ideas on the
subject of religion:
There is no contradiction in saying, that all the
testimony which ever was really given for a miracle, or
ever will be given, is a subject of derision; and yet
forming a fiction or supposition of a testimony for a
^•Letters, I, 3k9~3$l*
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particular miracle, which might not only merit attention,
but amount to a full proof of it . . . .
... I find no difficulty to explain my meaning, and
yet shall not probably do it in any future edition. The
proof against a miracle, as it is founded on invariable
experience, is of that species or kind of proof, which is
full and certain when taken alone, because it implies no
doubt, as is the case with all probabilities; but there
are degrees of this species, and when a weaker proof is
opposed to a stronger, it is overcome. ...
Does a man of sense run after every silly tale of
witches or hobgoblins or fairies, and canvass particularly
the evidence? I never knew any one, that examined and
deliberated about nonsense who did not believe it before
the end of his inauiries.
. . . Miracle- working was a Popish trick, and discard¬
ed with the other parts of that religion. Men must have
new and opposite ways of establishing new and opposite
follies. ... I never read of a miracle in my life, that
was not meant to establish some new point of religion. . . .
If a miracle proves a doctrine to be revealed from
God, and consequently true, a miracle can never be wrought
for a contrary doctrine. The facts are therefore as in¬
compatible as the doctrines
These comments are followed by a paragraph in which
Hume defends his position against the charge of infidelity:
I could wish your friend had not denominated me an
infidel writer, on account of ten or twelve pages which
seem to him to have that tendency: while I have wrote so
many volumes on history, literature, politics, trade,
morals, which in that particular at least are entirely
inoffensive. Is a man to be called a drunkard, because
he has been seen fuddled once in his lifetime?2
The force of Hume's argument is evident—miracles can
in no way be used to support religious beliefs. Yet, individuals
do manifest belief in the realm of religion. It became Hume's
problem to determine the origin and validity of such beliefs.
He was convinced that religion could not be substantiated by
reason, but to his mind this did not involve the acceptance of
an atheistic position. He considered himself an Infidel only
in the sense that he could not accept the prevailing tendency
betters, I, 3)4.9-351. 2Letters, I, 3£l.
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In the religions circles of his day to build a revelational
theology on a rationalistic foundation. Neither could he
accept a sentimentalistic type of religion which entirely
discarded reason. It seems Hume was pointing the way to a
religion grounded in human belief but worked out and analyzed
by the reasoning capacity of the human mind.
After Campbell's Dissertation on Miracles appeared in
17o2, Hume wrote a friendly letter to him:
It has so seldom happened that controversies in philoso¬
phy, much more in theology, have been carried on without
producing a personal quarrel between the parties, that I
must regard my present situation as somewhat extraordinary,
who have reason to give you thanks for the civil and obliging
manner in which you have conducted the dispute against me,
on so interesting a subject as that of miracles. Any
little symptoms of vehemence, of which I formerly used the
freedom to complain, when you favoured me with a sight of
the manuscript, are either removed or explained away, or
atoned for by civilities, which are far beyond what I
have any title to pretend to. It will be natural for you
to imagine, that I will fall upon some shift to evade the
force of your arguments, and to retain my former opinion
in the point controverted between us; but it is impossible
for me not to see the Ingenuity of your conformance, and
the great learning which you have displayed against me.
I consider myself as very much honoured in being
thoughtworthy of an answer by a person of so much merit.
Hume then proceeds to explain why he will not answer Campbell's
objection even though he has a strong inclination to defend
himself: "I had fixed a resolution, in the beginning of my
life, always to leave the public to judge between my adversaries
and me, without making any reply."2 Campbell responded in
amicable terms and declared that he was forced "to love and
Honour" Hume as a man because of the "goodness and candour,"3
Cotters, I, 3^0. 2Letters, I, 361.
3quoted in Fossner, The Life of David Hume, pp. 293-291|..
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which appeared in every line of Hume's letter.
It is unfortunate for us today that Hume made this
resolution not to argue with his critics. If he had chosen
to answer the objections made against his system we can be
reasonably sure that his ideas would not have been so greatly
misunderstood and misrepresented by succeeding generations.
Possibly his enemies would have been less egotistical in their
approach and perhaps Hume himself would have re-evaluated his
s7/stem and clarified some of the concepts which were the cause
of so much antagonism against him. As we have seen, he was
generally regarded as a sceptic and an atheist—an enemy of
religion. It is regrettable that Hume, who was well aware of
this attitude, did not meet his critics and endeavor to eluci¬
date his position in religion.
Very similar- to the courteous polemic between Hume
and Campbell was the manner In which Thomas Reid endeavored to
refute Hume's philosophical thought. Besides debating Hume's
opinions in the Philosophical Society of Aberdeen, Reid composed
an Inquiry into the Human Hind on the Principles of Common Sense,
in which he combated the theories contained in the Treatise of
Human Hature.^ Like Campbell before hiny Reid, through his friend
Hugh Blair, submitted the manuscript to Hume for comments,
"Till that time the good-natured sceptic knew nothing of his
opponent, and he received the parcel with natural reluctance,
expecting a humdrum Refutation, by a scandalised minister of
the Gospel, of a treatise which he had himself discarded, and
3-Supra, pp. 3-6.
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wished to be forgotten.1,1 For the moment Hume was irritated
and told Blair sharply, "I wish that the Parsons would confine
themselves to their old occupation of worrying one another, and
leave Philosophers to argue with temper, moderation, and good
p
manners." Hume later relented when he was assured that Reid
was a calm, acute philosopher who did not forget charity in
zeal for the faith.
After reading the manuscript of the Inquiry, Hume
wrote directly to Reid:
By Dr Blair's means I have been favoured with the
perusal of your performance, -which I have read with great
pleasure and attention. It is certainly very rare that
a piece so deeply philosophical is wrote with so much
spirit, and affords so much entertainment to the reader.
. . . I must do you the justice to own, that when I en¬
ter into your ideas, no man appears to express himself
with greater perspicuity than you do; a talent which,
above all others, is requisite in that species of litera¬
ture which you have cultivated. ... I shall only say,
that if you have been able to clear up these abstruse
and important subjects, instead of being mortified, I
shall be so vain as to pretend to a share of the praise;
and shall think that my errors, by having at least some
coherence, had led you to make a more strict review
of my principles, which were the common ones, and to
perceive their futility.3
Hume corrects Reid on a matter of style and then closes with
his compliments to his "friendly adversaries, Dr Campbell and
Dr Gerard, and also to Dr Gregory.n^
Reid replied to Hume's courteous letter:
... I though,''myself very happy in having the means of
obtaining at second hand, through the friendship of Dr
1 -
xGraham, Men of Letters, p. 251.
O
Quoted in Dugald Stewart, Biographical Memoirs of Smith,
Robertson, and Reid (Edinburgh, l3ll), p. kl7«
3Letters, I, 373-376. ^-Letters, I, 376.
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Blair, your opinion of my performance; and you have been
pleased to communicate it directly, in so polite & friendly
a manner as merits great acknowledgements on ray part.
Your keeping a watchful Eye, over my Style with a
view to be of use to me, is an Instance of Candor and.
Generosity to an Antagonist, which would affect me very
sensibly although I had no personal concern in it. And
I shall always be proud to follow so amiable an Example.
In attempting to throw some new light upon these abs¬
truse Subjects, I wish to preserve the due mean betwixt
Confidence.and Despair. But whether I have any success
in this Attempt or not, I shall always avow my self your
Disciple in Metaphysicks. I have learned more from your
writings in this kind than from all others put together.
Your System appears to me not only coherent in all its
parts, but likeways justly deduced from principles common¬
ly received among Philosophers: Principles, which I never
thought of calling in Question, untill the conclusions
you draw from them in the treatise of human Nature made
me suspect them. If these principles are Solid your
System must stand; and whether they are or not, can better
be judged after you have brought to light the ishole System
that grows out of them, than when the greater part of it
was wrapped up in clouds and darkness. I agree with you
therefore that if this System shall ever be demolished,
you have a just claim to a great share of the Praise, both
because you have made it a distinct and determinate mark
to be aimed at, and have furnished proper artillery for
that purpose, 1
It is apparent that Reid missed the whole point of
Hume's sceptical arguments. In the Inquiry into the Human
Hind Reid regarded Hume's only contribution to philosophy to
lie in the reducing to absurdity of the whole modern system.
The publication of the Inquiry in 1761u inaugurated the radical
misunderstanding of Hume which dominated the philosophical
world for well over a century. Mossner sees "pervasive irony"
in Hume's letter: "Reid had so thoroughly misconceived him
that Hume contented himself with the correction of a Scotticism!"
Thomas Reid was the sole philosopher worthy of the
name who dealt at any length with the Treatise of Human
Nature. during the lifetime of its author, and, prior to
Kant, he remained the most thorough. Little wonder that
1Quoted in Kossner, The Life of David Hume, pp. 298-299.
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Hume was ready to renounce publicly that Treatise which,
after a quarter of a century, could still engender in its
readers so little understanding of its basic ideas A
Diplomatic Service in Prance
With the publication, early in 17&2, of the History of
England from the Invasion of Julius Caesar to the Accession of
Eenr:f VII Hume's work as a philosopher and man of letters vir¬
tually ceased. Some of his close associates urged him to add
a volume or two on the history of Great Britain from the Revolu¬
tion of l688 to the accession of George I or even of George II,
but he never succeeded in accomplishing more than the collection
of a few notes. Hume's French friends tried to get him to
write an ecclesiastical history probably because they desired
to see "the application of his powers of irony to popes and
cardinals, presbyters and bishops, and the nice points of theo-
2
logical disputes." Nothing ever came of these projects, how¬
ever, and Hume laid aside his pen of literary composition for
a pen of diplomatic service.
During the period from October 1763 until November 176^
David Hume served as Embassy Secretary to Lord Hertford in
Paris. Hertford was regarded as a piotis, orthodox churchman,
and Hume informs a friend that having been chosen by such an
individual, he is "now a Person clean & white as the driven
Snow.In another letter, written after he had arrived in
"Siossner, The Life of David Hume, pp. 299J 300.
p
Greig, on. cit. , p. 267. Fcf. Mossner, The Life of
David Hume, pp. kuk-k^J ~ L
^Letters, I, 393.
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Prance, Hume exclaims: "I am . . .in the high road to dignities.
You must know, that Lord Hertford has so high a character for
piety, that his taking me by the hand is a kind of regeneration
to me, and all past offences are now wiped off.""1"
Hume was not long in Paris before he became acquainted
with a number of important personages. "I naturally sought and
obtained Connexions with the learned," he rsnarked and later
informed Hugh Blair:
The Men of Letters here are really very agreeable;
all of them Men of the World, living in entire or almost
entire Harmony among themselves, and quite irreproachable
in their Morals. It woud give you & Jardine & Robertson
great Satisfaction to find that there is not a single
Deist among them. Those whose Persons & Conversation
I like best are D'Alembert, Buffon, Marmontel, Diderot,
Duclos, Helvetius; and old President Henaut. . . .2
The reference to Deism is plainly ironical. Diderot records
how Hume learned the religious opinion of the group, meeting
in Baron d'Holbach's house:
... La premiere fois que M. Hume se trouva a la table
du baron, il etoit assis a cote de lui. Je ne scais a
quel propos le philosophe angluis s'auisa de dire au
baron qu'il ne croyait pas aux athees, au'il ne'en avoit
iarnais vu. Le baron lui dit: <iCComptez combien nous somes
ici.^ Hous etions dix-huit. Le baron ajouta: << II n'est
pas malheureux de pouvoir vous en montrer quinze du
premier coup: les trois autres ne scavent qu.ien penser»>)
In the philosophical sessions at Holbach's some of the
best minds in Paris came together to discuss topics in phil¬
osophy, religion, and politics. "Religion, its superstitions
and its evil consequences to society, provided a constant and
^fetters, I, Jj.22-Lj.23. 2Letters, I, IlL9.
^Denis Diderot, Lettres a Sophie Volland, ed. Andr/
Babelon (Paris, 1933), II, 77.
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fertile topic of conversation," One would imagine that David
Hume found entire satisfaction in these assemblies; however,
there is reason to believe that he was not perfectly satisfied.
He learned to respect many of these French -thinkers but could
not go the length of their scepticism, which outstretched his
doubts and ended in materialism and atheism. "The philosoohes
simply could not understand Hume's sceptical or agnostic posi¬
tion and were inclined to think that he had not entirely
throv/n off the shackles of bigotry." In 17&3 Gibbon visited
Paris and recorded that the -ohilosophes "laughed at the
scepticism of Hume, preached the tenets of atheism with the
bigotry of dogmatists, and damned all believers with ridicule
and contempt," Writing from Paris in l?6k, Sir James Mac-
donald informed a friend in England "that poor Hume, who on
your side of the v/ater was thought to have too little reli¬
gion is here thought to have too much."^~ Hume himself con¬
firms this statement in a letter written many years later:
"Both Lord Marischal and Helvetius . . . used to laugh at me
for my narrow way of thinking in these particulars.They
\Yere not able to change his deliberate judgment expressed in
the Dialogues: "... nothing can afford a stronger pre¬
sumption, that any set of principles are true, and ought to
^Mossner, The Life of David Hume, p. 1l63. ^Ibid., p. k85.
^Edward Gibbon, Memoirs, ed. 0. F. Emerson (Boston,
1398), P. 135.
4 -noted in Mossner, The Life of David Hume, p. k8b.
^Letters, II, 27k.
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be embraced, than to observe, that they tend to "che confirmation
of true religion, and serve to confound the cavils of atheists,
libertines, and freethinkers of all denominations."*^
2
David Hume protested against the infidelity of Paris.
He denounced dogmatism whether he found it expressed in theism
or atheism. "Over the ubiquitous dogmatism on the issue of reli¬
gion, the philosopher of human nature may well have been inclined
"3
to despondency." He doubtlessly was dismayed when the French
philosophers advocated their variety of empiricism which was
mingled with metaphysical necessitarianism. "The dogmatism,
he found, was not confined to atheism, but extended into meta¬
physics, economics, and related social subjects."' The a priori
character of French atheism and materialism showed complete in¬
difference to his philosophy of mitigated scepticism# "The old
Aristotelian dogmatism of the schools was but replaced in France
by a new dogmatism of inevitable progress." Intellectual de¬
pression must have overwhelmed Hume as a result of his experience
with the French intelligentsia.
Hume differed greatly with the French atheists on the
status of religion in human affairs. In the concluding chapter
of the Life and Correspondence of David Hume, John Hill Burton
^-D, llpO.
2
Samuel Romilly, Memoirs of the Life of Sir Se-muel
Romllly, Written by Himself; with a Selection from his Corres¬
pondence^ ed. by his Sons (London: John Murray, 1okO), I, 179«
%ossner, The Life of David Hume, p. Il86.
''-Ibid. ^Ibid., p. L37.
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makes some pertinent remarks on Iiume's social character and
on his attitude towards religion. Burton states:
... . the tone of his thoughts sometimes rose to en¬
thusiasm. Thus the son of his valued friend Ferguson,
remembers his father saying, that, one clear and beauti¬
ful night, when they were walking home together, Hume
suddenly stopped, looked up to the starry sky, and said,
more after the manner of "Hervey's Meditations" than the
"Treatise of Pluman Mature," "Oh, Adam, can any one contem¬
plate the wonders of that firmament, and not believe
that there is a God!"^-
Burton continues:
Those who know him solely by his philosophical reputa¬
tion, will perhaps believe him to have been
Parcus deorum cultor et infrequens.
But this does not seem to have been the case, at least in
his outward conduct.^
That Plume retained an interest in church attendance
is illustrated by correspondence with Gilbert Elliot concern¬
ing his sons, whom Hume had more or less supervised while they
were being educated in France. In the course of one letter
Hume mentions that he had not found "your young Gentlemen in
3
Church last Sunday." In earlier communications he lead shown
his concern for the Elliot boys' religious training and indi¬
cated to their father that they would "need never go to Mass
Linless they please, and nobody shall ever talk to them about
Religion" £in an endeavor to convert them to Catholicism]].^"
And again: "They are never to hear Mass, but to attend at the
g
Ambassador^s Chapel every Sunday." On another occasion Hume
made an allusion, indicative that he himself had been a fairly






regular attendant at the ambassador's chapel.''" Burton de¬
clares:
£Hume] is said to have been fond of Dr. Robertson's preach¬
ing and not averse to that of his colleague and opponent,
John Erskine. A lady, distinguished in literature, remem¬
bers that in a conversation with a respectable tradesman's
wife, who had been a servant to Hume, she said that her mas¬
ter one day asked her very seriously, why she was never seen
in church, where he had provided seats for all his household.
... The woman's defence was, that she belonged to a dis¬
senting congregation; and it was admitted to be quite satis¬
factory. 2
It was as the result of attendance at a religious service
that David Hume had the famous exchange with the Reverend Laurence
Sterne in Paris in May 1761j_. Sterne had been asked to deliver
a sermon before an audience in the tiny chapel of Lord Hertford's
Embassy. Hume was among those present, and that evening he en¬
tered into a friendly tussle with the preacher concerning miracles,
a subject which had been given a prominent place in the sermon.
Sterne records that the "little pleasant sparring at Lord Hert¬
ford' s table" had "nothing in it that did not bear the marks of
good-will and urbanity on both sides. ... David was disposed
to make a little merry with the Parson; and, in return, the Par¬
son was equally disposed to make a little mirth with the Infidel;
we laughed at one another, and the company laughed with us both.
"I never see Mr Wilkes here but at Chapel, where he
is a most regular, & devout, and edifying, and pious Attendant.
I take him to be entirely regenerate." ^Letters, I, ););); .J
p
Burton, oo. cit., II, 1l5>3»
^Lawrence Sterne, Letters of Laurence Sterne, ed.
Lewis Perry Curtis (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 193ij-), p. 219.
LCf• Wilbur L. Cross, Life and Times of Laurence Sterne (Hew
Haven: Yale University Press, 1925), II, 3'-!-•[}
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Another glimpse into Hume's character is given by the
sons of Baron Mure. They were taken to see St. Paul's Cathedral
and were informed that the daily service was not attended and
that even on Sundays the congregation was small. Thinking this
situation presented an excellent opportunity to gain the favor
of the "Great Infidel," the boys remarked "how foolish it was
to lay out a million ... on a thing so useless." Hume,
however, gave them an instant denunciation:
Never give an opinion on subjects which you are too
young to judge. St. Paul's as a monument of the religious
feeling and sentiment of the country, does it honour, and
will endure. We have wasted millions on a single campaign
in Flanders, and without any good resulting from it.1
These incidents lead to the suggestion that at least
in outward conduct David Hume gave assent to the importance
of the church in the life of an individual. Yet, he was not
willing to be a hypocrite in these matters and therefore made
no pretense of being a whole-hearted supporter of any religious
organization. For instance, on one occasion, Hume gave his
candid opinion to a young man who, though in holy orders, had
a tendency to scepticism and sought the philosopher's advice.
A letter from James Edmonstoune to Hume provides some details
concerning the young clergyman:
... I write you at present to consult you about an
Acquaintance of your Mr Vivian who is here with Lord
Abingdon and who thinks of returning to England May next.
You'll be so good as to determine for him what Character
he is to assume on his Arrival, whether that of a Clergy¬
man or a Layman. I suppose you know he is in Orders, but
he is very very low Church, to speak plain Language, I be¬
lieve him to be £aj Sort of Disciple of your own and tho he
does not carry Matters quite so far as you yet you have
1Csldwell Papers, I, 38
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given him Notions not very consistent with his Priestly
Character so that you see you are somewhat bound to give
him your best advice. . . . Youll determine whether a
Man of Probity can accept of a LivingaBishoprick that
does not believe all the 39 Articles; for you oriLy can
fix him, he has been hitherto irresolute. If [l am notj
mistaken he seems rather inclined not to be a Clergyman
but you know better than I do how difficult it is to get
any tolerable civil Employment. I mean any patent place.
Write as soon as you can conveniently and if you should
determine for his' being a Clergyman throw in something
consolatory on his being oblig'd to renounce white
Stockings the rest of his Life. . . .3-
Hume's answer is indeed straightforward and indicates
his personal feelings on the subject of religious orders:
What! do you 'mow that Lord Bute is again all-powerful,
or rather that he was always so, but is now acknowledged
for such by all the world. Let this be a new motive for
Mr Vivian to adhere to the ecclesiastical profession, in
which he may have so good a patron; for civil employment,
for men of letters can scarcely be found: all is occupied
by men of business, or by parliamentary interest.
It is putting too great a respect on the vulgar, and
on their superstitions, to pique one's self on sincerity
with regard to them. Did ever one make it a point of
honour to speak truth to children or madmen? If the
thing were worthy being treated gravely, I should tell
him, that the Pythian oracle, with the approbation of
Xenophon, advised every one to worship the gods vojU.10 7roXiui^,
I wish it were still in my power to be a hypocrite in this
particular. The common duties of society usually re¬
quire it; and the ecclesiastical profession only adds a
little more to an innocent dissimulation, or rather simu¬
lation, without which it is impossible to pass through the
world. Am I a liar, becatxse I order my servant to say, I
am not at home, when I do not desire to see company?^
Retirement in Edinburgh
David Hume served as Under-Secretary of State, Northern
Department, at London in 1767 and 1763. It is interesting to
note that one of his various duties was the composition of





Church of Scotland--that venerable body which, some years be¬
fore, had considered excommunicating him because of "impious
and infidel principles" expressed in his books."1" Assisting
in the administration of ecclesiastical patronage in Scotland,
Hume now received petitions for advancement from the presby¬
ters of the Church. He used his influence with General Conway,
the Secretary of State, "to steer Scottish church patronage
into the proper channels, that is to say, to the Moderate
2
Party." In the King's letter addressed to the General
Assembly in May 17&7, Hume gave recognition to the merits of
the Moderate leaders:
You may be assured that the Presbyterian Church of
Scotland, as by law established, will always meet with
Our support to the full enjoyment of their rights and
privileges; and We are convinced, that the same wise con¬
duct, which has so often manifested itself in your former
meetings, will be exerted on the present occasion, and
that cordiality, unanimity, and brotherly love will attend
all your proceedings, and be the means of securing a
happy and satisfactor:/ conclusion of this present meeting
of the General Assembly.^
Another indication of Hume's respect for and aid to
the Moderates is found in his treatment of the Reverend Dr.
Robert Henry, an historian who had turned to him for advice
and assistance. It was through Hume's repeated efforts that
Strahan and Cadell brought out Henry's first volume of the
History of Great Britain in 1771.^'" In a review of the book
Hume pays sincere tribute to his clerical associates by extending
■'•See supra, pp. 272-281;..
%lossner, 'The Life of David Hume, p. 5l|-0.
^Quoted in Sossner, The Life of David Hume, p. 5>lj,0.
■ribid. , p. 333.
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a kindly patronage to his new friend, Robert Henry and a well-
meant acknowledgment to two old friends, William Robertson and
Hugh Blair. It concludes with the following sentences:
The reader will scarcely find in our language, except
in the works of the celebrated Dr. Robertson, any per¬
formance that unites together so perfectly the great
points of entertainment and instruction. It is happy
for the inhabitants of this metropolis, which has naturally
a great Influence on the country, that the same persons
who can make such a figure in profane learning, are in¬
trusted with the guidance of the people in their spiritual
concerns, which are of such superior, and Indeed of un¬
speakable importance. These illustrious examples, If any
thing, must make the infidel abashed of his vain cavils,
and put a stop to that torrent of vice, profaneness, and
immorality, by which the age is so unhappily distinguished.
This city can justly boast of other signal characters
of the same kind, whom learning and piety, taste and devo¬
tion, philosophy and faith, joined to the severest morals
and most irreproachable conduct, concur to embellish. One
in particular, with the same hand by which he turns over
the subline pages of Horner and Virgil, Demosthenes and
Cicero, is not ashamed to open with reverence the sacred
volumes; and with the same voice by which, from the
pulpit, he strikes vice with consternation, he deigns
to dictate to his pupils the most useful lessons of
Rhetoric, poetry, and polite literature.1
James Beattie is chiefly responsible for disturbing
the tranquillity of Hume's years of retirement in Edinburgh.
Beattie's pious friend Dr. John Gregory, Professor of Physics,
wrote from Edinburgh in 1766 informing him that "materialism
and atheism are the present fashion." In Gregory's alarming
reports of the encroachments of infidelity, Beattie is told
that "absolute dogmatic atheism is the present tone" and that
"a man who expresses belief in a future state of existence is
Quoted in Burton, op. cit., II, 1l70. For a detailed
discussion of the circumstances surroundng the episode of
Hume's suppressed review, see E. C. Mossner, "Hume as Literary
Patron: A Suppressed Review of Robert Henry's History of Great
Britain. 1773" in "odern Philology, XXXIX (I9I12), 361 -382.
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regarded as a fool or a hypocrite.""*" All this seems to be
attributed to the "licentious teaching" of David Hume. Con¬
sidering himself the best man to chasten offenders, Beattie
felt it his duty to defend orthodoxy against the malignant
scepticism of Hume, whose theories were a frequent subject of
debate at the Philosophical Society of Aberdeen. Diligently,
Beattie labored on the Essay on the Origin and Immutability of
Truth, which was expressly written to combat the position of
Hume and was expected to silence scoffers and convince
doubters. "The Professor was no philosopher; he knew nothing
of his subject till he began to teach it, and not much even
then; he disliked metaphysics, which he never could under¬
stand, and yet he essayed the task.
Unlike Hume's other "friendly Adversaries" at Aber¬
deen, who treated the philosopher with the respect due a
serious thinker, Beattie attempted to arouse the emotional
prejudice of his readers. By the use of abusive language,
Beattie hit the right tone for popular success, and the Essay
was received with great enthusiasm, especially in England.
"Seeing nothing of the constructive side of Hume's philosophy
of human nature and mistaking him for a complete sceptic,
anxious only to subvert Christianity, the age would have re¬
joiced to see him demolished by any means.Mossner declares
^Margaret Forbes, Beattie and His Friends, (London.
190Il), p. J±5.
^Graham, Men of Letters, p. 263.
^Mossner, The Life of David Hume, p. £8l.
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that "it was not until 1783 that his [Beattie's] flimsy pre¬
tensions to philosophy were fully exposed. Kant's irony may
be taken as the final word on James Seattle as a poet-turned-
philosopher."1
It is quite understandable that David Hume was gen¬
uinely angry. His reported exclamation about the Essay on
Truth — "Truth] there is no truth in it; it is a horrible
large lie in octavo"^ — caused Seattle to exult:
Mr. Hume's censure I am so far from being ashamed of, that
I think it does me honour. It is, next to his conversion
(which I have no reason to look for) the most desirable
thing I have to expect from that quarter. I have heard
from very good authority, that he speaks of me and my
book with very great bitterness (I own, I thought he
would rather have affected to treat both with contempt):
and that he says, I have not used him like a gentleman.
He is quite right to set the matter upon that footing.3
Early in his literary career Hume had determined
never to reply in print to any criticisms of his works. In
the main he maintained this long-standing resolution and did
not answer his opponents directly. In many respects this
was not a good practice, when made so absolute. Besides
leaving himself open to charges of arrogance and self-suffi¬
ciency, the measure deprived him of the chance to engage in
Ibid. "I should have thought that Hume had as good
a claim to sound sense as Seattle, and on top of this to some¬
thing that Seattle certainly did not possess, namely a criti¬
cal reason, which keeps common sense within limits, so that it
does not soar into speculation and lose itself, or if specu¬
lations alone are at Issue, does not try to decJ de anything,
not knowing how to justify itself concerning its own principles;
for only thus will It remain sound sense." [Kant, op. cit.,
PP. 3-9J
'-G-entlonan' s Magazine, XLVII (1777), l59n.
3
-v/illiam Forbes, op. cit. , p. 171.
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free and keen discussions with his critics. An answer to
such men as Thomas Reid would lilcely have done Hume himself
some good and might even have caused Reid to re-think much
of his own system. As it was, the common-sense philosopher
considered his criticisms of Hume as final, and the errors
of this interpretation of Hume's thought were perpetuated in
Reid's followers. Reid's supposedly successful refutation of
Hume led Seattle to attempt further criticism on the same
basis. Hume's resentment of the publication of the Essay on
Truth and of its subsequent popularity took the form of the
famous "Advertisement" to a final edition of his philosophi¬
cal works;
Most of the principles, and reasonings, contained in
this volume, were published in a work of three volttmes,
called A Treatise of Human Hature: A work which the author
had projected before he left College, and which he wrote
and published not long after. But not finding it success¬
ful, he was sensible of his error in going to the press
too early, and he cast the whole anew in the following
pieces, where some negligences in his former reasoning
and more in the expression are, he hopes corrected. Yet
several writers, who have honoured the Author's Philoso¬
phy with answers, have taken care to direct all their
batteries against that juvenile work, which the Author
never acknowledged, and have affected to triumph in any
advantage, which, they imagined, they had obtained over
it: A practice very contrary to all rules of candour and
fair dealing, and a strong instance of those polemical
artifices, which a bigotted zeal thinks itself authorized
to employ. Henceforth, the Author desires, that the
following pieces may alone be regarded as containing his
philosophical sentiments and principles.!
Hume evidently considered it futile to attempt to
discuss Beattie's misconceptions of the truth. Writing to
Strahan, Hume comments: ". . . this Advertisement ... is a
1G. G., III, 37-38.
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compleat Answer to Dr Reid and to that bigotted silly Fellow,
1
Seattle." Actually, it was no answer at all but rather the
petulant and weary confession of a man tired of controversy.
Hume despaired of ever being understood.
It can only be that the long and unhappy career of the
youthful Treatise from 1739 to 1775, reaching the climax
in the latest spate of abuse from Seattle, finally deter¬
mined Hume to make a public repudiation. Hapoily, few
philosophers have taken the "Advertisement" seriously;
and the Treatise of Human Nature, so needlessly and so
unsuccessfully maligned by its own author, is generally
and properly regarded as his masterpiece.2
In point of fact, Hume never really disavowed the philosophy
of the Treatise. Even in these years of extreme disappointment
and bitterness, he was planning to have the Dialogues issued
contemporaneously with the final edition of his works. He con¬
tinued to revise them and intended that they should be a com¬
plete response to the attacks of his opponents. In Hume's
estimation, the Dialogues were the careful and artistic expression
of the basic principles of his thought applied in the realm of
religion. He was anxious for the fate of this work until the
end, and only in the last year of his life was it known by his
close friends and relatives that special provisions for the
publication of the Dialogues had been made in his will.
As a man who held "unorthodox" views on religion and
immortality, Hume no doubt realized that the manner of his
death would be of public interest. He determined to die
philosophically, true to the principles expressed in his books.
-'•Letters. II, 301.
%Iossner, The Life of David Hume, p. 532.
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In "My Own Life" he declares:
I now reckon upon a speedy Dissolution. I have suffered
ver:/ little pain from my Disorder; and what is more
strange, have, notwithstanding the great Decline of my
Person, never suffered a Moments Abatement of my Spirits:
Insomuch, that were I to name the Period of my Life which
I shoud most choose to pass over again I might be tempted
to point to this later Period. I possess the same Ardor
as ever in Study, and the same Gaiety in Company. I
consider besides, that a Man of sixty five, by dying,_
cuts off only a few Years of Infirmities: And though I
see many Symptoms of my literary Reputation's breaking
out at last with additional Lustre, I know, that I had
but few Years to enjoy it. It is difficult to be more
detached from Life than I am at present.^
Hume's opinions remained imperturbable in the face of
the questioning of James Boswell, who was determined to find
out whether the philosopher—having death before his eyes—
O
could still solemnly declare his disbelief in immortality.
Hume persisted in his agnosticism and gave reasons for his
position much the same as those expressed in the suppressed
essay on immortality. He asserted that the thought of complete
annihilation gave him no more uneasiness than the thought that
he had once not existed. The interview gives the impression
that Hume may have been amusing himself at Boswell1s expense.
But there is no reason to believe that he was not expressing
his personal beliefs on the subject of immortality. At any
rate, his statements are in line with his often expressed con¬
viction that it is impossible to base religious belief on reason.
As for his own intimate faith Hume obviously lacked the trust
and devotion characteristic of a truly religious individual.
^Letters, I, 7.
2See Boswell, Private Papers. XII, 225-232.
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Concluding Comments
'."/lien Hume saw the end of life approaching, he made cer¬
tain by special provisions in his will that the Dialogues would
be published as the expression of his ideas on religion. In a
sense, then, the work is an attempt to placate his age by means
of an explication of his true religious position. By the year
175&- Hume had finished the historical treatment of religion in
the "Natural History of Religion" but he spent several more
years on the philosophical aspects of the subject. The Dialogues
were his last philosophical endeavor, and from various letters
between Hume and his friends as well as from the fact that he
took the utmost pains for its publication, we know that this work
was highly esteemed by its author*
The Dialogues were carefully prepared and written and
contain some of Hume's most explicit statements on religion.
The work has become a philosophical classic, widely discussed
and variously interpreted. It would not be possible within the
confines of this thesis to analyze the discussion of the Dialogues
and such a study is unnecessary-here. What we intend to do
is to note the outstanding characteristics of the argument as
they have a beaming on Hume's attitude towards religion.
It Is difficult to make a proper estimate of this con¬
tribution of Hume to the philosophy of theology. He seems
to purposely veil his true opinions by Introducing three inter¬
locutors—Demea, Cleanthes and Philo--and by putting something
of his own beliefs into the mouth of each.-5- Possibly he intended
-fSee Mossner's discussion on the identity of these
three characters. [["The Enigma of Hume.'J
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to show by the general nature of the discussion how difficult
it is to argue about religion on a rational basis. Or perhaps
he allowed his own opinions to remain in doubt because this
was actually where he found himself in the religious sphere,
i.e., in the position of an agnostic. At any rate, the teach¬
ing of the Dialogues is predominately negative and leaves only
a few minor religious arguments by which the believer may
support his faith."*" Hie reason for this negativism is that
Hume uses scepticism to show the futility of trying to prove
the validity of religious beliefs by rationalism. He felt
that an important service was to be rendered to the cause of
religion by unreserved critical handling of the difficulties
which beset man's attempts to apply the theistic conception
in the midst of finite relations.
Hie Dialogues are a plain, painstaking attempt to
discover what reasoned foundation, if any, could be allowed
for religion. In other words, the chief question is--"Can
there be a natural theology?" Hume v^as Interested in deter¬
mining whether our natural faculties, employing the data of
experience, are or are not capable of establishing the truth
of theism. He discussed Cod and the relation of God to the
natural world. In this respect he dealt with natural theology
in a restricted and literal sense. His study was limited in
■*"In a careful study of the original manuscripts and
of the revisions and additions which Hume made, Kemp Smith
concludes that "the teaching of the Dialogues is much more sheer-
ly negative than has generally been held. This statement is
corroborated by evidence from Hume's letters and the "Natural
History of Religion." See Kemp Smith, Introduction to the
Dialogues.
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that man was not brought into the picture and thus such prob¬
lems as freedom and immortality were ignored. Hume was still
viewing religion from the standpoint of a purely external
observer.
The professed subject of debate in the Dialogues is
the nature of God, all three speakers having agreed to take
1
the being of God as certain. The discussion centers on a
statement and criticism of the teleological argument, theism's
most cogent proof for the intelligence of the ultimate cause
of the universe. The question arises as to whether the argu¬
ment from design, as an argument from analogy, can allow of
being formulated in a tenable manner. Hume had placed limi¬
tations upon the argument in Section XI of the Enquiry Concern¬
ing the Human Understanding and in the "Natural History of Reli¬
gion." It is qualified even further in the Dialogues as he
comes to the agnostic conclusion that God's nature, attributes
and plan of providence in the world are obscure, doubtful and
uncertain. Thus, although Hume all along allows for some valid¬
ity of the argument, we now see that it does not give us much
knowledge about the God who exists. The argument from design
may reach a conception of God that is lofty, yet it can never
attain to the conception of an Infinite. The finite world, with
all its defects and abounding misery in the midst of its order
and adaptation, can never lead us to an inference of an infinite,
perfect, all-powerful, all-wise and benevolent deity.
Himne contends that although the argument from design
1D, 128; Ikl.
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pxxrports to be an argument from experience, it is unable to
point to any circumstance which would be incompatible with
quite different hypotheses about the way things come into
being. He indicates the inadequacy of the teleological proof
when taken by itself and in isolation from the demands of the
moral nature. The argument cannot show that anything whatso¬
ever would be different were the world not designed. Herein
lies the proof of its emptiness. The difficulty with which
we are faced in this essentially negative conclusion represents
for Hume the crux of the theological situation. The argument
from design is the "religious hypothesis" par excellence; yet
it is not defensible on the basis of reason or experience.
In accordance with his general distrvist of rationalism,
Hume again repudiates Deism with its insistence upon natural
religion. He claims such a system is not capable of attaining,
by reason, that certainty which its supporters believed. The
ultimate cause of the universe—theology's one great postulate--
lies beyond the sphere of reason. Thus, the last support of
the "religious hypothesis"--the argument from design— is
wrested from the hands of the Deists. Hume contends that a
rationalistic study of nature cannot prove the dogmas of reli¬
gion—reason is not equal to the task of uroof. Since there
is no corroborative evidence from natxxre (sensative realm) for
religious entities (transcendent realm), the natural theology
of Deism is bankrupt. One single effect or artifact (the uni¬
verse) makes it virtually impossible to argue by analogy to
one cause or one artificer. It is precarious to argue in such
3ia
cases since the solar- system is a rare, unique object and we
do not have a range of possible worlds, nor the possibility
of bringing about another world.
The Dialogues confirm Hume's basic principles express¬
ed in his other works. He at no time abandoned his original
plan (expressed in the Treatise) of developing a complete
system of the sciences based on the science of human nature.
In the Dialogues he expounds and develops his seepticism and
logic (the main principles of which had been firmly established
in the Treatise) in opposition to what he considers false
theology. Mossner describes the book in the following terms:
It shows that Hume rejects all attempts to base religion
upon metaphysics. It shows further that a religion based
upon matters of fact and scientific method still finds it
difficult to rise beyond human nature and the world of
nature into the realm of the supernatural.
Rationalism in religion is destroyed by Hume's negative specu¬
lation but a possibility remains for establishing a religion
based on natural belief. This is analogous to his contention
that it is instinct or natural belief which determines our ac¬
tion in the moral sphere. Man is bound to think, or infer,
a purposive Being as the meaning and cause of the universe.
This natural judgment holds whatever be its defects in logic
or method.
In the Dialogues Hume allows for and appears to have
personally held a belief in the existence of an intellectual
Deity, having some dim analogy to human intelligence. But he
distinctly refuses to predicate anything more regarding it, or
^"Mossner, The Life of David Hume, p. 606.
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of its relations to the universe, especially as to its moral
character. This conclusion leaves the reader with a vague and
shadowy type of theistic religion. Nevertheless, it is not
atheism. For Hume it was seemingly just as impossible to rest
in religious scepticism, as to remain in scepticism about the
existence of an external world. According to him atheism is
largely a term of abuse, and disputes between atheists and
believers are largely verbal since a suspension of judgment
is impossible. By our very nature vie must believe and make
judgments.
The Dialogues show that the questions which theism
raises are outside the sphere of human reason. The position
reached here is a logical development of the principles of the
Treatise. The a priori proofs of theism are effectively criti¬
cized. The pure being reached by these proofs, if valid, is a
mere abstraction of the intellect, a speculative dogma, remote
from practice. Likewise, Hume acutely shows the limitations
of the a •posteriori proofs. The only intelligible defense of
the religious hypothesis, he concludes, is its utility--its
possible impact on morals.
The closing paragraphs of the Dialogues call us away
from the speculations of pure theology to the practical appli¬
cation of divine truth in life. Through the mcuth of philo
come Hume's last words on religion added to the Dialogues in
the final revision of 177&:
If the whole of natural theology, as some people seem
to maintain, resolves itself into one simple, though some¬
what ambiguous, at least -undefined proposition, that the
3h-3
cause or causes of order in the universe "Probably bear
some remote analogy to human intelligence: If this propo¬
sition be not capable of extension, variation, or more
particular explication: If it afford no Inference that
affects human life, or can be the source of any action
or forbearance: And if the analogy, imperfect as it is,
can be carried no farther than to the human intelligence;
and cannot be transferred, with any appearance of probabil¬
ity, to the other qualities of the mind: If this really be
the case, what can the most inquisitive, contemplative,
and religious man do more than give a plain, philosophical
assent to the proposition, as often as it occurs; and be¬
lieve that the arguments, on which it is established, ex¬
ceed the objections which lie against it? Some astonish¬
ment indeed will naturally arise from the greatness of the
object: Some melancholy from its obscurity: Some con¬
tempt of human reason, that it can give no solution more
satisfactory with regard to so extraordinary and magnifi¬
cent a question. But believe me, CLEAHTHBS, the most
natural sentiment, which a well-disposed mind will feel
on this occasion, is a longing desire and expectation,
that Pleaven would be pleased to dissipate, at least
alleviate, this profound ignorance, by affording some more
particular revelation to mankind, and making discoveries
of the nature, attributes, and operations of the divine
object of our Faith. A person, seasoned with a just sense
of the imperfections of natural reason, will fly to re¬
vealed truth with the greatest avidity: While the haughty
dogmatist, persuaded that he can erect a complete system
of theology by the mere help of philosophy, disdains any
farther aid, and rejects this adventitious instructor.
To be a philosophical sceptic is, in a man of letters, the
first and most essential step towards being a sound be¬
lieving Christian. . . .-*•
From the preceding study of the life and works of
David Hume we arrive at the following conclusions regarding
his attitude towards religion. There is no doubt that religion
and the evidence for and against it, was one of the dominant
interests of Hume's life. He was diligently occupied, indeed
pre-occupied, with theological arguments. Experimental theism--
its presuppositions, its relations to morality, and to the
state, its hostility to bigotry and to superstition--comprised
one of the major problems that wa3 seldom quiescent in his mind.
1D, 227-228.
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His speculations led him from questioning the validity of theo¬
logical doctrines into an evaluation of the whole problem of
religion.
The principal aim of Hume's "experimental" philosophy
was to justify natural as opposed to rationalistic belief,
thus providing an adequate basis for the sciences, and more
especially, for the more "human" among the sciences. Judged
by rationalistic canons, no matter of fact could be established;
scenticism wins out in the end. But there is a natural belief
*
*
upon which we can build our knowledge. Hume suggested that
beliefs that flow in upon us with the force of sensation are
as good as sensation itself. It was this emphasis on belief
which attracted the "Faith Philosophers" of Germany, and they
used the positive doctrines of Hume's philosophy in the refuta¬
tion of the "intellectual" position of Kant. Because of his
insistence on the primacy of "feeling" in all spheres of human
activity, Hume was naturally the philosopher to whom the faith
school referred. Hamann and Herder attached great importance
to his doctrine of natural belief and regarded him as an advo¬
cate of faith philosophy. In many respects this interpretation
of Hume was nearer the truth than the common view that Hume was
"for science and against religion."
Hume was overjoyed by his discovery concerning the
role of natural belief in knowledge and as an exemplar of the
Age of Enlightenment, he exulted on the title-page of the
Treatise: "Kara temporum felicitas, ubi sentiri, quae veils;
& quae sentias, dicere licet." At this time he ha d not
3^5
explicitly expressed his views on religion. Subsequently,
he came to realize that he had misjudged the felicity of the
age—the vaunted liberty of the press was not fully extended
to religious speculation. Hume's life was a constant struggle
against the inertia of ideas and the forces of superstition
and intolerance.
Hume wrote as a builder of the science of human nature
and it was as such that he encouraged in men the hope of the
successful extension of scientific progress to human nature
itself. He hoped to find a reasoned, definitive and accurate
answer to all problems—religious, moral, social, and political.
Hume regarded his first task to be an emancipation of his fellow-
men from error and delusion. Although he destroyed the old
theology and metaphysics by his questioning concerning the
ground of causal reasoning, tie constructed a "new medium of
truth," justifying a faith in the sciences he himself claimed
to advance. His attitude towards religion parallels that to¬
wards science. Faith or belief, whether in science or theology,
is not a matter of reason. It is an instinct or emotion or
whatever one might call that realm v/hich lies more or less out¬
side our "rational" processes. Reason is limited in its
application; rationalism and a rationalistic basis is denied
for science as well as religion.
Hume was not a Christian. He regarded Christian be¬
liefs as in the main a malign influence. Doubtlessly, he reason¬
ed this way because Christianity was not presented to him as
a religion of love, but as a religion of fear. Its ethics
3l}.6
was an ethics of fear. Hume reacted against the hell-fire
Calvinism of the early Presbyterian Church in which he was
brought up. He criticized the crude Calvinistic dogma for
overlooking the importance of the ordinary virtues ana for
neglecting them in order to concentrate attention upon salva¬
tion. Calvinism in Hume's mind served as an example of false
religion with consequences pernicious in society and utterly
demoralizing in the individual. Yet he never denied the
existence of God, nor did he directly impugn revelation. And
although his final word on the subject of religion suggests
doubt and uncertainty, he nonetheless allows for the possibility
of substituting a true religion for the false. The concept
of true religion found in Hume's writings is that according to
which we assent to the existence of God, and for the rest give
our energies to the practice of morality. Religion should
limit itself to reinforcing moral sanctions. The more we
adhere to this "true religion" the more we abhor both the
vulgar superstitions that have caused so many miseries in human
history and those divines who inculcate and preach them.
Religion, zealously held, is very detrimental to the welfare
of the individual as well as to the state.
The main interest of Hume's work on theology was not
to combat religion or Christianity as such but rather to des¬
troy that type of thinking which was based on fanatical dog¬
matism, superstitious sentimentalism or the rationalistic,
demonstrative systems established by the Cartesians. He strongly
opposed a "rigid inflexible orthodoxy" which was content to
3k7
accept its first principles without factual investigations,
and from then to deduce a conclusion as demonstrably certain
as the proposition that the sum of the three angles of a tri¬
angle is equal to two right angles. "Hume attacks not theism,
but superstition and idolatry; he questions not the existence
of God but only the mistaken arguments for such existence, and
the unworthy modes of conception in which they result."^"
It was Hume's opinion that religion develops from
the elements of human nature rather than out of an intricate
process of reasoning on the part of man. We are not to appeal
to reason in religious matters; religion must be based on
natural belief. In this way, the difficulty which reason finds
in establishing the nature of the Deity does not affect the
foundation of religion in our human nature.
Throughout his life Hume remained consistently scepti¬
cal of all traditional forms of religion; he had no sympathy
for popular religion. He was fundamentally the sceptic bring¬
ing to a close, at least so far as philosophy was concerned,
the Age of Reason in Great Britain. Being in philosophy a
sceptic, Hume was regarded as a sceptic In religion. "Hume
the Atheist" was a common designation in his own day and per¬
sists even now. Accordingly he was resisted and condemned as
an enemy of religion. This antagonism fretted his life and
often seriously embittered Hume towards religion and clergy¬
men. But he did not deprecate religious faith. His scepticism
in religion applied to that theology which attempted to bring
1Kemp Smith, Introduction to the Dialogues, p. 37.
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reason into the religious sphere. Since the knowledge of God
cannot come through the senses, religion must be exclusively
a matter of belief.
The conception of true religion which Hume seems to
have held was an assent to the existence of God and for the
rest we are to give our energies to the practice of morality.
Religion is for Hume, in the first place, a simple faith and,
secondly, a mile of conduct in the present life. It has very
limited knowledge of God derived by reason working in the
realm of experience. Hume believed in the existence of an
intelligent First Cause who set the universe in motion and
placed it under the dominion of natural laws. But it is not
possible to prove the existence of this Cause or to establish
relations with it. Human affairs are not in any way directly
influenced by the Deity. The practicalness of Hume's mind
circumscribed and limited his experience and prevented him
from sympathizing with the devotional aspects of religion.
He saw very little value in acts of worship whether they were
conducive to ethical behavior in the worshipper or not. Such
ideas appeared to him to be enthusiasm and fanaticism. This
was a serious limitation in Hume's view and largely accounts
for his misunderstanding of the religious experience. Hume
was not a religious man; consequently, the only questions on
which he was qualified to speak were matters of doctrine in
respect of their validity. He used as a test of this validity
the tendency of doctrines to promote or discourage moral be¬
havior. Conduct is made the final test of value and stress
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is laid on the "moral" benefits which religion contributes
to the experience of men.
The position which Hume advocated in religion contains
implications which cannot be ignored. He made criticisms of
theology which are relevent for present day theological systems.
By means of Hume's criticisms considerable benefit was conferred
on religious thought. In shaking the theologian's confidence
in the authority of human reason and exposing its unreliable-
ness as the sole instrument of knowledge, Hume rendered a ser¬
vice to religion. Belief and faith were given a place of promi¬
nence. By attacking the rationalistic attempt to prove religion
by miracles, Hume compelled the Church to re-examine her lines
of defence and to adopt other methods of apologetics. He
pointed out the error of trying to make religion rely oil ex¬
ternal credentials. It must have an intrinsic value; its
validity cannot be established by a reasoned appeal to inerrant
and infallible books, nor by an attempt to prove rationally the
miraculous origin of the faith. Due to Hume's arguments theo¬
logians found it necessary to make their appeal for Christian¬
ity by pointing to what it does for man. Religion came to be
judged in terms of its contributions to the moral and material
improvement of the world. These fruitful suggestions came from
a reading of Hume even though his criticism of traditional
religious views caused him to be regarded as an atheist. In
the light of his positive contribution to philosophy a re-
interpretation of Hume's attitude towards religion should reveal
some additional insights Into the present day problems of
theology.
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